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Hello everyone, and welcome back to our new book network. I'm the host of Brain Pharmacy, and today I'm so pleased to be joined by Dr. Ahmed Aziz. To talk about his time with research book, Undesired Remission, the Art-Apprizing Agent at 3.11 and I since.
Welcome to the show of Dr. Ahmed. Hello, brain. Thank you for the invitation.
Yeah, I'm so happy that you're here and before diving into weird book, let's tell our leaders, our listeners a little bit about yourself. First of all, thank you so much again, Brain. I thank, and also for new book series as well for the invitation. I'm really honored to be, and why do you listen or actually?
It's like one of my favorite. Great. Every morning during breakfast, it's one of the things that I look for something to listen during breakfast type. Thank you, of course.
For the book, and I hope first of all, I hope you enjoy it and it's open up some truths about our uprising in Egypt. My name is Ahmed Abuzzi. I'm a political scientist from Egypt. Currently, I'm an lecturer of international security and international relation at the bottom of the politics and international relations at the University of Southampton, UK.
During the academic year, 2020, 2022, I was opposed to a dog field at Columbia University Center for Global Studies, where I work on one of my project about political violence in Middle East. I hold a PhD from University of St. Andrews, a master's degree from University of Aberdeen, also in Scotland. And my undergrad was political science and international relations in one of our Egypt University.
I think you're familiar with the name is University of Assuit where I study. Yes. When international relations before I moved to Emirates in 2008, I published two books in English, beside the undesired revolution. I have a book on counter-theory's ministry to fix ipship after the Arab Spring.
In Arabic, I published nine books and I have more than 70 peer reviewed paper in Arabic, English and French. Some of my work has been translated into 18 languages. And finally, according to Arab citation factor, since 2012, I was listed among the two most cited and most eventual Arab scholar in politics and international relations. This is original citation factor in 22 countries and listed among 3000 Arab scholars from these 22 countries.
Great. As an Egyptian, I'm so proud of your achievements. And before, and we'll start with the genesis of the book, how did you approach writing this book and what were you trying to accomplish by examining the uprising in Egypt? It's a very deep question.
You need to take a brief and reflect about it. First of all, this book is about international relations or this book is on international relations and foreign policy. But for me, I look at this book as a very personal book. And the story of the book itself was very interesting.
It was a writing process. It was very interesting. And I think it would be nice if I share this story with your audience. Yes, please share.
So after 2011 revolution, shortly after the removal of Mubarak regime in February, I started to work on my first book in Arabic about Egypt foreign policy after the revolution, which I think is still that only a book in Arabic about a single of international relations and foreign policy of Arabic Spring. And after I finished the book almost in 2012, I found myself full of questions or I have more questions than I expected to have after finishing. Because usually, and also, you know, like you start writing from several or many questions that you are quite with and you try to answer it and solve it and then back it during the writing. But actually, what happened to me was opposite.
I found myself surrounded by millions of questions that I can't find, especially the question about the people or the representation of the people. At that time, I was a realist and realistic for your audience international relations, it's a state-centric experts, security experts and war studies experts. This is the kind of scholars that emphasize on the on security on war and conflict on stability, intervention, blah, blah. And this is very Anglo-Saxon, Bose-Dervast School of Thoute in International English.
So for me, the question about the people was not since we are a state-centric approach. But the intersectionality here, which was completely new concepts for me, happened because I was in the Harry's Square like millions of people. I witnessed the revolution, which is something very, very rare. And it's one time, if ever, in its color can, witnessing their life, that you find yourself in the middle of a momentum or a historical event that actually you're in the middle of a moment.
That actually you write about it, but you never witness. It's like war, revolution, civil wars, this massive event, massive drama as well if you want to use a state-centric language. So I went there and I remember all the feeling and emotion and the momentum of the event itself and what you get into and what you experience. And suddenly, in almost 400 pages, there is no people.
Even the dedication was to the people of the Harry's Square for everything and for everything. On the other hand, I saw, because I was one of these people, that actually made the revolution works. So this original transformation to you is a realist concept, who is actually a product or a result of the people struggling with the people fight for their dignity, for their freedom and for social justice. Nevertheless, the people, sacrifices, the people's struggles, the people's road, who is conveniently a risk, not only from my book, but from the overwhelming literature about Arab Spring.
And for me, I start like, I need to stop here and I need to rethink about how should I address this question. The last layer of this story was, as you kindly know, but you audience don't know yet, that I am originally from Upper Egypt. And Upper Egypt is not the metropolitan Cairo or the cosmopolitan Alexandria that everyone familiar with me talk about Egypt. It's not the colonial Egypt we will talk about.
This is the original life. This is a periphery. This is ex- secluded, impoverished and underdeveloped region of Egypt. And in 2011, I didn't see the revolution in Upper Egypt.
And for me, that was shocking because, you know, during the 18 days, you take two days or two break and you go back to see your family, make sure they are finally back to the square. And it's like literally you will do another universe. It's only 300 kilometers between my family city, which in Al-Minir and Cairo. But literally, it's like you cross in a time zone.
It's completely, there is no revolution. So the book started from the big kitchen, why there was no revolution in Upper Egypt? And where is the people in our story about Arab Spring and about the study of foreign books? Sorry, I told you, I have a long answer for you, Kwej.
Yeah, that's the reason. I really love your answer. And we talked later in this episode about why there was no revolution in Upper Egypt. We started listening to see when you raised out the book.
And it's amazing. And why? Tell us a little bit about the title, undesired revolution. When I finished the book, which actually as I will operate more later on, was like old or etiquette.
At the beginning, I had an idea to call it decolonizing the revolution, or decolonizing the square. Since I'm talking about Arab Spring from post-colonial and political perspective in general. And by the time I finished the book in 2021, to be honest, the term decolonization and decolonization become very, I will not call it trendy, but something about a revolution of the concept. So it doesn't reflect what I believe, what is decolonization.
And every book now, it's either decolonization or decolonization about everything. And for me, I didn't want the book to be perceived as, yeah, this is the momentum of decolonization, even the book is about decolonization. And to be honest, it's not about decolonization, but I build on post-colonial and decolonial evolution international relation, but it's not about decolonization and it's not about decolonizing the revolution, which other authors did it like our different, the art of sight in his great book about the square root of the revolution and other scholars from Egypt and from the Middle East in general. Another title I was thinking about, which is, Trappling, Triesian.
This is the realistic phase I mentioned, the realism period of my time when you talk about all about conflict over about civic wars and all about stability. And after 2011, this message, tremendous wave of scholarship and literature and security based and policy oriented, highly charged literature about Arab Spring and it's all about both creating and representing the region as it's a war zone. Civil War, the last title I read about this was Middle East as a battlefield, like the whole region is a war zone, or the Arab Wars, or Civil War in Syria. And for me, this is the only thing I wanted to distance myself from.
I am not that expert that talk about this region and this historical event, as if it's only mattered because it has something to say over related to US national security or European security, original security blah blah blah. Finally, after I submit this book to Real and just before we push it to the press, I have a very dear friend who hears and it's like my consulting will come to my publication and my work, film director and critic, Slim Milba from Cairo. And I told him about the book and what I'm thinking and I'm not happy with the typing, so he suggested undesired revolution because the book, in fact, is about hell widely internationally celebrated revolution. As you remember, the discourse of the global discourse about Arab Spring 2011 and 2013 about as it's the fourth wave of democracy or the new spring over the 1968 or 1848 for the Arabs or 1989 blah blah blah.
And suddenly, just in few years, this has become one of the most despicable, one of the most any stable region in the whole international system. And any conversation about Arab Spring in a positive way was completely dismissed or ignored or even executed was in academia and outside academia. So also I was very interested in how exactly this happened, how this whole, how this celebrated revolution, tableau, and Tefal does suddenly become something everyone feels shamed about it and everyone wants to distance themselves from it. And that's why we agree with Islam and other people like my partner, Darias, which is a political system, just as well.
We come up with this title undesired revolution. Yes, that makes sense. This is great because I asked myself while reading the book about the title. It is literally in some extent.
My next question is the... My next question is the book. Oh, should read this book. I hope everyone will read the book if it's in one of the four interests, but let me approach this way.
Since I mentioned this book is about foreign policy and international revolution, which is very, very broad and prone for anyone can be interested in it. But also I believe that this book introduced none with some perspective on the Arab uprising and the social transformation in the middle. It's not only about Egypt, Egypt is a move-by point. I build up in politics all about the region.
And I try to decentralize international relations and the Middle Eastern studies. And actually this book is one of the foremost workers I talk about having a critical... Decolonial stand from international relations theory and the study of Arab Spring, which is very rare. By the way, again, we will talk more about the massive literature from policy-oriented and security studies and the academic and scholarly work.
There is a massive gap between the two. Literally like Arab Spring in its scholarly manner, it's literally invisible. And especially if this perspective is common from the region or within the region. So therefore international relations, Middle Eastern studies and revolution and social movements.
So I think this book will be merely interested to students of Middle Eastern studies, security studies, Middle Eastern studies, international relations, ex-abertains of the Gulf or in development and international development. And especially human rights as well. Because it's talking about how foreign policy actually failed because of the overlooking of the question about human rights development and human dignity. Perfect.
My next question is what were the limitations of the study and what is the main takeaway of the book? Okay. Before the main takeaway of the book, I think it will be important also to talk more about how exactly this book was written. What kind of scholarship and literature and sources I use?
Which like a break in the law or expand the model actually want to read this book or maybe interested about this one. So for me this book almost like I told you, I dedicate from 2012, early 2012 until 2021 almost I dedicate. During this years, I couldn't obtain as much as I remember over 200 interviews. Wow.
Because I lived in Dubai, I lived in and worked in Emirates for 10 years or 12 years actually since 2008. I interviewed politician, practitioners, diplomats, activists, scholars, and academics and I interviewed people from Upper Egypt, from Cairo, from the Delta, from Yemen, from Syria. Because you know like most of the region was in the Gulf during the revolution. And I was involved in the public life in Emirates for my work.
So I also have this deep conversation and interviews with activists and people who are involved in the revolution in the world. I also conduct an ethnography and field work in Egypt and other countries as well. And most importantly, I haven't owned the local scholarship. As you can see from the biography of the book, most of the away from the theoretical discussion, when it comes to the cases study of Egypt of the Gulf of other countries, the main body of the literature I'm using on the social outlook on social.
And this is something deeply invisible, underrepresented, and with certainly I can tell you it's ignored. Overlooked from the scholarship in English in French, in German, in Spanish, about Arab Spring. The local sources, the local knowledge production in the Middle East is overlooked. And for me, that was that was structural methodology intervention for me.
So that's for me, that was the the the Aesin-Zev example. Therefore, it's deeply theoretical work, which is also something very interesting we can discuss if you feel like because as you know, like only that the can in academia and the West, since you come from Middle East, you should talk about Middle East. Your field of interest, your field of expertise, where you come from, and only white scholar, Western, Eurocentric scholars that only have the right, and the ability, and the skill, and the training to write about political theory and the field of international research. And myself, I define myself and I am by education and by training on my background, this political theory.
And I have a PhD in political theory. And I work on political theory for 15 years. So for me, like I told you back when the book started, that for me, where is theorizing from the region? Where is the people when it comes to about the theories that discuss the future and their country, future, and their stability?
So we just have a really made series that was produced, experienced, examined, and the West, but has nothing to do with the reach. So for me, that was the main take off of my book. That is one example of knowledge production, theorizing from inside the reach. And that's why you will find half of the book is the book, the first section is theory.
So you engage with the theory and you try to predict the theory and you try to develop analytical framework or theoretical framework, which I did when it come to how we should study Egypt foreign policy and how we study regional transformation in the Middle East from inside the reach. And that's why I wanted to approach or to address a massive phenomenon like Arab Spring and the foreign policy post, the revolutionary countries away from policy oriented and security studies that, like I told, I mentioned before, it's only look as a region as it's a world. Or a problem, which is to use a positivist language, it's problem solving theories. But for me, I'm coming from critical background.
So for me, this is not a problem solving. This is I'm trying to understand. I'm not interested in explaining the security consequences, the failure of the revolution. I was interested in what exactly happened, how this very promising democratic oriented or programmed revolution ended up in a new way of transnational terrorist attacks, civil wars.
As we never saw in the modern time since the 19th century, and that this integration of the Arab states. And for me, that is a small psychological problem more than political or security book. That's for me, the main takeaway of the book. The limitation, that's the big picture for any other one.
But let me tell you, and tell your audience a phrase that I read since I was undergrads in Upper Egypt, and it stayed in my mind until today. And this phrase is by Iranian scholar from that will century call and I met Alice Fajan, it's philosopher and linguistic and philosophy as well. And Alice Fajan said that I need to translate it because I can find it in English as well. That every author, there is no author that wrote a book and never questioned the limitation of this work.
Authors always thinking about what if I had this, what if I removed that, what if I refused that. But by the end, most of us have to reach to a one result which is no one can be perfect. So, as any kind of human neighbor writing a book also has limitation and sure to come in, and these things cannot be avoided. I try, it's a human nature, right?
And to be honest with you, I did my best to overcome this limitation. The one I indicate either during writing the book or during the editing of the book. However, to be honest with I'm writing the book or I'm writing the journal, I don't think a lot about the limitation because that's what is strictly, but you do your best. And the critique and the short comment and of course the limitation can be observed later on and that's the rule of readers, critics and of course there is again to the book to tell you this book suffered from that or I hope you can do that that book can be improved this way.
But for me, I'm very repetitive also, by repetitive I mean like I have many drafts and I don't rush to publish any work of my works but I take my time and I always try to improve it. But like I told you, it's a human nature and no one is perfect. No, that's great. Okay, but there is some aspects, some topics can be improved or can be developed of course in the future.
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If you have questions or concerns about your gambling or gambling or something close to you, please contact connectsontario.ca. Great. I think you've talked about the gap that the book builds and you've told us a little bit about how you book it, how it builds for previous studies. Can you elaborate on this?
How was the book built up on previous studies on the Arab uprising? I bring this work, I'll do your favorite to my work over the work in general about the work in general and if you work already on the Arab uprising, can you tell us more about it? Sure. Like I told you, political science and politics is a dominant in both ways that come to the study of the rich.
And international annihilation is a minority, it leads to politics this way. And in Arabic scholarship, in particular, it's very difficult to find how to say it without being condescending or to undermine other people's work. But it's very difficult to find any good, discoloury work or theoretical, it leads to this way. The theoretical work, from the perspective of international annihilation.
Like to be honest, if you ask me now, since I'm also, I also teach courses on Arab Spring and Solutions. From Egypt, I can only remember or mention like Dr. Jameel Selim. Jameel Selim is a professor in British University in Cairo.
And Professor Bagat Oreni, of course, this is like one of our great minds in our board. We need to come to film policy and international relations. And one year and one year and one year to trap the minimum side, but also this is a big policy oriented paper, it's not scholarly or theoretical. So it for me, it was very difficult to find a scholarship I can develop to write gages unfortunately in Arabic because I am interested more in engaging with Arabic literature and Arabic scholarship.
Also knowledge production from the media is not from the West. But having said that, I tried at least to have a dialogue, not when we take with Western theory. The theories of international relations with foreign policy analysis, but I try to have a dialogue with Western or EU centric theories of international relations. And I choose to engage with one particular scholar, which is Stephen Walt.
Stephen Walt is a professor of international relations at Harvard. And he wrote a great book in 1987, Core Revolution and War. And that is one of the leading and very few books that talk about revolution for international relations theory. And another author is Frid Hamidih, a professor at London School, also his book about revolution and international relations.
So I engage with this work that by the way has nothing to do with the Middle East, these two books, this particular two words, engage with the theory from a systematic level from the international order level. So he took about great powers. He took about Russia and China, United States, France, England or Great Britain, but not Middle Power like Egypt or small powers like the Gulf States. So for me, that was a whole new discipline.
That was a whole new whole thing that I am trying to engage and bring to the conversation about Arab Spring. And noticing that these two books actually was published like a mission to you in the eighties, so we took it about almost 30 years tied in distance between the Arab Spring and the original world. So for me, it was very important, it was very empirical, like I told you the existential question or existential slash if it's semi-quench, and that I faced during the revolution, like how exactly we approached that. And that's why the first part, engagement in scholarship, the second chapter, engaging with the critical theories of international relations, which by the way was the five endings of the result, the chapter for me was shocking because critical international relations represented itself or presented itself as its alternative to the dominant positivist.
They're talking about the global dialogue about the revolution, but actually, the scholarship about the Arab Spring from the critical theory from the national relations by critical international relations theory, we are talking about the extinction of Frankfurt School in IR. We're talking about hypervegion or hypervegion and grammation approach to international relations. And when it comes to the Arab Spring, hardly, even in English, hardly from the dominant or the canonical, IR theory, hardly you can find any theoretical accounts about the Arab Spring. So that's for me, I try not only to address or to survey 10 years of the scholarship about the Arab Spring, but also how can we actually using this historical moment to also start not to critique or to threaten the lead or to have a conversation, even it's not a conversation to be just a moment over, just one direction conversation, just to you, you take this theory and try to just make sense to your context, but for me, I try to go beyond the steep one of critique to the steep two, which is how can we produce newly when it comes to foreign policy and the revolution of the Middle East in that will be for essentially that for me was the biggest challenge that I tried to build up with this book, especially also it's a book in English, it's not book in honor because yeah, and I think you have talked about that theoretical framework in between, but can you elaborate on that theoretical framework in study, why did you choose it?
So on, okay, certainly. So after I did this survey, the state of the field, as we call it, the state of art, for whatever had been published about Arab Spring in the talk to 20 or 25 journals of international relations, that's what my survey or my depletion review to use the technical consent, I did the top 25 and I reached to the conclusion that there is not only an urgent necessity to deconail our knowledge about revolution policy and international relations in general, not only that but also we need to move beyond state-centric approach, to what I call it in the book human-centric approach, and I will have written it, so we need more human paradigm to study something that is completely related to everyday life struggles, to be able to life in this, be able to survive, not to state survival, because in Egypt we were lucky, to this unlucky that we didn't have a violent revolution, but you only need, if you stand in Egypt, you only need literally look west to Libya, look south to Sudan, look north to the east, and look north to the indigenous side we witnessed every day, so October, look to the east and you find Yemen, this is exactly why I told you at the beginning I wanted to call it like tropical, but for me, no, this is not about that, this is about, we need to actually overcome this, because by doing that, if we did not challenge the state-centric, you will end up consciously or unconsciously to embrace this logic, you will find yourself what I call it in my new book, the world of the state, but that's not what I saw, I saw with my own eyes during 2011 and 2012, and this is not what other people, I meet an interview, yeah, so you can read this again, because the state, state becomes not, by that is, as a result of the widespread instability, zero risk, civil wars, right, and completely repression, because of the repression and failure states as becoming the middle district, because of all these results, people, the majority of the people start to look at the state as the last result, the savior, and that's why in the book I have two timeframes, which is 2011 to 2013, 2016-21, the 2013 because of all, it's a book that you were, it sounds like, it's a book that you were, it's a book that you were, it's a book that you were, yeah, yeah, yeah, yes, but that's also this idea, the inception of this idea coming from this book, when you talk about litigation and the improvement, that is one of the things you find you seek to develop it from your own world, so the culture of the state, after the state was was breaded to use Samir Abid or Peter Evans terminologies, from breaded to the state, it becomes the savior, and that's why, if you also look around that robustness of authoritarian, the, yeah, Professor Ali Dini left and lost the book, which was published like almost after 10-15 years of his last book before the revolution called the restoration of the state, state is bringing the state back in, and that's for me, it was not the case, because I wanted to understand why people, especially people are experiencing people's inspiration and actually people' agency that makes this revolution actually a reality, it means this transformation that everyone celebrate all these new political regimes and the new form of government you saw in the region is actually direct or indirect result of the people' agencies, and suddenly people who pushed back to the corner, so that's why, like, I wanted to stay away from the state center and try to theorize to people's centering model, which could, helps me, not only to study the correlation or the art of the revolution between the revolution as a domestic phenomenon, and foreign policy, and foreign relation as an exciternment phenomenon, but also what made revolution fail, right? What is the rule of social forces in the, within or at all end abroad as well, and what are the rules that counter revolution forces in the region and international level plays, and what exactly is the intersectionality over the interlocals in between this level of analysis, since the methodology, the subtitle of the book is a three-level analysis, and this is, I will end here if you don't mind, and this three-level analysis is a very dominant idea in certain national relations by Kenneth Walters, which by the way, one of the great, my different, modern international relations, I shared one of the story I never mentioned before that when I start to write the first draft of the theoretical section, I think that actually to Kenneth Walters before he passed away in 2015, and he completely disagreed with Misk, but actually his commitment was really helpful to develop the book, so I used his framework about three-level analysis to understand the correlation between foreign policy, regional policy, and international politics and so on. That was mainly my theoretical or misagulogical framework.
That was perfect. And how do you evaluate the position of international relations series towards the study of the Arab rising? To recap the big, I'm sorry, I give it to you about the question, which is very related actually, or it's like continuation of it. So it's a main bosom or bibliomatic that book or in this book I try to dismantle that actually to reveal why most of international relations series and the so-called exuberft interventions that is stress on the relationship or the correlation between the revolution at democracy or between stability and development and efficient foreign policy and revolutionary foreign policy.
Why most of these scholarship histories on that relation? But actually, when it comes to reality, there is no representation or presence of the bibliom, or even the security of the bibliom. So most of this series actually talk about either state security, regime security, original security, and of course, the original security, or the international security, but the security of the bibliom or the society security, there is nothing about that, which actually, for me, because I would there, and for me that was my bibliography, as an international relations scholar, I was interested in not really anything about that. All I really just, you both state, to realize the state at the center of your conversation, and it's like you're talking about invisible, conservative state, as the state is only a state, not like you're talking about the country like Egypt.
By 2010-2011, we were almost 80 million or 90 million people. The population of Egypt, 80 million people, and no one talk about 80 million people. You just talk about Egypt security from the perspective of United States, from Europe, or from international system, but not about the people's principle. And you just go back to business as usual, and you talk about the effects or the influence of Egypt, for the political and political process.
But yeah, all democratic transition, as it's like democratic transition is a process. And for me, I was not, let me put it this way, I was not satisfied with the explanation, international relations, provide about the Arab Spring, or how we should address the Arab Spring which is a way for war and peace, stability, instability, development or under development or state-filling. Which actually, if you look at it, it's just looking at the Arab Spring as like I told you, a sociological phenomenon. And this way is a transition from my own understanding of international relations, having from being the realist to be a historical sociologist or political sociologist.
When you are interested actually more about the social forces, about the institution, about the wood of production and about the values and norms more than about intervention or regional balance of power or about relationship with Greek. I try to be more critical about the international relations series. And my next question is, how does the structure of the book relate to the way you build your arguments? I mentioned before that the book is two sections or two blocks, actually, I said that you can get some of the chapters you had.
Yeah, yeah, my chapters are right. My chapters, my ad into the lecture. So, I had good solutions. So, almost like seven chapters, three chapters, which is the first section is about three sections about ACES.
I think I took more about today. I took more about the theory, but like I told you, that was for me as a political theorist and somewhat why did fighting as a scholar of international relations here is more than an adult, many studies, a scholar or expert by any, by any chance. I'm not working on political theory and international relations. So, the structure was how exactly these arguments would be applied and I were to recap with you.
Who is combined with three questions, right? How exactly international relations or ministry, ministry, ministry, international relations theory, address our revolution in general and our end the revolution in Egypt in particular. And by ministry, I'm not only about talking about realist, liberalist, constructivist, but also about critical theories and because they have many co features like most of them, if not all of them are in eccentric, the dominant publication is in English. And they share similar epistemic policies and I have a chapter about the fallacies of international relations theory where I wouldn't, I think lying fallacies that shared among most of the ministry my art theory, when it comes to the study of uprising and the global south in general.
The second question is why there was no revolution in upper Egypt when the person I live like I told you and the third one, what exactly the role of social forces played in the culture of which either my social forces either within Egypt or in the Gulf where I lived and moved in between Egypt and Emirates and the GCC country for almost two years. So the structure was I was trying to bridge the gap which is a big issue in international relations as well. There is a huge gap between theory and practice. You have a series that took about balance of power about security and stability as it's like a chessboard, people history of the conflict, people struggling and dividends isn't just erased from the conversation.
So I tried in the second in the second section of the book to present an answer for every question on this equation. So you will find a chapter I start from bottom up. So we start from society level, first image, regional level, sorry society level, state level, which is a foreign policy. And then the first image which is regional and international system level.
So chapter about upper Egypt, chapter about for a policy process and see that we can in Egypt and another chapter or two chapters about Egypt for relation with the Gulf and the green power. That's how the I imagine the structure would be divided or structured to answer the theoretical questions I have. Ask your second question, the second question that told you why writing this book. What are the reasons behind the absence of revolution in the large version line and isolated society side where do we need you left and I'm learning right now.
This is just a great question. Unfortunately is not said that either race or race or race or race or be answered because it's very difficult. But let's try to dismantle it. I mentioned that the book is about two periods 2011 to 2013 to 2021.
And between the two periods, I have the chance to come and visit our Egypt almost twice per year to see my family and also work in the topic, but mainly to see my family because I'm not observer. I'm not outsider. This is where my family lives. So for me, this is not a field.
I'm not going to the field, which is very colonial and very Eurocentric turns or it's no good because I'm not doing this. I'm literally talking with with my people, which also problematic because also I want to avoid the native guess or gaze, right? I don't want to talk about native knowledge because we are not just we just human be like anybody. We are not special.
We are not have our culture, blah, blah, blah, blah, or me or other orientalist argument about others. I'm not othering myself to put it this way. So during this time, I observed things. So upper Egypt, in 2013 was completely at least because I have a contestation and tough time was with Egypt's oldest colors in the West.
We're not talking about upper Egypt because there is many scholar about revolution in upper Egypt, which I don't like, but I was talking about in particular media, Venezuela, maybe you can tell if you remember what happened in 2011. At least what I saw, media and Venezuela and Venezuela and to the beginning of a suit. The three big cities in North Florida sign. There was no revolution.
So when we saw it in Swiss, the one we saw in Matsura and Mahalna, Alexandria, Airo and Giza, particularly this one and us one. So for example, to give you two two contradictory perspective with mine in us one person, as one and looks at professors in a bubble bags from a bright college in Ohio. And I think professor Leila below, that's what was written if I'm not wrong. And Christian Wagner, Los Jose, as well, I think as well, sorry with the name, if I missed it up, they wrote their work about revolution in upper Egypt, in particular in Krena and as well, right.
So also like, like, like, like, a lot of the talk about the social media campaigns in a car, which is very famous village in us one and looks And this is not a lot. They double-edged talk about talk about discuss the revolution in Krena, where she had family coming from. But I was talking about the love of upper Egypt, Venezuela and media and also, and I didn't so any revolution there. Of course, like the cities big city or have the political lies active, the state or city or city or Paris city, but as a popular uprising for below, that was not.
On the second phase, 2013, 2021, was completely the culture of the state. So actually, the culture revolution that was disappeared over or silent, right during the first time of the revolution actually, weked up again. And it was very, very supportive to the state or the new religious booting this way. And for me, I was just observing this transformation only changed.
And I started to talk with people. I started to interview young colleagues and relatives and friends and childhood friends about their experience in the career for those who travel actually to the real. And they are always sitting in the coffee houses, as you know, like Hezbollah, about their perception, their being supposedly good. During this time, a very different of mine, actually, was a political sociologist from from us one and it's my list.
And it's also political sociologist from an eccentric and it's my role to peace in a new people in Lebanon about the revolutionary, North and silent south. And I still remember the piece, it's excellent piece and it's a very well-jeanous second, revolutionary north, north of Egypt, which is exactly a kind of Swiss, a Bosient, Delta and silent upper Asia. Right? And for me, I engaged with that, the inscription of the book, 2015.
I engaged with Esma and Lita on a sock. We have agreed to beat on Jadalia by the way about revolution at upper Asia. And for me to sum it up, why there was an order of revolution, I identified five main reason that caused, or was there reason behind the absence of revolution in operation, which is the overwhelming presence of the security state or the security apparatus. This is not fair.
Again, there is where the Baba-Barti read is over 62. If you look at the development of all the Egypt, the top five most powerful cities or regions in Egypt, from Upper Egypt, so Hage, Armenia, and Faiyun, very sweet, four of the top five. Right? So there is a coalition, most of the scholarship, there is a coalition between Baba-T and the region, no?
Which for me, as a positivist, that's interesting. Another one, one of the, actually, most of the interviews I conduct, people who are talking about losing of hope, you know, embassy, like, nah, even the analysts. Like, what are you doing? There is no one care about us.
As you can, if you remember in the book, like, I have kids like, no one care about us. Oh, what revolution is out there? One of the media actually meeting with what revolution is out there. Here is our aim to look around.
Or be able to talk about, I have five children. I can't feed them, I had stuff like that. Also, good bearing with the doors, the informal economy is very efficient and operational. And by informal economy, that the basics need for the first majority of the people actually satisfied by their own networks.
Away from the states, you literally not relying on the state like other regions. Because you know the majority of the people are peasants, farmers. So there is a way around the official channels to satisfy the basic city. So people manage their stuff.
So it's fine. We can feed our kids so we don't need anything. The fourth intimate was the legacy of what I call it a highly repressive character of the state in operation. Egypt sends Nasser.
And actually, since about half the time, if not before, it was only the exception of Nasser's first planning or program planning of development in 1958, 1962. That's where most of the development took place in operation. That's where a pseudo-trivastity was built. For the first time in modern time in Egypt, that the upper Egypt lies in cities at only one state until the 80s.
And after that, especially during the day after the 2011, that was an evenly inclusion character of the state. The side was not a part of the state by origin. Like Ironman, because also I work on the legacy of counterterrorism in Egypt in the postcolonial state. One of the very famous frees of Mubarak, when the militant group in upper Egypt was completely controlling the region, Mubarak said we would not hesitate to bomb them.
You're talking about the possibility of a civil war in 1992-1995. So for that, upper Egypt people was deeply under the feelings that they were an unwanted child. We are undesired Egyptians to use the titans of the book. That's why we are fighting.
Since there is no top hierarchy, figures or official from upper Egypt, most of the state budget to the doors. And the house is just unwanted and marginalized. Finally, that's unfortunately on our bank, it's our fault. In fact, we're not going to do that, but also with the doors, upper Egypt is very conservative society.
And imagine conservatives with poverty and illiteracy. Like the education read in other Egypt is almost 47 to 60%. So you're talking about almost from each two kids or children, one of them is keep education. So conservatives with poverty, with no education, of course, revolution is very civilized.
And civilized, you're not versus barbarism or uncivilized. No, it's very civic. Like you need education, you need awareness, you need critical recognition of the political situation and the social rotation. And of course, education.
So for all of this, for me, at least, this is a five-indication that the education is observed to justify or to explicitly, why the revolution in this region of the upper Egypt is committed with that. And by the way, this is the last one to convey what my findings or my results with Abu al-Baghdadi and Abu Lode and Wagner. If you even convey this economic data or economic factors between media, banis weave and us one, it's us one. It's the most famous tourist destination until 2010, outside of Europe, before Dubai become Dubai.
This is us one. This is like tourists. You find people willing, willing, willing, willing, informed, will connect it. And Korna is also a regional center, but Egypt, but our Egypt in India and banish weave and faibou, it's not the same.
That's why the result was not actually contradictory, but some people take this finding, very defensive that I'm attacking our Egypt or undermine their sacrifices. And by saying that they actually ignored the fact that actually I am an upper Egypt. I was educated in the state government schools. I didn't, I never go to private school or international school, even in my other grad in an ethnic school, but still, I went to the Hageray Square and I take a part and I know people take a part.
But that was not the case. The case we took it about the secienusic and phenomenon, what went wrong with upper Egypt. That was the big question for me about why there was a revolution in upper Egypt in 2011. Perfect.
And for me, I remember that I wasn't the second year school when during the revolution. And I really, I couldn't take part of the first day because I was still young and I was too pleased, swammed with my study. But I remember that I remember some demonstration in Al-Sawaki Square and some people were running away from the police and some clashes between the demonstrators and the police, the policemen. So I really felt frightened.
I usually, I used to ask myself when would all of these come to an end because even when I conversated or I chatted with my father, I told me that, oh my god, they want to overthrow our father, which is Mubarak. And for me, I used to call Zana Werk as Maros Zhan. And I don't know why, oh that was, yeah, my imagination. The older generation used to call her Maros Zhan and the patriarchal, the regime, which was authoritarian, really dominated our thinking.
Everyone in my family thought that nothing would happen. But I was really on his chair. And I think this is big, this was because the poverty as you just mentioned. One of those, not only Robert, because I mentioned, I'm sorry for interrupting you.
I received my education in government schools, right where there is 30 to 50 students in one room. But also my family as well is not with family. It's not even a middle class family, to be honest with you. My father is still a farmer, slash work with the government or a public servant, and my mom is a housewife and have their own small business glossary to put it this way.
Poverty was not a domain issue, but it's not individual property. That's what I was trying to say. It's not individual. And it was also not a structure, because it was structural, so no one is working out.
Nothing is working out. But it was very complex. It was multi-layer film because you can deny that many, many upper Egyptian youth and activists actually talk about to observe Bush. But when you talk about revolution, you talk about social freedom, not individuals.
That's again, maybe it's not infinite, by the way, maybe it's not infinite. Maybe something went wrong, and it's not going to stay uninvitable. No, it's actually you don't know what will happen. It was interestingly enough, interestingly enough, in my other book, I was interested in the act of resistance in upper Egypt.
And it's very interesting to see the legacy of resistance in upper Egypt. Either or both, actually not either both during pre-colonial, which is Muhammad Ali, colonial, which is a British occupation, and most colonial during the north. But there is something, because of what I thought I was saying, formally, it could be a new liberalization of the state. Something, especially after the change of the agricultural lands, low 1992 change, where the social fabric of upper Egypt was really complicated.
And this transformation was incomplete, which that's why you have this. I wouldn't call it high birth, next year, like you have a will, that will, that you have educated away young people, that is actually was a part of the government. But committed with the massive majority, or the vast majority of the young people of the society, the operation was actually not occupied with the question about social transformation or political transformation, which is the revolution that took place in the country 2011. It's amazing.
But as you know, the 25th revolution, Egypt has shaken the world, its roots. And my question is, can you read that rate on the post-reducian Egyptian policy, which is an important part of your book, of course? Totally. And I told you, like, by definition, I work in international relations, so that's my field.
And for me, I always, like, my first book in Arabic is about my first paper in my life as a graduate student who's about for policy. So it's, I'm coming from there. And for me, like I told you, in Egypt model in history, there's only three four revolutions, right? If you count the revolution of 1802 is a revolution, and 19 by 19, so of course, and the 1952 course, last revolution, and 2011.
Interestingly, we don't have enough scholarship or literature about Egypt foreign policy after these revolutions. Like, I, I, the only one, for example, I can't remember after 1919 is, look, yes, or are we, PhD, thesis, in London school, about Egypt foreign policy under the left. Fascinated work, unfortunately, unpublished, but accessible, not the school of the economy's website. Out after 1952, I ain't got this question about that, because this is about North, certain, Ben Arabism, and ideology, and also originally blocked.
So you can find, of course, but it was really works. That's the corny, absolutely. Mustafa, and we were first of all, we do a professor, I've been in a short and has a buck of course, and I'll do it. Sorry, after the middle, I'm sorry, not the crap that I'm able to do it.
And Dr. Hala Salty, this is like the main scholarship about Egypt foreign policy. But after after the living, and Mubarak, literally, it's not. You can't find, like the only book I can recall in Arabic is Jack and Dr.
Jad Audel, about foreign policy of Mubarak, and a lot of papers. But this is not theoretical or scholarly workable, that is policy, so for me, that's was a big challenge. How can we have a break, a disruption between laws of foreign policy, and what I believe that's the time it's a new era of Egypt for a policy. Like I remember, I engaged with with Ambassador David Fabi, Egyptian ambassador in the United States, and later on the deal of AUC School of Government about his paper in El Ciesse, about Egypt, so it was a real phrase of the same massive scale of interest, the Arabic, the African, the Mediterranean, and the global south.
And for me, this was outdated. This is not what we saw. For me, there is a great challenge, there is a great ambition, there is a great potential to understand all, to try to build new foreign policy. So, on my own experience and conversation and interviews, I tried to build a new theoretical framework to understand the future of policy in Egypt after 2011 revolution.
And this framework is based on seven variables or analytical variables, such as national choices, what kind of country we want to democratic or non-democratic, and the national performance of the government, domestic policy, regime type, civil military relation, public participation in public life, and the national strategy. And for me to understand the development that changes, the transformation that took place in every one of these variables will give you an insight about the direction of Egypt for a policy after the revolution, either it will be in you, or sorry, or it will be our old buttons as one. So, for example, when you talk about the regime type, look at 2011, 2013, for a secular regime like Mubarak to an Islamist. And this reflect actually how this was manifested in Egypt for the policy after the revolution.
So, during Morsi, you'll find Egyptian foreign policy priorities become towards countries like Iran, like Indonesia, like Malaysia, and of course, towards Qatar, because the regime type was its Islamist ideology, the referred to, and of course, Turkey, sorry, however, we've been talking of course. The regime type with its own ideology and perception of the world, defined Egypt to national trust. So, that's with the direction of Egypt for once after 2016, for example, look at the civil military relation, right? So, you have civilians that control the foreign policy and the intelligence and decision making, but now because of the 30-year movement, now you have a military that control the state.
So, now our priority is security base. We need to secure the borders of the country. We need to avoid civil war. We need to save side-side aid to be saved.
We need to fight terrorism. So, the type of civil military relationship also to fight for the post, and the same with national strategy, and the same with national issues, like national strategy, for example, right? So, bear, for example, that President Dazif, the program, was available to the government to have been supported by every single single. I'm talking about, well, 2012, right?
Why do these candidates reach to the presidency or become a president? That's the full of both of them, the country will be completely tough. Like for example, more so in order to improve Egypt economic policy, he aligned Egypt with the law. So, between 2011 and 2016, the massive recipient of aid from Qatar was Egypt.
So, it's a national strategy, a national economy strategy was towards, investment, foreign direct investment towards Qatar, or foreign Qatar. But after 2003, Egypt aligned it with the embers and so directly. So, also the preference and the national choices defined Egypt football. And for me, that was mostly radical approach, not necessary, about the movement.
That's why, like I told you, the knowledge production element here. How can we develop our own understanding to understand which path is the country will take into the future? So, your move, the Muslim brother who, who you come with, CC regime, or in the future, you have Islamist or liberal or leftist, but still, since it's both originally period, this is, in my view, this is the most crucial element that everyone need to know, or need to study, or need to take into consideration before we talk about which direction Egypt footballs will be looked like. That's great.
I will not ask you about your evaluation of the more CC regime or anything, but I will move to the next question, which is, in your book, you write the book, you write the present critical account of why democratic revolutions have failed, how counter-inclusions and authoritarianism have fortified. Could you comment on this? Can I say, no, I can't say it. Not totally, but with me, what can I say here?
As a political theorist, based on comparative historical cases, adding vertical data, either from Egypt or from all over the world, I can claim that since the socio-political and social-economic reasons that caused the revolution in the first place and drew the people to march to Tahrir Square and into the streets in 2011, did not change. The revolution is always in the whole side. This is the most tricky. Or at whom, on the other hand, originally speaking of international scale, also since the intervention, aggression, and the aggressive and neoliberal policies also did not change, there is always a possibility of rising up again.
In short, what we see now is not the final stage of Arab uprising. For the good or for the bad, again, do not forget that no one, yes, and I can stress no one, so the Arab uprising coming. No one included myself. I will tell you another personal account from my own diaries from the Arab Spring time 2011.
By 2011, I was in Emirates working as a director of research in the think tank, and I was meeting a friend in Tahrir Square on January 4, again, 24th of January. It was 5-7 BM, kind of time. We are sitting outside the building, the building, the building, and this friend he told me, something can happen to me. I told him, no, nothing can happen.
He said, what do you mean nothing can happen to me? You cannot see what happened in Libya. I said, listen, I don't think Egypt is right enough. Again, that's opposite the resistance, the realist.
I told you, we didn't suffer enough to have a revolution. To 7 BM, I arrived from Cairo. I went to see my family. I arrived there.
Very late. I slept and woke up to have breakfast with my mom. And you turned on the TV. It was a revolution until the vice.
Again, you are an expert, you work in political science and for policy, blah, blah, blah, blah. But still, you didn't see it coming. Even everybody is talking about it. In my view, build on that experience and when you read the religion about it, you have courses that drove me to repel in the first place.
Since these courses did not change or disappear, they were even minimized or managed. So why exactly the possibility of revolution would not happen again? And especially on the other hand, the counter revolution forces is actually being controlled too. And I'm talking about the confistating.
For different degrees, but mainly the main counter revolution in the region is to parties, the confistate and Israel. And these two actors, which are very, very different from each other, by the way, but they have a common goal here. For this, the revolution is stopping the democratic transition to take place in the region. Like genuine democratic revolution that lead to democratic states in the region.
And that's what me, the seeds of this revolution. But the one converted to it, and it's not my mission to tell you when the revolution will take place. And what has been left out? Are there areas in which you think the book could be improved and what are your recommendations for further stance?
Totally. Absolutely. If I told you there is nothing to be approved or to change, no, that would be a big statement that reflects your ignorance. My ignorance, not your snick, to them.
For me to be, see if I have that change or if I have that time to revisit the book once again, I would work on improving and expanding two particular topics in the book. The first one, as you can indicate, the brain is averaged. These are black books. It's a black book.
Honestly, when it comes to, like, I told you, the social movements, the revolution, the resistance, the political and economic development, ex-exclusion, marginalization, social structure, and empowerment, and gender relation, everything. You can find anything you can engage with serious. So in arbical English, don't get me wrong. Not only, I'm not only blaming our colleagues in English, but also, particularly in English.
It's hard to find anything. I remember, again, when I was trying to work on the paper, honestly, I only beside this, my Ian and Sock, and the live upload and Wagner's and Wagner's and Abul Magid. Honestly, there were only three articles by Abraham Zewe, which by Zewe is also for Vigna, and then big enough to be ignored by Abraham Zewe. And another, um, a recession from Aswan also wrote three pieces about the revolution and the sort of thing.
Right? The second one, which I would be happy to work with. And it's my lifetime work to be honest, which is critiquing and decodalizing international English. I wish I had that I'm more to develop the nine fallacies to bigger chop.
This is not about chop. This is not about even about this. This is like a research agenda. And I hope in the future, not necessarily in the book, but I hope in the future, in the journal, I have the chance to work on this.
I did both by writing about the particular topic, upper Egypt and decodalizing international relations series about the global South and about to reach. Yeah, great. Thank you. And my last question is, what are you currently working on?
I always get myself a book by two peers. Like either if I'm not working on a new paper or a book, I also love to keep engaging with Arabic or secular. So I also have site and project on giving lecture and talk about my work in Arabic, not only in English because most of my work in English, but I still, still interested. And actually, it's a very crucial to me to keep me engaging and in contact with with Arabic audience and scholars as well.
So I have this one on YouTube and other platforms, but now I'm working on two projects. One in Arabic and one in English. The one in Arabic is two volume, Madge Grapf with Carter University Press about theories of international relations and the study for peace. And this book is the first of its quite in Arabic that discuss theories of international relations and the study of war.
It's like more studies at peace recession in Arabic. And the first volume about as the world studies will be published this year with Carter University Press. And this one will be the handbook for other grad students in particular. Since like I told you, it's a very reduction about international relations in Arabic, especially the update to it is very rare.
And this one is the first of its type in Arabic will be published this year. And the second project in English is now under review with Oxford University Press. And this book actually about the phenomenon I told you about, which is called the state or the call to authority. This book is about the genealogy and archaeology of state violence and resistance in Islam.
And actually it's a book about the Faldul. So I am building a new theory about state building based on the Faldul and Muqandima. And this book is about of white equality and decentering knowledge production about political theory, where I look at it before the political series to not as a historian, not as a sociologist, but actually as a forgotten political theorist. And in this book over a millennium since the seven century until the post colonial condition in the global south I trace is the genealogy of state violence and resistance as our coalition between the state and authority and the law.
Which actually like I told you very interestingly, it's a reccesinate with the first question you kindly ask me about why you write this book or how you write this book or wins this book. And if you remember the unfortunate we are not normal to sizing the Arab Spring. We are not like nostalgia about nostalgia about the Arab Spring, but everything for I can see that everything for our generation started with three ones in our. I had a great idea.
Wonderful. This is my. Yeah, thank you. Thank you for all your wonderful and brilliant answers and thank you for asking our invitation.
Thank you for being on the show. I can be a good. I really enjoyed that conversation. And thank you everyone for listening.
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