Self Identity, Part II
Does it make sense to think we can duplicate persons, so that people can divide just like cells?
An episode of the Philosophical Problems podcast, hosted by Professor Andrew Brennan, titled "Self Identity, Part II" was published on March 20, 2013 and runs 42 minutes.
March 20, 2013 ·42m · Philosophical Problems
Summary
Does it make sense to think we can duplicate persons, so that people can divide just like cells? Since splitting means dividing one person into two people, the obvious answer seems to be that persons are unable to undergo fission. By looking at the old example of the Ship of Theseus we find that it is possible to think of artefacts dividing, in that one ship can become two. More precisely, a set of time-slices that constitute one ship can be shared by two different future sets of time slices that constitute two different ships. Exactly the same can be said of person fission of the sort that could happen using Star-Trek-style teleporter technology. Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.
Episode Description
Does it make sense to think we can duplicate persons, so that people can divide just like cells? Since splitting means dividing one person into two people, the obvious answer seems to be that persons are unable to undergo fission. By looking at the old example of the Ship of Theseus we find that it is possible to think of artefacts dividing, in that one ship can become two. More precisely, a set of time-slices that constitute one ship can be shared by two different future sets of time slices that constitute two different ships. Exactly the same can be said of person fission of the sort that could happen using Star-Trek-style teleporter technology.
Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.
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