“Hyperstition as the Natural Enemy of Rationality” by alseph

If the box contains a diamond, I desire to believe that the box contains a diamond; If the box does not contain a diamond right now, but will contain a diamond if I believe there is a diamond, Uh... Holding unfounded beliefs might sometimes, by some cruel irony, produce better outcomes than being rational. (This post was inspired by a couple cases where the causal effect of belief seems hand-waved away in the Sequences.) "Diseased Thinking" In this essay, Scott suggests that a consequentialist model deals with the question of whether to moralize issues like obesity better than a definitional argument over whether it is a "disease" or not. If it benefits the person, you moralize; otherwise you let them resort to medical interventions guilt-free. But there's this annoying feature of morality where most people feel like it has to be absolute to be worth acting on.[1] You can't just say "we should only guilt people if it would benefit them". The person is either guilty or not guilty; you can't pragmatically decide whether they're guilty or not. The consequentialist frame debuffs the power of moral pressure. Some individuals, who would have gotten their act together if everyone bought [...] ---Outline:(00:41) "Diseased Thinking"(02:45) "Why Our Kind Can't Cooperate"(04:28) Self-Confidence(04:57) AI(05:23) Conclusion The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration. --- First published: June 19th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/KDbdkvenK3DCTeL6t/hyperstition-as-the-natural-enemy-of-rationality --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.