Imagine yourself in Ottawa, surrounded by thousands of vibrant tulips, and discovering your new favorite microbrew before cycling along scenic bike paths and wandering through a museum in awe. Adventure awaits in Ottawa from oh to ah. Plan your getaway at ottawatourism.ca Hey there, it's Stephen Dubner. Before we start, I would like to tell you about our new membership program.
It is called Freakonomics Radio Plus. If you are a member, you get an exclusive bonus episode every week, and you can listen to all our shows without ads. To learn more about Freakonomics Radio Plus, search for Freakonomics Radio on Apple Podcasts. In early August this year, on a Monday morning, the National Weather Service issued a warning of high winds in Maui County, Hawaii.
By the next morning, the wind was gusting at over 70 miles an hour. Here's how one resident described it. Tiles were getting ripped off roofs, leaving exposed rooftops with bare wood everywhere. Power lines were like spaghetti strings everywhere.
The islands started to lose electricity, and near the town of Lahaina, there was a brush fire. Firefighters arrived, and it was soon declared contained. But later that day, the high winds caused a flare-up. We could see the smoke, and all of a sudden, oh my gosh, the quickness with which it happened was the craziest part.
It was just so fast. What happened next, you have probably read about or seen in horrifying videos and news coverage. The town of Lahaina was swallowed by fire. People tried to flee in their cars, but the roads were clogged.
Some people jumped in the ocean to escape. Here is one survivor. We were in the ocean for like eight hours, fighting the water, getting pulled out, flames were hitting you still. Things were falling from the palm tree on fire on you.
At least 97 people died. About a dozen are still missing. More than 2,000 buildings were destroyed, most of them homes. We're mad.
We're mad. We didn't just lose our homes. We lost our town. We lost history, you know?
Our kids are traumatized. You guys messed up real bad. Who messed up real bad? That is the kind of question that some people make it their business to find out.
In my work, failure is fatal. Ed Galea is Director of the Fire Safety Engineering Group at the University of Greenwich in London. He got his PhD in astrophysics. I was modeling how stars are born and how they die.
But it so happens that the mathematics that I used to develop these models of stars are very similar to the mathematics that we need to simulate how fire spreads in structures. Galea studies how people react to disasters. For example, the World Trade Center evacuation in 9-11, the Dusseldorf Airport fire, the Grenfell Tower fire. It's not just fire where a lot of this is relevant.
If we look at marauding armed shooters, we also study those situations. The recent event in South Korea where there were a number of young people crushed to death in a narrow street is another example. It's always distressing to look at a new event, especially events that were predictable and preventable. Wait a minute.
Events that were predictable and preventable, like marauding armed shooters or that crowd crush on Halloween in Seoul, South Korea, where more than 150 young people were killed? Don't events like these happen because they weren't predictable and preventable? We tend to use the word tragedy to describe all kinds of terrible events, but would you call a tragedy that was predictable and preventable? You call that a failure.
At least Ed Galea does. Consider the nearly 100 people who died by fire in Lahaina. One of the key issues in managing wildfire situations is managing the evacuation. When do you start the evacuation?
How do you inform the public as to the need to evacuate? Hawaii has a robust emergency warning system, although it is most famous for having falsely notified the entire state of an impending missile strike in 2018. But the system appears to have failed during the wildfires. This is from an NBC News interview with a survivor.
Did you hear any alarms? Did you get any kind of warning? No alarms, no warning, nothing. No sign, nothing that we had to evacuate.
Ed Galea says it's too early to know everything that went wrong in Hawaii, but it's clear that the evacuation was a failure and therefore preventable. Because, as Galea likes to say, a failure is not just about the tragic moment. It's a chain of events. Failure to notify people early enough.
Failure for the people to respond to the call. Failure for the people to have a plan as to what they're going to do during an evacuation. Okay, can we agree on that? That a failure, any kind of failure, is a chain of events.
There can be any number of causes and any number of consequences, too. Embarrassment, shame, anger, pain, financial loss, the loss of reputation, the loss of life. There are public failures and private failures, each of them costly in their own ways. And, of course, there is the fear of failure and the fear of being seen having failed.
This means that sometimes we don't even try. And what's the cost of that? Or we try to hide our failures, which means denying everyone else what might have been a helpful example. You might think that as long as we humans have been failing, that by now we would be very good at managing it and learning from it.
But my argument today is that we are not. Most of us don't think about failure as a chain of events. Most of us get angry or frustrated and we go looking for someone to blame. Consider what happens when a hospital patient is given the wrong drug.
The natural tendency is just to look at what they call in hospitals the sharp end, the last person, the person at the bedside who administered that drug. But in fact, the chain of events goes back to the pharmacy and even to the IT folks who printed the label in a weird way. That is Amy Edmondson, another failure expert. She's at the Harvard Business School.
And her research focuses on failure in organizations, which is not uncommon. Many times you have failures in organizations simply because one silo doesn't know what the other silo is doing. So these are learning events. One big reason we don't learn enough from failures is that we don't share them systematically enough.
Okay, so let's get systematic. Failure is something that has long intrigued me. And so I hope you don't mind. We are making a series on the topic.
We'll call it How to Succeed at Failing. I suspect that you are also intrigued by failure. A while back when we asked listeners to send us their failure stories, we got many replies. There were stories about failure in the business world.
What happened to Enron, what happened to WeWork. We heard about failures of government policy. Detroit's failures are interesting because it's also a failure of planning. Failed relationships, of course.
Well, I actually don't think that they're a failure, but that's for different Darwinian reasons. There are failures of imagination. You've prepared for problems A, B, C, D, E, and F, and something like M comes out of the blue and smacks you. Failures of determination.
Part of my problem was I did not ask enough questions. And failures that cut deep. I think that was my tipping point where I just went, I'm done. And it broke me.
You will hear those stories and you'll also hear about better ways to think about failure and learn from it. I once had a wise teacher and he had a wise teacher and she had a wise teacher and that teacher had a mantra. It went like this. Be bad.
Don't be boring. I should say these were acting teachers, but I think the lesson applies anywhere. The idea is that when you're trying to create something or accomplish something, it's tempting to stick to the boring, the tried and true, the riskless path. That's how much we fear failing.
But the point of the mantra is that it's better to take a chance, to risk being bad, because that's the only way you'll actually make something good. Our special series, How to Succeed at Failing, gets started right now. This is Freakonomics Radio, the podcast that explores the hidden side of everything with your host, Stephen Dubner. If we could just talk about your path to this moment, this place.
How did you become a scholar of failure, if I may be so bold as to call you so? I'm very happy to be called that. It seems like an upgrade. I became a scholar of failure because I wanted to be a scholar of organizational learning.
So I came to graduate school with the idea, unformed, that organizations need to keep changing to stay relevant in a world that keeps changing. And they didn't seem to be very good at it. That, again, is the organizational psychologist Amy Edmondson. She recently published a book called Right Kind of Wrong, The Science of Failing Well.
She understands this is a hard sell. I haven't met anyone who feels really good about failure, myself included. You have to force yourself to feel good about failure. And why do you think that is?
I think it's our upbringing, right? By the time you're in elementary school, there's such a strong emphasis on getting the right answer or succeeding, not failing. And so we're not trained very well in the whole idea of uncertainty or novelty. You write that there are three reasons why most of us fail at failure, aversion, confusion, and fear.
I'd like you to walk us through each of those and say how they contribute to failure. Sure. I think of them as emotional, cognitive, and social. So emotionally, we're just spontaneously averse to failure, right?
I don't like it. I don't want to have it. I don't want to look at it I think they tend to be cliches. And my negative reaction to them is it's pretending that we should learn to enjoy failure.
And I don't think we should enjoy failure. I think failure needs to burn on us. When I talk to people, I want to find out if they're experts. One of the things I ask them is, can you tell me about the last mistake you made?
And some people, a surprising number of people, say, I can't think of any mistakes. But the people I think are the real experts, they can tell you because those mistakes have been bothering them for the last couple of weeks. But many of the failures that I read about in the academic literature on leadership and management, most of them have a happy ending. You know, we got through all that failure on the way to our great triumph.
What do you think of that type of narrative being so dominant? Does it hide too many failures at end in failure? I think it does. I think the failure stories tend not to be advertised as well.
People who had those stories aren't in a position to go on a lecture circuit or write books. Would the world be better if we had a broader acceptance of, or at least less fear, of discussing failure? I think it would, but we don't want to discourage entrepreneurs from trying things out, even though the chances of success are so low. It's not a good gamble for the entrepreneurs, but it's good for our society.
Let's step back for a minute and acknowledge this fact. The way we see failure has changed over the centuries. It also varies greatly across individuals and across cultures. The ancient Greeks, for instance, hated and feared failure, but they largely attributed it to the whims of the gods.
The ancient Romans, meanwhile, attributed failure, particularly on the battlefield, to human error. Failure was considered shameful, often the grounds for suicide. And think about the Christian concept of original sin. You are born with failure in your soul.
I asked Gary Klein for a modern definition of failure, at least his modern definition. Failure is an inability to accomplish important goals that you have set out for yourself. Okay, that's one definition, maybe a bit narrow. I asked Amy Edmondson for her take.
I want to be broad. Let's start broad. Like a failure is something undesired that happens. And a failure-free life is not a possibility.
One way to think about this is, we will be failing. So, let's do it joyfully. Let's do it thoughtfully and celebrate them appropriately. Okay, so we're starting to see why failure is tricky.
Two failure experts, two very different definitions. There are people who say, we should learn to enjoy failure and use failure and not respond negatively to it. I don't agree with that. I think it needs to be a negative emotionally.
The value of failure is it forces us to re-examine our assumptions and to revise our concepts of how things work or can fall apart. I've seen the argument that a lot of failure is hushed up because A, people are embarrassed or ashamed, perhaps, but also B, they're eager to move on to something that's not a failure. And that that hushing up can have a big downside, which is that people don't know what that failure was. The data aren't necessarily published or released.
And therefore, it can waste an awful lot of time by an awful lot of smart, motivated people if they don't know what path produced failure. What are your thoughts on that? I think that's exactly accurate. That in many organizations, people don't want to admit their own failures because it will reflect poorly on them.
And they don't want to call out their colleagues because that's going to disrupt the harmony. And so they avoid it or they just find some ways to redirect the focus of the team in another direction so they don't have to confront how this failed and why it failed. So when you're in the realm of decision making, you're working with a lot of people, I assume, who come from different disciplines. They might be from management, from engineering and so on.
But with a background in cognitive psychology, I'm wondering, Gary, if you feel the way you do about failure in part because of an evolutionary explanation. In other words, does failure need to burn at us for the simple reason that we won't progress as a tribe, as a civilization, if it doesn't burn at us? That feels right. I would accept that analysis.
So if someone were to ask you, what's the correct way or the most productive way to think about failure generally? Do you have an answer for that? I don't have a good answer. I'll tell you what I do.
What I do is I become discouraged and depressed for a couple of days. And I say, I never want to do any of that again. And I just I don't totally repress it, but I wish I could repress it. And then eventually, after a couple of days, almost always, I realize, you know, if I had done that or if we had arranged that differently, that could have been really exciting.
And now I can't wait to do it again. So that's how a couple of psychologists think about failure, especially personal failures and failure in organizations. Let's slide over to thinking about failures in the economy. How might an economist think about failure?
I think it's extraordinarily important. John Van Rienen is a professor at the London School of Economics. He studies innovation or as Amy Edmondson calls it, innovation, blah, blah, blah. I think that when you do what we do in research, you recognize the fact that most ideas you have are not going to work.
There's a risk of being paralyzed by that. But the way to approach that is to say, well, let's just try them out. In a way, the whole market economy is like an experimentation machine. Loads of companies fail, but the ones who do come up with things which people want to buy or come up with new ideas are the ones who can be successful.
So I think that notion of embracing failure is very important. Van Rienen is particularly interested in failure because of a puzzle that economists are trying to solve. Why has there been, over the past couple of decades, a decline in innovation and productivity in advanced economies like the UK and the US? If you look over the last 20, 25 years, the fraction of jobs in new firms has actually declined in the US.
The degree of entrepreneurship has been going down. Van Rienen thinks this may have to do with a decreased appetite for risk. One of the reasons for people being risk averse is the worry about failure, because if you fail, it makes it look like maybe you were incompetent or doing the wrong thing. There is a set of mantras from Silicon Valley about fail fast and the success of failure and so on.
But in most places in the world, people don't really believe in that. Failure is seen as an embarrassment, a shameful thing, a thing we don't talk about and therefore a thing we don't learn about. So do you have any advice for changing mindsets about failure? Well, I think, yes.
America is a bit like this compared to Europe. It's like, you know, it's best to try and fail than never to have tried at all. So the rewards for actually trying something, even if it doesn't work out, that is part of a kind of cultural change that I think is very beneficial. I just want to make sure I understood that right.
You were saying that America does lead the world in failure. In trying and in success. I think that's probably true in failure and in success compared to say Europe. I think there's a much stronger Amazon entrepreneurship.
If you think of the bankruptcy laws, for example, a more generous approach in Chapter 11 to saying, oh, things went wrong. It's not necessarily your fault. In many parts of Europe historically, it's like if you're bankrupt, you're not allowed to run another business for another 15 years. That reflects this feeling that it's always your fault if things went wrong.
Are you saying that that relatively high rate of success is due in some part to a particularly American embrace or at least ability to withstand failure? I think it is. I think that's part of the historically at greater levels of entrepreneurship in the United States and in Europe is related to that greater tolerance of things go wrong. It's not such a great shame as it would be in Europe.
And that creates more success when you think about the superstar firms in the digital sector. The Googles, the Facebooks, and everything else. You don't see many of those in Europe or any parts of the world, maybe apart from China. So there is something about the culture of America.
I've seen this having lived both in America and in Europe. There is a greater openness to trying new things out, even if at the end of the day they don't work out. Okay, to summarize John Van Rienen's economic view, the United States is a hotbed of failure. And that's a good thing.
But he is talking about failed business ideas. How about failed relationships? I ended up finding that romantic love is an addiction. That's coming up after the break.
I'm Stephen Dubner. This is Freakonomics Radio. And you are listening to How to Succeed at Failing. Most of the academic literature on failure is devoted to institutional and business failures.
And that makes sense. That's where the money is. But let's consider another kind of failure, one that is typically the province of poets and occasionally a brave academic researcher. Well, nobody gets out of love alive.
We all know that. But we go on. That is Helen Fisher. I'm a biological anthropologist at the Kinsey Institute.
And I write books on love. Fisher is also chief science advisor for the dating site Match.com. Over the years, she has learned a great deal about why people start relationships and what happens when they fail. People are going to break up for very different kinds of reasons.
But the brain just knows that you've been abandoned. And of course, Our work-life balance realm are utterly subjective. We are societally very likely to see it differently based on gender, based on mother or father, and we know this, right? Something that is seen as a success, you know, or successful or appropriate or positive behavior for a father can be coded very differently for a mother.
When we asked listeners to submit their failure stories, one thing that jolted us was that probably 90% of the responses were from men. Ultimately, we went back with another call-out for stories from women because we just had so few. But it really made me wonder about how failure is perceived and perhaps discussed differently for men and women. We don't have what you would call scientific evidence.
I have plenty of anecdotal evidence in the classroom and also a theory. Okay, let's have it. So this is the unequal license to fail, and that can make, and I think does make, women more risk-averse, you know, in boardrooms and classrooms alike. In my classroom, I have noticed over the years that women are substantially less likely to raise their hand with a mediocre comment.
They put their own threshold higher. And I think of a classroom, and I try to convey this very clearly to my students as a laboratory, right, as a place where here's where we can make mistakes so we don't make them out there. The whole point of a classroom is to take risks to get things wrong along the way to getting them right. Now, I understand it is a very social context and they want to be seen well in the eyes of others.
But consistently, women act as if they're more risk-averse. They don't raise their hand, and then they'll tell me that in my office too, that they don't want to raise their hand unless they know it's a really good comment. And men seem to be less inhibited. After the break, a more serious classroom failure, one of those chain of events tragedies.
He had the gun in his backpack. I'm Stephen Dubner. This is Freakonomics Radio. We'll be right back.
Earlier, we talked with the economist John Van Rynen about failure in the context of innovation, the idea that a certain amount of failure just goes with the territory and a tolerance for failure may be a precondition for success. But there are some cases in which any failure is unacceptable. If you remember our series on airline travel, you know how safe it is to fly these days. That's because the industry and its regulators decided to collaborate in order to reduce commercial airline crashes to zero.
And so today, as the CEO of Delta Airlines told us... It's safer than riding a bike, safer than driving a car, safer than crossing the street. There are other places where you might think there would be zero tolerance for failure. It's very popular for organizations to describe themselves as learning cultures.
We're going to experiment and we're going to try, but school safety can't be a learning culture because the consequences of a failure are too serious. That is David Riedman. I'm the founder of the K-12 School Shooting Database, and I'm the only person that records every shooting at a school in the United States. Riedman is getting a PhD in criminal justice at the University of Central Florida, but he is not one of those PhD candidates who went straight from college.
He grew up in Maryland, just outside of Washington, D.C., and went to nearby Georgetown to study literature. What happened in the middle of college is I had been a volunteer in the fire department since I was 16 years old. And when Hurricane Katrina happened, I felt that I couldn't be sitting in a classroom amid this national disaster. So I took a leave of absence and I began working as a reservist for FEMA and I worked on disaster recovery and response on New Orleans.
And that really started my career in emergency management, which then progressed into homeland security and intelligence. I worked in various roles on the contractor side in just about every capacity from science and technology through emergency planning, through intelligence analysis, monitoring watch centers. I'm really a homeland security generalist. If you had to sum up David Riedman's central motivation, it might be this protecting innocent people from terrible things.
And ultimately that led me to the Naval Postgraduate School where this school shooting database project started. For years, Riedman ran the school shooting database out of his bedroom. It will soon become part of the Violence Prevention Project Research Center at Hamlin University in St. Paul, Minnesota.
By now, Riedman has recorded every school shooting in the U.S. since 1966, more than 2600 incidents and 1000 deaths. The database is not just a date and a link. Each incident is carefully set up with standardized continuous or categorical variables.
There are more than 200 different variables about the who, what, where, when and how, but also information about the location, about the situation, the shooter, the victims, the weapons used, and then lots of pieces that add extra context within the school day. You know, where in the school building did it occur during what period of the school day, morning classes, lunch? Why does Riedman care about all these details? This goes back to what Ed Galea, the astrophysicist turned disaster scholar, told us that most tragedies come at the end of a chain of events.
For David Riedman, assembling that chain takes a lot of time. Oh, easily 40 hours a week. I get about 30 Google alerts every morning at 7 a.m. And the first 90 minutes to two hours of my day are going through those Google alerts and updating the database, transferring narrative data from a news report into relational database data that's coded in all of these ways that can easily be sorted and filtered for just about any research question.
It's a time consuming process and something that is not easily automatable. David, you sent us an email a while back. It said the causal chain leading up to a school shooting has dozens of events and every single one of them needs to be a failure for the shooting to occur. Any single success would break the chain and prevent the shooting from happening.
That sounds to me like both an empirical argument and almost a philosophical argument. Can you unpack that for me? What do you mean by that? I think that it's both empirical based on looking at now thousands of incidents and philosophical, because as you said, leading up to that shooting, there's this causal chain of actions.
And with each one of those actions, there's either a right or a wrong decision that could be made. And one right decision is going to break that chain. I think an incident that really highlights this is the Oxford High School shooting in November 2021. This is in Michigan, Oxford Township, Michigan.
In Michigan. Yes. There were four students killed, seven wounded. But leading up to this attack, just four days prior, the parents bought the 15 year old shooter a gun and he posted pictures with it online.
And then the day prior to the attack, he was caught Googling bullets. His teacher saw this and made a report of it. So everyone should have been on high alert. Students were on high alert because there were rumors circulating of a school shooting.
You get to the morning of the shooting. He's taking a test and on the test he draws a picture of himself committing a school shooting. And the teacher sees this test, is clearly worried and sends him to the guidance counselor's office. The guidance counselor could have called police or asked other staff members to come in and help her.
The guidance counselor did a suicide screening, but she didn't interpret the results in a way that would show that he was actively suicidal. The parents could have checked the gun safe before they got to the counselor's office and seen the gun was gone. At this point, it was still not known that he was in possession of the gun. Yes, Stephen, he had the gun in his backpack.
And at any point, one of those adults could have looked in his backpack. His parents also could have said that he has told them that he's actively suicidal. He was telling his parents, he was sending text messages saying that he was having bad thoughts. He wanted to hurt himself.
He wanted to hurt others. The guidance counselor then could have said, you know, he probably shouldn't go back to the classroom. Why doesn't he go for a formal mental health evaluation? And lastly, the parents could have thought there are all of these different things going on here.
Why don't we just take him home? But they didn't do that. The shooter pleaded guilty to 24 charges, including four counts of first degree murder. And his parents are being held in jail on charges of involuntary manslaughter.
They are the first parents in the U.S. to face criminal charges for a school shooting committed by their child. They have pleaded not guilty. And the parents of one victim have filed a lawsuit against the police department for failing to intervene.
The Oxford community is still waiting for the school district to publish a full report of the shooting. David Reidman thinks that school officials may have made mistakes that day. But he says if you take the chain of events approach, there is a much bigger problem that leads to a failure like this. We have no national guidance and no common playbook for how a school official is supposed to react to the threat of a school shooting.
It's on people to essentially make it up when they're in these circumstances. After 9-11, the public was engaged in preventing terrorism and we created the see something, say something program. And every citizen knew what to look out for and knew what actions to take. And from taking those actions, you would immediately get the attention of federal resources that would make sure there was an investigation.
That's what we've never done in the context of school shootings. We tell people to look for red flags, but we haven't given clear action to take. And even if that action is taken, there is nothing to make sure that that information doesn't fall a very difficult policy question to answer because it comes down to the philosophical point of do you care about the public good or do you care about your individual freedoms? And I try to look at history and look at the context for these events and following Ruby Ridge and Waco and Oklahoma City, we put very significant restrictions on who is allowed to buy explosives.
But I fear that this is an issue that's far too polarized and I get death threats just for reporting school shootings. Can you describe one? Oh, yeah. I get emails that say, you know, we're going to find you and you'll be eviscerated in front of your family.
So, you know, it's it's a it's a very careful path that one has to walk. And I really try to objectively report a problem that is in every community and every part of the country over now a 60 year period of modern history. And I do that in really an objective manner that can be studied for just about any research purposes. I'm also extraordinarily hopeful because far more shootings are averted than attacks that happen.
So just last month at a high school in Ohio, a student walked into the bathroom and he found a bullet that was sitting upright on the toilet seat. And he knew that something was wrong. So he went and he found the school resource officer, the vice principal, the principal and a teacher and told all of them there's a problem because he wanted to make sure that he was heard. And they took him seriously.
They watched the surveillance footage, figured out which student had left the bathroom and they detained a student. And in his backpack, he had a loaded handgun, three loaded magazines, a hit list and a written plan to commit a shooting that day. And that is because these mass shootings and these school shootings are public suicides. And somebody is going to cry for help until the moment right before the attack.
And that bullet was left there hoping somebody would find it. And that's the opportunity that we have. If somebody knows what to do and has someone to talk to, we can prevent almost every one of these attacks. Readan has collaborated with other academic researchers, including Jill Peterson and James Densley, co-founders of the Violence Prevention Project Research Center.
In 2021, they published a book called The Violence Project, How to Stop a Mass Shooting Epidemic. For their book, they interviewed convicted mass shooters in jail. And one of the questions that they asked each person they interviewed is who could have prevented the shooting? And the answer they got was anyone could have prevented the shooting.
I think that's why we need this system where the public knows the red flags, knows that there's somebody in crisis and then has a system to get that person help. There's a gentleman named Aaron Stark, and he did a TED Talk about when he plotted a school shooting when he was in high school. He was a victim of serious abuse at home, and he thought that this school shooting would be something that would finally really get back at his parents. He had bought the gun and he had the plan.
And there was one classmate who reached out to him and said, why don't you come over to my house and have some lunch and let me get you a clean shirt? And that one act of kindness showed him that his life had value and he never committed that shooting. We reached out to Aaron Stark to see if he would give his recollections. Absolutely.
My name is Aaron Stark and I am currently an assistant manager at come and go here in Denver, Colorado. I have a wife and four kids, and I'm also a public speaker who flies around the country talking because when I was a teenager, I used to be a school shooter. So what was Stark thinking at the time? I was going to cause as much damage as possible, kill as many people as possible, including myself.
But the actual targets, I wanted to make my parents deal with making me. I wanted to make them deal with creating a monster. And what kind of lessons does Aaron Stark think we should take from his story? I would say the biggest lessons from my story are to remember that up until the point that the kid actually pulls the trigger, that he can be helped, that he can be reached, that that is a kid that is falling down a path of destruction.
He hasn't reached the end yet. And until you reach the end, you can still be pulled off of it. And the biggest thing that helped me was simple human compassion, simple connection. It wasn't someone coming to me with a program and someone coming to me with this project.
It was a friend sitting down next to me and treating me like I was a human. I was covered in dirt and blood and nastiness and chaos. And he still treated me like I was a kid. And that to me is the important thing we need to do.
The failure that happens is trying to mitigate the after effects and try to stop the damage afterwards and trying to put in all these band-aids to try to make the adults feel better. If you talk to a kid in class, they know what kids in their class are super depressed, what ones are on the edge, what ones are living in hell, which ones are very abused, which ones are very aggressive and stuck up, which ones have borderline personality disorders, which ones are just having anxiety issues and need to have more care. No one ever talks to the kids who actually have the problem. No one ever digs in to the actual human behind any of the story.
Here is David Friedman again, the school shooting researcher. And I think that that's what we're missing in fortification of the schools, in adding school police officers and creating all of these levels of fortresses around schools and public spaces. The person that ultimately wants to commit a mass shooting is somebody who's very, very deeply hurt. And rather than trying to keep that person further out and demonize that person even further, if we can just show them a tiny bit of kindness, you know, a lot of these shootings would never happen.
Probably none of these shootings would happen. David Friedman, when he was in high school, had his own terrifying experience with a series of shootings. In October 2002, there were 17 different random sniper attacks in the Washington, D.C. area, and there was no clue as to why they were happening and where the next one was going to be.
There were two gentlemen, one older, one a teenager. The older man was the car driver. The younger man laid in the back and fired through a hole that they had made in the trunk. And they drove to random locations and shot people.
And they were only caught when they started leaving clues, which eventually led to their arrest. And that was three weeks where really going to school every day, there was genuine fear that you weren't going to come home. We left the school in groups of five, running in a zigzag pattern. And that really framed, I think, a lot of my future experiences around school shootings and gun violence.
If you look at the long arc of David Riedman's career as someone who wants to protect innocent people from terrible things, you see that it, too, was a long chain of events. The fear that fueled him in high school, the fear of tragedy, has driven him to prevent as many tragedies as he can. This is an absolute reverse image of the chain of events that create so many tragedies, so many failures, as we've been calling them today. The fact that we humans are capable of this, too, of creating a virtuous circle rather than a vicious circle, is testimony to the fact that failure is not inevitable.
So let's keep figuring it out together. Next week in Part 2 of How to Succeed at Failing. I just went from the blameworthy end all the way over to the praiseworthy end. What if we could think of failure as a spectrum?
Also, a Nobel Prize was just awarded for a scientific triumph that for decades had been considered a failure. Research on messenger RNA itself started in 1961. That's next time on the show. Until then, take care of yourself.
And if you can, someone else, too. Freakonomics Radio is produced by Stitcher and Renbud Radio. You can find our entire archive on any podcast app or at freakonomics.com, where we also publish transcripts and show notes. This episode was produced by Zach Lipinski and mixed by Greg Ripon with help from Jeremy Johnston.
Our staff also includes Elena Coleman, Elsa Hernandez, Gabriel Roth, Jasmine Klinger, Julie Canfer, New York Bowditch, Morgan Levy, Neil Karuth, Rebecca Lee Douglas, Ryan Kelly and Sarah Lilly. Our theme song is Mr. Fortune by the Hitchhikers. The rest of our music is composed by Luis Guerra.
As always, thank you for listening. I meant to prepare a great deal more than I have. Uh-oh. I guess I've been preparing 30 years, so...
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