Brown v. United States

Welcome to Supreme Court Opinions. In this episode, you’ll hear the Court’s opinion in Brown v United States.      In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense? The case was decided on May 23, 2024. The Supreme Court held that a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, Precedent and statutory context support the Government’s interpretation—that the federal and state definitions of a drug must match when the state crime was committed. ACCA is a recidivist statute that looks backward at a defendant's prior convictions to gauge their culpability and dangerousness. Treating state and federal drug offenses differently based on later changes to drug schedules would lead to strange results. Second, the Government's interpretation best fulfills ACCA's objectives. A defendant's prior serious drug convictions indicate a risk of future dangerousness, even if the drug is later considered less dangerous. The fact of the earlier conviction, not the legislature's subsequent judgment, is what matters for ACCA's purposes. Jackson's reliance on the reference canon and the principle that the law setting the penalty is the law in place when the crime was committed is misplaced. ACCA's reference to the Controlled Substances Act is specific, not general, and treating Jackson's prior convictions as ACCA predicates is consistent with the current law. Additionally, Brown's textual argument based on ACCA's use of the present tense, noting that this was likely a stylistic choice. Brown's reliance on the Schooner Peggy principle is misplaced because ACCA itself has not changed during the litigation. While the Government's interpretation may have some limitations, such as not capturing pre-1970 drug convictions, this is not absurd given the comprehensive regulatory scheme introduced by the Controlled Substances Act in 1970. The rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is not grievously ambiguous after considering context, precedent, and statutory design. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined in full and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that, notwithstanding the majority’s contrary contention, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) definitively answers the question presented here, establishing that courts should apply the drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearms offense that triggers ACCA’s potential application. The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.