Rivers v. Guerrero

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) apply to all second habeas petitions, or only specific types of second petitions?The case was decided on June 12, 2025.The Supreme Court held that when a district court enters judgment on a first federal habeas petition, any subsequent habeas filing qualifies as a “second or successive application” subject to the strict requirements of §2244(b), regardless of whether the first petition is pending on appeal. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes significant procedural barriers for second or successive habeas applications. These restrictions prohibit relitigating previously denied claims and permit new claims only when they rely on new retroactive constitutional law or present previously undiscoverable facts establishing innocence. Additionally, petitioners cannot file successive applications directly with the district court but must first obtain authorization from the court of appeals after making a prima facie showing that their petition satisfies one of §2244(b)(2)’s narrow exceptions. The phrase “second or successive application” constitutes a term of art that applies to filings seeking adjudication of federal claims on the merits, not merely to all filings made second in time.The entry of final judgment, not the pendency of appeal, marks the dividing line between first and second or successive habeas applications. While amended petitions filed before judgment do not trigger §2244(b), and Rule 59(e) motions represent a limited continuation of the original proceeding that merges into the final judgment, new habeas filings submitted after judgment constitute second or successive applications even during appeal. This rule advances AEDPA’s purposes of conserving judicial resources, reducing piecemeal litigation, and lending finality to state court judgments. Allowing petitioners to file unlimited new applications during appellate review would encourage inefficiency and make it difficult to produce a single final judgment for appeal. Historical habeas doctrine before AEDPA provides no clear guidance, as courts inconsistently treated new filings during pending appeals.The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.