The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppe's Specificity Principle

An AI narration of the article 'The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppe's Specificity Principle' by Jake Desyllas. Do we have rights because of what we are, or because of some capacity we later acquire? Libertarians are split, and the stakes run straight through the hardest questions about children, abortion, and self-ownership. This episode tests the two rival theories against one of Hans-Hermann Hoppe's meta-ethical principles: that every property right must be specific about who holds it and when. Drawing on admissions from Tibor Machan, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Stephan Kinsella, it argues that the theory of acquired rights cannot say when a child becomes a self-owner, and so fails the test on its own terms. The theory of inherent rights, which locates the start of rights at conception, does not. A short, sharp piece on a meta-ethical principle with large consequences. Chapters: 0:00 Introduction 2:25 The theory of acquired rights is not specific about when a child becomes a self owner 7:29 The Theory of Inherent Rights Conforms To The Specificity Principle First published at https://www.jakedesyllas.com/blog/2025/1/21/the-theory-of-acquired-rights-violates-hoppes-specificity-principle on 21 January 2025.