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Sex tourists fuel outrage about vice in Japan The debates do not have women’s interests at heart Jun 4th 2026|Tokyo|4 min read MAI, a 34-year-old woman in Tokyo, used to work at a hospital. But when covid-19 overwhelmed the wards, she found her work too stressful. A single mother, she also needed money for her family. Lured by higher pay, she entered the sex trade, first working as a porn actress before becoming a deriheru or “delivery health” worker—slang for call-girls who visit clients at home or in hotels. For a two-hour session, she earns ¥30,000 ($190). Mai is among hundreds of thousands of women working in Japan’s sprawling sex industry. The business, thought to be worth ¥2trn-5trn ($12bn-31bn) a year, is woven into male social life. One study in 2022 found that 48% of Japanese men had paid for sex at some point, compared with 11% in Britain. Hagiwara, a 63-year-old man in Tokyo, recalls being taken to a brothel by senior colleagues after joining a company, as a rite of passage. Emu, a man in his 30s, says “most men around me have been at least once.” Lately, however, lawmakers’ tolerance for the industry has come under much strain. Two recent triggers have encouraged Japanese to re-examine the confusing thicket of laws and conventions that govern how sex work is policed. One was an outrageous crime: last year authorities rescued a 12-year-old Thai girl who had been trafficked to Japan and forced to work at a sex shop in Tokyo. The second concern has been the growing visibility of women who sell sex around Okubo Park, near Tokyo’s red-light district (where the haggling more ordinarily goes on behind neon-lit doors). Relatively few women are involved in this. Nonetheless, solicitation (waiting for or approaching clients in public) is illegal in Japan. The sight of women openly waiting for clients has unsettled the public. Compounding the public debate is the fact that some of their customers are foreign tourists, lured to Japan by the cheapness of the yen. Videos of them approaching women in Okubo Park have spread rapidly online. “It is truly lamentable,” said Kamiya Sohei, leader of the right-wing populist Sanseito party, in a video. Behind the outrage lies a sense of wounded pride: during Japan’s boom years in the 1970s and 1980s, it was Japanese men who went abroad for sex. The authorities have decided to act—at least where the streetwalkers are concerned. Recently women around Okubo Park have been detained or arrested. Yet campaigners say it is unfair that authorities have not also been trying to punish the buyers. “Women are taken away by the police—while the men who buy sex stand beside them smirking,” says Kanajiri Kazuna of PAPS, a women’s-rights group. In November an opposition lawmaker raised this disparity in parliament. In response Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, ordered the justice ministry to re-examine current practices and consider reforms. The prospect of change has sparked very broad debate about how Japan could improve its policing of sex work. Some Japanese feminists would like their country to implement the Nordic style of regulation adopted by Sweden, France and others, which criminalises buying sex while shielding sellers themselves from prosecution. “Buying sex is a form of violence against women,” says Ms Kanajiri. Other Japanese argue that getting tougher on buyers will drive sex work underground, leaving women more exposed to violence. Some want the industry fully legalised and regulated, as in Germany and the Netherlands. Nakayama Misato of Siente, a sex-work advocacy group, argues that criminalisation can mean that women are treated merely as victims, ignoring their agency. “Doing sex work is not a bad thing—it’s a valid way of making a living.” To be more than skin deep, any changes would have to apply not only to streetwalking but to Japan’s vast indoor sex-industry, the laws for which are riddled with loopholes and selectively enforced. Consider the practice of “soapland”, in which customers ostensibly pay to be bathed; if sex happens to take place in the process, officials generally turn a blind eye. Takao Yasuo of Curtin University says this is typical of Japan’s approach to regulating the sex industry. The priority is to keep vice decorously out of public view. A big rethink seems unlikely. For now, the justice ministry is narrowly focused on street prostitution. Taking care of that is “the lowest-cost, highest-visibility form of enforcement available to the state”, notes Mr Takao. “Many lawmakers, especially conservatives, are sensitive to the idea of women becoming sexually promiscuous,” says Shiomura Ayaka, a lawmaker. Women openly soliciting sex in public have become symbols of social disorder. ■ 性觀光客加劇了對日本色情業的憤怒 這些辯論的核心並非以女性的利益為出發點 2026年6月4日 | 東京 | 4分鐘閱讀時間 小麥（Mai），一名在東京的34歲女性，過去曾在一家醫院工作。但是當新冠肺炎壓垮了病房時，她發現自己的工作壓力太大了。作為一名單親媽媽，她也需要錢來養家。在更高薪水的誘惑下，她進入了性產業，先是擔任成人片（A片）女演員，之後成為一名「deriheru」或「派遣健康（外送茶）」工作者——這是指前往客戶家中或飯店服務的應召女郎的俚語。一個兩小時的服務時段，她可以賺取30,000日圓（190美元）。 小麥是日本龐大且擴張的性產業中，成千上萬名工作女性的其中之一。這項據信每年價值達2兆至5兆日圓（120億至310億美元）的行業，已經融入了男性的社交生活之中。2022年的一項研究發現，48%的日本男性曾在某個時間點花錢買過性服務，相比之下，英國的比例僅為11%。萩原（Hagiwara），一名在東京的63歲男性，回憶起自己在進入公司後，被資深同事帶去妓院，將其視為一種成年禮。艾姆（Emu），一名30多歲的男性說：「我身邊的大多數男人至少都去過一次。」 然而，近來立法者對該產業的容忍度受到了極大的考驗。最近的兩個導火線，促使日本人重新審視管理如何對性工作進行治安維持的、那套令人困惑且錯綜複雜的法律與慣例。其中一個是一起駭人聽聞的罪行：去年當局解救了一名被販賣到日本、並被強迫在東京一家情色店工作的12歲泰國女孩。 第二個擔憂則是，在東京紅燈區附近的「大久保公園」周邊，販賣性服務的女性其能見度越來越高（在那裡，討價還價通常是在霓虹燈閃爍的門後進行）。雖然涉及此事的女性相對較少。儘管如此，拉客（在公共場所等待或主動接近客戶）在日本是違法的。女性公開等待客戶的景象讓公眾感到不安。 使公眾辯論更加劇的複雜因素是，她們的某些客戶是外國觀光客，他們因日圓貶值（便宜）而被吸引到日本。他們在大久保公園接近女性的影片在網路上迅速傳播。右翼民粹主義「參政黨」黨魁神谷宗幣（Kamiya Sohei）在一段影片中表示：「這真是令人悲哀。」在憤怒的背後，隱藏著一種受挫的自尊心：在1970年代和1980年代日本經濟繁榮的歲月裡，是日本男性前往國外進行性觀光。 當局已決定採取行動——至少在涉及街頭流鶯的部分。最近，大久保公園周邊的女性遭到拘留或逮捕。然而，社會運動人士表示，當局沒有同時試圖懲罰買家是不公平的。「女性被警察帶走——而買性的男人則站在一旁傻笑，」女權團體 PAPS 的金尻カズナ（Kanajiri Kazuna）表示。去年11月，一名反對黨議員在國會中提出了這一不平等待遇。作為回應，首相高市早苗（Takaichi Sanae）命令法務省重新審視現行做法並考慮改革。 變革的前景引發了關於日本如何改善性工作治安管理的廣泛辯論。一些日本女性主義者希望她們的國家能實施瑞典、法國等國採用的「北歐模式」規範，該模式將買性行為定為刑事犯罪，同時保護賣性者免受起訴。「買性是對女性的一種暴力形式，」金尻女士說。 其他日本人則認為，對買家採取更嚴厲的態度會將性工作推向地下，使女性更容易暴露於暴力之中。有些人則希望像德國和荷蘭那樣，將該產業完全合法化並進行規範。性工作倡議團體 Siente 的中山美里（Nakayama Misato）認為，刑事犯罪化可能意味著女性僅被視為受害者，而忽略了她們的自主權（主體性）。「從事性工作並不是一件壞事——這是一種正當的謀生方式。」 若要使任何改變不只是流於表面（深層改革），這些改變不僅必須適用於街頭拉客，還必須適用於日本龐大的室內性產業，而該產業的法律充斥著漏洞，且屬於選擇性執法。以「泡泡浴（soapland）」的慣例為例，顧客表面上是付費接受沐浴服務；如果在過程中偶然發生了性行為，官員通常會睜一隻眼閉一隻眼。寇廷大學（Curtin University）的鷹尾安雄（Takao Yasuo）表示，這是日本規範性產業的典型做法。其首要任務是體面地將惡行（色情）保持在公眾視線之外。 一場徹底的大反思似乎不太可能發生。目前，法務省正狹隘地將焦點集中在街頭賣淫上。鷹尾先生指出，處理這件事是「國家目前可行、成本最低且能見度最高的一種執法形式」。國會議員塩村文夏（Shiomura Ayaka）表示：「許多立法者，特別是保守派，對於女性變得性生活混亂（放蕩）的想法非常敏感。」在公共場合公開拉客的女性，已經成為了社會秩序混亂的象徵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How to fight back against Gen-Z socialism The me-first doctrine is a threat to prosperity Jun 4th 2026|5 min read Something new is stirring on the left. A fresh crop of socialists want to remake the economy with price controls,** hefty **wealth taxes and a spree of nationalisations. Supercharged by fury over Gaza, they are winning voters at a formidable pace. Many rose to prominence only recently, like Zack Polanski, who leads the Green Party in Britain, or Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of New York. Others are long-standing political fixtures: the septuagenarian Jean-Luc Mélenchon is on his fourth swing at the French presidency, but thumping support from the 20-somethings of “Generation Z” has put the Elysée back in his sights again. Call it Gen-Z socialism. Not because all its adherents are young—or because it is new for young people to lean leftward—but because it is the brand of leftism, made for the TikTok era, that today’s young revolutionaries support. Forget weighty collectivist ideals or seizing the means of production. Gen-Z socialism is a me-first doctrine. Climate change and race, preoccupations of the 2010s and early 2020s, are now much more peripheral concerns. So are social issues, barring Gaza. Angst about inflation, housing and artificial intelligence have replaced all that with something cruder. “This country is awash in wealth,” says Avi Lewis, freshly elected leader of the New Democratic Party in Canada, a country where productivity has been all but flat for a decade. “We can have nice things.” Saying that prices should be capped to keep your bills down while someone else pays for your public services is a seductive, shareable message. Plenty of the grievances that animate Gen-Z socialists do stem from real issues. Inflation has been too high, rent in big cities is now often unaffordable and AI could upend the labour market. Dismissing these worries would be foolish. Yet Gen-Z socialism is wrong about how to fix the problems of capitalism. It must be resisted, because it is a profound threat to prosperity. No country’s Gen-Z socialists are quite alike. The realities of power have forced some, like Mr Mamdani, to become more moderate. But they broadly agree on three core principles. First, that growth does little to help ordinary people. Theirs is a zero-sum mindset, where a better outcome comes not from creating but from taking—as they fear ai barons will soon do on a vast scale. Second, that spending can be paid for by the richest. Once the left wanted higher taxes for everyone; Gen-Z socialists demand handouts funded by billionaires. The third tenet is a remarkable hostility to private enterprise. Gen-Z socialists are uninterested in letting the market rip and redistributing the proceeds. They would have chunks of everyday life, from housing to groceries, governed by state diktat. Politics has always had zany fringes. The far right is no less barmy—and more dangerous. But what is so worrying about the Gen-Z socialists is how deeply their ideas are bleeding into the centre-left. Desperate to compete, even mainstream Democrats in America now propose mad schemes like exempting over half of tax filers from federal income tax. In Britain the Labour Party, having won power on a centrist platform, has been spooked by the Greens and is rekindling its zeal for higher taxes and state control. Increasingly, the ideas of the Gen-Z socialists can win even when their candidates lose. That is bad news. Rent controls would worsen housing shortages by crushing the incentive to build. The profit margins of big supermarket chains, demonised by Gen-Z socialists, are already wafer-thin after years of ruthless competition—a miracle of modern capitalism. Wealth taxes would become confiscatory and deter innovation. Do not assume that the failure of these policies, if implemented, would bring about an automatic course correction. Europe has struggled for decades to escape the low-growth funk left by its own over-regulation; the rise of statist “Peronists” in Argentina helps explain its century of relative decline. Resisting Gen-Z socialism is therefore an urgent task. The first step is for free-market liberals to stop apologising. A series of popular criticisms of capitalism, each containing a grain of truth, has in aggregate obscured the fundamental wisdom that private enterprise is at the root of human prosperity. Yes, people aren’t always rational, as behavioural economics shows. True, inequality matters and growth is better when broad-based. Free trade and globalisation create losers as well as winners. But this is the best time in human history to be born, given record real incomes, high life expectancy and low rates of extreme poverty. A punchier defence of capitalism would work better in the social-media age than hand-wringing by uncharismatic centrists like Sir Keir Starmer. Centrist governments must also solve the problems driving popular discontent. “Abundance” liberals are right to want to build cheap and plentiful housing and infrastructure. Politicians must stop saddling the young with the burden of funding excessive pensions. The tax system must ensure that meritocracy prevails over inheritocracy: broader-based inheritance taxes and levies on property would help. The hardest challenge will be the disruption caused by advances in AI. The Gen-Z leftists have set out their stall with calls for a moratorium on data centres and a government jobs guarantee. Liberals must be more positive and imaginative in their own prescriptions, using a mixture of taxes, distributed capital ownership and support for workers to make sure that the upsides of labour-market disruption are widely shared. The world is ruled by little else Populists have the wind in their sails; it can sometimes seem as though market liberalism is doomed to political failure. *The Economist *disagrees. A robust defence of the ideas that have brought unprecedented riches has barely been tried. Many of the problems that animate Gen-Z socialists, like high rents, are the result of markets that are insufficiently free, not excessively so. There is time yet for liberalism to once again produce results—and to win the argument. ■ 如何反擊 Z 世代社會主義 「自我優先」的教條是對繁榮的威脅 2026年6月4日 | 5分鐘閱讀時間 左翼陣營中正在醞釀一些新的東西。新一批的社會主義者想要透過價格管制、高額財富稅以及一連串的國有化來重塑經濟。在對加薩局勢的憤怒催化下，他們正以驚人的速度贏得選民支持。許多人直到最近才嶄露頭角，例如領導英國綠黨的柴克·波蘭斯基，或是紐約市市長佐蘭·馬姆達尼。其他人則是政壇的常客：年屆七旬的尚-盧·梅蘭雄正第四次角逐法國總統寶座，而來自「Z 世代」20多歲年輕人的巨大支持，讓他再次將目光投向了愛麗舍宮。 姑且稱之為「Z 世代社會主義」。 這並非因為其所有信徒都很年輕——也不是因為年輕人傾向左翼是什麼新鮮事——而是因為這種左翼主義的品牌是為 TikTok 時代量身打造的，且深受當今全體年輕革命家支持。 忘掉沉重的集體主義理想或奪取生產工具吧。Z 世代社會主義是一種「自我優先」的教條。氣候變遷和種族問題曾是 2010 年代和 2020 年代初期人們關注的焦點，如今已退居到極其邊緣的位置。除了加薩問題之外，社會議題也是如此。 對通貨膨脹、住房和人工智慧的焦慮已經取代了這一切，取而代之的是更粗糙的東西。「這個國家充斥著財富，」加拿大新民主黨新當選的領導人艾維·路易斯說，而該國的生產力在過去十年中幾乎停滯不前。「我們可以擁有美好的事物。」宣稱應該限制價格以降低你的帳單，同時讓別人來為你的公共服務買單，這是一個極具誘惑力且易於分享的訊息。 許多激發 Z 世代社會主義者不滿的情緒，確實源於真實存在的問題。通貨膨脹一直過高，大城市的房租現在往往令人無法負擔，而且人工智慧可能會顛覆勞動力市場。 對這些擔憂不屑一顧將是愚蠢的。然而，Z 世代社會主義在如何解決資本主義問題上是錯誤的。它必須受到抵制，因為它是對繁榮的深刻威脅。 沒有哪個國家的 Z 世代社會主義者是完全相同的。權力的現實已經迫使像馬姆達尼先生這樣的一些人變得更加溫和。但他們大致上認同三個核心原則。 第一，經濟成長對幫助普通人微乎其微。他們抱持的是一種零和思維，認為更好的結果不是來自創造，而是來自掠奪——正如他們擔心人工智慧巨頭很快就會大規模所做的那樣。 第二，政府支出可以由最富有的人來支付。過去的左翼希望對每個人提高稅收；而 Z 世代社會主義者則要求由億萬富翁出資提供福利津貼。 第三，是對私營企業顯著的敵意。Z 世代社會主義者對放任市場自由發展並重新分配收益不感興趣。他們希望日常生活的各個層面，從住房到雜貨，都由國家的強硬命令來管轄。 政治圈一直都有荒誕的邊緣群體。極右翼也同樣瘋狂——而且更加危險。但是，Z 世代社會主義者之所以如此令人擔憂，是因為他們的思想正極深地滲透到中左翼陣營中。為了拼命競爭，甚至連美國主流的民主黨人現在也提出了瘋狂的方案，例如免除超過一半申報者的聯邦個人所得稅。在英國，以中間派政綱贏得政權的工黨已被綠黨嚇壞，正在重新燃起對提高稅收和國家控制的熱情。越來越多情況是，即使 Z 世代社會主義者的候選人落選，他們的思想依然能取得勝利。 這是個壞消息。租金管制會摧毀建造房屋的誘因，從而加劇住房短缺。被 Z 世代社會主義者妖魔化的大型連鎖超市，其利潤率在經歷多年的殘酷競爭後已經薄如蟬翼——這是現代資本主義的奇蹟。財富稅會演變成變相沒收，並阻礙創新。不要假設這些政策一旦實施並遭遇失敗後，會帶來自動的路線修正。歐洲數十年來一直難以擺脫自身過度監管所帶來的低成長泥淖；阿根廷擁護國家主義的「庇隆主義者」崛起，有助於解釋該國經歷長達一世紀的相對衰落。 因此，抵制 Z 世代社會主義是一項迫切的任務。第一步是自由市場自由主義者要停止道歉。一系列對資本主義的普遍批評，雖然每一項都包含著一絲道理，但總體而言，卻掩蓋了「私營企業是人類繁榮的根本基石」這一核心智慧。 誠然，正如行為經濟學所顯示的，人們並不總是理性的。沒錯，不平等確實至關重要，而且當經濟成長基礎廣泛時效果會更好。自由貿易和全球化在創造贏家的同時，也製造了輸家。但是，鑑於創紀錄的實質收入、高預期壽命和極低的極端貧困率，這是人類歷史上最適合出生的時代。在社群媒體時代，對資本主義進行更有力的辯護，會比像施凱爾·斯塔摩爵士這樣缺乏魅力的中間派人士在那裡焦慮束手無策更有效。 中間派政府也必須解決引發民眾不滿的問題。追求「豐裕」的自由主義者渴望建造廉價且充足的住房和基礎設施，這毫無疑問是正確的。政治家們必須停止將資助過高養老金的負擔強加在年輕人身上。稅收制度必須確保唯才主義凌駕於世襲主義之上：更廣泛基礎的遺產稅和房產徵稅將會有所幫助。 最艱巨的挑戰將是人工智慧的進步所帶來的顛覆性衝擊。Z 世代左翼分子(主張社會平等、社會福利與改革進步的人士)已經表明了他們的立場，呼籲暫緩建設數據中心並由政府提供就業保障。自由主義者在他們自己的處方中必須更加積極且富有想像力，透過結合稅收、分散資本所有權以及對勞工的支援，來確保勞動力市場顛覆所帶來的正面效益能被廣泛分享。 世界幾乎不被其他東西所統治。民粹主義者正順風順水；有時這看起來就像是市場自由主義注定要在政治上失敗。《經濟學人》對此持反對意見。對於那些帶來前所未有財富的思想進行堅定辯護，目前還幾乎沒有人嘗試過。許多激勵 Z 世代社會主義者的問題，例如高昂的租金，其實是市場「不夠自由」的結果，而不是「過度自由」所致。自由主義依然有時間再次創造出成果——並在這場辯論中贏得勝利。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Leaders | Don’t look back in Changhua How East Asia should respond to its China shock As they deindustrialise, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan must reform May 28th 2026|4 min read AMERICA’S artificial-intelligence** boom** has put the rich economies of north-east Asia into overdrive. Taiwan’s output is growing at a blistering 14% annual pace, thanks to soaring sales of chips and servers for data centres. In the past year operating profits at South Korea’s makers of memory chips have risen by over 500%. Even sluggish Japan is benefiting—though it long ago lost its title as the world’s pre-eminent chipmaker. In 2025 all three countries enjoyed record exports and current-account surpluses. The region’s export bonanza, though, obscures an important story in the rest of its economy. As we report, outside its highest-tech sectors, rich north-east Asia is deindustrialising. Strong competition from China, paired with increasing specialisation in chips, has disrupted an economic model based on a wider range of manufacturing exports—the model that helped make the region prosperous in the 1980s and 1990s. Even as it booms, north-east Asia increasingly needs reform. The ascendant assembler In the past few years China’s relations with its rich neighbours have been transformed. Once it imported high-value parts from north-east Asia and focused on low-value final assembly. Now it competes across the whole supply chain. Taiwan’s long-running surplus in goods with the mainland flipped into deficit this year, as South Korea’s did years ago (though in the past few months Korean chip exports have returned it to surplus again). In Japan the bilateral deficit with China has plumbed new depths, setting a record earlier this year. Industries from carmaking to chemicals are under intense pressure. As in the West, the perception that domestic manufacturers are competing with goods produced by subsidised Chinese firms is feeding protectionist sentiment. The specialisation in chips is an understandable development that reflects these economies’ maturity. Yet this particular focus also creates fragility. The tech-hardware cycle is notoriously volatile and its vicissitudes increasingly affect the region’s economies. The tech supply chain also relies deeply on America and China for both critical inputs and end-user demand. On an index of export-basket concentration, north-east Asia is 73% higher than the rich-world average, and concentration has risen since 2019. This leaves the region dangerously exposed to protectionism by either superpower. There is nothing wrong with specialisation, as David Ricardo would attest. However, East Asia’s rich economies would be better off if they paired their chip-export juggernauts with dynamic domestic economies. The trouble is that domestic demand is too low—a legacy, in part, of outdated economic structures that hold down consumption in order to promote exports above all else. The time has come to sweep these old systems away. Two-tier labour markets guarantee employment for insiders, often working for big exporters, while inflicting wage penalties and precarity on everyone else. Freeing up labour markets would improve the matching of workers and firms, lifting real wages. Pension systems favour staff at exporters but are stingy for others, leaving the region with some of the rich world’s highest rates of relative poverty among the elderly. Higher minimum incomes would boost aggregate spending. Taiwan has engineered a weak currency, and South Korea and Japan use the state to allocate credit. Less financial engineering would let resources flow to the firms that will use them best. North-east Asia must allow failing manufacturers to die a natural death. Support should be stopped for mighty firms such as TSMC and Samsung Electronics, which do not require lavish subsidies to compete. And although East Asian countries can hardly avoid relying on markets in America and China—the world’s two biggest economies—they can cut other barriers to trade. Some of these barriers are local. Grievances from colonial times mean that South Korea and Japan still do not have a bilateral free-trade agreement. South Korea should join the Japan-led CPTPP, a top-notch trading pact. The danger is that, spooked by the China shock, the region’s governments will instead double down on aggressive industrial policy. South Korea has promised $530bn in chipmaking subsidies and Takaichi Sanae, Japan’s prime minister, is overseeing state-led investment into 61 “strategic” goods. Using the power of the government to promote exports succeeded for these economies when they were poor and trying to catch up with the West. It is not an approach that works in places that are already rich. Doubling down on exports will leave north-east Asia poorer and more exposed. Instead, the region’s best economic bet is to become more dynamic at home and more diversified abroad. ■ 東亞應如何回應其「中國衝擊」 隨著去工業化發生，台灣、南韓與日本必須進行改革 2026年5月28日｜閱讀時間 4 分鐘 美國的人工智慧熱潮已讓東北亞的富裕經濟體全速運轉。由於資料中心所需晶片與伺服器銷售激增，台灣的產出正以驚人的年率 14% 成長。過去一年裡，南韓記憶體晶片製造商的營業利潤增加了超過 500%。即使是長期低迷的日本也從中受益——儘管它早已失去全球首要晶片製造國的地位。2025年，這三個國家都創下了出口與經常帳盈餘的新紀錄。 然而，該地區的出口榮景掩蓋了其餘經濟中的一個重要故事。正如我們所報導的，在最高科技產業之外，富裕的東北亞正經歷去工業化。來自中國的強大競爭，加上日益專注於晶片產業，已經擾亂了一種以更廣泛製造業出口為基礎的經濟模式——正是這種模式在1980與1990年代幫助該地區走向繁榮。即使正處於繁榮之中，東北亞也愈來愈需要改革。 崛起的組裝者 過去幾年間，中國與其富裕鄰國的關係已經發生轉變。過去，中國從東北亞進口高附加價值零組件，自己則專注於低附加價值的最終組裝。如今，中國已在整條供應鏈上展開競爭。 台灣長期對中國大陸維持的貨物貿易順差，今年已轉為逆差；南韓則早在數年前就出現同樣情況（雖然過去幾個月南韓晶片出口回升，又讓其恢復順差）。在日本，對中國的雙邊貿易逆差已跌至前所未有的低點，並於今年稍早創下紀錄。從汽車製造到化學工業，各產業都面臨沉重壓力。如同西方國家一樣，人們認為本國製造商正在與受到中國政府補貼的企業所生產的商品競爭，這種看法正在助長保護主義情緒。 專注於晶片產業是一種可以理解的發展，反映出這些經濟體的成熟。然而，這種特定的聚焦也帶來脆弱性。科技硬體產業週期向來波動劇烈，而其起伏如今愈來愈影響整個地區的經濟。此外，科技供應鏈在關鍵投入與最終需求方面都高度依賴美國與中國。在一項衡量出口商品籃集中度的指數上，東北亞比富裕國家平均高出 73%，而且自2019年以來集中度還在上升。這使該地區危險地暴露於任何一方超級大國所採取的保護主義措施之下。 專業分工本身並沒有錯，正如大衛．李嘉圖所主張的那樣。然而，如果東亞富裕經濟體能夠在其強大的晶片出口機器之外，同時擁有充滿活力的國內經濟，它們的處境將會更好。問題在於國內需求過低——這在某種程度上是過時經濟結構的遺留結果。這些結構壓抑消費，以便把促進出口放在首位。 現在是時候徹底掃除這些舊制度了。雙軌勞動市場保障了體制內人士的就業——這些人往往受僱於大型出口企業——卻讓其他人承受薪資懲罰與不穩定的工作環境。放寬勞動市場限制將改善勞工與企業之間的配對效率，並提高實質工資。 退休金制度偏袒出口企業員工，卻對其他人相當吝嗇，使得該地區老年人口的相對貧窮率居於富裕國家之列的高位。提高最低所得將有助於提升整體支出。 台灣一直維持疲弱的匯率，而南韓與日本則利用國家力量配置信貸。減少這類金融工程，將能讓資源流向最能有效運用它們的企業。 東北亞必須允許失敗的製造商自然退出市場。像台積電與三星電子這樣強大的企業，其實不需要慷慨補貼也能維持競爭力，因此應停止對其提供支持。 此外，雖然東亞國家幾乎無法避免依賴美國與中國——這兩個全球最大的經濟體——但它們可以降低其他貿易障礙。其中一些障礙源自區域內部。殖民時代遺留下來的恩怨意味著南韓與日本至今仍未簽署雙邊自由貿易協定。南韓應加入由日本主導的《跨太平洋夥伴全面進步協定》（CPTPP），這是一項高水準的貿易協定。 危險在於，受到「中國衝擊」驚嚇後，該地區政府反而會加倍推動積極的產業政策。南韓已承諾提供 5,300 億美元的晶片製造補貼，而日本首相高市早苗則正在監督由政府主導、涵蓋 61 項「戰略商品」的投資計畫。 當這些經濟體仍然貧窮、試圖追趕西方時，利用政府力量促進出口確實取得了成功。然而，對於已經富裕的國家而言，這並不是一種有效的方法。進一步押注出口將使東北亞變得更加貧窮，也更加脆弱。 相反地，該地區最佳的經濟策略，是讓國內經濟變得更具活力，同時讓對外經濟關係更加多元化。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The secrets to a good employee survey Likert or not Mar 19th 2026|4 min read 1. “This sentence is false” is an example of a logical inconsistency known as the liar paradox. If this sentence is true, then it is indeed false. But if this sentence is false, then it must be true. This is the kind of thing that makes philosophers go weak at the knees and gives normal people a headache. 2. A small echo of the liar paradox can be heard in a ritual of modern management: the annual employee survey. Imagine being asked to react to this statement: “This survey is a complete waste of time.” If enough people Strongly Agree with this proposition, then it’s probably true. But if a company is the kind of place where employees are prepared to give such honest feedback, then isn’t it likely to be false? 3. Employee surveys are a staple of corporate life. Knowing what workers are thinking is an important goal. High employee churn imposes financial and operational costs. There is lots of research to suggest that employee satisfaction leads to better financial outcomes. But set-piece surveys are really useful only if three conditions are met: they are properly designed, they are used in conjunction with other tools and they lead somewhere. 4. Among other things, proper design means grappling with the problem that employees are not necessarily incentivised to be honest. Faced with a Likert scale and the proposition that “My bosses have the communication skills of a banana,” you might Strongly Agree but still opt to Neither Agree Nor Disagree on your submitted form. Promises of confidentiality and anonymity can help, but only to a point. 5. Impression management, a fancy name for making yourself look good, can skew results on questions about things like job-safety practices. There are ways to mitigate this, however. A recent study by Emma Zaal of the University of Groningen and her co-authors found that using different survey formulations can have a big impact on responses. In a survey of Dutch adults, which asked questions like whether they had sent text messages while driving a car, the inclusion of face-saving options such as “occasionally” or “only when no other option” elicited a very different set of answers from binary “yes” or “no” options. 6. Employers can look at unvarnished feedback, most obviously on workplace-review sites such as GlassDoor. Artificial intelligence has the ability to build a coherent picture out of a mass of unstructured comments. In one recent paper, Tom Reader and Alex Gillespie of the London School of Economics looked for evidence of high-pressure cultures in employee reviews of European firms. Reviews that suggested very ambitious targets and expediency in reaching them were predictive of companies experiencing a future corporate scandal. 7. Frequency is another aspect of good design. A lot can change in the space of a year; an annual survey is a long time to wait for an update on employee sentiment. Retrospective evaluations are also subject to biases like the peak-end rule, which describes how people overweight the most extreme and the closing moments of an experience when they recall it. In one famous experiment, Daniel Kahneman and others put volunteers through two unpleasant tasks: the first involved holding their hands in icy water for a minute, and the second for 90 seconds, though for the final 30 seconds the water’s temperature rose by a little. The first experience was objectively less painful but, given a choice, the second was the one people chose to repeat. 8. Shorter “pulse” surveys cannot eradicate these problems, but are a way to gather more timely data. HappyOrNot, a Finnish company that makes those smiley-face feedback terminals you see in airports and elsewhere, also installs its machines inside companies as a way of keeping track of employee sentiment on a daily or weekly basis. 9. Good design and multiple sources of information contribute to a successful employee survey. But nothing matters more than being seen to act on feedback. If you say that your bosses have the communication skills of a banana and then hear nothing back, you have the faint satisfaction of knowing you are right but not much else. Surveys that prompt no follow-up action deepen cynicism rather than enthusiasm. 10. All of which leads to another paradox. Surveys are most useful in organisations that care about what their employees think. But organisations that care about what their employees think often have less need for surveys.■ 員工滿意度調查成功的秘訣 不論你喜不喜歡（Likert scale 刻度調查的雙關語） 2026年3月19日 | 4 分鐘閱讀 「這句話是假的」是一個被稱為「說謊者悖論」的邏輯矛盾案例。如果這句話是真的，那麼它確實是假的；但如果這句話是假的，那麼它就必須是真的。這種事情會讓哲學家雙膝發軟，並讓一般人感到頭痛。 在現代管理的一項儀式中，可以聽到說謊者悖論的微弱迴聲：那就是年度員工調查。想像一下，當你被要求對這句話做出反應：「這次調查完全是浪費時間。」如果有足夠多的人「強烈同意」這個命題，那麼它很可能是真的。但如果一家公司是那種員工願意提供如此誠實反饋的地方，那麼這句話難道不更有可能是假的嗎？ 員工調查是企業生活的家常便飯。了解員工在想什麼是一個重要的目標。高員工離職率會帶來財務和營運上的成本。有大量的研究表明，員工滿意度能帶來更好的財務成果。但是，這種固定形式的調查只有在滿足三個條件時才真正有用：它們經過妥善設計、與其他工具配合使用，並且能帶來實際的改變。 其中，妥善的設計意味著必須解決一個問題：員工不一定有動機保持誠實。面對李克特量表（Likert scale）以及「我的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧」這個命題時，你內心可能「強烈同意」，但最終在提交的表單上還是會選擇「既不同意也不反對」。保護隱私和匿名的承諾會有所幫助，但也只能起到一定程度的作用。 印象管理（這是一個讓自己看起來面子好看的精緻名稱）可能會在有關工作安全規範等問題上扭曲調查結果。然而，有一些方法可以減輕這種情況。格羅寧根大學的艾瑪·扎爾（Emma Zaal）及其合著者最近發表的一項研究發現，使用不同的問卷設計表述會對回答產生重大影響。在一項針對荷蘭成年人的調查中（詢問他們是否曾在開車時發送簡訊），加入「偶爾」或「僅在別無選擇時」等顧及面子的選項，所引出的答案與二分法的「是」或「否」選項截然不同。 雇主可以參考未經修飾的反饋，最顯而易見的是在 GlassDoor 等職場評價網站上。人工智慧有能力從大量非結構化的評論中，拼湊出一個清晰完整的輪廓。在最近的一篇論文中，倫敦政治經濟學院的湯姆·里德（Tom Reader）和亞歷克斯·吉萊斯皮（Alex Gillespie）在歐洲企業的員工評論中，尋找是否存在高壓文化的證據。那些暗示目標非常宏大、且在達成目標時不擇手段的評論，預示著這些公司未來將會經歷企業醜聞。 頻率是妥善設計的另一個面向。在長達一年的時間裡，很多事情都會發生變化；對於獲取員工情緒的最新動態而言，年度調查是一段漫長的等待。回溯性的評估也容易受到像是「峰終定律」（peak-end rule）等偏誤的影響，該定律描述了人們在回憶一項經歷時，會過度重視最極端以及結束時的時刻。在一個著名的實驗中，丹尼爾·康納曼（Daniel Kahneman）等人讓志願者經歷兩項令人不快的任務：第一項涉及將手放在冰水中一分鐘；第二項則是放 90 秒，不過在最後的 30 秒內，水溫稍微上升了一點。第一種體驗客觀上痛苦較少，但如果可以選擇，人們卻選擇重複第二種。 更短期的「脈搏」（pulse）調查雖然無法完全消除這些問題，但卻是收集更即時數據的一種方法。HappyOrNot 是一家芬蘭公司，負責製造你在機場和其他地方看到的那些笑臉反饋終端機，該公司也將這些機器安裝在企業內部，作為每日或每週追蹤員工情緒的一種方式。 好的設計和多元的信息來源有助於員工調查的成功。但沒有任何事情比「被看見對反饋採取行動」更重要。如果你說你的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧，隨後卻沒聽到任何回應，你只會得到一種知道自己是對的、卻於事無補的微弱滿足感。沒有引發任何後續行動的調查，非但不能深化熱情，反而會加深諷刺與犬儒主義。 這一切引出了另一個悖論：調查在那些關心員工想法的組織中最有用。然而，關心員工想法的組織，往往較不需要進行調查。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The world wants Chinese tech. China is determined to keep it China’s rivals are learning how to get what China won’t share Apr 20th 2026|5 min read THEY USED to gripe about too much technology transfer in China. But in the past year or so, foreign business and political leaders** have started to fret that too little is happening.** No longer do they worry so much about Western tech landing in Chinese hands; rather, they fear that China is now too effective at preventing its best stuff from passing to foreigners. A former Chinese trade official reacts to the pivot with empathy rather than mockery. “It is a bit hypocritical but it’s understandable,” he says. It might be tempting to craft a morality play out of this, as if countries outside China are getting their comeuppance. But at its heart this is a practical problem, a question of whether China will be able to dig a moat around its world-leading technologies, from electric vehicles to artificial-intelligence-powered robots. Chaguan is inclined to take the other side of the bet—namely, that knowledge will flow as it normally does, from those who have it to those who want it. A reverse tech transfer will, over time, occur. In principle, the mechanism is straightforward. Countries can offer Chinese firms market access as long as they set up local manufacturing. In practice, none of this is automatic—and all of it is fraught. The European Union is now at the forefront, recently proposing procurement rules that would require things such as battery-storage systems for Europe to be made there. Chinese companies wanting to be let in to European markets would have to invest in factories there. Developing countries also see promise. From Brazil to Vietnam, governments are opening their doors to Chinese EV companies and urging them to use local content. Yet it is early days. “We have been talking about tech transfer for just the past year and it’s still not really clear how it will work,” says one diplomat with refreshing candour. One obstacle will be China itself. Over the past five years it has built an export-control regime, mimicking America’s. The stated goal is to protect national security but many controls are aimed at shoring up Chinese industry. Last year, for example, the commerce ministry said it would require companies to obtain licences before exporting technologies used in EV batteries. A Western trade official sees little prospect of Chinese officials letting out anything genuinely valuable. They have already reacted angrily to the made-in-Europe legislation, viewing it as a ploy to weaken Chinese industry. The saga of Manus, an AI startup, also highlights Chinese leaders’ paranoia. Founded in China, Manus shifted its business registration to Singapore last year, facilitating a sale to Meta, Facebook’s parent company. Chinese regulators are now attempting to unwind that deal and have barred Manus’s two co-founders from leaving the country. But China’s own record in digesting foreign tech offers some guidance for the rest of the world. Persistence will be essential. China took three decades to hone its methods: incentives for investors; requirements for local joint ventures; content rules; partnerships with foreign universities; and, yes, theft of intellectual property. One critical need is more attention to Chinese scientific research: much of it, at least in pre-commercial phases, is in journals, says Tai Ming Cheung, an analyst of Chinese tech policy. “It’s something we didn’t think about that now we have to,” he says. Moreover, it is a mistake to think tech transfer involves discrete bits of technology, such as a blueprint for photovoltaic cells. Instead, what matters is the whole process, including workforce training—a lesson that India is slowly absorbing. Apple, whose investments helped build up China’s supply chains, now produces a quarter of its iPhones in India. Even if most components are sourced from China, many are made in Chinese factories owned by foreign companies, according to analysis by Chris Miller and Vishnu Venugopalan for the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank. The implication is that the Chinese supply chain may ultimately prove more mobile than it currently seems. At the same time the rest of the world will have to follow a different formula from China’s. Instead of relying on the government’s top-down strategy, other countries will have to depend on companies themselves. The auto sector offers an early indication. Almost all global carmakers—General Motors, Hyundai and Volkswagen, to name a few—are now developing EVs in China, learning from local firms. Many ideas are also seeping out through research-and-development partnerships. “The biggest companies are off limits but there are thousands of suppliers to work with,” says one Chinese executive with a foreign carmaker. China’s tech controls may also have the opposite of their intended effect. For young innovators in AI, the crackdown on Manus is chilling. If they are unable to sell to foreigners, they will never get full value. That will only give them more incentive to take ideas abroad early on. The ultra-competitive Chinese business environment pushes in the same direction. The Chinese auto executive says many local suppliers are starved for profits, which makes foreign partnerships yet more tempting. Transfer portal For all its manufacturing prowess, China still wants what the West has to offer, notably in the semiconductor industry. In that sense the current wrangling over tech transfers has an air of negotiation to it. As the former Chinese trade official puts it, China will not fully benefit from its inventiveness unless it can export its own technology. The point, he says, is to extract a price from others, including access to their latest innovations. This is not a winning proposition for now, especially as American officials want to keep China away from cutting-edge chips. But it points to a possible, even a likely, future in which tech flows both ways across China’s borders. That may worry leaders in both Beijing and Washington. They will, however, struggle to stop it. ■ 世界渴望中國科技，中國決心據為己有 中國的競爭對手正學習如何獲取中國不願分享的技術 2026年4月20日 | 5分鐘閱讀 過去，人們總是在抱怨中國有太多的技術轉移。但在過去一年左右的時間裡，外國商界和政治領袖開始擔心技術轉移發生的得太少。他們不再那麼擔心西方科技落入中國手中；相反地，他們擔心中國現在過於有效地阻止其最優秀的技術流向外國人。一位前中國貿易官員對這種轉變感到感同身受，而非嘲諷。他說：「這有點虛偽，但可以理解。」 把這件事塑造成一部道德劇，彷彿中國以外的國家正在自食其果，或許很吸引人。但其核心這是一個切實的技術問題：中國是否能夠在其世界領先的技術（從電動汽車到人工智慧驅動的機器人）周圍挖出一條護城河。對此，「茶館」傾向於站在賭局的另一邊——即知識會像往常一樣，從擁有者流向渴望者。隨著時間的推移，一場「反向技術轉移」將會發生。 原則上，這個機制非常簡單。各國只要要求中國企業在當地設立製造基地，就可以向其開放市場。但在實踐中，這一切都不是自動發生的——而且每一步都充滿了挑戰。歐盟目前走在前列，最近提出了採購法規，要求供應歐洲的電池儲能系統等產品必須在歐洲本土製造。想要進入歐洲市場的中國公司必須在當地投資設廠。發展中國家也看到了希望。從巴西到越南，各國政府正向中國電動車企業敞開大門，並督促它們使用本地零組件。然而，這一切才剛開始。一位外交官帶著令人耳目一新的坦率說道：「我們在過去一年才開始討論技術轉移，目前仍不清楚這將如何運作。」 其中一個障礙將是中國本身。在過去五年中，中國建立了一套模仿美國的出口管制體系。其宣稱的目標是維護國家安全，但許多管制措施旨在保護中國的產業鏈。例如，去年商務部表示，企業在出口用於電動車電池的技術之前必須取得許可。一位西方貿易官員認為，中國官員幾乎不可能讓任何真正有價值的技術流出。他們已經對歐洲製造的立法做出了憤怒的反應，認為這是削弱中國工業的陰謀。人工智慧初創公司 Manus 的故事也突顯了中國領導人的偏執。Manus 創立於中國，去年將其業務註冊地遷至新加坡，以便利出售給 Facebook 的母公司 Meta。中國監管機構目前正試圖撤銷該筆交易，並禁止 Manus 的兩位聯合創始人離境。 不過，中國自身消化外國科技的歷史紀錄，為世界其他地區提供了一些指引。堅持不懈是至關重要的。中國花了三十年的時間來磨練其方法：給予投資者激勵措施、要求成立當地合資企業、規定在地化比例限制、與外國大學建立合作夥伴關係，當然，還有盜取智慧財產權。中國科技政策分析師張太銘（Tai Ming Cheung）表示，一個關鍵的需求是必須更加關注中國的科學研究：至少在商業化前階段，許多研究都發表在期刊上。他說：「這是我們以前沒想過、但現在必須去做的事。」 此外，如果認為技術轉移只涉及具體的技術碎片（例如光伏電池的藍圖），那就錯了。相反地，重要的是包含員工培訓在內的整個流程——這是印度正在慢慢吸收的教訓。曾協助在中國建立供應鏈的蘋果公司（Apple），現在有四分之一的 iPhone 在印度生產。根據美國企業研究院（American Enterprise Institute）智庫學者克里斯·米勒（Chris Miller）和維什努·維努戈帕蘭（Vishnu Venugopalan）的分析，即使大多數零組件仍源自中國，但許多零組件是在外國公司擁有的中國工廠中製造的。這意味著，中國的供應鏈最終可能會被證明比目前看起來更具流動性。 與此同時，世界其他地區必須採用與中國不同的模式。其他國家不能依賴政府自上而下的戰略，而必須依靠企業自身。汽車行業提供了一個早期的跡象。幾乎所有全球汽車製造商——通用（GM）、現代（Hyundai）和福斯（Volkswagen，又譯大眾），僅舉幾例——目前都在中國研發電動車，向本土企業學習。許多想法也透過研發合作夥伴關係滲透出來。一家外國汽車製造商的中國高管表示：「最大型的公司是不能碰的，但有成千上萬家供應商可以合作。」 中國的技術管制也可能產生適得其反的效果。對於人工智慧領域的年輕創新者來說，對 Manus 的打壓令人心寒。如果他們無法將公司賣給外國人，就永遠無法獲得完整的價值。這只會給他們更多動力，在早期就將想法帶到國外。內捲極其嚴重的中國商業環境也推動了相同的方向。上述汽車大廠的高管表示，許多本土供應商正處於利潤飢渴狀態，這使得與外國建立合作關係變得更具吸引力。 轉移門戶 儘管中國擁有強大的製造實力，但它仍然渴望西方所能提供的東西，特別是在半導體產業。從這個意義上說，當前圍繞技術轉移的爭執帶有一種談判的氣氛。正如那位前中國貿易官員所言，除非中國能夠出口自己的技術，否則它無法完全從自己的創造力中獲益。他說，關鍵在於向他人索取代價，包括獲取他們最新的創新技術。 目前這還不是一個穩贏的提議，特別是在美國官員希望讓中國遠離尖端晶片的情況下。但它指出了一個可能、甚至很大概率發生的未來：科技將在中國邊境進行雙向流動。這可能會讓北京和華盛頓的領導人感到擔憂。然而，他們將很難阻止這一切。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China | Chaguan Xi Jinping wants China to read more—as long as it’s the right books A new campaign to put down phones and pick up classics Apr 27th 2026|5 min read THE BINHAI library, often called China’s most beautiful, is** breathtaking**. *Swirling shelves* of books rise in gravity-defying stacks to a high ceiling in a light-dappled room: a modern cathedral to learning. No wonder the library, in Tianjin, an eastern city, has become a favourite photo stop for glammed-up young folk posting to social media. But it does not take long in the library to see that there is less to it than meets the eye. Most of the books are just pictures of spines glued to the wall. And most of the visitors are glued to their phones, not perusing books. It is the perfect backdrop not just for photos but also for one of China’s new official obsessions: how to get people to read more, and to read more deeply. Since its founding in 1921, China’s Communist Party has treated literacy as a core objective. For Mao Zedong, briefly a librarian before becoming a revolutionary, the motivation was not bookish: he wanted to build a proletariat conscious enough to overthrow its feudal overlords. Yet literacy campaigners can appreciate his results. He helped propel China from a literacy rate of less than 20% in 1949 to about 60% at his death in 1976. It is approaching 99% today. Xi Jinping has revived the cause, with a twist. In February a new regulation that aims to promote reading came into effect. On April 26th the country concluded its first-ever national reading week. State media are full of discussions about how to get people to put down their phones and pick up a book. And Mr Xi has given it his imprimatur. In the latest issue of Qiushi, the party’s leading theoretical journal, he pronounced on the value of reading and quoted a line attributed to Mao: “One can go a day without eating, a day without sleeping, but not a day without reading.” Part of this is China’s response to a problem common everywhere. Chinese adults read on average 4.8 physical books a year, according to a national survey. Similar surveys have put American adults at about 13 books a year. Scepticism of that American figure is warranted, but Chinese reading of physical tomes is clearly down. On trains, planes and metros, it is rare to see anyone with a paperback. People do still look at text, just mostly on their phones. Wu Shulin of the Publishers Association of China has said online reading is time-killing, not knowledge-building—a gripe familiar to teachers and parents anywhere. What makes **the reading campaign **unique to China is how it reveals two of Mr Xi’s preoccupations. The first is techno-nationalism, a belief that China’s future depends on mastery of the industries of tomorrow. In a widely circulated essay, Cui Haijiao of the Chinese Academy of Press and Publication argues that deep reading breeds innovation. Mr Xi himself has called for reading the classics to grasp why things are as they are. (For the most part China’s culture vultures encourage international fare, and want everything from Tang poetry to Twain and Tolstoy appreciated.) The second is Mr Xi’s veneration of Chinese tradition, in which reading is central to what it means to be Chinese. There is indeed much history to this. “In books there are houses made of gold,” reads a famous poem attributed to an emperor of a thousand years ago. Mr Xi wants China to become a “cultural powerhouse” by 2035, and the revival of reading is one of its pillars. How, then, to do it? Here, good intentions meet practical limits. The party knows it cannot simply force people to read. The new regulation is largely about fostering conditions that would encourage more reading. It urges officials to build better public reading spaces, for instance. Yet it is easy enough to imagine cadres, ever glad of an excuse to pour concrete, putting up libraries and then losing interest. The Binhai library is a case in point: the newspaper-reading room offers a meagre selection, and by late afternoon had yet even to stock that day’s papers. The regulation gestures at supporting bricks-and-mortar bookshops, but does little. One shop owner laments the absence of bolder measures, such as Japan’s fixed-price system, which prevents online discounting. China’s marginalia Any discussion of reading must also consider what is being read. The new regulation calls for the reading of more “good” books. At a recent book fair in Tianjin, many stalls were devoted to Chinese medicine, children’s gadgets and craft jewellery rather than to books. One stall manager said people just do not want to pay to read when there is so much online for free. Indeed, some of China’s most original literature in recent decades has appeared online. Outsiders may assume that this reflects political censorship. Certainly, books critical of the party or unorthodox on history are blocked from print. Some officials have learned to their personal cost the danger of such fare: reading literature containing “serious political problems” has been cited as a reason in multiple purges in recent years. But more readers are almost certainly affected by crackdowns on unapproved, highly popular genres, especially danmei books, which depict male same-sex romance, and supernatural fiction. “If you want to publish in print, you have to cut or change things,” says a bookseller. Another trend has been the rise of independent Chinese bookshops outside China. Jifeng, a liberal one, was forced to close in Shanghai in 2018 and reopened in Washington, DC, in 2024. Causeway Bay Books, known for political contraband, moved from Hong Kong to Taipei in 2020 after five of its employees were arrested. Mainland intellectuals have also opened small independent bookshops in Tokyo, Chiang Mai, Amsterdam and beyond. So, taking a wider lens, Chinese literature is in decent shape, though much of it is now online or published abroad.** Absent from the new campaign are the things that would make it a truly valuable exercise: open publishing, diverse formats, intellectual risk. The party wants people to read more, but not widely**. ■ 這篇文章標題為《中國的邊際註記》（China’s marginalia），詳細探討了中國當前的閱讀推廣運動及其背後的政治與社會意涵。以下為全文逐字翻譯： 濱海圖書館經常被譽為「中國最美圖書館」，其景象令人屏息。旋轉的書架在光影斑駁的空間內，以挑戰重力的堆疊方式延伸至高聳的天花板：這是一座現代的學習大教堂。難怪這座位於東部城市天津的圖書館，會成為盛裝打扮的年輕人向社群媒體發文的熱門拍照景點。但只要在館內待上一會兒，就會發現這裡表裡不一。大多數的「書」只是貼在牆上的書脊照片。而大多數的訪客則緊盯著手機，而非翻閱書籍。 這不僅是拍照的絕佳背景，也反映了中國官方的新執念之一：如何讓民眾讀得更多、讀得更深。自1921年成立以來，中國共產黨一直將提升識字率視為核心目標。對於在成為革命家之前曾短暫擔任圖書館管理員的毛澤東而言，這種動力並非出於書卷氣：他想要建立一個具有足夠意識、足以推翻封建領主的無產階級。然而，識字運動的推動者會讚賞他的成果。他幫助中國的識字率從1949年的不到20%，提升到1976年他逝世時的約60%。時至今日，這一數字已接近99%。 習近平重啟了這項事業，並賦予了新的轉向。今年二月，一項旨在促進閱讀的新條例正式生效。4月26日，中國結束了首屆「全民閱讀週」。官方媒體充斥著關於如何讓民眾放下手機、拿起書本的討論。而習近平也給予了此舉認可。在黨內權威理論刊物《求是》的最新一期中，他論述了閱讀的價值，並引用了一句據傳出自毛澤東的名言：「飯可以一日不吃，覺可以一日不睡，書不可以一日不讀。」 這部分是中國針對全球普遍存在之問題所作出的回應。根據一項全國性調查，中國成年人平均每年閱讀4.8本實體書。類似的調查顯示美國成年人約為13本。雖然對美國的數據持懷疑態度是有理由的，但中國實體書閱讀量的下滑顯而易見。在火車、飛機和地鐵上，很少看到有人拿著平裝書。人們依然在閱讀文字，只是大多是在手機上。中國出版協會的鄔書林曾表示，網路上閱讀是在「消磨時間」，而非「建立知識」——這是任何地方的老師和家長都熟悉的抱怨。 使這場閱讀運動具有中國特色的是，它揭示了習近平的兩個關注點。第一是「技術民族主義」，即相信中國的未來取決於對明日產業的掌握。在一篇廣為流傳的文章中，中國新聞出版研究院的崔海教論證了深度閱讀能孕育創新。習近平本人也呼籲閱讀經典，以掌握事物運作的底層邏輯。（在大多數情況下，中國的文化推手鼓勵國際化的內容，希望人們能欣賞從唐詩到馬克吐溫及托爾斯泰的作品。） 第二是習近平對中國傳統的推崇，而在這套傳統中，閱讀是定義「何謂中國人」的核心。這確實有深遠的歷史背景。「書中自有黃金屋」是一首據傳出自千年前皇帝的名詩。習近平希望中國在2035年前成為「文化強國」，而振興閱讀正是其中的支柱之一。 那麼，該如何達成？在此，良好的意圖遇到了現實的限制。共產黨知道它不能單純強迫民眾閱讀。新條例主要在於營造鼓勵更多閱讀的環境，例如敦促官員建設更好的公共閱讀空間。然而，不難想像那些總是以灌溉混凝土為樂的基層幹部，在蓋好圖書館後便失去興趣。濱海圖書館就是一個典型案例：其報紙閱覽室提供的選擇貧乏，到了傍晚甚至還沒備齊當天的報紙。條例中提到支持實體書店，但收效甚微。一位書店老闆哀嘆缺乏更大膽的措施，例如日本的圖書定價制度，該制度能防止網路削價競爭。 中國的邊際註記 任何關於閱讀的討論也必須考量閱讀的「內容」。新條例號召閱讀更多的「好書」。在最近一場天津書展中，許多攤位致力於中醫、兒童器材和手工飾品，而非書籍。一位攤位負責人表示，既然網路上有這麼多免費內容，人們根本不想付費閱讀。 事實上，近幾十年來中國一些最具原創性的文學作品都出現在網路。外界可能認為這反映了政治審查。誠然，批評共產黨或歷史觀點不合正統的書籍被禁止出版。一些官員已為此付出了個人代價，意識到這類讀物的危險：閱讀含有「嚴重政治問題」的文學作品，已被列為近年多起肅清行動的原因之一。但受到打擊影響更大的讀者群，幾乎可以肯定是因為當局對未經核准且極受歡迎的類型文學進行掃蕩，特別是描繪男同性戀浪漫關係的「耽美」小說和超自然小說。「如果你想出版紙本，你必須刪減或修改內容，」一位書商說道。 另一個趨勢是海外獨立中國書店的興起。自由派書店「季風書園」於2018年在上海被迫關閉，並於2024年在華盛頓特區重新開張。以政治禁書聞名的「銅鑼灣書店」在五名員工被捕後，於2020年從香港遷至台北。內地知識分子也在東京、清邁、阿姆斯特丹等地開設了小型獨立書店。 因此，從更廣泛的角度來看，中國文學的現狀尚稱良好，儘管其中許多內容現在轉向網路或在海外出版。然而，這場新運動中唯獨缺少了能讓其成為真正有價值的活動的要素：開放的出版環境、多元的格式以及智識上的冒險。黨希望人們讀得更多，但不希望人們讀得太廣。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Ageing workers in East Asia are essential. More are needed Yet they often face high barriers to employment and unpalatable options Apr 27th 2026|SEOUL AND TOKYO|6 min read HONDA TAMIKO began working as a child on her family’s farm back when Japan was at war with America. Now 93, Ms Honda still puts in a hard day’s toil as a janitor at a McDonald’s branch in Kumamoto, in southern Japan. Ms Honda says her pension is plenty to live off; she chooses to keep showing up. “Humans are animals, after all,” she chuckles. “We have to keep moving as much as we can.” Ms Honda is the oldest in McDonald’s crew of some 220,000 in Japan. But she is less an outlier than a harbinger. As people live longer, they are staying healthy for longer and working longer, too. Japan and its neighbour South Korea, two of the most rapidly ageing countries, are at the forefront of this transition. Nearly 40% of South Koreans and more than 25% of Japanese aged above 65 remain at work, the highest rates in the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries (see chart). But labour markets and social systems designed for a different demographic era struggle to make the most of those who can work and to support those who can’t. Many people in both Japan and South Korea keep working out of necessity. More than half of elderly employees in Japan say they work for income. The financial pressure is even greater in South Korea, where the pension system failed to keep pace with the country’s rapid development after the Korean war, leaving generations of people with inadequate support. The average public pension replaces only about a third of workers’ pre-retirement income, so nearly 40% of South Koreans over 65 make less than half the median income, the highest rate in the OECD. Many in South Korea fear being made to retire too early: bus drivers in Seoul went on strike earlier this year demanding that the retirement age be raised. “In the past, 65 was considered quite elderly, but now, even at 65, people live a youthful life,” says Shin Gyo-beom, who drives Seoul’s bus number 107. “Wouldn’t it be better for someone more experienced to drive?” Yet money is only part of the story. Many want to keep working for other reasons. “There is infinite value that can’t be quantified in monetary terms,” says Kim Mi-gon of the Korea Labour Force Development Institute for the Aged, a think-tank. Staying employed can help stave off health problems and keep loneliness at bay. “When you’re this age, if you stay at home, you lose it mentally and physically,” says Ms Honda, who belongs to McDonald’s Japan’s “Premium Age Crew”, as employees over 60 are known. “My family keeps telling me to quit, but I know that if I stop working and stay at home I’ll be a burden to them and end up in a facility.” Across East Asia, studies show older people who keep working tend to be less frail and less likely to report depressive symptoms. (The direction of causality is hard to establish, however.) Ro Ick-kyun, a 60-year-old from Hanam, east of Seoul, has had several jobs since he retired from his original career as a corporate executive. “My wife says when I work I seem younger and more full of energy,” he smiles. Some companies are making concerted efforts to use older workers. Consulting on later-stage career options has become common practice at large Japanese firms. Companies are adjusting roles and responsibilities to accommodate older workers. The boss of a car-repair shop in Kashiwazaki, a small city in northern Japan, says that with fewer young people, he needs to get more out of his existing staff. Yet too often those who want to keep working face high barriers and unpalatable options. Lots of human capital is wasted, argues Randall Jones, a former head of the Japan/Korea desk at the OECD. Seniority-based wage and promotion systems are still common in Japan and South Korea, which makes keeping workers on full-time staff contracts costly for companies. Many thus rehire older workers after their official retirement on new temporary contracts with reduced pay and responsibilities. Those who look for new jobs can struggle, not least because discrimination is rampant. “Korean case law and social norms tend to view hiring discrimination based on age…as reasonable,” says Kwon O-hun, a labour lawyer at Gapjil119, a South Korean watchdog that combats workplace abuse. Some start small businesses. Others take on temporary work as cleaners, carers or security guards. “There’s a huge mismatch: lots of supply of desk workers and lots of demand for menial work,” says Kitao Sagiri of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “The skills older folks accumulated are not necessarily what’s needed.” Those who struggle to find new jobs can turn to a host of government programmes and agencies to support older workers. South Korea’s national government finances over 1m part-time jobs for seniors as a quasi-welfare policy. The Seoul 50Plus Foundation, an arm of the capital’s municipal government, aims to help those on the cusp of retirement from their first career plan for a second one. At one airy outpost in the city’s east, older jobseekers can get advice on how to polish their résumés or receive training in AI. Japan has more than 1,300 Silver Human Resource Centres, which help match people aged 60 or above with job opportunities, from caring for even older folk to cleaning up family gravesites for those not up to visiting. Policymakers want to encourage these trends. Keeping people employed for longer helps compensate for the shrinking number of young people in both countries; to the extent it keeps people fit, it also helps reduce health- and nursing-care costs. Since 2006 Japan has encouraged firms to offer job opportunities until the age of 65; in 2021, the government began urging employers to keep workers on until 70. In 2013 South Korea raised its statutory retirement age from 59 to 60. But that does not tackle the underlying issue about what kind of work older people should do. Getting the most out of those who can keep working while providing support to those who cannot will require a more ambitious redesign of social systems and hiring practices. For older workers it also means reconceiving the latter stages of a working life as something more akin to the beginning of it. Murazeki Fumio, the head of Koureisha, a temporary-employment agency for elderly workers in Japan, encourages his new employees to shed their attachments to their old roles: “I always tell everyone: once you’re over 65, approach it as if you were a new hire, with the mindset of starting over from scratch.” ■ 東亞高齡勞工不可或缺：需求日益增加，卻仍面臨重重障礙與無奈選擇 2026年4月27日 | 首爾與東京報導 本田民子（Honda Tamiko）在童年時期就開始在自家的農場工作，當時日本正與美國交戰。如今已 93 歲高齡的本田女士，依然在日本南部熊本市的一家麥當勞分店擔任清潔員，每天辛勤工作。本田女士表示她的養老金足夠生活，但她選擇繼續露面工作。「人類終究是動物，」她笑著說，「我們必須盡可能地保持活動。」 本田女士是日本麥當勞約 22 萬名員工中最年長的一位。但她與其說是一個特例，不如說是一個先兆。隨著人類壽命延長，健康壽命也隨之增加，工作時間也變得更長。日本與鄰國南韓作為全球高齡化最快速的兩個國家，正處於這場轉型的最前線。南韓 65 歲以上的人口中有近 40% 仍在工作，日本則超過 25%，這是經濟合作暨發展組織（OECD，主要由富裕國家組成的俱樂部）中最高的比例。然而，為不同人口結構時代所設計的勞動力市場與社會體制，正難以充分發揮有能力工作者的潛力，也難以支援那些無法工作的人。 許多日韓的高齡者是出於必要性而持續工作。日本超過半數的高齡員工表示，他們是為了收入而工作。而在南韓，財務壓力更為沉重，因為當地的養老金制度未能跟上韓戰後國家快速發展的步伐，導致好幾代人缺乏充足的支援。平均公共養老金僅能替代勞工退休前收入的三分之一，因此南韓 65 歲以上的人口中，近 40% 的收入低於中位數的一半，比例居 OECD 之冠。許多南韓人擔心太早被迫退休：首爾的公車司機在今年早些時候發動罷工，要求提高退休年齡。「過去 65 歲被認為非常老，但現在即使是 65 歲，大家生活得還是很年輕，」駕駛首爾 107 號公車的申教範（Shin Gyo-beom）說，「讓更有經驗的人來開車不是更好嗎？」 然而，金錢並非故事的全貌。許多人是為了其他原因想繼續工作。「有些無限的價值是無法用金錢衡量的，」韓國高齡勞工發展研究院（一個智庫）的金美坤（Kim Mi-gon）表示。維持就業有助於延緩健康問題，並防止孤獨。 「到了這個年紀，如果一直待在家裡，你的身心都會崩潰，」本田女士說，她是日本麥當勞「銀髮菁英組」（Premium Age Crew，指 60 歲以上的員工）的一員。「家人一直叫我辭職，但我知道如果我不工作待在家，就會成為他們的負擔，最後落入安養機構。」 在整個東亞，研究顯示持續工作的高齡者往往較不虛弱，且較少出現憂鬱症狀（然而，因果關係的方向尚難確定）。來自首爾東部河南市、60 歲的盧益均（Ro Ick-kyun）自從結束原本的企業高管生涯退休後，已經換過幾份工作。「我太太說我工作的時候看起來更年輕、更有活力，」他笑著說。 部分公司正有意識地運用高齡員工。在日本大型企業中，針對職涯後期的諮詢已成為慣例。公司正在調整職位與職責以適應高齡員工。日本北部小城柏崎市的一家修車廠老闆表示，隨著年輕人減少，他需要從現有的員工中發揮更大的價值。 然而，那些想繼續工作的人往往面臨高門檻與無奈的選擇。OECD 前日韓事務主管藍道爾·瓊斯（Randall Jones）認為，許多人力資源被浪費了。日本與南韓仍普遍採用年功序列制（依年資敘薪與晉升），這使得公司保留全職高齡員工的成本極高。因此，許多公司在員工正式退休後，以薪水降低、職責減少的新型臨時合約重新聘僱他們。 那些尋找新工作的人則面臨困難，尤其年齡歧視依然猖獗。南韓勞權監督組織 Gapjil119 的律師權五勳（Kwon O-hun）表示：「南韓的判例與社會規範往往認為基於年齡的招聘歧視……是合理的。」有些人選擇創業，其他人則從事清潔工、看護或警衛等臨時工作。東京政策研究大學院大學的北尾早霧（Kitao Sagiri）指出：「這裡存在巨大的錯配：大量想做辦公室工作的勞動力供應，與大量體力活的需求。高齡者累積的技能未必是市場所需要的。」 找不到新工作的人可以尋求政府計畫與機構的支援。南韓政府資助了超過 100 萬個高齡者兼職職位，作為準福利政策。首爾 50Plus 基金會（市府下屬機構）旨在幫助那些即將從第一職涯退休的人規畫第二人生；在首爾東部一個明亮的服務據點，高齡求職者可以諮詢如何修改簡歷，或接受 AI 培訓。日本則擁有 1,300 多個「銀髮人才中心」，幫助 60 歲及以上的人媒合工作，從照顧更高齡的老人到為無法親自前往的人清理祖墳等。 決策者希望鼓勵這些趨勢。延長就業時間有助於補足兩國日益萎縮的年輕勞動力；只要能讓長者保持健康，也有助於降低醫療與護理成本。自 2006 年起，日本鼓勵企業提供工作機會至 65 歲；2021 年起，政府開始敦促雇主讓員工工作到 70 歲。2013 年，南韓將法定退休年齡從 59 歲提高到 60 歲。但這些舉措並未解決底層的核心問題：高齡者究竟該做什麼樣的工作？ 要從有能力工作者身上獲得最大價值，同時支援無法工作者，需要對社會體制與招聘慣例進行更具雄心的重新設計。對於高齡勞工來說，這也意味著需要將職涯後期視為某種「新開始」。日本高齡者人力派遣公司 Koureisha 的負責人村關文雄（Murazeki Fumio）鼓勵新員工放下對過去職位的執念：「我總是告訴大家：一旦你超過 65 歲，就要把自己當作新進員工，以從零開始的心態出發。」■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China | A hawkish turn Public opinion in China is hardening on America and Taiwan A rare poll shows the views of ordinary Chinese are changing Mar 19th 2026|3 min read CHINA IS having a moment in Western public opinion. Communist Party mouthpieces crow that the country is increasingly “cool”. Young Westerners on social media are “Chinamaxxing”: adopting Chinese habits like drinking hot water (not cold), or Tsingtao beer. Polls suggest that views of China, especially among the young, are growing more favourable. A report released on March 9th suggests the feeling is not mutual. Chinese opinion polls rarely ask about sensitive issues. But unusually, across three surveys in 2024-25, the Carter Centre, an American think-tank, was able to ask 6,500 Chinese people for their views on international affairs. The results suggest that China’s population sees the world in increasingly stark terms. Fewer Chinese now oppose using military force to unify China and Taiwan. President Donald Trump’s aggressive foreign policy appears to have dented views of America and stiffened Chinese resolve. The survey also shows that opinion diverges from state narratives in some key areas. Two years ago more than half of Chinese opposed unifying China and Taiwan by military force. By late 2025, that figure had fallen to 38% (see chart one). Support for forced unification, under at least some circumstances, had risen from 25% in 2024 to almost half. Importantly, of all their neighbours, Chinese feel most warmly about Taiwan—in line with state narratives that the Taiwanese are “family”. A minority see Taiwan’s computer-chip business as an important reason for unification. A series of events last year, including a big arms deal struck by America and Taiwan and comments by the Japanese prime minister, probably contributed to the rising hawkishness, bolstering President Xi Jinping’s stance. Mr Xi can also count on support for his tit-for-tat approach to relations with Mr Trump. Almost three-quarters of respondents regarded America as a national-security threat. Some 62% of people backed retaliation against America’s trade war, for instance by cutting off rare-earths exports, even if it is costly to China. Only 4% supported negotiating over export controls on chips. In 2024 views on America were more evenly split. In the past, the public saw amity with America as vital to China’s economic success. Now, however, they “are demanding a relationship of equals”, says Nick Zeller, one of the survey’s authors. Public opinion in China is remarkably unified, thanks in part to the consistency of the state narratives that help shape it. But one characteristic appears to predict a respondent’s views better than others: income. High earners tend to view America, including its culture, more favourably than does the population at large, the poll suggests (see chart two). But the well-off are also more strident about Chinese power: they think more highly of Russia, and are more open to a military solution to Taiwan. The government has previously suppressed polling that showed that the rich had views out of step with the rest of the country. Still, the population appears to be at odds with the dominant state narratives on some issues, notes Yawei Liu, another survey author. Despite support for trade with Russia, some 44% of Chinese oppose sending troops to support its war in Ukraine, a limit on the countries’ “no-limits partnership”. China calls its territorial claims in the South China Sea “indisputable”, but almost half the population would support giving up some claims in return for America reducing its security presence in Asia. And contrary to state-media love-ins, the population has a remarkably low opinion of Cambodia, a diplomatic pal, thanks to its rampant scam industry. Popular support at home can be useful to the government when it wants to signal its resolve abroad. But opinion in China tends to be elastic and responsive to state narratives. That is partly because the state can be persuasive, and partly because survey respondents know what the government wants to hear. ■ 中國民意在美國與台灣議題上正在轉趨強硬 一項罕見的民意調查顯示，普通中國民眾的觀點正在改變 2026年3月19日 | 3分鐘閱讀時間 第一段：西方對中的觀感 中國正處於西方公眾輿論中的一個高光時刻。 共產黨的喉舌媒體吹噓該國正變得越來越「酷」。 社交媒體上的西方年輕人正在進行「極致中國化」：採納中國習慣，例如喝熱水（而非冷水），或喝青島啤酒。 民意調查顯示，對中國的看法，特別是在年輕人中，正變得越來越正向。 第二段：卡特中心的調查結果 3月9日發布的一份報告顯示，這種感覺並非相互的（雙向的）。 中國的民意調查鮮少詢問敏感議題。 但不同尋常的是，在2024至2025年間的三項調查中，美國智庫「卡特中心」得以詢問6,500名中國人對國際事務的看法。 結果顯示，中國人口正以日益極端（非黑即白）的角度看待世界。 現在反對使用武力統一中國與台灣的中國人變少了。 唐納·川普總統激進的外交政策似乎削弱了對美國的看法，並強化了中國的決心。 調查還顯示，在某些關鍵領域，民意與國家論述存在分歧。 第三段：台灣議題與武力統一 兩年前，超過一半的中國人反對以武力統一中國與台灣。 到2025年末，該數據已下降至38%（見圖表一）。 對強制統一的支持（至少在某些情況下）已從2024年的25%上升到近一半。 重要的是，在所有鄰居中，中國人對台灣感覺最溫暖——這與國家敘事中台灣人是「一家人」的說法一致。 少數人將台灣的電腦晶片產業視為統一的重要原因。 去年發生的一系列事件，包括美台達成的大型軍售協議以及日本首相的言論，可能促使了鷹派情緒的上升，支持了習近平主席的立場。 第四段：對美關係與反制措施 習近平也可以指望民眾支持他對川普關係採取的「以牙還牙」方針。 近四分之三的受訪者將美國視為國家安全威脅。 約62%的人支持對美國貿易戰進行報復，例如通過切斷稀土出口，即便這對中國代價高昂。 僅有4%的人支持就晶片出口管制進行談判。 在2024年，對美國的觀點分布較為均衡。 過去，大眾將與美國的友好視為中國經濟成功的關鍵。 然而現在，調查作者之一尼克·澤勒表示，他們「正要求一種平等的關係」。 第五段：收入對觀點的影響 中國的民意顯著統一，部分歸功於塑造民意的國家敘事的一致性。 但有一種特徵似乎比其他特徵更能預測受訪者的觀點：收入。 民調顯示，高收入者往往比大眾人口對美國（包括其文化）持有更多好感（見圖表二）。 但富裕階層對中國力量也更加強硬：他們對俄羅斯的評價更高，且對台灣問題的軍事解決方案抱持更開放的態度。 政府此前曾壓制顯示富人觀點與國家其他地區不一致的民調。 第六段：與國家論述的分歧 儘管如此，另一位調查作者劉亞偉指出，在某些問題上，民眾似乎與主導性的國家論述不一致。 儘管支持與俄羅斯的貿易，約44%的中國人反對派遣軍隊支持其在烏克蘭的戰爭，這是兩國「無上限夥伴關係」的一個限制。 中國稱其在南海的領土主張是「無可爭辯的」，但近一半的人口會支持放棄部分主張，以換取美國減少在亞洲的安全存在。 與官方媒體的熱情宣傳相反，由於柬埔寨猖獗的詐騙產業，民眾對這個外交盟友的評價明顯很低。 第七段：結論 當政府想要對外展現決心時，國內的民眾支持可能很有用。 但中國的民意往往具有彈性，且會對國家論述做出反應。 這部分是因為國家具有說服力，部分是因為調查受訪者知道政府想聽什麼。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

On the front lines, Russian soldiers pay officers to stay alive The war against Ukraine has created a corrupt economy of blood money Apr 1st 2026|Altai and Luhansk|5 min read The newly built one-bedroom flat is nicely decorated, with parquet floors, an aquarium, a shower cabin and a full kitchen. The downside is the location: underground in the trenches near Baihavka, a village in the occupied region of Luhansk. The apartment is home to the commander of the local Russian army unit. Maxim, a deserter who helped to build it, says the commander did not spend a kopek. Not only was the labour free, but soldiers paid for the materials, appliances and paint. Russian soldiers must also buy officers alcohol. “They have four korporativy [office parties] a week,” says Sergei, who bribed his way into a rear position as a cook. He works from 5am to 11pm, paying over half his salary to a commander for the privilege. Interviews with a dozen contract soldiers in locations including the Belgorod region, Luhansk and Donetsk reveal a system of extortion and punishment. Officers see their soldiers not just as grunts but as a source of enrichment. Corruption and slave labour have long been features of the Russian and Soviet armies: professional officers control the means of destruction, while recruits serve as cannon fodder in war or free labour in peacetime. Russia’s recruitment drive for its war in Ukraine has poured blood and money into the system, resulting in a vast battlefield economy. Soldiers describe the front lines as a marketplace where everything has a price: drones, medals, home leave and life itself. To back up their claims, they show screenshots of bank transfers, complaints to military prosecutors, demands for money and orders to take part in assaults. Maxim, a 26-year-old from the city of Krasnodar, signed his contract in August 2024 in Moscow, where bonuses were higher. He supplies various reasons: government propaganda, the death of his stepfather in the war. “Something just snapped in my head,” he says. “I didn’t even know the contract was indefinite.” It probably helped that he had been arrested with amphetamines in his pocket and given the option of enlisting to avoid prosecution. He got a bonus of 2.5m roubles ($30,000) and was sent without training to the Luhansk region, where he was paid 200,000 roubles a month until he deserted in January 2026. Of the 8m roubles he got in total, he says 6m went in equipment and bribes. Russia’s army provides gear to elite airborne and special-forces units, but infantry must buy their own. Since 2023 Wildberries and Ozon, the main Russian online retailers, have been available in the occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson. “If you don’t want to spend money on a good pair of boots and a decent body-armour vest, you go into assault wearing trainers,” says Maxim. The collections begin under the pretext of raising money for drones, equipment or food, says Anton, an assault trooper. But if you pay once, “you’ll pay for ever so they don’t send you to the meat grinder.” Ukraine’s wall of drones has created a kill zone at least 20km deep, rendering mass assaults suicidal. It has also created an economy of life and death. Making their own luck Maxim says his commander welcomed new recruits by telling them he had buried 12 companies and they would be the 13th. “He said we were cannon fodder and only 5% of soldiers survive assaults.” The next day he explained that survival was not a matter of luck, but of ability to pay. Maxim and Sergei, another soldier, each paid 1m roubles to be transferred to the rear, plus another 100,000-150,000 roubles a month. Some commanders requisition troops’ bank cards and PIN codes before sending them into an assault. Ilya, another deserter, says a staff officer collects them for safekeeping. The dead are declared missing, and commanders withdraw the money they earned from their bank accounts at ATMs in Donetsk and Luhansk. There is a rich trade in medical documents declaring soldiers unfit for combat. Getting wounded is not free either. “I paid 100,000 for leave after a wound,” says Anton. “To get discharged they ask for a million.” Soldiers who refuse to pay may be thrown into dug-out pits for torture. Andrey Bykov refused to hand over 2m roubles he received as compensation for being wounded to his commanders, who used the call signs Kemer and Dudka. According to his mother, he was first handcuffed and beaten for several days. Later he was tied to a tree and shot. Soldiers ordered by their commanders to kill their own comrades call it “zeroing out”. Soldiers say “refuseniks” can be zeroed out by shooting them, tying them to trees to freeze, denying them medical care after beatings or having drone operators kill them on the battlefield. Verstka, an independent Russian news site, confirmed the identities of at least 100 commanders who either ordered or carried out such killings. “Will these bastards ever be punished?” asks Elena, a 39-year-old from the Altai region in Russia’s north-east. In February 2025 she buried her son, who had served in Kemer’s regiment. He had paid 100,000 roubles “for the needs of the regiment” and was reported as having died on a combat mission. Last summer Elena’s husband, who was serving in the same unit, deserted and recorded several videos about extortion schemes. He filed a complaint with military prosecutors saying Kemer had taken 2m roubles from him. But shortly before the new year he was found by military police and sent back to Kemer’s unit. On January 11th, Elena says, he was tied to a tree and killed.■ 俄羅斯士兵在前線付錢給軍官以求活命 這場對抗烏克蘭的戰爭創造了一個腐敗的血錢經濟 第一部分：前線的「豪華」地堡與剝削 2026年4月1日 | 阿爾泰與盧干斯克 | 5分鐘閱讀時間 這間新落成的一房一廳公寓裝飾精美，鋪著魚骨木地板，有魚缸、淋浴房和設備齊全的廚房。唯一缺點是地點：位於盧干斯克（Luhansk）佔領區白哈夫卡村（Baihavka）附近的戰壕地底下。這間公寓是當地俄軍部隊指揮官的家。協助建造這間公寓的逃兵馬克沁（Maxim）說，指揮官一分錢都沒花。不僅勞動力是免費的，士兵們還支付了建材、家電和油漆的費用。 俄羅斯士兵還必須為軍官購買酒類。曾透過賄賂獲得「廚師」後方職位的謝爾蓋（Sergei）說：「他們每週舉辦四次公司派對（korporativy）。」他從凌晨 5 點工作到晚上 11 點，並將超過一半的薪水交給指揮官，以換取這個特權。 第二部分：制度化的勒索與懲罰 對貝爾哥羅德（Belgorod）、盧干斯克和頓內茨克（Donetsk）等地區的十幾名合約兵進行的採訪揭露了一個勒索與懲罰系統。軍官不僅將士兵視為底層小兵（grunts），更將其視為發財的來源。腐敗和奴隸勞動長期以來一直是俄羅斯和蘇聯軍隊的特徵：職業軍官控制著毀滅手段，而招募的新兵在戰爭中充當炮灰（cannon fodder），或在和平時期充當免費勞動力。 俄羅斯為烏克蘭戰爭發起的徵兵行動為這個系統注入了鮮血與金錢，導致了一個巨大的戰場經濟。士兵們將前線描述為一個「萬物皆有價」的市場：無人機、獎章、返鄉假，乃至生命本身。為了支持他們的說法，他們展示了銀行轉帳截圖、向軍事檢察官提出的投訴、要錢的要求以及參與突擊的命令。 第三部分：高額賄賂與物資自理 來自克拉斯諾達爾（Krasnodar）的 26 歲青年馬克沁，於 2024 年 8 月在獎金較高的莫斯科簽署了合約。他給出了各種理由：政府宣傳、繼父在戰爭中去世。他說：「我腦袋裡有些東西斷掉了。我甚至不知道合約是無限期的。」另一個推動因素可能是他因口袋藏有安非他命被捕，並獲得了透過參軍來避免起訴的選擇。他獲得了 250 萬盧布（3 萬美元 (1 俄羅斯盧布 等於 0.41 新臺幣 )的獎金，並在未經訓練的情況下被派往盧干斯克地區，在那裡他每個月領取 20 萬盧布的薪水，直到 2026 年 1 月逃亡。在他總共獲得的 800 萬盧布中，他說有 600 萬盧布花在了裝備和賄賂上。 俄羅斯軍隊為精銳的空降兵和特種部隊提供裝備，但步兵必須自備。自 2023 年以來，俄羅斯主要電商 Wildberries 和 Ozon 已在頓內茨克、盧干斯克、扎波羅熱和赫爾松等佔領區提供服務。馬克沁說：「如果你不想花錢買一雙好的靴子和體面的防彈背心，你就得穿著運動鞋去衝鋒。」 第四部分：生存的代價 一名突擊隊員安東（Anton）表示，募款通常以籌集無人機、設備或食物的錢為藉口開始。但如果你付了一次錢，「你就得永遠付下去，這樣他們才不會把你送進肉靶機（meat grinder）。」烏克蘭的無人機牆已創造了一個至少 20 公里深的殺傷區，使得大規模突擊等同於自殺。這也創造了一種生與死的經濟。 馬克沁說，他的指揮官迎接新兵時告訴他們，他已經埋葬了 12 個連，他們將是第 13 個。「他說我們是炮灰，只有 5% 的士兵能在突擊中倖存。」隔天他解釋說，生存不是運氣問題，而是支付能力的問題。馬克沁和另一名士兵謝爾蓋各付了 100 萬盧布被調往後方，此外每個月還要再付 10 萬至 15 萬盧布。 第五部分：「清零」與殘酷處決 一些指揮官在將部隊送入突擊前，會徵用士兵的銀行卡和 PIN 碼。另一名逃兵伊利亞（Ilya）說，一名幕僚軍官會收集這些卡片以便「安全保管」。死者被宣佈為失蹤，而指揮官則在頓內茨克和盧干斯克的 ATM 機提取他們賺來的錢。此外，宣佈士兵不適合戰鬥的醫療文件交易也非常興旺。受傷也不是免費的。安東說：「我為了傷後的休假付了 10 萬盧布，如果要退伍，他們要價 100 萬。」 拒絕付錢的士兵可能會被關進地坑受審。安德烈·比科夫（Andrey Bykov）拒絕將他因受傷獲得的 200 萬盧布補償金交給代號為 Kemer 和 Dudka 的指揮官。據他母親稱，他先是被戴上手銬並毆打數日，後來被綁在樹上射殺。士兵被指揮官命令殺死自己的戰友，稱之為「清零」（zeroing out）。 士兵們說，「拒絕者」（refuseniks）可以透過槍殺、綁在樹上凍死、毆打後拒絕提供醫療護理，或讓無人機操作員在戰場上將其殺死來進行「清零」。獨立俄羅斯新聞網站 Verstka 證實了至少 100 名下令或執行此類殺戮的指揮官身份。 「這些混蛋會受到懲罰嗎？」來自俄羅斯東北部阿爾泰地區 39 歲的埃琳娜（Elena）問道。2025 年 2 月，她埋葬了在 Kemer 團服役的兒子。他曾為「團裡的需要」支付了 10 萬盧布，並被報告死於一次戰鬥任務。去年夏天，埃琳娜在同一單位服役的丈夫逃亡，並錄製了幾段關於勒索計劃的影片。他向軍事檢察官提出投訴，稱 Kemer 從他那裡拿走了 200 萬盧布。但在新年前夕，他被軍警找到並送回 Kemer 的單位。埃琳娜說，1 月 11 日，他被綁在樹上殺害。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Why women, more than men, are abandoning rural Japan Bigger cities are, in turn, skewing more female Apr 1st 2026|NANTO|4 min read KOYASU MIWA traverses Japan, from Sapporo in the north to Miyazaki in the south, with one goal: to make the countryside less hostile to women. Ms Koyasu runs a consultancy that advises local governments, lectures businessmen on discrimination and runs workshops urging community elders to let women take a bigger role in local decision-making. On a recent stop in Nanto, a region in central Japan ringed by snow-capped mountains, she leads a session on gender inequality for members of its various community councils, volunteer bodies that deal with issues from disaster preparedness to organising festivals. Of the 31 council chairs in the region none is a woman. Ms Koyasu’s work is part of an effort to assuage a national worry: young women are draining away from the countryside and from small-town Japan. A government report in 2014 expressed alarm about the future of 900 municipalities, half of the country’s total. It concluded that the number of women of child-bearing age in those places would fall by half within the next quarter-century, and that these municipalities faced “extinction” as a result. Officials in lots of outlying places accept that young people will move to cities for university or a first job. But they count on them doing a U-turn and returning home in their 20s or 30s. Yet in roughly 70% of Japan’s 47 prefectures, young women are leaving at higher rates than young men. In Toyooka, a small city in western Japan, census data show that 52% of men who left as teenagers came back in their 20s. For women, the figure was just 27%. Tokyo and a handful of other urban centres are seeing the opposite trend, with more young women moving in than men. The reasons for all this are deeply entrenched: a shortage of good jobs for women, a wider gender pay gap than in the cities and many other forms of sexism. Last year a government regional-revitalisation plan cited unconscious bias and inflexible gender roles as forces pushing women away. Rural areas often struggle with attitudes that the larger cities have shed, argues Yamamoto Ren, a campaigner. In many small offices, women still make the tea while men make the decisions. Ms Yamamoto says those who have left for cities sometimes dread returning home for holidays. “Family and neighbours keep asking, ‘Isn’t it time for a baby?’” Although many Japanese women are enjoying their lives in the cities, others would willingly return to the countryside if things were different. Tokuno Sayuri, a woman in her 30s from Nanto, returned there after briefly living in Tokyo, finding the capital too hectic. Miura Miwako, a journalist in Akita, a northern prefecture famed for its bears, says she would ideally spend her whole career there. “The countryside suits me better,” she says. Yet both she and Ms Tokuno are deeply frustrated with the status quo. “When women notice discrimination here, they rarely speak up—they just leave silently,” says Ms Miura. Many smaller places have now established strategies to tackle gender discrimination. Initiatives in Toyooka include handing out manga cartoons that raise awareness of the issue, and training teachers and businesspeople. Ms Koyasu, the consultant, says her work was once met with jeers and pushback. “But people are increasingly realising that being inclusive towards women is a matter of survival.” Therein lies a tension at the heart of many of the official initiatives. The single biggest reason authorities want women to stay in the countryside is so they can have children. “I never want women to feel like they’re simply kept around to pop out babies,” says Ms Koyasu. Promoting gender equality ought to mean accepting a woman’s choice not to marry or have children. In practice, many towns send mixed signals. Even those that now promote gender equality also sponsor nannyish matchmaking schemes, such as hosting government-backed parties for young singles to find partners, or getting local elders to encourage those who are too shy to pair off. In Nanto, both programmes sit in the same department. Last year Iwate prefecture published a dating guide urging women to wear skirts that make them look “delicate” and make-up that looks “demure” to attract husbands. Changing attitudes, as Ms Koyasu puts it, will take time. ■ 日本鄉村的「消失女孩」 日本的鄉村正在失去她們的女性。 雖然日本年輕人往大城市跑不是新鮮事，但最近的數據顯示，女生離開家鄉的比例遠遠高過男生，這讓很多地方政府開始緊張了，甚至出現了「地方滅絕」的危機感。我們一起來看看是怎麼回事。 1. 誰在決定鄉村的大小事？ 我們先把鏡頭轉到日本中部的「南砺市」。這裡風景很美，被雪山環繞，但這裡的社會結構卻很「硬」。 有一位叫小安三和（Koyasu Miwa）的顧問，她每天的工作就是跑遍全日本，試圖讓鄉村對女性更友善一點。她在南砺市辦了一場講座，對象是當地的「社區委員會」。這些委員會管的事情可多了，從防災到辦祭典都要負責，但全區 31 個委員會的主席，竟然沒有一個是女性。 這就是問題的核心：在很多鄉下地方，做決定的永遠是男性長輩。 2. 回不去的家鄉 日本政府早在 2014 年就發出警告，全日本有一半的鄉鎮（大約 900 個）面臨消失的風險。原因很簡單：育齡女性流失得太快了。 很多地方官員原本以為，年輕人去東京讀書、工作，到了二、三十歲總會回鄉成家吧？結果數據狠狠打臉。在兵庫縣的豐岡市，去外地闖蕩的男生有 52% 會回流，但女生只有 27%。換句話說，女生一旦看過外面的世界，就不想回去了。 3. 為什麼女生不回來？ 這背後的原因其實很根深柢固： · 職場天花板： 鄉下的好工作少，男女薪資差距比大城市還大。 · 刻板印象： 很多辦公室還留著「女生倒茶、男生決策」的舊習。 · 社交壓力： 很多女生說，回老家過年最怕鄰居問：「什麼時候要生小孩？」這種令人窒息的關心，讓家鄉變成了壓力堡壘。 有一位在秋田工作的記者三浦美和子（Miura Miwako）說得很精準：「當女性在這裡感覺到歧視時，她們很少會大聲抗議——她們只是靜靜地離開。」 4. 為了生存，還是為了女性？ 現在，越來越多的小鎮開始緊張了。有的發漫畫宣傳性別平等，有的幫老師和商人上課。小安顧問說，以前她演講時常被噓，但現在大家慢慢發現：「這已經不是政治正確的問題，而是生存問題。」 不過，這裡有個很矛盾的地方。政府之所以想留住女性，主要目的是希望她們「生孩子」來挽救人口。 這讓政策變得很奇怪：一方面在推性別平等，另一方面卻在辦那種「保姆級」的相親活動。甚至還有縣政府發手冊，教女生要穿裙子看起來比較「纖弱」、妝要畫得「端莊」才討男人喜歡。 說到底，如果鄉村留住女生的目的只是為了讓她們當「生育機器」，那這種平等恐怕只是表面功夫。 真正的進步，應該是讓女生不論想不想結婚、想不想生小孩，都能在自己的家鄉感受到尊重，並且有發揮才華的空間。這條改變觀念的路，日本鄉村顯然還有一段路要走。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Self-driving cars will transform urban economies A robotaxi boom is coming. The impacts might be broader than you expect Nov 27th 2025|San Francisco|6 min read Urban Economies reflect how their residents get around. And before long, that will start to change—more dramatically than at any time since the automobile was invented over a century ago. The robotaxis now autonomously shuttling passengers around the Bay Area or Los Angeles may look like ordinary cars, perhaps with a few ungainly sensors, but as they spread and develop, they will operate under different constraints to human-driven ones, and accordingly reshape cities. Over the next year, robotaxis will become** increasingly** difficult to ignore. Waymo, Google’s offering, plans to expand to cities including Miami and Washington. London will mark the company’s first international expansion and put it in direct competition with Uber, which is also set to launch a self-driving offering in the city. San Francisco’s experience suggests that public and regulatory resistance—a formidable force in many cities—can be overcome. A thin majority of residents opposed robotaxis in 2023 when Waymos hit the streets. Today two-thirds are in favour. Pioneer cities offer a glimpse of changes to be expected elsewhere. Road safety ought to improve: Waymos are involved in ten times fewer serious crashes than an average human driver. So far, at least, in San Francisco there have not been job losses among cab or rideshare drivers. The cars operate at the top end of the market. A trip with a Waymo costs roughly a third more than a ride-hailing service on average, reflecting the swish Jaguar cars the firm uses and research spending that must be recouped. Despite the cost of a ride, robotaxis’ market share is rising fast . This is just the start. Robotaxis are losing money at present, but they ought to become much cheaper. The most important fact about them is also the most obvious: no one is at the wheel. That makes their economics entirely different to either regular taxis or cars. Unlike taxis, per-trip costs can be low. A rider no longer needs to buy a driver’s time at a high enough wage to make it worth their while. Although robotaxis still need to be charged, maintained, cleaned and so on, doing so is far cheaper. Unlike regular cars, robotaxis do not sit idle for most of the day, meaning their main cost—the investment to build them—can be spread across many more journeys. Such costs will also come down once fleets begin to be built in bulk. Carmakers will be able to fiddle with the shape of cars that no longer need to accommodate a driver. Tesla, Elon Musk’s firm, is trying to work out how to just use cameras rather than more expensive lidar sensors. Further down the road Thus the economics of owning a car, even an autonomous one, will be altered. In the countryside, which may lack the population density to sustain a robotaxi network, things will probably not be too different. Yet car ownership could lose appeal for many city- and suburb-dwellers. The average American household **allocates **15% of its spending to vehicle ownership. For anyone who is not a ferocious gearhead, drastically reducing this would be tempting. A world of cheap urban transportation is alluring. But it could also cause a real problem: horrific traffic jams. Congestion is** a classic economic externality.** The cost of any single car’s contribution to a jam is not borne entirely by its occupants. Instead, it is spread across everyone on the road. At present, urban traffic is constrained by the fact that getting around by car either requires (expensively) paying someone else to drive or (inconveniently) driving oneself. Without such constraints, the result could be brutal gridlock—negating many of the benefits of robotaxis. An economist’s answer to this conundrum is straightforward: put a price on traffic. Although congestion charging has been a feature of European roads for decades, it is formidably unpopular in America. New York recently set road fees, but only after a protracted battle. Swarms of robotaxis may force the matter. Self-driving cars are much less likely to break traffic rules and incur fines, meaning something will need to fill a hole in city budgets. Presenting a congestion charge as a “robot tax” might even make it easier to swallow. San Francisco may not yet have seen job losses, but that is likely to change as costs fall. America is home to 1m taxi and bus drivers, as well as over 3m truck drivers—adding up to 3% of the working population. Other potential losers are less obvious. Without car accidents there will, for instance, be less demand for personal-injury lawyers. If people stop buying cars, dealers and used-car salesmen will go. Robotaxis might compete with short-haul air travel and even hotels if some are kitted out with beds. Although new jobs will be created—in, say, managing fleets or manning depots—they will hardly make up for the losses. Social disruption is likely; at the same time, job losses will be an opportunity. Workforces in the rich world are shrinking as populations age. Freeing people to work elsewhere might be invaluable. Productivity in the transport industry would surge. The rest of the economy ought to perk up, too. An average working American spends just under an hour commuting each day, against eight hours on the job. Turning even a sliver of that into work could boost output appreciably, says Will Denyer of Gavekal, a research firm. Self-driving cars offer a smoother ride, which, along with better suspension, should make it easier to get work done onboard. And fewer accidents not only mean fewer human tragedies—they also mean lower hospital and rehabilitation bills. Then comes the impact on urban areas. Parking spaces take up a quarter of the downtown of the average American city (see chart 2). Most could be put to better use, perhaps as housing or offices. On-street parking could become drop-off bays or pavements, making city strolls more pleasant. More urbanites might cycle if traffic accidents become less common. Denser and better connected city centres ought to be an economic boon. Outside city centres, however, robotaxis will probably lead to sprawl, since longer journeys will be more tolerable. Self-driving cars could pull people away from more space-efficient transport such as buses, subways and trains, prompting a “death spiral” where fewer customers mean lower revenues, leading to worse service and, in turn, fewer customers. Policymakers will have to increase funding and use autonomous technology to improve public transport (think of self-driving buses). Other policy conundrums will also emerge. Roads dominated by robotaxis may need to be regulated more tightly. Already, human drivers tend to bully their robot counterparts; risk-averse algorithms tuned for safety would rather get cut off at an intersection than risk a crash, and drivers know that. Besides, there is no one behind the wheel to honk or yell profanities. Pedestrians, too, can wander across streets without the frisson of fear that comes from jumping in front of a vehicle with a potentially erratic human driver. Crime might be another problem, since driverless cars are easy to steal from and vandalise. The final shape of the self-driving city is hard to predict. Nearly a century passed after the automobile’s invention before the car-oriented city reached its apogee in places such as Atlanta, Dallas and Los Angeles, each with thick arterial roads, enormous parking lots and sprawling suburbs. The self-driving era carries risks of its own—but also vast promise. ■ 無人駕駛車將翻轉城市經濟 機器人計程車（Robotaxi）熱潮即將來臨，其影響力可能遠超乎你的想像。 城市經濟的樣貌，往往取決於居民的移動方式。不久後，這一切將迎來百年前汽車發明以來最劇烈的變革。目前在舊金山或洛杉磯街頭穿梭的無人駕駛計程車，雖然看起來跟一般車子差不多（頂多多了些笨重的感測器），但隨著技術普及，它們不再受限於人類駕駛的種種約束，進而重新形塑城市。 接下來這一年，機器人計程車將讓你無法忽視。Google 旗下的 Waymo 正計畫擴張到邁阿密和華盛頓；倫敦則將成為其進軍國際的首站，直接對上同樣準備推出無人駕駛服務的 Uber。舊金山的經驗顯示，原本強大的法規與輿論阻力是可以克服的——2023 年 Waymo 剛上路時，過半居民是反對的，但現在已有三分之二的人轉向支持。 先驅城市的轉變跡象 從這些先驅城市可以預見未來的改變。首先，道路安全會提升：Waymo 發生嚴重車禍的機率比人類駕駛低十倍。此外，目前舊金山的運將或外送員尚未出現失業潮，因為無人車目前鎖定高端市場，由於採用捷豹（Jaguar）車款且需回收研發成本，車資比一般叫車服務貴約三分之一，但其市佔率仍快速攀升。 這僅僅是個開始。雖然目前機器人計程車還在虧損，但未來價格一定會大降。無人駕駛最核心的關鍵就在於「沒人開車」，這讓它的經濟模式與傳統計程車完全不同。你不必支付司機薪水，雖然仍有充電、維修與清潔成本，但相對便宜許多。而且與私人轎車不同，無人車不會整天閒置，建造成本可以分攤到更多的趟次中。未來車廠若能大規模量產，甚至能因不必預留駕駛座而改變車體設計；特斯拉（Tesla）甚至嘗試捨棄昂貴的光學雷達（lidar），改用純相機感測來壓低成本。 更遠遠景的連鎖反應 這將改變擁車的邏輯。鄉村地區因人口稀疏可能維持現狀，但在城市與郊區，買車的吸引力將大減。一般美國家庭約有 15% 的支出花在養車，除非你是鐵桿車迷，否則這筆省下的錢極具誘惑力。 然而，廉價交通雖然誘人，卻可能導致災難性的交通大塞車。塞車是典型的「經濟外部性」：單一車輛造成的延誤是由路上所有人承擔。目前城市交通受限於司機的人事成本或親自開車的體力消耗，一旦這些限制消失，路面可能會陷入嚴重的癱瘓。 經濟學家的對策很簡單：徵收「擁擠費」。雖然美國人一直很反對這項收費，但當無人車不再違規、導致城市少掉罰單收入時，市府預算缺口將迫使規費轉型。若將這筆費用包裝成「機器人稅」，或許大眾會比較容易接受。 產業結構的重組 雖然目前還沒看到失業潮，但隨著成本下降，這將不可避免。美國有百萬名運將，還有超過三百萬名卡車司機，佔勞動力 3%。其他受害者包括：事故減少會導致人身傷害律師需求下降；沒人買車，車行與二手車商就會倒閉；如果無人車內裝配備床鋪，甚至會威脅短程航空與飯店業。 當然也會創造新工作（如車隊管理），但很難抵銷損失。雖然會造成社會動盪，但從人口老化、勞動力萎縮的角度來看，這也是釋放人力到其他產業的契機。 對城市空間與生活的影響 運輸業的生產力將大幅躍升，上班族每天平均一小時的通勤時間，若能轉換成在車上工作或休息，對經濟大有幫助。更重要的是，美國城市中心平均有四分之一的空間是停車位，未來這些土地可以改建為住宅或辦公室。路邊停車位能變成行人步道，當交通事故減少，騎單車的人也會增加，更緊湊、連結度更高的市中心將成為經濟助力。 不過，這也可能導致「城市擴張」（sprawl），因為通勤變得輕鬆，人們願意住得更遠，這可能導致公車與地鐵陷入「乘客流失、收入減少、服務變差」的惡性循環。政策制定者必須加強補助，並利用自動駕駛技術來優化大眾運輸。 最後，當路上都是機器人時，交通規則可能需要更嚴格。因為人類駕駛會「欺負」奉公守法的無人車，行人也可能大膽穿梭車陣。此外，車內沒人看管，犯罪與破壞行為也可能增加。 雖然無人車時代充滿風險，但其帶來的繁榮潛力同樣驚人。一如百年前汽車改變了城市地景，新一波的變革也正在路上。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Meta and Google face** a reckoning **over *social-media addiction* A landmark verdict in California could have far-reaching consequences Mar 25th 2026|3 min read Among the 17m American children who use Instagram, the average time spent scrolling the app each day is 30 minutes. But for Kaley, a 20-year-old who started using social media aged six, it became an hours-a-day addiction. Spending time on Instagram, as well as YouTube, led to feelings of body dysmorphia and thoughts of self-harm, she claimed. On March 25th a jury in California agreed, ordering the apps’ parent companies, Meta and Google, to pay Kaley (whose full name has not been made public) $6m in damages. The payout amounts to less than one-thousandth of a percent of the companies’ annual sales. But it threatens to do them far more harm. The novel legal argument used by Kaley’s lawyers may bring social networks to heel in a way that previous attempts have not. The firms are weighing their options—both have said they will appeal—but the ruling could be a turning point in how social apps are regulated. Although this was the first time that Mark Zuckerberg, Meta’s boss, appeared before a jury, it was hardly the first attempt to sue social apps into changing their ways. In 2023 a case against Twitter, over its hosting of terrorist material, made it to the Supreme Court. But that case, like many others, went in favour of the tech industry. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 excuses social networks from liability for what their users post. Kaley’s lawyers took a different approach. Rather than trying to hold Meta and Google responsible for the harmful content hosted on their platforms, they attacked them for the way the platforms are designed. They showed the jury internal company documents demonstrating that executives knew of their products’ harmful effects on children, and argued that features like auto-playing videos, personalised recommendations and infinite feeds were designed to lure youngsters. The verdict could influence thousands of similar lawsuits that have been filed against Meta, Google and other social-media firms. (TikTok and Snap were part of Kaley’s complaint, but settled before the trial.) Some lawyers have compared the claims to the cases brought against tobacco companies in earlier decades, which led to widespread regulation of the industry. **America is not the only place where social apps are facing greater scrutiny. **In February a preliminary ruling from the European Commission found TikTok in breach of its Digital Services Act owing to its “addictive” features. TikTok was told to change the design of its app or risk a fine of up to 6% of the global revenue of its Chinese owner, ByteDance. Reining in such features would probably reduce the amount of time spent on social apps, and thus the number of ads users could be served—and the profits to be gained. Governments are focused in particular on protecting youngsters. In December Australia banned under-16s from using social networks; others from Britain to Malaysia are considering similar measures. A 30-country study last year by Ipsos, a pollster, asked whether under-14s should be excluded from social media, and found a majority in favour in every country. The verdict in California may soon go viral. ■ 社群媒體成癮：Meta 與 Google 正面臨大清算 加州法院的一項指標性判決，可能對科技業產生深遠影響 ** ** 在全美國 1,700 萬名使用 Instagram 的孩童中，平均每人每天刷螢幕的時間大約是 30 分鐘。但對於今年 20 歲的凱莉（Kaley）來說，社群媒體卻成了一場長達數年的噩夢。她從 6 歲就開始接觸社群平台，後來發展成每天花好幾個小時沉迷其中。凱莉聲稱，過度使用 Instagram 和 YouTube 讓她出現了「身體意象失調」（對外表極度自卑）的情況，甚至產生自殘念頭。加州陪審團在 3 月 25 日認同了她的說法，判決母公司 Meta 和 Google 必須賠償凱莉 600 萬美元（約新台幣 1.9 億元）。 這筆賠償金雖然還不到這兩家公司年營收的百分之 0. 1，但對他們的殺傷力卻遠不止於此。凱莉律師團所採用的「全新法律觀點」，可能會以前所未有的方式制衡社群網路。雖然兩家公司都表示會提出上訴，但這個判決很可能成為社群平台監管制度的轉捩點。 雖然這是 Meta 老闆馬克．祖克柏第一次站在陪審團面前，但這並非民間第一次嘗試透過法律手段要求平台做出改變。2023 年，曾有人針對 Twitter 散布恐怖主義內容提起訴訟，一路打到最高法院，但最後結果卻偏向科技產業。因為根據 1996 年《通訊規範法》第 230 條，社群平台對於用戶發布的內容具有「免責權」，不需要負法律責任。 但這次凱莉的律師團隊換了個招式：他們不再針對平台上的「內容」吵，而是針對平台的「設計」開刀。 他們向陪審團展示了公司的內部文件，證明高層明明知道產品會對孩童產生負面影響，卻依然設計出「自動播放」、「個人化推薦」以及「滑不到底的動態牆」等功能，目的就是要誘使年輕人上鉤。 這個判決可能會牽動數千件針對 Meta、Google 及其他平台的類似訴訟（先前 TikTok 和 Snap 也是被告，但在開庭前已達成和解）。有些律師甚至將這次的案例比作數十年前對菸草公司的集體訴訟，當時那些案件最終導致了整個菸草業受到嚴格監管。 除了美國，世界各國對社群平台的監管也越來越嚴。今年 2 月，歐盟委員會初步判定 TikTok 違反了《數位服務法》，原因就在於其「成癮性」功能。TikTok 被要求必須更改設計，否則可能面臨其母公司字節跳動（ByteDance）全球年營收 6% 的鉅額罰款。一旦這些讓人成癮的功能被限制，用戶留在平台上的時間就會縮短，看到的廣告變少，公司的利潤自然也會跟著縮水。 現在世界各國政府都把焦點放在保護青少年。澳洲已經在去年 12 月禁止 16 歲以下青少年使用社群網路；英國與馬來西亞也在考慮跟進。去年 Ipsos 針對 30 個國家的民調顯示，絕大多數人都支持禁止 14 歲以下孩童使用社群媒體。看來，加州這場判決的影響力，很快就會像病毒一樣傳遍全球。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

War in Iran is making Donald Trump weaker—and angrier By diminishing the president’s political superpowers, his reckless campaign may make him more dangerous Mar 19th 2026|6 min read NEVER BET against Donald Trump. No politician can defy political gravity like the man whose supporters stormed the Capitol on January 6th 2021, only for him to be re-elected in 2024 with a bigger share of the vote. And yet it is hard to imagine a crisis more precisely engineered to intercept the trajectory of his presidency than his ill-judged, heedless war against Iran. Even a short war will alter the course of his second term. One that lasts months could bring it crashing to earth. The reason is that the fight against Iran diminishes Mr Trump’s three political superpowers: his ability to impose his own reality on the world, his remorseless use of leverage and his dominion over the Republican Party. Even without Iran, the potency of these Trumpian strengths was likely to wane after the midterm elections. Wars accelerate change. Start with Trump v Reality. In politics, the president has shown a remarkable ability to twist facts and, sure enough, he insists that he has already triumphed in Iran. Yet the war tells a truth of its own. Iran’s regime cannot win in any conventional sense. But despite widespread destruction of infrastructure and the assassinations of senior leaders—including the security chief, Ali Larijani—Iran’s regime survives for now and its 400kg or so of near-bomb-ready uranium remains at large. What is more, Iran is waging its own parallel war against the global energy industry. As it strikes shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the infrastructure of its neighbours, the markets are keeping score. With Brent **crude spiking to more than $110 a barrel **on March 18th, following an Iranian missile attack on a Qatari natural-gas hub, the regime will conclude that its strategy is working. If anything, time is on Iran’s side. America and Israel will gradually run out of useful targets to strike from the air, or run low on interceptor batteries to see off Iranian weapons. By contrast, Iran appears still to have plenty of drones. For as long as it restricts traffic in the strait, oil prices will climb and the damage to the world economy will grow. Mr Trump’s second superpower is leverage. Now that other countries’ leaders have come to expect rough treatment, they are learning how to resist. When the president called on America’s allies to help open the strait, warning that NATO faced a “very bad” future if they refused, they turned him down. He quickly reversed course, pretending he had never needed help. Likewise,** Iran is opposing Mr Trump by accumulating leverage against him. **In recent days it has signalled that it will grant safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz to ships from friendly countries—a sign that it means to use access as a bargaining tool. Even if Mr Trump wants to end the war, Iran could continue to fire at ships. If the waterway remains closed until the end of April, the oil price could reach $150 a barrel. Given that leverage, Iran may hold out for more than just a return to the status quo before the war. It may ask for sanctions to be lifted, or an American commitment to abandon some bases in the Middle East or to restrain Israel. If recession looms in America and stockmarkets start to fall, would Mr Trump escalate by, say, seizing Kharg island, home to Iran’s export terminals? Or would he buckle? The answer depends partly on the last of his powers: his hold on his party. Mr Trump was elected on promises to spare voters from war and inflation. So far, 13 American service personnel have died; ground operations inside Iran, to recover that uranium, or on Kharg would put many more in danger. Average prices of petrol and diesel have reached $3.88 and $5.09 a gallon, compared with $3.11 and $3.72 at Mr Trump’s inauguration. Republican support for the war is strong, but softening. A vocal faction of MAGA, notably Tucker Carlson (interviewed on “The Insider”, our video show, this week), talks of betrayal. In private many elected Republicans are seething. Mr Trump’s** failure to heed warnings** about the Strait of Hormuz is typical of his contempt for strategy and his hubris in thinking he knows better than people who really do. Republicans are now highly likely to lose control of the House in the midterm elections in November. Their chances of losing the Senate too have risen by ten points, to about 50%. The worse the defeat, the lamer a duck the president will be and the less influence he will have over who inherits the party. Were the war to drag on, leading to very high oil prices and tumbling stockmarkets, Mr Trump could seek a way out and look for a win somewhere else—in, say, Cuba. Markets would doubtless register relief if the fighting stopped. But Mr Trump is not in full control of this war. Iran’s attack on the gas hub in Qatar shows it still has cards to play. And even if the fighting ended tomorrow it could take four to six weeks to restore oil production, four to eight weeks to settle oil markets and two months to normalise shipping. The risk of renewed Iranian action would remain. Prices may stay high for months. Every day they do weakens the president. Mr Trump’s politics depends on the strength that comes from winning. If he seems a loser, expect him to exact retribution. A weaker president could become a more dangerous one. Tanking Mr Trump is freest to act abroad. He may abandon NATO. He may cut Ukraine loose to punish Europe. He could bully Latin America in the name of fighting crime and drugs. He may demand money for defending Japan and South Korea. He will be maximalist on tariffs. Even if he does not succeed, that will further erode America’s alliances, to the glee of China and Russia. But Mr Trump is also liable to lash out at home. He has already endorsed the idea of withholding broadcasting licences from media outlets that criticise the war.** He wants the Federal Reserve to slash rates, but his war makes that less likely**—expect further clashes with the central bank. He could target perceived enemies or send immigration agents to more Democratic-run cities. He could threaten to meddle in the midterms, either as theatre to rile his opponents, or because he intends to influence the results. It is hard to see how Mr Trump ends up a winner in Iran. Be warned: he makes a very bad loser. ■ 伊朗戰事正削弱唐納·川普——且讓他愈發憤怒 由於總統的政治「超能力」正在消減，他那魯莽的軍事行動可能使他變得更加危險 2026年3月19日 | 閱讀時間 5 分鐘 永遠不要賭唐納·川普會輸。沒有哪位政治人物能像他一樣無視「政治重力」：他的支持者曾在 2021 年 1 月 6 日衝擊國會大廈，但他卻能在 2024 年以更高的得票率重新當選。然而，很難想像還有什麼危機，能比這場判斷失誤且不計後果的對伊戰爭，更精準地攔截他總統任期的上升軌跡。即使是一場短暫的戰爭，也將改變他第二任期的走向；若戰事持續數月，則可能讓他摔得粉身碎骨。 究其原因，對伊戰爭削弱了川普的三大政治超能力：他將自身現實強加於世界的能力、對籌碼（leverage）冷酷無情的使用，以及他對共和黨的統治力。即便沒有伊朗問題，這些「川式強項」的效力在期中選舉後本就可能轉弱，而戰爭則加速了這種變化。 首先看「川普對抗現實」。在政治領域，這位總統展現了扭曲事實的驚人能力，果不其然，他堅稱自己已在伊朗取得勝利。然而，這場戰爭本身就訴說著真相。伊朗政權在任何傳統意義上都無法獲勝，但儘管基礎設施遭到大規模破壞、高層領導人（包括安全首長阿里·拉里賈尼）遭到暗殺，伊朗政權目前依然倖存，且其約 400 公斤近乎武器級的濃縮鈾仍下落不明。 更甚者，伊朗正針對全球能源產業發動一場平行戰爭。隨著伊朗襲擊荷姆茲海峽的航運及鄰國的基礎設施，市場正在「記帳」。3 月 18 日，在伊朗飛彈襲擊卡達天然氣樞紐後，布蘭特原油價格飆升至每桶 110 美元以上，該政權將據此認定其策略正發揮效用。 如果說有什麼差別，那就是時間站在伊朗這一邊。美國與以色列能從空中打擊的有效目標終將耗盡，或者用來攔截伊朗武器的防空飛彈電池將會短缺。相比之下，伊朗似乎仍有充足的無人機。只要伊朗持續限制海峽交通，油價就會攀升，對世界經濟的損害也會日益擴大。 川普的第二項超能力是「籌碼」。既然其他國家的領導人已經習慣了被粗暴對待，他們正學會如何抵抗。當總統要求美國盟友協助開放海峽，並警告若拒絕則北約（NATO）將面臨「非常糟糕」的未來時，他們拒絕了。川普隨即改弦易轍，假裝自己從未需要過幫助。 同樣地，伊朗也正透過累積對抗川普的籌碼來反擊。近日，伊朗示意將允許友好國家的船隻安全通過荷姆茲海峽——這跡象表明它有意將航行權作為談判工具。即使川普想結束戰爭，伊朗仍可繼續攻擊船隻。若該水道持續封閉至 4 月底，油價可能觸及每桶 150 美元。 有了這項籌碼，伊朗要求的可能不只是回到戰前的現狀。它可能要求解除制裁，或要求美國承諾撤離部分中東基地，或限制以色列。如果美國經濟陷入衰退且股市開始下跌，川普會選擇升級行動（例如奪取伊朗出口終端所在地——哈爾克島），還是會屈服認輸？ 答案部分取決於他的最後一項權力：他對政黨的掌控。川普當年是憑藉「讓選民免於戰爭與通膨」的承諾當選的。到目前為止，已有 13 名美軍官兵喪生；而在伊朗境內發動地面行動以回收濃縮鈾，或進攻哈爾克島，將使更多人陷入險境。目前汽油和柴油的平均價格已達到每加侖 3.88 美元和 5.09 美元，而川普就職時僅為 3.11 美元和 3.72 美元。共和黨對戰爭的支持依然強勁，但正在鬆動。MAGA 陣營中聲音響亮的一派——尤其是本週接受我們影音節目《知情者》（The Insider）採訪的塔克·卡森——已經開始談論「背叛」。 私底下，許多共和黨民選官員正怒火中燒。川普未能聽取有關荷姆茲海峽的警告，這典型地反映了他對策略的輕視，以及那種自認比專業人士更懂的傲慢。共和黨現在極有可能在 11 月的期中選舉中失去眾議院的控制權；失去參議院的機率也上升了 10 個百分點，達到約 50%。敗得愈慘，總統就會變成愈弱勢的「跛腳鴨」，對誰能繼承黨內大位的影響力也就愈小。 若戰爭拖延下去，導致油價居高不下且股市大跌，川普可能會尋求退路，並在其他地方（例如古巴）尋找一場「勝利」。若戰事停止，市場無疑會感到寬慰。但川普並未完全掌控這場戰爭。伊朗對卡達天然氣樞紐的攻擊顯示它手中仍有牌可打。即便戰事明天結束，恢復石油產量可能需要四到六週，穩定石油市場需要四到八週，航運正常化則需兩個月。伊朗重新採取行動的風險依然存在。高物價可能維持數月，而每一天的物價高漲都在削弱總統。 川普的政治生命取決於「勝利」所帶來的實力。如果他看起來像個輸家，預期他將會採取報復行動。一個更虛弱的總統可能會變得更加危險。 兵敗如山倒 川普在外交事務上最能隨心所欲。他可能會放棄北約，可能切斷對烏克蘭的支持以懲罰歐洲，可能以打擊犯罪與毒品為名霸凌拉美各國。他可能要求日本和南韓支付防禦費用，並在關稅問題上採取極限施壓。即便這些行動未能成功，也將進一步侵蝕美國的同盟關係，令中俄兩國竊喜。 但川普也傾向於在國內撒氣。他已經支持「撤銷批評戰爭的媒體機構廣播執照」的構想。他希望聯準會（Fed）降息，但他的戰爭讓這變得更不可能——預期他將與中央銀行發生更多衝突。他可能鎖定所謂的敵人，或向更多民主黨執政的城市派遣移民官員。他甚至可能威脅干預期中選舉，或作為激怒對手的戲碼，或是真想影響選舉結果。很難預見川普如何在伊朗問題上成為贏家。請注意：他是一個非常輸不起的人。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Obituary | God’s dictator falls Ali Khamenei hoped his legacy might last for ever Iran’s Supreme Leader was killed on February 28th, aged 86 Mar 3rd 2026|5 min read Across the decades, Ali Khamenei built up countless reasons for his hatred of the West. They began with a fiery speech he heard at 13, when at school, inveighing against the monarchy that was backed by America and its allies. As a young man he was jailed six times, beaten and tortured by the Shah’s secret police. When the Shah fell in 1979, and the hotheads in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s new Islamic Republic took American** diplomats** hostage, it was plain that America would seek to undermine Iran by any means. In the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 America even supported Iraq, ruled by a tyrant, rather than Iran. A decade later, when Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader himself, attitudes had hardened on both sides. Increasingly, over the next 30 years, he knew he was personally in the Great Satan’s sights. This did not daunt him. Martyrdom would be sweet; in many ways, he had already courted it. Like Khomeini, his long-term mentor and friend, he had divine right on his side. America led a phalanx of countries that were morally corrupt; but Islam made Iran strong, pure and spiritually protected. It disgusted him to have to deal or negotiate with the West, even through officials. He came to disdain foreign investment, in case it increased “Westoxification” in Iran; during the pandemic he refused to import Western vaccines, because they might bring the virus in. Only “heroic flexibility”** induced him to** agree to the nuclear deal with America in 2015. Then, predictably, Donald Trump tore it up and tried, with Israel (the Little Satan) to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities into oblivion. Why trust such people? Why negotiate, when America’s sole purpose was to ensure that Iran had no nuclear power at all? No free nation would behave that way. Besides, when Mr Trump’s body was ashes, eaten by worms and ants, the robust tree of the Islamic Republic would still be standing. His position as Supreme Leader seemed unassailable, but it had never been his ambition. He was a literary boy, and the books he most enjoyed—“Uncle Tom’s Cabin”, “The Grapes of Wrath” and, especially, Victor Hugo’s “Les Misérables”—were about the struggles of the poor. Growing up as he did, with many siblings in a single room and a damp basement, sometimes subsisting on bread and raisins, he knew that story. He enjoyed music, too, and his mother quoted the poet Hafiz to him. But he was in Mashhad, a sacred city; his father was a religious scholar; so from four years old he was immersed in Islamic studies, eventually in Qom. They went slowly. By the 1980s he was still a hujjat al-islam, equivalent to a middle-ranking Christian priest. As he was appointed to higher and higher posts—first, by Khomeini, to the presidency, then by Khomeini’s allies to the ultimate position—he did not feel it was his proper place. He, after all, had been the mild cleric sent to wish the American hostages Happy Christmas. But when he was made an ayatollah almost at once, and the constitution amended to overlook his lack of learning, he settled into the role as if born to it. It was as a supreme jurist, wearing the black cap of a direct descendant of Muhammad, that he gazed benignly from billboards and posters across the country. And it was as a great teacher that he preached and wrote books on forgiveness, patience and “101 tips for a happy marriage”, telling Iranians how to live. In short he was everywhere, ruling now by divine authority. His tongue could channel God. Also, though many had underrated him, he knew how to build up worldly power. He proved adept at playing Iran’s state institutions off against each other—the presidency against parliament and the army against the regime’s most powerful security force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose activities he encouraged. This made him the final arbiter. Besides, whereas Iran’s often-more-moderate presidents had a limit of two consecutive terms, he was appointed for life. Beneath him, too, he had the Guardian Council, a quango of clerics and lawyers that vetted electoral candidates and, increasingly, disqualified or drove out all but his favourites. Rival ayatollahs and their acolytes were co-opted with government money and jobs. Meanwhile his office vastly expanded, with commissars in all government departments, provinces and military units. A force of over 1m paramilitaries enforced ideological discipline at home. Meanwhile an “axis of resistance”—Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen—carried it abroad. His business empire was also extraordinary. He might live frugally, receiving visitors in a bare room with one sofa and a few wooden chairs, but he controlled assets worth tens of billions of dollars. Soon after his succession he took over the Shia charities from the government and turned them into vast conglomerates that hoovered up state contracts. He also seized the properties the Shah’s men had abandoned when they fled from the Islamic revolution. The humble cleric from Mashhad had inherited the Earth. Yet many of his subjects grew to loathe and rise against him. Their troubles were economic, obviously the result of American sanctions, though they added those familiar, tiresome Western tropes of freedom, human rights, dress codes for women. Clearly, foreign enemies had fomented this. So he responded by beating, jailing and shooting, eventually ordering the killing of thousands. An attack by dissident revolutionaries in 1981, which paralysed his right arm, had taught him never to concede. As he said then, he did not need his arm, as long as his brain and tongue worked. He hoped to leave a legacy. This was not necessarily a dynasty, though he had four sons, all of them clerics. He was thinking more of his “Second Step” of the Islamic revolution, more pious and more energetic. Evidently, his own time was limited. He would be bundled away for safety if or when Iran’s enemies struck. How much more honourable, more deserving of the paradise to come, to drink the pure draught of a martyr’s end. ■ 訃聞】上帝的獨裁者倒下：哈米尼曾期望其豐功偉業永存 伊朗最高領袖於 2026 年 2 月 28 日遇刺身亡，享壽 86 歲。 2026 年 3 月 3 日 | 5 分鐘閱讀 數十年來，阿里·哈米尼（Ali Khamenei）累積了無數痛恨西方的理由。這一切始於他 13 歲在學校聽的一場慷慨激昂的演說，內容抨擊受美國及其盟友支持的君主政權。年輕時，他曾六度入獄，並遭受沙阿（Shah）秘密警察的毆打與酷刑。1979 年沙阿政權垮台，何梅尼（Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini）領導的新伊斯蘭共和國激進分子挾持了美國外交官作為人質，當時情勢已很明朗：美國將不擇手段削弱伊朗。在 1980 年的兩伊戰爭中，美國甚至支持由暴君統治的伊拉克而非伊朗。十年後，當哈米尼親自接任最高領袖時，雙方的立場皆已硬化。在接下來的 30 年裡，他深知自己已被「大撒旦」（美國）盯上。 這並未令他畏縮。殉道對他而言是甘甜的；在許多方面，他甚至早已在追求這一點。正如他的長期導師兼好友何梅尼一樣，他認為神權站在他這一邊。美國領導的是一群道德腐敗的國家；而伊斯蘭則讓伊朗強大、純潔並受到精神保護。對他而言，即便透過官員與西方交涉或談判都令人厭惡。他開始鄙視外國投資，唯恐這會增加伊朗的「西化」現象；在疫情期間，他甚至拒絕進口西方疫苗，認為那可能帶來病毒。 只有「英勇的靈活性」才讓他勉強同意 2015 年與美國達成的核協議。果不其然，唐納·川普（Donald Trump）隨後撕毀了協議，並試圖與「小撒旦」（以色列）一起將伊朗的核設施炸成平地。為何要信任這種人？當美國唯一的目的是確保伊朗完全沒有核能時，還有什麼好談判的？沒有一個自由的民族會接受這樣的對待。此外，他堅信當川普的軀體化為灰燼、被蟲蟻啃食時，伊斯蘭共和國這棵茁壯的大樹依然會屹立不倒。 身為最高領袖，他的地位看似堅不可摧，但這從非他的志向。他曾是個熱愛文學的少年，最喜歡的書籍如《黑奴籲天錄》、《憤怒的葡萄》，尤其是維克多·雨果的《悲慘世界》，皆與窮人的鬥爭有關。他成長於一個多名手足擠在一間房與潮濕地下室的家庭，有時僅靠麵包與葡萄乾維生，他對這種故事並不陌生。他也熱愛音樂，母親常向他引用詩人哈菲茲的詩句。但他身處聖城馬什哈德（Mashhad），父親又是宗教學者；因此他從四歲起就沉浸在伊斯蘭研究中，最終進入庫姆（Qom）深造。 他的晉升之路緩慢。直到 1980 年代，他仍只是一位「霍賈特·伊斯蘭」（hujjat al-islam），相當於基督教中階神職人員。當他被指派到越來越高的職位時——先是被何梅尼任命為總統，隨後由何梅尼的盟友推舉至最高職位——他並不覺得那是他該待的地方。畢竟，他曾是那個被派去向美國人質祝賀聖誕快樂的溫和教士。然而，當他幾乎立刻被擢升為大阿亞圖拉，且憲法為了忽略他學術素養的不足而進行修改後，他便適應了這個角色，彷彿天生如此。他作為最高法學家，戴著代表穆罕默德直系後裔的黑色頭巾，慈祥地從全國各地的看板與海報上俯視眾生。他以偉大導師的身份，宣講並撰寫關於寬恕、耐心以及「幸福婚姻的 101 個秘訣」等書籍，教導伊朗人如何生活。簡而言之，他無處不在，如今憑藉神授權威實施統治，他的舌頭可以傳達上帝的旨意。 此外，雖然許多人低估了他，但他深諳建立世俗權力之道。他證明了自己善於玩弄權術，讓伊朗國家機構互相制衡——讓總統對抗議會，讓軍隊對抗政權最強大的安全力量「伊斯蘭革命衛隊」（IRGC），並鼓勵後者的活動。這使他成為最終的裁決者。此外，儘管伊朗那些溫和派總統有兩屆任期的限制，他卻是終身任職。 在他之下，還有憲法監護委員會，這是一個由教士和律師組成的官方機構，負責審查候選人，並日益排擠或取消除他心腹之外所有人的資格。競爭對手的阿亞圖拉及其追隨者則透過政府資金和職位被收編。與此同時，他的辦公室極度擴張，在所有政府部門、省份和軍事單位都派駐了監軍。一支超過 100 萬人的準軍事力量在國內執行意識形態紀律，而「抵抗之弧」——黎巴嫩真主黨、加薩哈瑪斯、葉門胡塞武裝——則將其影響力延伸至海外。 他的商業帝國同樣驚人。他或許生活簡樸，在只有一張沙發和幾張木椅的空曠房間接待訪客，但他控制著價值數百億美元的資產。繼位後不久，他從政府手中接管了什葉派慈善機構，將其轉變為巨大的企業集團，壟斷國家合同。他還沒收了沙阿親信在革命逃亡時遺留的財產。這位來自馬什哈德的謙卑教士，繼承了整個土地。 然而，他的許多臣民卻越來越憎恨他，並起身反抗。他們的困境顯然是美國制裁導致的經濟問題，儘管他們也加入了那些陳腐、令人厭煩的西方說辭，如自由、人權、女性著裝限制等。他認為這顯然是外國敵人的煽動。因此，他以毆打、入獄和槍擊作為回應，最終下令處死數千人。1981 年一場導致他右臂癱瘓的異議革命者襲擊，教會了他絕不讓步。誠如他當時所言，只要大腦和舌頭還能運作，他就不需要那隻手臂。 他希望能留下豐功偉業。這不一定是一個王朝，儘管他有四個兒子且皆為教士。他考慮更多的是伊斯蘭革命的「第二步」，即更加虔誠、更具活力。顯然，他的時間已經不多了。如果伊朗的敵人發動攻擊，他會被秘密轉移。對於他而言，能飲下這口純淨的殉道之泉，是多麼光榮、多麼配得上未來的樂園。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The biggest band you’ve never heard of If you want to impress your children, tell them you listen to this South Korean boyband Feb 26th 2026|6 min read WHO MADE the second-highest-selling album in the world last year? (There are no prizes for correctly guessing who claimed the top spot—it was Taylor Swift.) You may be tempted to name a pop juggernaut such as Lady Gaga or Justin Bieber. Country-music fans might opt for Morgan Wallen. Lovers of Latin music might volunteer Bad Bunny, the star of the Super Bowl half-time show. All those answers are wrong. The right one is Stray Kids, a South Korean boyband. You might find this perplexing, because Stray Kids sounds like a clothing line or an after-school club. Chances are you cannot name one of their hits, never mind hum one of their punchy dubstep- and electronic-inflected tunes. But there are millions of people across the world who can. Stray Kids are** fully fledged** superstars. The band has more than 10.5bn views on YouTube and almost 2bn likes on TikTok. Fans have spent some 21m hours—roughly equivalent to 2,400 years—feasting on a track called “God’s Menu” on Spotify. In November “DO IT” became their eighth album or ep (extended play) to reach number one on the Billboard 200 chart. It is a feat not even BTS, another K-pop group with far superior name recognition, have accomplished. Stray Kids’s recent stadium tour, “dominATE”, lived up to its name, with revenues of almost $200m. A concert film was released in cinemas at the beginning of February. For one weekend, it was the highest-grossing movie in the world. The band is not an overnight success. The eight members had been working on their skills as singers, rappers and dancers in K-pop’s intensive training system long before they joined the band in 2017. That year a reality-television show chronicled Stray Kids’s transformation from a gaggle of novice, nervous youngsters—during shows members would drop their microphones and mess up the words—into a well-oiled entertainment machine. The show was a canny marketing technique; their debut single, “Hellevator”, was released to coincide with its broadcast. But the group’s global breakout came later, in 2020, with the release of “God’s Menu”, a cacophony of sirens, thudding beats and aggressive vocals. (Throughout, the members mimic the sound of gunshots: “DU DU DU DU DU DU”.) The music video, displaying sharp dance moves and even sharper editing, went viral. Stray Kids’s success is not the result of child’s play. They have prospered for two reasons. One is a defiantly original sound. From the start Stray Kids eschewed the effervescent tunes preferred by their K-pop rivals in favour of something much rowdier. (Some call it “noise music”, which does a disservice to the catchy hooks and tuneful bridges.) The frenetic trap-pop style made them outliers, but over time has won them admirers. Stray Kids’s followers—around 75% of whom are female, according to Chartmetric, a music-data firm—find it thrilling. “We made it on our own,” the band declares. “We do what we wanna do.” This is all by design. In 2017 Bang Chan, the group’s leader, selected each member himself from the trainees at JYP Entertainment, a record label. Normally it is music executives who put bands together and it can result in groups that lack chemistry. But Bang Chan picked performers who suited his boisterous style. For instance, Felix, a rapper, has a deep, gravelly voice that lends a distinctive texture to songs. And whereas other K-pop groups may be assigned tracks by their label, leading to variations in style across albums, Stray Kids write most of their music themselves. Three members, working as a group called 3RACHA, handle the music production. Their songwriting approach is guided by recurring “melodic symbols” within tracks, Changbin, one member, has said. Fans can repeat these leitmotifs even if there is a language barrier. Watch “dominATE” and you will see hordes of women screaming “LA-LA-LA-LA” or “MANIAC” on beat. The other reason for their success is Stray Kids’s relationship with those fans. For though their music is gritty, their public image is anything but. The band members wear makeup and paint their nails. They sport designer clothes. (It is a miracle their concert outfits did not precipitate a global shortage of rhinestones and sequins.) Stray Kids demonstrate a more progressive kind of manhood, says Ray Seol of Berklee College of Music. “It’s the Korean way of masculinity…it’s very different from the Western way,” Mr Seol says. “Fans love to see this kind of stuff.” The members also cultivate an air of authenticity. (K-pop fans are attuned to engagement they feel is “fake” or done at the behest of a record label.) The group regularly chats with fans online via livestreams, with special broadcasts for birthdays and other major events; Stray Kids also take fans behind the scenes, sharing songs-in-progress. This creates a sense of proximity and allows fans to feel that they have a direct relationship with their idols. Stray Kids chat about their feelings, particularly feelings of anxiousness. In the “dominATE” film every single member talks to the camera about one insecurity or another. Hyunjin says it took him a long time to accept that being vulnerable was acceptable, to realise that “A wounded blade of grass smells sweeter.” This sensitive side comes out in their music. Their lyrics express the concerns of young listeners starting to make their way in the world. (A large majority of the fanbase is aged 13-24.) “My Pace” talks about the perils of comparing yourself with others. “Grow Up” reassures listeners that they are “doing fine”: “Even adults make mistakes.” Nicole Ohiomah-Paul, a teenage fan from London, says that she “didn’t really like to show [her] emotions” for fear of seeming weak. But Stray Kids have taught her that it “is part of who we are. We’re human.” **Stray Kids exemplify a generational divide **that has long existed in culture. Since the dawn of popular music, parents have been perplexed by what their offspring bop along to in their bedrooms. This has been heightened with the advent of streaming, as listeners can access tracks written by anyone, anywhere. The scale of Stray Kids’s success demonstrates just how much the media landscape has changed in the 21st century. In decades past, television shows, radio stations and newspapers were music’s kingmakers: they decided which acts were worth exposure and listeners’ time. They could boost careers or throttle them. That is no longer the case: “Consumers are the new broadcasters,” says Will Page, a former chief economist at Spotify. Stray Kids have had relatively little attention from traditional outlets, but they have still won fans from Seoul to Sydney and São Paulo. “We make the rules,” the band asserts on “MEGAVERSE”, and “our music echoes through the galaxy.” ■ 你從未聽說過的全球最強天團 如果你想讓孩子對你刮目相看，告訴他們你也在聽這支韓國男團。 去年的全球專輯銷量亞軍是誰？（第一名毫無懸念由泰勒絲奪冠）。你可能會直覺想到女神卡卡（Lady Gaga）或小賈斯汀（Justin Bieber）等流行巨頭；鄉村音樂迷可能會選摩根·沃倫（Morgan Wallen）；拉丁音樂愛好者則可能推舉超級盃中場秀巨星 Bad Bunny。 這些答案都錯了。正確答案是 Stray Kids，一支韓國男團。你可能會感到困惑，因為「Stray Kids」聽起來像個服裝品牌或課後社團。你很可能連他們的一首熱門歌曲都叫不出來，更別提哼出那些富有打擊感、融合了迴響貝斯（dubstep）與電子樂元素的旋律。 然而，全球有數百萬人對他們瞭如指掌。Stray Kids 是名副其實的超級巨星：他們在 YouTube 上的觀看次數超過 105 億次，TikTok 上的按讚數近 20 億。粉絲們在 Spotify 上聆聽《神選菜單》（God’s Menu）這首歌的時間總計約 2,100 萬小時——相當於 2,400 年。去年 11 月，《DO IT》成為他們第八張登上 Billboard 200 榜首的專輯或迷你專輯（EP），這是一項連知名度更高的 K-pop 團體 BTS 都未曾達成的壯舉。 Stray Kids 最近的體育場巡迴演唱會「dominATE」人如其名，創造了近 2 億美元的營收。2 月初上映的演唱會電影，更曾蟬聯週末全球票房冠軍。 他們的成功並非一蹴而就。在 2017 年成軍前，八位成員就在 K-pop 嚴苛的練習生體系中磨練唱跳與饒舌技能。當年的實境節目記錄了他們從一群青澀緊張的青少年——當時他們還會在表演中掉麥克風或忘詞——蛻變為精準運作的娛樂機器的過程。該節目是一場精明的行銷，首支單曲《Hellevator》便配合節目播出同步發行。 但他們真正的全球突破是在 2020 年，憑藉《神選菜單》一曲成名。這首歌融合了警報聲、沉重的鼓點與侵略性的唱腔，成員們在副歌中模仿槍聲（DU DU DU DU DU DU）。其舞蹈動作俐落、剪輯銳利的音樂錄影帶隨即在網路瘋傳。 Stray Kids 的成功並非兒戲，主要歸功於兩大原因。首先是標新立異的音樂風格。他們從一開始就捨棄了 K-pop 對手偏好的輕快旋律，轉而追求更為狂放、喧鬧的曲風。雖然有人稱之為「噪音音樂」，但這顯然忽略了其中朗朗上口的記憶點與動聽的過渡段落。這種狂躁的 Trap-pop 風格讓他們成為異類，卻也隨著時間贏得大批擁護者。據數據公司 Chartmetric 統計，其粉絲約 75% 為女性，她們對此深感震撼。正如樂團所宣言：「我們靠自己成功，我們只做想做的事。」 這一切都在計畫之中。2017 年，隊長方燦從 JYP 娛樂的練習生中親自挑選成員。通常團體是由高層湊合而成，往往缺乏化學反應，但方燦挑選的是能契合他豪放風格的表演者。例如，饒舌擔當 Felix 那深沉渾厚的嗓音，為歌曲增添了獨特的質感。 此外，其他 K-pop 團體通常由經紀公司分配曲目，導致風格參差不齊；但 Stray Kids 大部分音樂皆為自創。由三位成員組成的「3RACHA」負責音樂製作。成員彰彬曾表示，他們的創作受歌曲中反覆出現的「旋律符號」引導。即便有語言隔閡，粉絲仍能跟著這些主導動機（leitmotifs）唱和。在「dominATE」現場，你會看到成千上萬的女性隨著節奏尖叫「LA-LA-LA-LA」或「MANIAC」。 第二個成功關鍵是他們與粉絲的關係。雖然音樂風格硬核，但他們的公眾形象卻極其細膩。成員們化妝、塗指甲油，身著設計師服飾（他們的表演服幾乎快造成全球水鑽與亮片的短缺）。伯克利音樂學院的 Ray Seol 指出，Stray Kids 展現了一種更進步的「男子氣概」——這是一種不同於西方、帶有韓國特色的陽剛之美，深受粉絲喜愛。 成員們也努力營造真實感。K-pop 粉絲對於「虛假」或應公司要求的互動非常敏銳。該團體定期透過直播與粉絲聊天，舉辦生日特輯，並分享創作過程的幕後花絮。這創造了一種親近感，讓粉絲覺得自己與偶像之間有著直接聯繫。 Stray Kids 也常談論心理感受，尤其是焦慮感。在「dominATE」紀錄片中，每位成員都對著鏡頭傾訴自己的不安全感。鉉辰提到，他花了很長時間才接受「展現脆弱」是沒問題的，並體悟到「受傷的青草聞起來更香」。這種感性也體現在音樂中。他們的歌詞觸及了年輕聽眾（13-24 歲的主力粉絲群）初入社會的煩憂。《My Pace》探討了與他人比較的危險，《Grow Up》則安撫聽眾：「即便大人也會犯錯，你已經做得很好了。」一位倫敦的青少年粉絲說，她以前因害怕顯得軟弱而不敢表達情感，但 Stray Kids 教會她：情感是人類的一部分。 Stray Kids 體現了文化中長期存在的世代鴻溝。自流行音樂誕生以來，父母總是對孩子在房間裡聽的音樂感到困惑。隨著串流媒體的興起，聽眾可以隨時隨地獲取任何人的作品，這種現象更加顯著。 Stray Kids 的巨大成功反映了 21 世紀媒體的巨變。在過去幾十年，電視、廣播和報紙是音樂界的「造王者」：他們決定誰值得曝光，進而左右歌手的興衰。 但現在情況已大不相同。Spotify 前首席經濟學家 Will Page 表示：「消費者就是新的廣播員。」Stray Kids 雖然相對較少受到傳統媒體關注，卻依然從首爾、雪梨一路紅到聖保羅。正如他們在《MEGAVERSE》中所言：「規矩由我們制定，我們的音樂迴盪在銀河之中。」 小分享:奧茲維新集中營的叛亂 The Great Sonderkommando Revolt of 1944 Article written by:Sky HISTORY WW2 On 7 October 1944, the inhuman tyranny of Auschwitz was suddenly challenged in the most astounding way. A group of prisoners, known as the Sonderkommando, fought back against the SS, in an act of rebellion that shocked their complacent captors. So just what was the Sonderkommando, and how did they orchestrate their uprising? The Sonderkommando In a place that was as close to Hell as anything that has ever existed on Earth, the men of the Sonderkommando inhabited their own special circle of anguish. They weren't just prisoners – they were forced to assist in the mass killings of other prisoners. Largely made up of Jews, the Sonderkommando were men deemed fit and able enough to help the Nazis process new arrivals – shepherding them from the trains, giving them false reassurance, leading them to the gas chambers and disposing of the mountains of corpses in the crematoria. Some of these corpses were of their own friends and relatives. They had no say in the matter – their choice was either to do as they were told, or face a swift execution themselves. It was a queasy, morally sickening position to be forced into – particularly as the men of the Sonderkommando were granted special privileges like better (or at least, less disgusting) living quarters, more food and "perks" like cigarettes and medicines. They were also less likely to be arbitrarily gunned down just because a Nazi officer felt like it. The sense of being forced into being "collaborators" was too much for the men to bear. One Sonderkommando prisoner who would survive the genocide, Filip Muller, later recounted how he his crushing feeling of guilt led him to follow one group of prisoners right into the gas chamber. As he put it, one of the girls in the doomed group stopped him, saying "We must die, but you still have a chance to save your life. You have to return to the camp and tell everybody about our last hours… They ought to fight, that's better than dying here helplessly." Of course, death for the Sonderkommando was still inevitable – it was simply postponed. Their slave labour meant they knew the truth of the camp and the industrialised slaughter taking place there. That in turn meant they had to be regularly slaughtered themselves, to make way for a new "generation" of Sonderkommando. It was the 12th generation who would rise up against their cruel masters. The October revolt The Sonderkommando uprising wasn't some spontaneous outburst of anger against the SS. It was a carefully thought-out plan that overcame incredible logistical odds. And some of the key players were female Jewish prisoners working in a munitions factory within the sprawling Auschwitz complex. In the months leading up to October, these women had painstakingly smuggled gunpowder from the factory to the secret resistance movement within the Sonderkommando. They used ingenious techniques, like hiding the tiny packages of powder in the false bottoms of food trays, and even in the nooks of corpses being sent to the crematoria. All the while enduring the nerve-jangling possibility of being found out. The gunpowder was used by the Sonderkommando to create makeshift bombs and grenades. This careful preparation came to a head on 7 October, when – during a roll call – one of the prisoners calmly walked up to a Nazi officer and with a triumphant "Hurrah!" struck him with a hammer. What followed was chaos, as the SS found themselves attacked on all sides by prisoners brandishing hammers, knives and explosives. According to accounts, one SS guard noted for his extreme sadism was nonchalantly thrown into a crematorium oven alive. Some of the prisoners also cut their way through the barbed wire to flee into the woods, while the SS opened fire with machine guns. It was a brief, delicious taste of vengeance for the Sonderkommando, killing three SS men and injuring around a dozen. But, inevitably, the Nazis crushed the revolt. The escaped prisoners were recaptured and executed. Hundreds of Sonderkommando prisoners were massacred, as were the brave women who helped them. But, despite all of this, some knew that the tide would turn again some day, and this time for good. A month after the revolt, and weeks before his own death, a Sonderkommando prisoner called Chaim Herman wrote a message for his family, and closed it with these words: "I am sending you my last farewell forever, these are my last greetings, I embrace you most heartily for the last time and I beg you once more, do believe me that I am going away calmly, knowing you are alive and our enemy is broken." 1944年10月7日：奧斯威辛特遣隊起義 1944 年 10 月 7 日，奧斯威辛那泯滅人性的暴政突然遭到了極其驚人的挑戰。一群被稱為「特遣隊」的囚犯向黨衛軍（SS）展開反擊，這場叛亂震驚了那些心滿意足的捕獵者。那麼，「特遣隊」究竟是什麼樣的組織？他們又是如何策劃這場起義的呢？ 特遣隊（The Sonderkommando） 在一個與人間煉獄無異的地方，特遣隊的成員們處於一種特殊的痛苦深淵中。他們不僅僅是囚犯，更被迫協助對其他囚犯進行大規模屠殺。特遣隊主要由猶太人組成，納粹認為這些人體格健壯，足以協助處理新抵達的人員——包括將他們從火車上引導下來、給予虛假的安慰、帶領他們進入毒氣室，並在火葬場處置堆積如山的屍體。而這些屍體中，有些甚至是他們自己的親友。 他們對此毫無選擇——唯一的生路就是聽命行事，否則將面臨立即處決。這是一種令人作嘔、在道德上極其痛苦的處境。尤其諷刺的是，特遣隊成員被賦予了某些「特權」，例如較好（或至少沒那麼噁心）的居住環境、更多的食物，以及香菸和藥品等「福利」。此外，他們也比較不會僅僅因為納粹軍官的一時興起就遭到隨意槍殺。 這種被迫成為「共犯」的感覺讓這些人難以承受。其中一位大屠殺倖存者菲利普·穆勒（Filip Muller）後來回憶說，那種壓倒性的罪惡感曾讓他一度跟著一群囚犯直接走進毒氣室。然而，那群走向死亡的人中，有一位少女阻止了他，她說：「我們必須死，但你仍有機會保住性命。你必須回到營區，告訴所有人關於我們最後時刻的事……他們應該戰鬥，這總比在這裡無助地死去要好。」 當然，對特遣隊來說，死亡終究是不可避免的，只是被推遲了而已。由於他們的奴隸勞動意味著他們掌握了集中營與工業化屠殺的真相，這反過來意味著他們必須被定期處決，好讓位給新一梯次的「特遣隊」。而最終對殘酷主子發起反抗的，正是第 12 梯次的特遣隊。 十月反抗 特遣隊的起義並非針對黨衛軍的自發性怒火爆發，而是一個克服了重重物流困境、精心策劃的計畫。其中一些關鍵角色是在龐大的奧斯威辛建築群內，於軍火工廠工作的猶太女囚。 在 10 月之前的幾個月裡，這些婦女含辛茹苦地將火藥從工廠偷運到特遣隊內部的秘密抵抗組織中。她們使用了精巧的技術，例如將微小包裝的火藥藏在餐盤的假底層，甚至藏在送往火葬場的屍體縫隙中，同時還要承受隨時可能被發現的極度恐懼。 特遣隊利用這些火藥製作了簡易的炸彈和手榴彈。這份精心的準備在 10 月 7 日達到了頂點。當時在點名期間，一名囚犯平靜地走向一名納粹軍官，高喊著勝利的「萬歲！」（Hurrah!），並用鐵錘擊中了他。 隨之而來的是一片混亂，黨衛軍發現自己陷入了囚犯們用鐵錘、刀具和炸藥展開的四面圍攻。根據記述，一名以極度虐待狂著稱的黨衛軍守衛，被若無其事地活生生扔進了火葬場的焚化爐。部分囚犯還剪斷了刺鐵絲網逃往森林，而黨衛軍則以機關槍開火掃射。 對於特遣隊而言，這是一場短暫而甘甜的復仇，他們擊殺了三名黨衛軍並傷及十餘人。然而，納粹最終不可避免地鎮壓了這場叛亂。逃跑的囚犯被抓回並處決，數百名特遣隊成員遭到屠殺，那些提供幫助的英勇女性也未能倖免。 儘管如此，有些人知道局勢總有一天會扭轉，而且會是徹底的扭轉。起義一個月後，就在自己去世前幾週，一位名叫海姆·赫爾曼（Chaim Herman）的特遣隊囚犯給家人寫下了一段話，並以這段文字作結： 「我向你們送上永別。這是最後的問候，我最後一次由衷地擁抱你們。我再次請求你們，務必相信我是平靜地離去的，因為我知道你們還活著，而我們的敵人已經支離破碎。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Master’s or Mandarin? China’s graduates face a whole new set of gruelling tests They prefer certainty to good pay Feb 5th 2026|4 min read Around 2024 Mr Wang, a tutor for people taking** graduate-admissions tests**, saw the number of students in his classes plummet by more than half. At first he thought something had gone badly wrong with his teaching. But comparing notes with others in the industry, he found the problem was pervasive. Mr Wang had also casually posted an ad offering his services as a tutor for the national civil-service exam. He was shocked to receive hundreds of replies. His newly opened class was filled with top talent, including two students who had flown from Hong Kong after graduating there. “Holy shit,” Mr Wang thought. “The winds have changed.” He is right. Young Chinese are rethinking the options they face when they complete undergraduate studies. Between 2023 and 2026 the number of people who registered to take exams for admission to master’s courses fell by a third, from 4.7m to 3.4m. Meanwhile, between 2021 and 2026, the number who applied (and passed checks) to take the national civil-service exam more than doubled to 3.7m, a record high. Interest in the latter now exceeds the former for the first time (see chart). An attraction of a master’s degree is that it can upgrade one’s human capital (at least, in theory), while delaying entry into the job market. But the civil service offers a far more immediate reward: stable, if staid, employment. Stella Zhou, who is 24, attended a tutoring camp for the civil-service exam. For three months she started the day at 9am and slogged through thousands of practice questions, only retiring to her dormitory after 9pm. “My bum hurt from sitting all day,” she gripes. Last year about 20% of those who took the exam for admission to a master’s course were accepted. The national civil-service exam is far more competitive. This year there are 38,000 positions available, meaning about 99% of those who took the written test in November (including many postgraduates) will be disappointed by the time the process, which also includes interviews, wraps up in the middle of the year. A 26-year-old woman, Ms Ma, is studying for a master’s degree in law. Some 80% of her class are planning to take the civil-service exam. It is a “battle royale”, she says (having a master’s degree confers little advantage for civil-service jobs, most of which do not require one). Because success is so unlikely, many are also sitting provincial- or city-level civil-service exams as a less prestigious back-up. The reason is clear: a bleak job market. Ms Ma, who is from the eastern province of Shandong, had never thought she would be interested in the civil service. She changed her mind after working as an intern at a small company: her colleagues were often not paid on time. When China was booming, government jobs were thought dull (“If you become a civil servant, you can see the whole of your life,” as a common saying goes). Now, as the economy falters, they are highly sought-after. Ms Zhou, who is from the south-western region of Chongqing, received an offer of 300,000 yuan ($43,000) per year from JD.com, an e-commerce giant, to work in its procurement arm. But she turned it down to try her luck with the civil service. Young people increasingly prefer certainty to good pay. Between 2020 and 2022, when China imposed a strict “zero-covid” policy, many students swarmed into postgraduate studies as a way of postponing the job hunt during economic turbulence (in China, a master’s often takes three years). Since then, the number sitting the master’s entrance exam has dropped. It has become clearer that staying in education produces diminishing returns. A survey in 2024 by Zhaopin, a hiring platform, found that by the spring recruitment round, 44.4% of postgraduates had received a job offer—one percentage point lower than those with bachelor’s degrees and 12 points below those with vocational training. It might be expected that many would apply for a master’s after failing the civil-service exam. But many graduates fear the job market could get worse. Better to take the plunge sooner rather than later, some reckon. So the rise in applications for the civil service and fall in demand for graduate courses are two sides of the same coin: a weak economy. It could become a self-reinforcing trend: the more that talented youngsters **turn their backs on **the private sector and seek government jobs, the less vigorous China’s economy will become. ■ 中國畢業生面臨全新嚴峻考驗：比起高薪，他們更求穩定 2026年2月5日 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘 約莫在 2024 年，專門輔導研究生入學考試的王老師發現，他班上的學生人數驟減了一半以上。起初，他以為是自己的教學出了問題，但與同業交換意見後，他發現這是整個行業普遍面臨的困境。與此同時，王老師隨手發布了一則國家公務員考試（國考）的補習廣告，驚訝地收到數百則回覆。他新開設的班級擠滿了頂尖人才，其中甚至有兩名學生是從香港畢業後專程飛回來的。王老師心想：「天哪，風向變了。」 他是對的。中國年輕人正在重新思考大學畢業後的出路。2023 年至 2026 年間，報考碩士班入學考試的人數減少了三分之一，從 470 萬人降至 340 萬人。與此同時，2021 年至 2026 年間，通過審核報考國考的人數翻了一倍多，達到 370 萬人的歷史新高。對後者的興趣已首度超越前 。 碩士學位的吸引力在於理論上能提升「人力資本」，同時延緩進入職場的時間。然而，公務員職位提供了一個更直接的回報：穩定（儘管沉悶）的就業。24 歲的周小姐參加了國考衝刺班，三個月來，她每天早上 9 點開始埋頭苦讀數千道練習題，直到晚上 9 點後才回宿舍。「整天坐著，坐到我屁股都痛了，」她抱怨道。 去年，碩士入學考試的錄取率約為 20%，而國考的競爭更為激烈。今年僅提供 38,000 個職位，這意味著 11 月參加筆試的人（包括許多研究生）中，約有 99% 的人最終會失望而歸。26 歲的馬小姐正在攻讀法律碩士，她班上約 80% 的同學都計劃報考公務員。她形容這是一場「大逃殺」（儘管碩士學位對大多數不要求學歷的公務員職位並無顯著優勢）。由於成功機會微乎其微，許多人也報考了省級或市級公務員考試，作為退而求其次的備選。 原因很明顯：就業市場低迷。來自山東省的馬小姐從未想過自己會對公務員感興趣，但在一家小公司實習後，她改變了主意——因為她的同事經常無法準時領到薪水。在中國經濟蓬勃發展的時期，政府工作被認為是枯燥的（當時流行一句話：「當了公務員，一眼就能望穿一生」）。 現在，隨著經濟步履蹣跚，這些職位變得炙手可熱。來自重慶的周小姐曾獲得電商巨頭京東（JD.com）提供的採購部職位，年薪高達 30 萬人民幣（約 43,000 美元），但她拒絕了，決定轉向公務員試試運氣。年輕人越來越傾向於選擇「確定性」而非「高薪」。 2020 年至 2022 年中國實施嚴格的「動態清零」政策期間，許多學生湧入研究所，將其視為經濟動盪期推遲求職的一種方式（在中國，碩士學位通常需要三年）。從那時起，報考研究所的人數開始下降，人們愈發意識到，留在教育體系中的邊際收益正在遞減。招聘平台「智聯招聘」2024 年的一項調查顯示，在春季招聘中，僅有 44.4% 的研究生獲得錄取通知（Offer），這比大學畢業生低 1 個百分點，比技職生低了 12 個百分點。原以為許多人在國考失利後會轉而考研，但不少畢業生擔心就業市場會進一步惡化，因此有人認為，與其等待，不如儘早投入職場放手一搏。 因此，公務員報考熱與研究所需求降溫，實為經濟疲軟的一體兩面。這可能演變成一種自我強化的趨勢：越多優秀人才背離私營部門轉向政府職位，中國經濟的活力就越發衰微。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How Poland can keep its place at the heart of Europe If it turns inward, the country and continent will lose out May 22nd 2025|5 min read TWICE IT** VANISHED** from the map, swallowed up by its rapacious neighbours. After it emerged from the second world war as a Soviet satellite, it endured decades of oppression. Today, Poland has transformed itself into Europe’s most overlooked military and economic power—with a bigger army than Britain, France or Germany and living standards, adjusted for purchasing power, that are about to eclipse Japan’s. Yet, just when Poland should stand proud and tall once more, is it about to throw away its influence? That is the question Poles face in the decisive run-off vote to elect their president on June 1st. One vision, from the candidate of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, is a brand of right-wing nationalism that feeds off conflict with Poland’s neighbours and the European Union. The other, from the centre, is that, in a dangerous world, Poland needs Europe to magnify its strengths, just as Europe needs Poland as a source of security and economic dynamism. Unfortunately, at the moment the right may have the upper hand. For the past three decades, Poland has shown how much a country can achieve by European integration and good economic policy. Since 1995 income per person has more than trebled. Since it joined the EU in 2004 Poland has never known recession apart from briefly at the height of the covid-19 shutdown. During those two decades, its average annual growth has been almost 4%. The fruits of that growth are on display across the country. Warsaw, the capital, boasts Europe’s tallest building outside Russia, the Varso tower; and below it bustles with designer shops and cafés, IT startups and fashion houses. Out in the once-neglected countryside fine roads, often built with EU money, criss-cross vistas of well-tended fields, farms and new houses. Poles used to flock abroad to find work, but for some years now home has been a stronger draw. Manufacturing is booming, thanks to Poland’s proximity to Germany, continuing to do well even as its western neighbour, like much of Europe, has stagnated. When Germany, under its new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, starts a planned new burst of infrastructure and defence spending, Poland is likely to be a beneficiary. Long attuned to the threat from Russia, Poland has used its wealth to enhance its security. It now musters the largest army in Europe after Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, and the third-largest in NATO. It spends well over 4% of its GDP each year on defence, far above the 2% that has been the NATO target since 2014, and plans to raise that to over 5% next year. This has translated into influence. These days the group that counts in European security is sometimes dubbed the four musketeers: the young addition to Britain, France and Germany is Poland, like the superlative swordsman d’Artagnan. Tellingly, its prime minister, Donald Tusk, travelled to Kyiv earlier this month with his three counterparts to stress that Europe is ready to stand by Ukraine even as America’s commitment has weakened. Poland’s stance is in sharp distinction to the rest of the “Visegrad Four”. Hungary under Viktor Orban and Slovakia under Robert Fico have both taken the side of Russia rather than Ukraine; and the Czech Republic is expected to tilt in that direction after elections in October. Given Poland’s record, much of it achieved during the total of ten years in which PiS has been in power, you might conclude that it could continue its renaissance with either candidate in June’s run-off election—especially as the role of president in Poland is less powerful than that of prime minister. However, that would be a mistake. Under the constitution, the president’s veto can be overridden only by a three-fifths majority in the Sejm, the lower house, which Mr Tusk does not command. The current president, Andrzej Duda, is a former PiS politician who has blocked or delayed many of the new government’s reforms and is now termed out. PiS wants his successor to be Karol Nawrocki, a fierce ideologue who would be even less accommodating than Mr Duda. Mr Nawrocki is almost certain to use his powers to block Mr Tusk’s agenda, so as to pave the way for a PiS victory in the next parliamentary elections. To win the presidency, he would depend on support from far-right parties that exploit growing anti-Ukrainian feelings; one is openly antisemitic. This matters because Mr Tusk is trying to unravel PiS’s capture of the state while it was most recently in office, from 2015 to 2023. In that time, while pursuing mostly sensible economic and security policies, PiS systematically took over independent institutions, including the judiciary, the media, the civil service, the central bank and the banking system. PiS’s fights with Brussels over the rule of law caused Poland to be temporarily shut out of some of the EU’s aid programmes. By contrast, Mr Tusk is a committed European—he previously served as the president of the European Council in Brussels. Under him Poland has co-operated with other European countries on security, diplomacy and defence to the benefit of all. Were Poles to use the presidential election to vote in Rafal Trzaskowski, a Tusk ally who is Warsaw’s mayor, EU co-operation would be easier and Poland’s influence would grow further. The world has changed since Mr Tusk took over. With another Donald back in the White House, the task of building up Europe’s strategic autonomy is not just a luxury but an urgent necessity. Poland could not only set an example in security, but also serve as a powerful voice for supporting Ukraine and deterring Russia. Economically, Poland is an example to central and eastern European countries; and Mr Tusk could be a proponent of the economic reforms the EU desperately needs. Don’t throw it away Next week’s election is finely balanced. In the first round the candidates of the hard right took around 52% of the vote. Were Mr Nawrocki to win the second round, both Poland and Europe would suffer. Europe would lose a source of dynamism, and Poland would risk losing the place at the heart of Europe it has worked so hard to claim. 波蘭如何守住其歐洲核心地位 若轉向內化，該國與歐洲大陸都將面臨損失 2025年5月22日 | 閱讀時間 5 分鐘 波蘭曾兩度從地圖上消失，被貪婪的鄰國吞併。在第二次世界大戰後成為蘇聯衛星國，經歷了數十年的壓迫。如今，波蘭已轉型為歐洲最被忽視的軍事與經濟強權——其軍隊規模大於英國、法國或德國，且經購買力平價調整後的生活水平即將超越日本。然而，正當波蘭應該再次昂首挺胸之際，它是否即將拋棄自己的影響力？ 這正是波蘭人在 6 月 1 日舉行的關鍵總統選舉第二輪投票中所面臨的問題。一種願景來自法律與公正黨（PiS）的候選人，這是一種以與鄰國及歐盟衝突為養分的右翼民族主義；另一種則來自中間派，認為在危險的世界中，波蘭需要歐洲來放大其實力，正如歐洲需要波蘭作為安全與經濟活力的來源。不幸的是，目前右翼可能佔據上風。 在過去的三十年裡，波蘭展示了一個國家透過歐洲整合和良好的經濟政策能取得多少成就。自 1995 年以來，人均收入增長了三倍多。自 2004 年加入歐盟以來，除了在新冠肺炎停擺的高峰期短暫出現過衰退外，波蘭從未經歷過經濟衰退。在這二十年間，其年均增長率幾乎達到 4%。 經濟增長的成果在全國各地隨處可見。首都華沙擁有俄羅斯以外歐洲最高的建築物——華沙塔（Varso tower）；塔下則是熙熙攘攘的設計師商店、咖啡館、資訊科技新創公司和時裝店。在曾經被忽視的農村，通常由歐盟資金修建的優質公路縱橫交錯，映襯著整齊的田野、農場和新房屋。 波蘭人曾成群結隊地出國找工作，但幾年來，家鄉的吸引力已變得更強。製造業蓬勃發展，這得益於波蘭鄰近德國的優勢，即使其西方鄰國（與歐洲大部分地區一樣）處於停滯狀態，波蘭仍能持續表現良好。當德國在其新任總理弗里德里希·梅爾茨（Friedrich Merz）的領導下，開始計劃中的新一輪基礎設施和國防開支衝刺時，波蘭很可能成為受益者。 波蘭長期以來一直對俄羅斯的威脅保持警惕，並利用其財富來增強安全。它現在擁有的軍隊規模在歐洲僅次於俄羅斯、烏克蘭和土耳其，在北約中排名第三。波蘭每年將超過 GDP 的 4% 用於國防，遠高於北約自 2014 年以來設定的 2% 目標，並計劃明年將這一比例提高到 5% 以上。 這轉化成了影響力。如今，在歐洲安全領域發揮作用的集團有時被稱為「四個火槍手」：繼英國、法國和德國之後的年輕新成員就是波蘭，就像那位卓越的劍客達太安（d’Artagnan）。值得注意的是，波蘭總理唐納德·圖斯克（Donald Tusk）本月早些時候與其他三位同行一起前往基輔，強調即使美國的承諾有所減弱，歐洲也準備好支持烏克蘭。波蘭的立場與「維謝格拉德集團」（Visegrad Four）的其他成員形成了鮮明對比：維克多·奧班領導下的匈牙利和羅伯特·費科領導下的斯洛伐克都站在俄羅斯而非烏克蘭一邊；而捷克共和國預計在 10 月選舉後也會轉向該方向。 鑑於波蘭的紀錄（其中大部分是在 PiS 執政的累計十年中取得的），你可能會得出結論：無論 6 月份的第二輪選舉中哪位候選人勝出，波蘭都能繼續其復興——特別是波蘭總統的角色權力不如總理。然而，那將是一個錯誤。 根據憲法，總統的否決權只能由下議院（Sejm）五分之三的多數票推翻，而圖斯克先生並不具備這種優勢。現任總統安傑伊·杜達（Andrzej Duda）曾是 PiS 的政治人物，他阻撓或延遲了許多新政府的改革，現在即將卸任。PiS 希望他的繼任者是卡羅爾·納夫羅茨基（Karol Nawrocki），他是一位激進的意識形態家，會比杜達先生更不配合。納夫羅茨基幾乎肯定會利用他的權力來阻止圖斯克先生的議程，以便為 PiS 在下一次議會選舉中獲勝鋪路。為了贏得總統職位，他將依賴極右翼政黨的支持，這些政黨利用日益增長的反烏克蘭情緒，其中一個政黨甚至是公開的反猶太主義。 這之所以重要，是因為圖斯克先生正試圖清理 PiS 在 2015 年至 2023 年執政期間對國家的掌控。在那段時間裡，PiS 在奉行大多合理的經濟和安全政策的同時，系統性地接管了獨立機構，包括司法機構、媒體、公務員體系、中央銀行和銀行系統。PiS 與布魯塞爾在法治問題上的爭鬥，曾導致波蘭暫時被排除在歐盟的一些援助計劃之外。 相比之下，圖斯克先生是一位堅定的親歐人士——他此前曾擔任布魯塞爾歐洲理事會主席。在他領導下，波蘭在安全、外交和國防方面與其他歐洲國家合作，惠及所有人。如果波蘭人利用這次總統選舉投票給拉法烏·特扎斯科夫斯基（Rafal Trzaskowski，圖斯克的盟友，現任華沙市長），歐盟合作將變得更加容易，波蘭的影響力也將進一步增長。 自圖斯克先生接任以來，世界已經發生了變化。隨著另一位「唐納德」（指川普）回到白宮，建立歐洲戰略自主的任務不再是奢侈品，而是迫在眉睫的必然。波蘭不僅可以在安全方面樹立榜樣，還可以成為支持烏克蘭和威懾俄羅斯的強大聲音。在經濟上，波蘭是中東歐國家的典範；圖斯克先生可以成為歐盟迫切需要的經濟改革支持者。 不要拋棄它 下週的選舉勢均力敵。在第一輪投票中，硬右派候選人獲得了約 52% 的選票。如果納夫羅茨基先生在第二輪獲勝，波蘭和歐洲都將受苦。歐洲將失去一個活力的源泉，而波蘭將面臨失去它努力爭取到的歐洲核心地位的風險。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How Japan’s prime minister will use her massive new mandate A remarkable election victory that will reshape Japanese politics for years to come Feb 8th 2026|TOKYO|4 min read TAKAICHI SANAE gambled her position as Japan’s prime minister by calling a snap election. Her bet has paid off. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) triumphed on February 8th. The LDP won a commanding two-thirds supermajority in parliament’s powerful lower house, even without the support of its coalition partner. The result gives Ms Takaichi, who is both a fiscal dove and a security hawk, a massive mandate, while marking the LDP’s return to unquestioned dominance in Japanese politics. Such a resounding victory was hardly guaranteed. Although Ms Takaichi herself has been unusually popular since taking office last October, her party remained far less so. The result shows that Ms Takaichi’s personal appeal is a potent force. Together with its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), and several allied independents, the LDP’s ruling coalition entered the election with 233 seats in the 465-seat chamber, for a majority of just one. They have secured 352. The LDP also benefited from the collapse of the mainstream left-of-centre opposition: the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), formed by the merger of two long-standing parties, lost more than half of the total seats they had held heading into the election. While several smaller upstart parties secured footholds in the Diet, none is strong enough to challenge the LDP. The LDP has lost power only twice since its foundation in 1955. **Following a turbulent period **of opposition rule in 2009-12, the party reclaimed its dominance under Ms Takaichi’s mentor, Abe Shinzo, the prime minister until 2020. But in recent years, it has stumbled from scandal to scandal; in the two most recent elections, an upper-house contest last summer and a lower-house vote in October 2024, the party lost its majorities, leaving it leading a minority government. The LDP turned to Ms Takaichi as party leader in October. She brought in Ishin as a new partner, producing a slender majority. Ms Takaichi has appealed to voters eager for change, or at least the appearance of it. The country’s first female prime minister, she has cut a welcome contrast to previous ones, thanks to her middle-class upbringing and plain-spoken style. A former heavy-metal drummer, she has performed confidently on the world stage, including with Donald Trump, the leader of Japan’s most important ally. (Mr Trump endorsed Ms Takaichi ahead of the election.) A diplomatic spat with China helped her to consolidate support at home. Her big-spending pledges have at times caused bond markets to shudder, but tend to appeal to voters. On the campaign trail, Ms Takaichi electrified audiences. She lived up to her pledge to “work, work, work, work, work”: during the 12-day election period, she covered more ground than any other party leader, racking up 12,480km, according to a tally by Yomiuri, a newspaper. She also dragged her fusty party into the digital era, becoming a force on social media. The hastily-assembled CRA, meanwhile, failed to inspire. Combining the Constitutional Democratic Party (the successor to the country’s historic main centre-left outfit, the Democratic Party of Japan), and the LDP’s former coalition partner, Komeito, produced a muddle rather than synergy. Online, the party acquired the unflattering nickname “5G”, a play on the Japanese word for “old man”, oji-san, in reference to the fact that its top leaders were all older male political dinosaurs. The remarkable election result will reshape Japanese politics for years to come. The leaders of the CRA will probably resign; whether the alliance itself survives remains unclear. Smaller leftist parties also suffered big losses, suggesting that voters see their ideological pacifism as out of step with today’s turbulent world. Upstart parties have proven more dynamic than the traditional opposition. The far-right Do It Yourself party (Sanseito) picked up a handful of seats, albeit fewer than they had targeted. Team Future (Mirai), a techno-optimist party founded in May, was a surprise breakout, emerging as an alternative for many independent voters, and winning 11 seats. With its imposing new majority, the LDP will be able to ignore opposition sniping. Ms Takaichi will emerge from the election stronger and bolder. Potential challengers inside the party will fall silent, leaving her to rule for the foreseeable future. With a supermajority in the lower house, the ruling coalition will be able to control the legislative process, as it can override the more fractious upper house (where it lacks a majority). Ms Takaichi can also pursue her preferred policies. She has pledged a “responsible and proactive fiscal policy”, including a temporary two-year cut to the consumption tax for food and big investments in industrial policy to support critical industries. She also wants to spearhead more reforms to strengthen Japan’s armed forces and security apparatus. She has called for lifting restrictions on arms exports to help boost Japan’s defence industry; she favours the creation of a new national intelligence agency. The fly in the ointment? Though Ms Takaichi has made quick work of her domestic political foes, other adversaries, from bond market vigilantes to her counterparts in Beijing, will not prove so easy to overcome. ■ 日本首相將如何運用她的龐大民意授權：一場將重塑未來數年日本政壇的重大選舉勝利 2026年2月8日 | 東京 | 閱讀時間約4分鐘 高市早苗以解散國會提前改選，賭上了她的日本首相寶座。事實證明，她賭贏了。執政的自由民主黨（LDP）於 2 月 8 日贏得大勝。自民黨在權力核心的眾議院中，即便不依賴聯盟夥伴的支持，也單獨拿下了具備主導權的三分之二「超級多數」席位。此結果賦予了兼具「財政鴿派」與「國安鷹派」色彩的高市女士極大的民意授權，同時標誌著自民黨重返在日本政壇無可置疑的霸權地位。 如此輝煌的勝利絕非預料中的必然。儘管高市女士自去年 10 月就任以來展現了罕見的高人氣，但她所屬的政黨卻沒那麼受歡迎。選舉結果顯示，高市女士的個人魅力是一股強大的政治力量。自民黨與其夥伴「日本維新會」（Ishin）以及幾位盟軍獨立人士組成的執政聯盟，在選前於 465 席的眾議院中僅佔 233 席，僅比過半數多出一席；而選後，他們成功奪下 352 席。 自民黨的獲勝也受惠於主流中間偏左反對陣營的潰敗：由兩大長期在野黨合併組成的「中間改革聯盟」（CRA），失去了選前持有席位的一半以上。雖然幾支新興小黨在國會取得立足點，但目前尚無足夠力量挑戰自民黨。 自 1955 年成立以來，自民黨僅失去過兩次政權。在 2009 年至 2012 年動盪的在野時期後，該黨在高市女士的導師安倍晉三帶領下奪回統治地位。然而近年來，自民黨深陷各類醜聞；在去年夏天的參議院選舉及 2024 年 10 月的眾議院投票中，該黨皆失去多數優勢，只能領導少數政府。去年 10 月，自民黨轉向推舉高市女士為黨魁，她引入維新會作為新夥伴，勉力維持微弱的多數。 高市女士成功吸引了渴望改變（或至少是改變的表象）的選民。作為日本首位女性首相，她憑藉中產階級的出身與直爽的言論風格，與過往的首相形成鮮明對比。這位前重金屬鼓手在國際舞台上表現自信，包括與日本最重要的盟友領導人唐納德·川普（Donald Trump）的互動（川普在選前曾公開支持高市）。此外，與中國的外交糾紛也有助於她在國內鞏固支持。雖然她擴大支出的承諾一度令債券市場感到不安，但這對選民極具吸引力。 在競選期間，高市女士令觀眾熱血沸騰。她實踐了自己「工作、工作、工作、工作、工作」的諾言：根據《讀賣新聞》統計，在為期 12 天的競選期內，她奔波的路程超過任何其他黨魁，總計達 12,480 公里。她還將保守陳腐的自民黨帶入數位時代，成為社群媒體上的重要勢力。相比之下，倉促組成的「中間改革聯盟」則未能激發選民熱情。由立憲民主黨（其前身為日本史上主要的中間偏左勢力民主黨）與自民黨前盟友公明黨合併，產生的只有混亂而非綜效。在網路上，該聯盟獲得了「5G」這個帶有貶義的綽號，這是對日語「大叔」（Oji-san）的戲稱，諷刺該聯盟的高層領袖全都是年長的男性政治恐龍。 這場卓越的選舉結果將重塑未來數年的日本政治。「中間改革聯盟」的領袖們可能會辭職，該聯盟能否維持仍是未知數。其他小型左翼政黨也遭受重創，顯示選民認為其意識形態上的和平主義與當今動盪的世界脫節。新興政黨展現出比傳統在野黨更強的活力。極右翼的「參政黨」（Sanseito）獲得了少數席位，儘管少於其預期目標。於去年 5 月成立、主張科技樂觀主義的「未來隊」（Mirai）則成為異軍突出的黑馬，成為許多獨立選民的替代選擇，並贏得了 11 個席位。 憑藉龐大的新多數優勢，自民黨將能忽視反對黨的抨擊。高市女士將在選後變得更強大、更果敢。黨內潛在的挑戰者將會噤聲，讓她在可預見的未來掌握統治權。擁有眾議院的超級多數後，執政聯盟將能掌控立法進程，因為它有權推翻意見紛歧的參議院（執政聯盟在參議院尚無多數）。 高市女士也可以推行她偏好的政策。她已承諾實施「負責且積極的財政政策」，包括為期兩年的糧食消費稅減免，以及對關鍵產業的大規模工業投資。她還希望帶頭進行更多改革，以加強日本的武裝部隊與安全機構。她呼籲放寬武器出口限制以提振日本國防工業，並贊成建立新的國家情報機構。唯一的隱憂在於：雖然高市女士迅速擊敗了國內的政敵，但其他對手——從債券市場的「糾察隊」到北京的領導層——可能不會那麼容易被克服。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Taiwan’s new opposition leader wants to talk to Xi Jinping Cheng Li-wun tells The Economist she hopes to meet China’s president early this year Jan 29th 2026|TAIPEI|5 min read RISK COMES naturally to Cheng Li-wun, Taiwan’s opposition leader. She began her career as a student activist in the 1990s, seeking independence for her homeland and castigating the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party at the time. Then she stunned colleagues by joining the KMT. Now, as that party’s new leader, she is making her biggest gamble yet. As China steps up military drills around Taiwan, which it sees as its territory, she is blocking efforts to boost defence spending. She thinks Taiwan’s people should accept that they are Chinese. And she hopes to bring her party back to power by pursuing reconciliation with China’s leader, Xi Jinping. **“The most important task of my tenure is to advance peace across the Taiwan Strait,” **she told The Economist in an interview on January 27th. To that end, she revealed that after a nine-year hiatus, the KMT will resume dialogue with China’s Communist Party in early February, starting with exchanges between their think-tanks. She says she hopes to visit China in the first half of 2026 to meet Mr Xi (who sent her a congratulatory telegram after her election in October, expressing hope that they could work together towards unification). “We must stop deliberately vilifying everything related to China,” she says. It is a controversial strategy, even for some within her party. The KMT lost the past three presidential elections to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which views Taiwan as a separate country. Opinion polls show that a majority of Taiwan’s people distrust China’s government, have little appetite for unification and consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Ms Cheng’s platform is also troubling for America, which is committed to helping the island defend itself but insists Taiwan must spend much more on its own armed forces. American officials believe Mr Xi has ordered his generals to be capable of taking Taiwan by 2027. Yet Ms Cheng, 56, believes that she can help avert an attack—and win round voters by the time of the next presidential election, in 2028. She admits that her views on national identity are out of step with public opinion but blames the DPP’s efforts to “de-Sinicise” Taiwan. Besides, she believes that national identity will not be the defining political issue of the next few years. “What matters more is cross-strait relations,” she says. “That’s what I believe will truly determine how people vote.” Her message plays on two main fears. One is that if the DPP wins again in 2028 China’s leadership could lose hope of peacefully unifying Taiwan with the mainland.** “Once it holds no expectations for Taiwan, the only way it can resolve or address the Taiwan issue would be through means none of us wish to see,**” she says. The other fear is that American support for Taiwan is wavering. She cites President Donald Trump’s demands that Taiwan increase defence spending to 10% of GDP and shift to America 40% of its semiconductor industry, which produces most of the world’s top-end chips. *“For many Taiwanese, piecing together this information makes them feel that America is abandoning Taiwan,”* she says. Critics view such talk as scaremongering. Although China has developed formidable capabilities to invade or blockade Taiwan (and often practises doing so), it is far from clear that it could succeed without suffering huge losses and devastating the global economy. Mr Xi has also just purged his military leadership. DPP leaders accuse Ms Cheng of echoing Chinese propaganda and endangering Taiwan’s security by blocking defence spending. Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, has pledged to increase military spending to 5% of GDP by 2030. He has also proposed a $40bn supplementary defence budget this year, mainly for American weapons. Yet both plans are being blocked in parliament by the KMT and its allies, which together hold a majority. In Ms Cheng’s telling Mr Lai is to blame for not providing more details of his military spending plans. The figure he has proposed “crowds out all other needs”, she says. She declines to specify how much Taiwan should spend on defence, but says it can never match China’s firepower. Instead, she argues Taiwan’s security should be achieved through “reasonable” military spending combined with negotiations with Mr Xi. And she faults Mr Lai for refusing to accept the consensus agreed with China in 1992, when the KMT was in power. That stipulated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are part of “one China”, while allowing for different interpretations. Because the DPP rejects that formula as legally invalid (and a trap), China has suspended official talks since it came to power in 2016. Embracing the 1992 consensus today “would significantly reduce the likelihood of military confrontation”, Ms Cheng says. As to the desired outcome of such negotiations, Ms Cheng chooses her words carefully. In meeting Mr Xi, she says her main goal is to secure an explicit public commitment that both sides should work to maintain peace, acknowledging that war would bring “unimaginably catastrophic consequences”. Can he be trusted? To avoid damaging its international image, China must “be true to its word”, she says. “Credibility is paramount.” For the longer term, she declines to say whether the ultimate goal should be peaceful unification (as a former KMT president has suggested). Within her four-year term, she says it would already be a big achievement to set up a framework for maintaining peace. “As for whether the status quo might change thereafter, I only hope it occurs under circumstances acceptable to people on both sides,” she adds. Her talk of reconciliation is all the more striking, given her past. Though her father was a soldier in the Nationalist army that fled to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949, she became a student protester who was drawn to the DPP. She left it in 2002, disillusioned by what she saw as corruption and intolerance of dissent within its ranks. Joining the KMT three years later, she quickly earned a reputation as a combative public speaker. But she only recently became more outspoken about her own sense of Chinese identity. Whether she will be the KMT’s presidential candidate in 2028 is unclear: she says she is focusing on her current job. But as the party’s chairwoman, she will shape its platform for local elections this November, as well as the presidential vote.** Already, she is shaking up Taiwan’s politics in ways that could alter the precarious balance of relations between Taiwan, China and America. The stakes have never been higher. And Ms Cheng is all in. ■** 台灣新任反對黨領袖欲與習近平對話 鄭麗文接受《經濟學人》訪問時表示，希望能於今年初會晤中國國家主席 2026年1月29日 | 台北 對台灣反對黨領袖鄭麗文而言，「風險」似乎是與生俱來的本能。她的職業生涯始於 1990 年代的學生運動，當時她追求台灣獨立並強烈抨擊當時的執政黨——國民黨（KMT）。隨後，她加入國民黨的舉動震驚了昔日戰友。如今，作為該黨的新任領導人，她正進行一場人生中最大的豪賭。在中國不斷加強對台軍事演習之際，她正阻撓增加國防開支的計畫；她認為台灣人民應該接受自己是中國人，並希望透過與中國領導人習近平尋求和解，帶領國民黨重返執政。 「我任期內最重要的任務就是推進台海和平，」她在 1月27日接受《經濟學人》專訪時表示。為此，她透露國民黨將在 2月初恢復中斷九年的國共對話，首波將從智庫交流開始。她表示，希望在 2026年上半年訪問中國並會晤習近平（習近平在去年 10月她當選黨主席後曾致電賀電，表達共同推動統一的期望）。她說：「我們必須停止刻意醜化與中國相關的一切。」 這是一項充滿爭議的策略，即使在國民黨內部亦然。國民黨已連續三屆總統大選敗給主張台灣是主權獨立國家的民進黨（DPP）。民意調查顯示，大多數台灣民眾不信任中國政府，對統一興趣缺缺，且認同自己是台灣人而非中國人。鄭麗文的政綱也讓美國感到不安；美國雖致力於協助台灣自我防衛，但堅持台灣必須大幅增加軍事支出。美國官員相信，習近平已下令要求解放軍具備在 2027年前奪取台灣的能力。 然而，現年 56歲的鄭麗文相信，她能幫助化解攻擊，並在 2028年下屆總統大選前贏回選民支持。她坦言自己的國家認同觀點與主流民意脫節，但她將此歸咎於民進黨推行「去中國化」的結果。此外，她認為國家認同不會是未來幾年的核心政治議題。她強調：「更重要的是兩岸關係，這才是真正決定民眾投票取向的關鍵。」 她的論點觸及了民間兩大恐懼。首先，若民進黨在 2028年再次勝選，中國領導層可能會對和平統一失去希望。她表示：「一旦中方對台灣不再抱有期待，解決台灣問題的方式將會是我們所有人都不願見到的。」另一個恐懼則是美國對台支持正在動搖。她舉例，美國總統川普要求台灣將國防開支提高至 GDP 的 10%，並要求將全球領先的半導體產業 40% 移至美國。她說：「對許多台灣人來說，這些訊息拼湊起來讓他們感到美國正準備遺棄台灣。」 批評者認為這種說法是危言聳聽。儘管中國已具備強大的侵略或封鎖能力，但在不承受巨大損失及摧毀全球經濟的情況下，中國能否成功仍是未知數。且習近平近期才剛清洗了軍方高層。民進黨領袖指責鄭麗文附和中國宣傳，並透過阻撓國防預算危害台灣安全。台灣總統賴清德已承諾在 2030年前將軍事支出提高至 GDP 的 5%，今年更提出 400億美元的國防追加預算，主要用於採購美製武器。然而，這兩項計畫目前在國民黨及其盟友佔多數的國會中遭到攔阻。 在鄭麗文看來，賴清德應為未提供軍費細節負起責任。她認為提議的金額將「擠壓到其他所有需求」。她拒絕具體說明台灣應投入多少國防預算，但表示台灣的火力永遠無法與中國匹敵。相對地，她主張台灣的安全應透過「合理」的軍費支出結合與習近平的談判來實現。她批評賴清德拒絕接受 1992年國民黨執政時達成的共識（即「九二共識」），該共識規定海峽兩岸同屬「一個中國」，但允許各自表述。由於民進黨認為該公式缺乏法律效力且是陷阱而拒絕接受，中國自 2016年民進黨上台後便中斷了官方對話。鄭麗文表示，現在擁護九二共識「將顯著降低軍事對抗的可能性」。 至於談判的預期結果，鄭麗文用詞謹慎。她表示，會晤習近平的主要目標是獲得一項明確的公開承諾，即雙方應致力於維持和平，並承認戰爭將帶來「難以想像的災難性後果」。習近平值得信任嗎？她說，為了避免損害國際形象，中國必須「言而有信」，「誠信至關重要」。 至於長遠目標是否為「和平統一」（如某位國民黨前總統所言），她不願定論。她表示，在她的四年任期內，若能建立維持和平的框架已是大功一件。她補充道：「至於現狀此後是否會改變，我只希望這是在兩岸人民都能接受的情況下發生。」 考慮到她的背景，這番求和言論更顯得引人注目。她的父親是 1949年隨軍來台的國民黨老兵，但她曾是投身民進黨的學運人士。2002年，她因不滿黨內腐敗與不容異己而離開。三年後加入國民黨，她很快以辭鋒犀利的政治評論員聞名。但直到近期，她才更公開地表達自己的中國認同感。 目前尚不清楚她是否會成為國民黨 2028年的總統候選人，她表示正專注於當前職務。但身為黨主席，她將主導今年 11月地方選舉及未來大選的政綱。她已經在撼動台灣政局，其方式可能徹底改變台、中、美之間脆弱的平衡關係。這場賭局的代價前所未有地高，而鄭麗文已傾力孤注一擲。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1) Donald Trump again defended the actions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Minneapolis. The president said that ICE agents’ killings of Alex Pretti and Renee Good were caused by “Democrat ensued chaos”. Braving freezing temperatures, protesters took to the streets across America. Tim Walz, Minnesota’s governor, urged Mr Trump to withdraw federal agents from the state “before they kill another American in the street”. 2) The price of an ounce of gold broke the $5,000 barrier for the first time. Demand for the metal—which cost $2,770 an ounce a year ago—shows no sign of slowing as investors dump bonds and currencies in the face of Mr Trump’s erratic attitude towards international trade. A weakening dollar has also made gold more affordable for those outside America. 3) Taiwan said it was monitoring “abnormal” changes to China’s top military brass. On Saturday Zhang Youxia, China’s top general, was put under investigation, reportedly for leaking nuclear secrets to America. General Liu Zhenli, the army’s chief of staff, is also being investigated. President Xi Jinping has set a deadline of next year for the People’s Liberation Army to** be capable of** taking Taiwan. 4) Alex Honnold successfully scaled Taipei 101, one of Asia’s tallest skyscrapers, without ropes or a safety net. The American’s 508-metre ascent was broadcast on Netflix, sensibly with a ten-second delay, and took an hour and a half. Standing atop the building’s spire, Mr Honnold** proclaimed** his achievement to be “sick”. 5) Israel said it would partially reopen Gaza’s Rafah border crossing with Egypt, a vital entry point for aid, after the body of the final Israeli hostage in the enclave is located. Israel’s army has launched a “large-scale operation” to retrieve the remains of Ran Gvili. The crossing was supposed to have reopened during the first phase of a ceasefire that was agreed in October. 6) Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that American security guarantees for post-war Ukraine were “100% ready”, with documents waiting to be signed and sent to American and Ukrainian lawmakers for ratification. The Ukrainian president’s comments suggest that tri-lateral talks between America, Russia and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi over the weekend had not been entirely fruitless. Talks are expected to continue this weekend. 7) Britain’s ruling Labour Party barred Andy Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester, from standing as its candidate in a forthcoming by-election, saying it would be too costly to run a mayoral campaign to replace him. Figures on the party’s left strongly criticised the decision. Mr Burnham is widely seen as a contender to challenge Sir Keir Starmer, the unpopular prime minister, for the party’s leadership. 8) In Melbourne anti-immigration demonstrators clashed with marchers protesting against Australia Day, which marks the landing of the First Fleet of British convicts in Sydney Cove in 1788. Riot police were reportedly deployed. Every year Australians get tangled in an argument over the event, which is seen by many indigenous Australians as celebrating colonisation. 1) **唐納·川普（Donald Trump）再次為移民暨海關執法局（ICE）**在明尼阿波利斯的行動辯護。總統表示，ICE 探員殺害艾力克斯·普雷蒂（Alex Pretti）與芮妮·古德（Renee Good）事件是由「民主黨導致的混亂」所引起的。抗議者冒著嚴寒走上全美街頭。明尼蘇達州州長提姆·華茲（Tim Walz）敦促川普先生在聯邦探員「於街頭殺害另一名美國人之前」，將其撤出該州。 2) 黃金價格首次突破每盎司 5,000 美元的關卡。黃金在一年前的價格為每盎司 2,770 美元，由於投資者面對川普先生對國際貿易的反覆態度而拋售債券與貨幣，目前對黃金的需求毫無放緩跡象。美元走弱也使得美國境外的投資者更容易負擔黃金。 3) 台灣表示正在監控中國軍方高層的「異常」變動。週六，中國最高將領張又俠遭到調查，據報導是因為向美國洩露核機密。陸軍參謀長劉振立大將也正在接受調查。習近平主席已為中國人民解放軍設定了明年必須具備奪取台灣能力的期限。 4) 艾力克斯·霍諾德（Alex Honnold）在沒有繩索或安全網的情況下，成功攀登了亞洲最高摩天大樓之一的台北 101。這位美國人的 508 公尺攀爬過程在 Netflix 上直播（基於安全考量設有 10 秒延遲），耗時一個半小時。霍諾德先生站在建築物的尖塔頂端，宣稱他的成就「酷斃了」。 5) 以色列表示，在尋獲位於加薩境內最後一名以色列人質的遺體後，將部分重新開放加薩與埃及之間的重要援助入境點——拉法跨境口岸（Rafah crossing）。以色列軍隊已發起一項「大規模行動」以追回藍·格維里（Ran Gvili）的遺體。該口岸原定於去年 10 月達成的停火協議第一階段期間重新開放。 6) 弗拉迪米爾·澤倫斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）聲稱，美國對戰後烏克蘭的安全保障已「100% 準備就緒」，文件正等待簽署並送交美烏兩國立法機關批准。這位烏克蘭總統的言論顯示，週末在阿布達比舉行的美、俄、烏三方會談並非完全沒有成果。預計會談將於本週末繼續進行。 7) 英國執政黨工黨禁止大曼徹斯特市長安迪·博納姆（Andy Burnham）參加即將舉行的補選，理由是為替換他而進行的市長選舉競選活動成本過高。黨內左翼人士對此決定表示強烈批評。博納姆先生被廣泛認為是挑戰民調低迷的首相**施凱爾爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）**黨魁地位的有力競爭者。 8) 在墨爾本，反移民示威者與抗議**澳洲日（Australia Day）**的遊行者發生衝突；澳洲日是為了紀念 1788 年英國第一艦隊囚犯抵達雪梨灣。據報導現場已部署防暴警察。每年澳洲人都會捲入對該紀念日的爭議，因為許多澳洲原住民將此日視為對殖民統治的慶祝。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Does Japan have a “foreigner problem”? Yes—but it is not what populist politicians say it is Jan 8th 2026|4 min read JAPAN is consumed by talk of a “foreigner problem”. The story goes that the country has been overrun by ill-mannered migrant workers, misbehaving tourists and opportunistic foreign investors. But Japan’s real problem is not that it hosts too many foreigners. It is that it has too few. Foreigners moved to the centre of political debate after the upstart Do It Yourself (Sanseito) party rode a “Japanese first” platform to big gains in last year’s upper-house election. In October the panicked ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chose as its new leader Takaichi Sanae, who launched her campaign for the job bylambasting foreign tourists who, she said without evidence, had been “kicking” sacred deer in Nara, an ancient capital. In Japan’s polite political culture, this was nearly as provocative as Donald Trump’s false claim that Haitian immigrants were eating American pets. Since becoming prime minister, Ms Takaichi has proposed tightening the screws on foreigners in the hope of winning voters back to the LDP. Her administration has talked of crackdowns on people who overstay visas, taxes on tourists, restrictions on property purchases and caps on foreign labour. A package of measures may be put forward later this month. Vilifying outsiders may make for good politics. But in the long run it is misguided. The true causes of voters’ frustrations are economic struggles. Cracking down on foreigners will not heal the underlying malaise. If anything, it will make it worse. The backdrop is demographic change. Japan’s population is expected to decrease by 30% to 87m in 2070. Ms Takaichi’s mentor, the late Abe Shinzo, recognised that Japan needed to open up if it was to keep thriving. When he served as prime minister he let in more migrant workers and encouraged tourism. The number of foreign residents in Japan has doubled since 2010 to 3.7m. The number of foreign visitors has quadrupled over the same period, reaching some 40m last year. Many foreigners live in Japan on temporary work visas. Such programmes are better than no immigration at all. But in Japan, where migrants are often treated as expendable cogs, not people who might settle and have families, such schemes hold back integration, which in turn causes tension. And as the foreign population in Japan has risen, mainstream politicians have often been reluctant to talk about it. That has helped populists paint the arrivals as a “silent invasion”. Some popular worries reflect real problems that can be fixed. Stricter oversight of foreign investors who buy land next to sensitive sites such as military bases is wise. Imposing Japanese-language requirements for permanent residence is reasonable, too. Over-tourism has turned Kyoto’s best-known temples into mosh pits during cherry-blossom season. But broader fears about social breakdown and loss of traditions are overstated. Japan is an island country with strong borders. It faces no surge of refugees from war or poverty. Its neighbours are either prosperous or North Korea, which locks its people in. Foreigners are only about 3% of Japan’s population; the average across the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, is 15%. And there is plenty of room for tourism to grow. Japan already relies on foreigners in industries including hospitality, farming and nursing. Migrants help sustain many of the traditions that nativists fear losing: they catch and harvest the raw ingredients for Japanese cuisine; in some ageing rural communities they help carry portable shrines during festivals. Japan will need far more workers in the coming decades to maintain even modest growth. That is why business leaders and governors tend to favour admitting more foreigners, not fewer. As for curbing tourism, that would mean stifling Japan’s second-largest export, after cars. Instead of discouraging tourists, Japan could** lure **more of them to the many beautiful places that are currently off the beaten track. (Even Kyoto has plenty of spectacular yet barely visited sites.) Instead of cracking down on foreign workers, it should design an immigration system that attracts and selects newcomers with useful skills, integrates them into society and ensures that they pay their fair share of health-care and welfare costs. The real problem is not foreigners. It is the failure to take advantage of one of Japan’s greatest strengths—that it is a wonderful place to live and work. ■ 日本真的有所謂的「外國人問題」嗎？ 有——但並非民粹政治人物所宣稱的那種 2026 年 1 月 8 日｜閱讀時間 4 分鐘 日本正被有關「外國人問題」的討論所籠罩。流行的說法是，日本已被不守規矩的移工、行為失當的觀光客，以及投機取巧的外國投資者所「淹沒」。然而，日本真正的問題並非外國人太多，而是外國人太少。 外國人議題之所以成為政治焦點，是因為新興的「自己動手黨」（Sanseito）在去年的參議院選舉中，憑藉「日本優先」的政綱取得顯著進展。10 月，驚慌失措的執政黨自民黨（LDP）選擇高市早苗為新任黨魁。她在競選期間，毫無證據地抨擊外國觀光客，指稱他們在古都奈良「踢踹」神聖的鹿群。在日本一向溫和的政治文化中，這樣的言論幾乎可與唐納．川普聲稱海地移民吃美國人寵物的虛假指控相提並論。 高市上任首相後，為了重新贏回選民支持，提出多項針對外國人的強硬政策，包括打擊逾期居留者、對觀光客課稅、限制外國人購置不動產，以及對外籍勞工設置上限。一套完整的措施可能將於本月稍晚提出。 妖魔化外來者或許有助於短期政治操作，但長期而言卻是誤入歧途。選民不滿的真正根源在於經濟困境，而非外國人。打壓外國人無法治癒結構性問題，反而可能使情況惡化。 其背景是人口結構的劇烈變化。日本人口預計將在 2070 年減少 30%，降至 8,700 萬人。高市的政治導師、已故前首相安倍晉三早已意識到，日本若要持續繁榮，必須對外開放。在他任內，日本引進更多移工並鼓勵觀光發展。自 2010 年以來，外國居民人數已倍增至 370 萬；外國旅客數量更在同期間成長四倍，去年達約 4,000 萬人次。 許多外國人在日本持短期工作簽證居留。這類制度固然勝過完全不接受移民，但在日本，移民往往被視為可替換的勞動齒輪，而非能夠定居並建立家庭的成員，這種作法阻礙了社會融合，也因此引發緊張。隨著外國人口增加，主流政治人物卻長期避而不談，反倒讓民粹勢力將移民描繪成一場「無聲入侵」。 部分民眾的擔憂確實反映了可解決的問題。加強對購買軍事基地等敏感地點附近土地的外國投資者之監管是明智的；對申請永久居留者設立日語能力要求亦屬合理。過度觀光確實讓京都的知名寺院在櫻花季期間人滿為患。 然而，對於社會崩解與文化流失的恐懼被嚴重誇大。日本是島國，邊境管控嚴密，並未面臨戰爭或貧困所引發的難民潮。其鄰國不是富裕國家，就是將人民封鎖在國內的北韓。外國人僅占日本人口約 3%；而經合組織（OECD）成員國的平均比例為 15%。日本的觀光成長空間仍然相當大。 日本早已在旅宿、農業與護理等產業仰賴外國勞工。移民實際上也在維繫那些排外者所擔憂失去的傳統：他們捕撈與收成日本料理所需的原料；在一些高齡化的鄉村社區中，他們協助在祭典時抬神轎。未來數十年，日本若要維持即便是溫和的經濟成長，也將需要更多勞動力。正因如此，企業領袖與地方首長多半支持增加而非減少外國人。至於抑制觀光，等同於扼殺日本僅次於汽車的第二大出口產業。 與其打擊觀光，日本更應將旅客引導至仍未被充分探索的美麗地區（即便是京都，也仍有眾多壯麗卻鮮少造訪的景點）。與其限制外籍勞工，不如設計一套能吸引具實用技能的新移民、促進其社會融合，並確保其公平負擔醫療與福利成本的移民制度。真正的問題不在於外國人，而在於日本未能善用自身最重要的優勢之一——它是一個極適合生活與工作的國家。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China and Taiwan both see lessons in America’s** raid** on Venezuela It won’t change China’s calculus but is a case study for “decapitation” strikes Jan 8th 2026|Taipei|4 min read China’s public is used to seeing flashy footage of its armed forces parading new weaponry through Beijing, conducting peacekeeping patrols in Africa or staging elaborate drills around disputed territory, especially Taiwan. But nobody under 45 can claim to have lived through an actual Chinese military strike on another country. And among older generations who did, most would rather forget the war of 1979 in which Vietnam repelled a Chinese invasion. No wonder, then, that many Chinese people were transfixed by reports of America’s dramatic night-time extraction of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela. China’s government swiftly denounced the raid, but details and discussion of it circulated widely online. Among the more nationalist comments, there was also a common refrain: could this be a template for a Chinese attack on Taiwan? Similar thoughts have been raised in Taiwan itself and in America, with prominent figures arguing that the raid could set a precedent for China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to conduct—and legitimise—an assault on the island. **In truth, Mr Maduro’s capture will probably have little direct impact on China’s approach to Taiwan. **Rhetorically, Chinese officials have already started to use the operation to bolster their long-standing portrayal of America as a global bully and serial violator of international law. But the Trump administration’s legal justifications are of little interest to China. More pertinently, China has refrained from attacking thus far, not because it fears foreign reprimand, but owing to its own military limitations and concerns that America would intervene. Even so, there are lessons to be drawn for both China and Taiwan. Chinese special forces have been planning “decapitation” strikes on Taiwan’s leadership for years. In 2015 China’s state television revealed that the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, had built a mock-up of Taiwan’s presidential palace in the desert in northern China to practise an assault. The training site has tripled in size since 2020. Models of other Taiwanese ministries have been built, according to satellite images obtained by a Japanese think-tank in October. China’s focus on decapitation seemingly intensified after the success of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, in rallying resistance to Russia’s invasion. Decapitation drills have been included in China’s recent military exercises around Taiwan, too. The latest, on December 29th and 30th, involved dozens of warships and military aircraft as well as long-range rocket fire. They simulated a blockade and operations to prevent foreign forces intervening. They also rehearsed strikes on pro-independence figures, according to Senior Colonel Zhang Chi of China’s National Defence University. China would need to do more than kill or capture Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, as that would leave intact the rest of the government, which has a clear line of succession. The PLA is thus likely to use decapitation strikes as part of a bigger operation, potentially a full-scale invasion. Still, the PLA’s own elite units have yet to conduct any operations of note at home, let alone abroad. Nor has China yet established the high-level integration of space, air, ground and other forces that is needed for such operations, despite reforms that Mr Xi introduced more than a decade ago to achieve that. So China is likely to scrutinise America’s raid on Caracas, just as it has studied other significant foreign operations with potential relevance to Taiwan, including the D-Day landings and the Falklands war. Taiwan will likewise be hungry for insight into the American raid. Its armed forces are better equipped and trained than Venezuela’s. But they have long worried about Chinese decapitation strikes, potentially involving sleeper agents already in Taiwan. Hsu Szu-chien, the island’s deputy defence minister, told reporters on January 5th that Taiwan’s armed forces had protocols to respond to various types of Chinese aggression. Those included the so-called Wan Chun plan to protect the president, details of which are secret. The Venezuela raid showed the importance of strengthening preparedness and ensuring weapons are upgraded and maintained, he said, linking the episode to his government’s recent efforts to boost defence spending—blocked by the opposition. One detail of particular interest to Taiwan is the apparent failure of Venezuela’s Chinese-made JY-27 air-surveillance radars. Their manufacturer describes them as jam-resistant, and Chinese state media have claimed they can detect incoming missiles and advanced stealthy aircraft, including America’s F-22 fighter jets. Though the radar’s failure in Venezuela may have been due to poor maintenance, operator error or even sabotage, any suggestion that America exploited a weakness could affect China’s perception of its own vulnerability in a Taiwan conflict. Versions of the same radars also protect the mainland. Operation nations But perhaps more significant for both sides is what the Venezuela operation says about the Trump administration’s willingness to use force and its new focus on the western hemisphere. Taiwanese officials suggested that it could deter China by demonstrating America’s willingness to deploy military might against autocracies. On the other hand, mainland officials may be quietly encouraged by Mr Trump’s suggestion that his next targets could be Mexico, Colombia—or even Greenland. That does not necessarily mean giving Mr Xi carte blanche on Taiwan. But if America is bogged down in its own backyard, China could reap the benefits all the same. ■ 中美兩國皆從美國突襲委內瑞拉中汲取教訓 這不會改變中國的盤算，但卻是「斬首」行動的案例研究 2026年1月8日 | 台北 | 閱讀時間 4 分鐘 中國大眾已經習慣看到其武裝部隊展示新式武器、在非洲進行維和巡邏，或在爭議領土（特別是台灣）周邊進行精密的演習。但 45 歲以下的人，幾乎沒人親歷過中國對另一國採取真正的軍事行動；而經歷過 1979 年中越戰爭的長輩  (1979年中國因邊境衝突及不滿越南入侵柬埔寨，發動「對越自衛反擊戰」。解放軍攻入越南北部，雙方死傷慘重；中方宣稱達到目標後撤軍，此後兩國在邊境對峙多年。)，多數也寧願遺忘那場被越南擊退的往事。因此，當美國戲劇性地在夜間將尼古拉斯·馬杜洛（Nicolás Maduro）從委內瑞拉帶走時，許多中國人感到震驚且目不轉睛。 中國政府迅速譴責了這次突襲，但相關細節與討論在網路上廣泛流傳。在民族主義色彩濃厚的評論中，也出現了一個共同的疑問：這是否能成為中國攻擊台灣的範本？ 同樣的想法在台灣和美國也被提出，一些知名人士主張，這次突襲可能為中國領導人習近平發動——並合法化——對台攻擊開創先例。 事實上，馬杜洛的被捕可能對中國應對台灣的方式影響甚微。在說法上，中國官員已開始利用這次行動，強化其長期以來將美國形塑為「全球霸權」及「國際法慣犯破壞者」的形象。然而，川普政府的法律依據對中國來說並不重要。更貼切地說，中國至今未發動攻擊，並非擔心國際譴責，而是出於自身軍事限制以及對美國可能介入的擔憂。 即便如此，中台雙方仍能從中汲取教訓。中國特種部隊多年來一直在籌劃對台灣領導層進行「斬首」行動。2015 年，中國中央電視台揭露解放軍（PLA）在內蒙古沙漠建造了台灣總統府的模擬建築以練習進攻。根據日本智庫去年 10 月取得的衛星影像，該訓練場自 2020 年以來已擴大三倍，並增建了台灣其他部會的模型。自烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基成功號召抵抗俄羅斯入侵後，中國對斬首行動的關注顯然有所加強。 近期中國在台灣周邊的軍事演習也納入了斬首演練。最近一次在 12 月 29 日至 30 日的演習中，涉及數十艘軍艦、軍機及遠程火箭，模擬了封鎖及防止外國勢力干預的行動。根據中國國防大學張弛大校的說法，他們還演練了針對「台獨分子」的打擊。 然而，中國僅僅殺害或抓捕台灣總統賴清德是不夠的，因為這會留下擁有明確繼任順序的政府運作體系。因此，解放軍很可能將斬首行動視為更大規模行動（可能是全面入侵）的一部分。 儘管如此，解放軍的精銳部隊尚未在國內執行過任何顯著行動，更不用說在海外。儘管習近平十多年前就推動改革以實現軍事轉型，但中國尚未建立起執行此類操作所需的高度太空、空域、地面及其他力量的整合。因此，中國很可能會仔細研究美國對卡拉卡斯的突襲，就像他們研究其他與台灣衝突相關的國外行動一樣（如諾曼第登陸和福克蘭戰爭）。 台灣同樣渴望從這次美國突襲中獲得洞察。台灣武裝部隊的裝備與訓練雖優於委內瑞拉，但長期以來一直擔憂中國的斬首攻擊，且可能涉及已潛伏在台灣的臥底特務。台灣國防部副部長徐斯儉於 1 月 5 日告訴記者，軍方已有應對各類侵略的預案，其中包括保護總統的「萬鈞計畫」（細節屬機密）。他表示，委內瑞拉突襲事件顯示了加強戒備及確保武器更新維護的重要性，並藉此聯繫政府近期提升國防預算的努力——儘管目前仍遭到在野黨阻撓。 台灣特別感興趣的一個細節是：委內瑞拉所使用的中國製 JY-27 防空雷達顯然失效了。製造商宣稱該雷達具備抗干擾能力，中國官媒曾吹噓其能偵測導彈及先進隱形戰機（包括美國的 F-22）。儘管在委內瑞拉的失敗可能是由於維護不良、人為疏失甚至內部破壞，但任何關於美國利用漏洞的暗示，都可能影響中國對自身在台灣衝突中脆弱性的評估。同款型號的雷達也負責保衛中國大陸。 行動國家 但對雙方而言，更具深遠意義的或許是：這次委內瑞拉行動展現了川普政府使用武力的意願，以及對西半球的新焦點。台灣官員暗示，這可能透過展示美國對獨裁政權部署軍事力量的決心，進而威懾中國。 另一方面，中國官員則可能因川普暗示下一個目標可能是墨西哥、哥倫比亞甚至格陵蘭而暗自感到鼓舞。這並不代表習近平在台灣問題上得到了「空白支票」，但如果美國被拖入自家後院的泥淖，中國仍可能從中獲利。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Leaders | Generation AI How AI is rewiring childhood The technology presents (3 meanings) dazzling opportunities—and ominous risks Dec 4th 2025|5 min read CHRISTMAS STOCKINGS may contain more surprises than usual this year, as children open presents that can talk back. Toymakers in China have declared 2025 the year of artificial intelligence (AI) and are producing robots and teddies that can teach, play and tell stories. Older children, meanwhile, are glued to viral AI videos and AI-enhanced games. At school, many are being taught with materials created with tools like ChatGPT. Some are even learning alongside chatbot-tutors. In work and play, AI is rewiring childhood. It promises every child the kind of upbringing previously available only to the rich, with private tutors, personalised syllabuses and bespoke entertainment. Children can listen to songs composed about them, read stories in which they star, play video games that adapt to their skill level and have an entourage of chatbot friends cheering them on. A childhood fit for a king could become universal. It is a future filled with opportunities—and hidden traps. As real kings often discover, a bespoke upbringing can also be a lonely and atomised one. What’s more, as their subjects often find out, it can create adults who are ill-equipped for real life. As AI changes childhood for better and for worse, society must rethink the business of growing up. Being reared by robots has advantages. Tech firms are already showing how AI can enhance learning, especially where teachers and materials are scarce. Literacy and language-learning have been boosted in early trials. The dream is that, with an AI tutor, children can be saved from classes pitched to the median, in which bright pupils are bored and dim ones are lost. If you want a version of this leader for an eight-year-oldHindi-speaker, AI can rewrite it; if they would prefer it as a cartoon strip or a song, no problem. Technology is creating new forms of fun, too. Hollywood may dismiss AI videos as “slop”, but young people are devouring them and making their own. Old toys are being upgraded: an AI-powered edition of “Trivial Pursuit” can pose questions on any topic. Video games are creating novel experiences, such as chatting to Darth Vader in “Fortnite”. Any child can meet their heroes (and shoot them). There are well-publicised risks in letting children loose on an evolving technology. AI tutors may hallucinate wrong answers. Toys can go off the rails: parents should check stockings for the AI teddy that was recently found to have spiced up its chat with talk of kinky sex. Children can easily misuse AI, to cheat at homework or harass each other with “deepfake” videos. Chatbots can coax vulnerable adolescents into harming themselves. Tech firms insist these stumbling blocks can be fixed; ChatGPT is only three years old. Yet childhood may be disrupted most radically by things that AI does when it is behaving as intended. The technology quickly learns what its master likes—and shows more of it. **Social-media feeds have already created echo chambers where people see only views they agree with (or love to hate). AI threatens to strengthen these echo chambers and lock children into them at an early age. **The child who likes football may be told football stories by his teddy and given footballing examples by his AI tutor. Not only does this stamp out serendipity. A favourites-only diet means a child need never learn to tolerate something unfamiliar. One-sided relationships with chatbots present a similar risk. AI companions that never criticise, nor share feelings of their own, are a poor preparation for dealing with imperfect humans. A third of American teenagers say they find chatting to an AI companion at least as satisfying as talking to a friend, and easier than talking to their parents. Yes-bots threaten to create children not used to taking turns, who grow up into colleagues unable to compromise and partners unfamiliar with the give-and-take required in a relationship. Other trends are pushing in the same direction. As birth rates crash, fewer children are growing up with siblings to smooth their sharp edges. Rising numbers of young adults are deciding that long-term romantic relationships are not worth the hassle. Remote work means that people who grow up in a personalised, asocial world can slip into jobs where they interact with colleagues only through screens—a chore they may soon delegate to an AI agent. Some basic counter-measures are urgent. Parents should think twice before entrusting their child to a word-regurgitation machine, whether it is sewn into a bear or not. Chatbots should have age restrictions that are properly enforced; governments should not give ai firms the leeway they gave social networks, which are only now being cajoled into age-gating. Teachers are kidding themselves if they think essays written at home can any longer be trusted. In the age of AI, more in-school assessment is essential. The longer-term challenge is to think deeply about how to preserve the socialisation that AI could rub out of children’s lives. Schools, where much of childhood plays out, are the best place to do this. They should take advantage of personalised tuition where it is proven to work. But they must also redouble efforts to teach things that a robot can’t: to debate, to disagree and to get along with—perhaps even to appreciate—people who are not as sycophantic as a chatbot. Happy princes, hollow kingdoms Schools should also enhance their role as centres of discovery. If AI is giving children more of what they want, it is more important that schools provide chances to meet people and encounter ideas that lie outside their experience. **Algorithmic personalisation **threatens to be a powerful barrier to social mobility if it nudges people to stay in the lane in which they start out. Inequality could widen if poor schools merely embrace chatbots as cheap substitutes for human teachers. AI shows undeniable potential to improve education and enrich entertainment. It may one day let every child live like royalty. But the truly privileged may be those whose parents and teachers know when to turn it off. ■ 領袖觀點｜AI 世代 人工智慧如何重塑童年 這項科技帶來耀眼的機會——也潛藏不祥的風險 2025 年 12 月 4 日｜5 分鐘閱讀 今年的聖誕襪裡，或許會出現比以往更多驚喜——孩子們打開的禮物，可能會「回話」。中國玩具製造商已將 2025 年稱為「人工智慧元年」，推出能教學、陪玩、講故事的機器人與泰迪熊。年紀稍大的孩子，則沉迷於爆紅的 AI 影片與 AI 強化遊戲。在學校裡，許多學生使用 ChatGPT 等工具製作的教材，甚至與聊天機器人導師一同學習。 無論在學習或娛樂上，AI 正在重新改寫童年。它承諾讓每個孩子都能擁有過去只有富裕家庭才能提供的成長環境：私人家教、個人化課綱、量身打造的娛樂內容。孩子可以聽到為自己創作的歌曲、閱讀以自己為主角的故事、玩會依能力調整難度的遊戲，甚至擁有一群為他加油打氣的聊天機器人。過去如王室般的童年，或將成為普遍現象。 然而，這樣的未來既充滿機會，也暗藏陷阱。正如歷史上的君王所發現的，過度量身訂製的成長過程，往往孤立而碎片化；而他們的臣民也知道，這樣的教育可能培養出不適應現實生活的大人。當 AI 同時以好與壞的方式改變童年，社會勢必得重新思考「成長」這件事。 由機器陪伴成長並非毫無優點。科技公司已展示 AI 在師資與教材匱乏地區，能有效提升學習成果，尤其在識字與語言學習方面，初步試驗成效顯著。理想情況下，AI 導師可讓孩子免於「為中位數設計」的課堂——資優生不再無聊，學習較慢者也不致迷失。若你想把這篇社論改寫成適合八歲、講印地語的版本，AI 也能做到；要變成漫畫或歌曲，同樣不成問題。 科技也創造了新的娛樂形式。好萊塢或許將 AI 影片貶為「垃圾內容」，但年輕人卻看得津津有味，甚至自行創作。老玩具也獲得升級：AI 版《Trivial Pursuit》可針對任何主題出題；電玩遊戲則提供全新體驗，例如在《要塞英雄》中與達斯．維達對話。任何孩子都能見到自己的英雄——甚至對他們開槍。 讓孩子接觸快速演進的科技，風險早已廣為人知。AI 導師可能會「幻覺」出錯誤答案；玩具也可能失控——近期就有一隻 AI 泰迪熊被發現在聊天中加入露骨的性暗示。孩子也容易濫用 AI，作弊寫作業或用「深偽」影片騷擾同學。聊天機器人甚至可能誘導脆弱的青少年自殘。科技公司強調這些問題都能修正，畢竟 ChatGPT 也才三歲。 然而，對童年影響最深的，或許是 AI 在「正常運作」時所帶來的後果。這項技術會迅速學會使用者的偏好，並不斷提供更多相同內容。社群媒體早已打造出回音室，讓人只看到自己認同（或厭惡）的觀點。AI 可能進一步強化這些回音室，讓孩子從小就被困其中。喜歡足球的孩子，泰迪熊會講足球故事，AI 導師會用足球舉例。這不僅扼殺了偶然發現新事物的可能，也讓孩子無需學習容忍陌生與不喜歡的事物。 與聊天機器人建立單向關係，也存在類似風險。永不批評、也不表達自身情緒的 AI 夥伴，無法讓孩子學會如何與不完美的人相處。三分之一的美國青少年表示，與 AI 夥伴聊天至少和與朋友聊天一樣令人滿足，甚至比與父母交談更輕鬆。「是的機器人」可能培養出不習慣輪流、不懂妥協的孩子，最終成為難以合作的同事，或不熟悉關係中互相付出的伴侶。 其他趨勢也正朝相同方向推進。隨著出生率下滑，越來越多孩子沒有手足來磨平稜角；愈來愈多青年認為長期親密關係不值得付出心力。遠距工作則讓在個人化、非社交環境中成長的人，進入幾乎只需透過螢幕互動的職場——而這項互動，未來也可能交給 AI 代理完成。 一些基本的對策刻不容緩。家長在把孩子交給「文字拼湊機器」之前，應三思而後行，不論那台機器是否縫在泰迪熊裡。聊天機器人應設有並確實執行年齡限制；政府不該再給 AI 公司如同當年社群平台般的寬鬆待遇。教師若仍相信在家完成的作文可信，無疑是自欺欺人；在 AI 時代，更多校內評量勢在必行。 更長遠的挑戰，是如何保留 AI 可能從童年生活中抹去的社會化過程，而學校正是最佳場域。學校應在證實有效的情況下，善用個人化教學；同時，也必須加倍努力教授機器無法取代的能力：辯論、分歧、合作，甚至欣賞那些不像聊天機器人般阿諛奉承的人。 快樂的王子，空洞的王國 學校也應強化作為探索中心的角色。若 AI 不斷給孩子他們想要的內容，那麼學校更應提供機會，讓他們接觸經驗之外的人與思想。演算法式個人化，若引導人們始終停留在起點所在的「車道」，將成為社會流動的強大障礙；若貧困學校僅以聊天機器人作為廉價的人類教師替代品，不平等恐將擴大。 AI 無疑具備改善教育、豐富娛樂的潛力，或許終有一天，能讓每個孩子都過上如王室般的生活。但真正的特權，可能屬於那些知道何時該把它關掉的家長與教師。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

"Watch who you’re calling childless Women in America are having as many babies over their lifetimes as they did two decades ago A set of public signs showing women, pregnancy, baby care, strollers, and children playing Dec 18th 2025 | 5 min read **A colony of **sentient lizards, living on a distant planet. It comprises 100 females and 100 males. Each lives for 100 years. There is only one male and one female of any age (eg, one 15-year-old female, one 74-year-old male). The planet is safe and peaceful: no lizards die from disease or violence. But every year the two 100-year-olds pass away. And every year two babies are born, the fruits of an unusual reproductive cycle. At age 24 every female produces a male baby; at 26, a female. She will never have any more. The population of Planet Lizard is thus fixed at 200. Now imagine an asteroid hits Planet Lizard, altering its atmosphere and climate. At first little seems to have changed. All the lizards miraculously survive, and they rejoice at their good fortune. But it soon becomes clear something is wrong: the two females, aged 24 and 26, who are due to produce baby lizards do not. The population shrinks to 198. The next year, the same thing happens. The colony dwindles to 196. Concern turns to panic. Prophecies of extinction are splashed across the front pages of lizard newspapers. Councils of senior lizards are convened to devise plans to revive fertility. Nothing works. Ten years after the asteroid struck, the remaining 180 lizards are resigned to their fate: ageing, death and extinction, two by two. And then: a miracle. The two females who failed to have babies at 24 and 26 are suddenly fertile, at 34 and 36. Soon, two infants are born, to general ecstasy. The next year, the miracle is repeated. And so on. The population stabilises and (a century later) climbs back to 200. Ultimately, the asteroid changed the timing of lizard births but not their number. This fable may seem silly, but it contains a lesson. For decades, across the West, the commonest measure of how many children women have, on average—the total fertility rate (tfr)—has been dropping. It has fallen well below the “replacement rate” (needed to keep a population constant) of 2.1. Between 2007 and 2022 America’s tfr dropped from 2.1 to just 1.6. Warnings of probable population decline, including from this newspaper, abound. Pronatalists are casting around frantically for solutions. A shrinking (human) population could be cause for concern. It means fewer working-age people to support the old. Fiscal crisis could loom. Fewer minds would yield fewer innovative ideas. Less scope for division of labour would mean a less efficient economy. But tfr has flaws. It measures the number of children a hypothetical woman might have in her life, based on current birth rates for women of different ages. To calculate it, you start by dividing the total number of births to a given group of women (aged, say 15-19 or 35-39) by the number of women in that group. Those group birth rates are then added up and multiplied by the number of years in each group (ie, five). The result is the number of children a woman will have if, aged 15-19, she has the same number of babies as the average woman of 15-19 is having today, then the same number at 20-24 as the average woman of 20-24 is having today, and so on. It is almost sure to be wrong. That does not make TFR useless. It captures what demographers call “tempo”—the timing of an event, like a birth. But as a measure of “quantum”—the total number of births—it is likely to mislead. In effect it assumes that a young woman will have babies not only at the same rate as her contemporaries, but also at the same rate as women five or ten years older. That is not necessarily so. A different measure, the completed fertility rate (CFR), captures the average number of births a woman has by the end of her child-bearing years (put at 44). America’s CFR has not fallen at all over the past two decades. In fact, according to an analysis of census data by Mike Konczal, a former Biden administration economist, it has risen slightly, from 1.91 in 2000 to 1.97 in 2024. Chart: The Economist Back on Planet Lizard, the TFR dropped to zero overnight. After ten years, when females started having babies again, it jumped back to 2. The CFR never budged. The timing of births simply shifted, and eventually the tfr caught up with the cfr. In a doomsday scenario, in which the asteroid did render the lizards infertile, the cfr would have dropped to meet tfr. Which scenario is playing out in the West? Many demographers, including Lyman Stone, of the Institute for Family Studies, a think-tank, point out that tfr is typically a strong predictor of cfr. But there is evidence that women are deferring, not forgoing, childbirth. In 2000 by age 26 the average American woman had produced one child; the average 32-year-old, 1.6 children; the average 40-year-old, 1.9. In 2024 the average 26-year-old had 0.6 children and the average 32-year-old 1.2. But the average 40-year-old has still had 1.9, having delayed in her 20s and caught up in her 30s. Economies of scales Does this mean, as with the lizards, that tfr will rise to meet cfr? Historical examples are suggestive. As women delayed childbearing in Sweden the tfr dropped sharply in the 1980s, before recovering in the 1990s (though it has fallen since). The cfr, at around 2, barely budged. In America the question is pertinent. The commonest ages are 33 and 34, because of a baby boom in 1990 and 1991. Women aged 34 have had, on average, 1.46 children each. As this group approaches their 40s, many more births may be on the way. As for younger women, those born in 2000 have had fewer children than those born in 1990 had had by 2015. Perhaps they will catch up—but that won’t be known for at least a decade. To be sure, an average of just under two births per woman is still not “replacement level”. But if that truly is the long-term average, panic is scarcely justified. It would mean a gradual population decline: tricky, but much more manageable than implied by TFR. It is easy to fear the end times. But the problem may be one that humans, like our faraway lizards, never face. 美國女性一生中生育的孩子數量，與二十年前其實一樣多 2025 年 12 月 18 日｜閱讀時間 5 分鐘 想像一下，在一顆遙遠的星球上，有一個由具備感知能力的蜥蜴所組成。這個社會共有 100 隻雌性與 100 隻雄性蜥蜴。每一隻蜥蜴都能活到 100 歲，而且每個年齡層都恰好只有一隻雄性與一隻雌性（例如：只有一隻 15 歲的雌蜥蜴，一隻 74 歲的雄蜥蜴）。這顆星球安全又和平，沒有任何蜥蜴死於疾病或暴力。然而，每年都會有兩隻 100 歲的蜥蜴自然死亡；同時，也會誕生兩隻新生蜥蜴，這來自一種特殊的繁殖週期。每隻雌蜥蜴在 24 歲時會生下一隻雄性幼蜥；在 26 歲時，會生下一隻雌性幼蜥。此後，她將不再生育。於是，「蜥蜴星球」的人口始終固定在 200。 接著，想像一顆小行星撞擊了蜥蜴星球，改變了它的大氣與氣候。一開始，看似毫無異狀。所有蜥蜴奇蹟似地存活下來，並為自己的幸運而歡欣鼓舞。但很快地，問題浮現了：原本應該在 24 與 26 歲生育的兩隻雌蜥蜴，沒有生下幼蜥。人口減少到 198。隔年，同樣的事情再度發生，人口降至 196。憂慮迅速轉為恐慌，關於滅絕的預言登上蜥蜴報紙的頭版。長老議會召開，試圖找出恢復生育力的方法，但一切都徒勞無功。 十年後，剩下的 180 隻蜥蜴只能接受他們的命運：逐漸老去、死亡，然後滅絕——每年少兩隻。 然後，奇蹟出現了。 那兩隻在 24 與 26 歲未能生育的雌蜥蜴，竟然在 34 與 36 歲時重新恢復生育能力。不久後，兩隻幼蜥誕生，整個星球陷入狂喜。隔年，奇蹟再次發生。接著年復一年。人口穩定下來，並在一個世紀後回升至 200。 最終，小行星改變的只是蜥蜴生育的「時間點」，而非「總數」。 這個寓言或許看來荒謬，但其中蘊含了一個重要教訓。數十年來，西方國家最常用來衡量女性平均生育子女數的指標——總和生育率（Total Fertility Rate，簡稱 TFR）——持續下降，且已遠低於維持人口穩定所需的「更替水準」2.1。2007 年至 2022 年，美國的 TFR 從 2.1 降至僅 1.6。各種關於人口即將衰退的警告不絕於耳，其中也包括本刊。鼓吹提高生育率的人士正四處尋找解方。 人口萎縮確實值得憂慮。這意味著勞動年齡人口減少，難以支撐高齡人口；財政危機可能浮現；創新思維的數量下降；分工的空間縮小，經濟效率隨之降低。 然而，TFR 本身存在缺陷。它是根據不同年齡層女性「當前」的生育率，推算出一名假想女性一生可能生育的子女數。計算方式如下：先將某一年齡組（例如 15–19 歲或 35–39 歲）的出生總數，除以該年齡組女性人數，得出該組的生育率；再將各年齡組的生育率加總，並乘以每組的年數（通常為五年）。結果是一個假設：一名女性在 15–19 歲時的生育行為，會與當今該年齡層女性相同；在 20–24 歲時，也會與當今該年齡層女性相同，依此類推。這種假設幾乎必然與現實不符。 這並不代表 TFR 毫無用處。它確實能反映人口學家所稱的「節奏」（tempo）——事件（如生育）發生的時間點；但作為衡量「總量」（quantum，即一生生育數）的指標，它往往具有誤導性。它實際上假設年輕女性不僅會以同齡人的生育率生育，未來也會以年長女性目前的生育率生育，而這並非必然。 另一個指標——完成生育率（Completed Fertility Rate，CFR）——則計算女性在生育年齡結束（通常定為 44 歲）時，平均實際生育的子女數。根據前拜登政府經濟學家 Mike Konczal 對美國人口普查資料的分析，美國的 CFR 在過去二十年間並未下降，反而略有上升，從 2000 年的 1.91 提高至 2024 年的 1.97。 回到蜥蜴星球：TFR 曾在一夜之間降為零；十年後，當雌蜥蜴重新開始生育時，TFR 又回升至 2。但 CFR 始終未曾改變。生育的時間只是延後，最終 TFR 追上了 CFR。若小行星真的使蜥蜴永久不孕，那麼 CFR 才會下滑，與 TFR 接軌。 那麼，西方世界正在經歷的是哪一種情況？ 許多人口學家（包括家庭研究所的 Lyman Stone）指出，TFR 通常是 CFR 的良好預測指標。然而，越來越多證據顯示，女性是在延後生育，而非放棄生育。 2000 年時，26 歲的美國女性平均已有 1 名孩子；32 歲者為 1.6；40 歲者為 1.9。到了 2024 年，26 歲女性平均只有 0.6 名孩子，32 歲為 1.2；但 40 歲女性仍是 1.9——她們只是把原本 20 多歲的生育延到 30 多歲完成。 規模經濟 這是否意味著，美國的 TFR 會像蜥蜴一樣，最終回升以追上 CFR？歷史案例提供了一些線索。瑞典在 1980 年代女性延後生育時，TFR 曾急劇下降，並於 1990 年代回升（儘管之後再度下滑）；但 CFR 始終穩定在約 2。 在美國，這個問題尤為關鍵。由於 1990 與 1991 年的嬰兒潮，當前人數最多的女性年齡層為 33 與 34 歲。34 歲女性目前平均已有 1.46 名孩子。隨著她們邁入 40 多歲，更多出生可能仍在路上。至於年輕世代，2000 年出生的女性，到目前為止生育數少於 1990 年出生者在 2015 年時的水準。她們是否會「追上來」，仍需至少十年才能確認。 誠然，每名女性平均不到兩個孩子，仍低於更替水準。但若這真是長期趨勢，恐慌其實並不必要。這代表的是一個緩慢、可控的人口下降，而非 TFR 所暗示的危機規模。人類很容易想像末日降臨。但這個問題，或許終究不會真正發生——正如那些遙遠星球上的蜥蜴一般。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Christmas Specials | Single men in possession of good fortunes Was Mr Darcy the richest of all Jane Austen’s characters? It depends how you count their wealth Dec 12th 2025|2 min read Mr Darcy is handsome, smouldering and rich. According to the 1995 television adaptation of “Pride and Prejudice”, he is also an excellent swimmer. But in Austen’s next novel, “Mansfield Park”, she introduces a man **in possession of **even more money: Mr Rushworth. He is a clod, a “king” who appears “best in the background”. But he is blessed with an estate spanning 700 acres (not counting the water meadows), one of the best houses on London’s Wimpole Street and £12,000 a year to Darcy’s mere £10,000. It is fun to compare characters’ fortunes across novels. Doing so reveals “fiscal twins”, as Marilyn Francus of West Virginia University calls them. For example, Mr Bennet’s income in “Pride and Prejudice” (£2,000) is as large as Colonel Brandon’s in “Sense and Sensibility”. Strange, then, that Mr Bennet has done so little to secure his daughters’ futures. In “Northanger Abbey” James Morland can offer Isabella Thorpe only £400 a year. If she had settled for that, she would have become the fiscal twin of Mrs Price, the poorest sister in “Mansfield Park”, who lived a life of clatter and chaos on what is reckoned to be a similar amount. The problem with these comparisons, however, is that the pound’s purchasing power was not steady in the years between Austen novels. Harvest failures and recurring wars with France contributed to rapid inflation. Conversely, the demobilisation of soldiers in brief interludes of peace caused unemployment and deflation. Austen was aware of the problem. While revising “Sense and Sensibility” in 1811, she noted that “the Incomes remain as they were, but I will get them altered if I can.” It can make a big difference whether her numbers reflect the characters’ times or the year of publication. Some scholars, for example, argue that “Pride and Prejudice” is set around 1793-4 when militias were mobilised to protect Britain from possible invasion by France (“a whole campful of soldiers” thrills Lydia, the youngest and most feckless Bennet sister). “Mansfield Park”, on the other hand, is believed to start in 1808 or 1812. Between 1793 and 1808, the cost of living rose by over half, according to Charles Feinstein, an economic historian. That means the £12,000 flowing to Mr Rushworth in “Mansfield Park” did not stretch as far as the pounds accruing to Mr Darcy roughly 15 years earlier. Indeed, Mr Rushworth’s fortune was worth less than £7,900 at the prices prevailing in 1793. By that logic, he is not in fact the richest of Austen’s characters. Mr Darcy is a better catch.■ 聖誕特輯｜單身男子若擁有良好財富 達西先生是珍．奧斯汀筆下最富有的角色嗎？ 答案取決於你如何計算他們的財富 2025 年 12 月 12 日｜2 分鐘閱讀 達西先生英俊、憂鬱而富有。根據 1995 年的電視劇《傲慢與偏見》，他還是一位游泳好手。但在奧斯汀的下一部小說《曼斯菲爾德莊園》中，她介紹了一位擁有更多財富的男子：拉什沃斯先生。他是個呆板的人物，一位「國王」，「最適合待在背景裡」。然而，他坐擁一座占地 700 英畝（尚未計入水草豐美的河畔草地）的莊園、倫敦溫波爾街上最好的宅邸之一，以及每年 12,000 英鎊的收入，相比之下，達西先生的年收入只有 10,000 英鎊。 把不同小說中的角色財富拿來比較，頗具趣味。這樣做會揭示出所謂的「財政雙胞胎」，西維吉尼亞大學的瑪麗蓮．弗朗西斯如此稱呼。例如，《傲慢與偏見》中班納特先生的收入（2,000 英鎊）與《理性與感性》中布蘭登上校的收入相同。那麼奇怪的是，班納特先生為何幾乎沒有為女兒們的未來做出安排？ (Chloe-- 但是她們的媽媽真的處心積慮了! 看單身男性都是在看年收入!! 聽看看經典的1995年BBC Pride and Prejudice的媽媽說話, 戲劇味十足而且頭會很痛!)在《諾桑覺寺》(17歲的凱薩琳·莫蘭陪伴富有無子的鄰居艾倫夫婦到巴斯度假，結識了新潮時髦的索普兄妹和有教養的蒂爾尼兄妹。後者邀請她到他們的宅第——諾桑覺寺做客。)中，詹姆斯．莫蘭只能向伊莎貝拉．索普提供每年 400 英鎊的生活費；若她接受了這樣的條件，她便會成為《曼斯菲爾德莊園》中最貧窮的姊妹——普萊斯太太——的「財政雙胞胎」，後者在大致相同的收入下，過著喧鬧而混亂的生活。 然而，這些比較的問題在於：奧斯汀各部小說之間的年代，英鎊的購買力並非一成不變。歉收與與法國反覆爆發的戰爭導致通貨膨脹迅速上升；相反地，短暫和平時期士兵復員，又造成失業與通貨緊縮。 奧斯汀對此心知肚明。1811 年修訂《理性與感性》時，她曾寫道：「收入仍然保持原樣，但如果可以的話，我會把它們改一改。」這些數字究竟反映的是故事設定的年代，還是出版的年份，差別甚大。部分學者認為，《傲慢與偏見》的故事背景約在 1793 至 1794 年，當時為防範法國可能入侵，民兵被動員起來——「整個營地的士兵」讓最年幼、也最輕率的班納特姊妹莉迪亞興奮不已。 相較之下，《曼斯菲爾德莊園》一般被認為始於 1808 年或 1812 年。經濟史學家查爾斯．費恩斯坦指出，1793 年至 1808 年之間，生活成本上升了五成以上。這意味著，《曼斯菲爾德莊園》中流入拉什沃斯先生手中的 12,000 英鎊，遠不如大約早 15 年前達西先生所累積的英鎊來得寬裕。事實上，按 1793 年的物價水準換算，拉什沃斯先生的財富價值還不到 7,900 英鎊。照此邏輯，他其實並非奧斯汀筆下最富有的人物；達西先生才是更理想的良緣。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

He Yanxin was the steward of a women-only language The last natural inheritor of nushu died on October 23rd, aged 86 Nov 27th 2025|5 min read In the summer of 1949, the year the Communists came to power in China, you might have found He Yanxin, then ten, sitting with her grandmother under a tree. It was cooler there, in the heat of the day. An ordinary scene, except that her grandmother was** inscribing** characters on the palm of Yanxin’s small hand. As she did so, Yanxin would sing the character, then jump up to draw it with a twig on the sand. For her, these lessons were fun. But she wondered why writing this script made her grandmother cry, sometimes so much that she could not see. Years passed; the Cultural Revolution violently came and went; she brought up six children **amid the strains of poverty **and a hard marriage. Then, from the early 1980s, researchers began seeking her out. She was not easy to find. Her home, Heyuan village, was tucked away in the foggy, vertiginous sandstone peaks of Jiangyong County in Hunan, in China’s south-east. But the visitors came because Jiangyong was the only site of a mysterious ancient language used by women only. They had heard Yanxin knew it, one of very few; but once they found her, with her tough demeanour and her straight gaze, she would tell them, firmly, no. The language was called nushu, “women’s script”. The characters were thin, slanting and graceful; locally they were called “long-legged mosquitoes” and “the words of ants”. Standard Chinese ideograms were chunky by comparison. Visually it was easy to learn, with each character representing one syllable; but to sing it well (for it was sung rather than spoken) required knowing the local dialect. It was therefore a natural medium for rural women denied education, as they all were until Mao’s time. Young unmarried women especially would meet to sing and sew nushu on fans, handkerchiefs and belts. When a bride left to live in the groom’s house, the “Third Day Books” of commiserations and hopes for her were naturally written in nushu, women to women. Nobody knew for sure how old it was. Some said a beautiful concubine in the medieval Song dynasty had invented it, others that it was the work of Yaoji, goddess of clouds and rain. Its secrecy was also disputed. Women certainly kept it to themselves, but men would have ignored it anyway. China was—still is—a patriarchy. Nushu was overwhelmingly filled with the grief and bitterness of women who had exchanged their own families for abusive husbands, hateful mothers-in-law and bound feet that kept them home. Rather than moonlight and flowers, its most common images were of closed rooms, lost friends and pain like the slash of a sword. One of Yanxin’s favourite images was of frost and snow on plum blossom: harsh beauty that destroyed life. Yet this was not a language of resistance. Many Third Day Books reminded a woman of her **“Three Obediences”: as a child, to her father; as a wife, to her husband; as a widow, to her sons. **Brides were reminded to “serve your father-in-law with a smile”. Desperate or resigned, by 1960 Yanxin did not need these songs. In earlier times there had been “sworn sisterhoods”, among the singers, “wisteria from the same root” which often proved stronger than ties of blood. But she herself had only one sworn sister, and they had lost touch. Learning nushu had also been an education, but under Mao all girls, like boys, could go to school. Then, slaving for her family, she had no time for it. One of her daughters asked if she would teach her, but she refused. What good was it? What money did it earn? It was useless. Yet her subsequent claim that she knew nothing of nushu did not hold up for long. A Japanese researcher, Endo Orie, having got that denial on the doorstep, handed her a pen and paper. Clumsily, out of practice, she began to draw the characters; but rapidly they became graceful, and Ms Endo urged her to go on; to write her life. At that point, her husband was gravely ill in hospital. Even there he continued to blame her. She visited him but, like a boat without wind, she could do nothing. One night in the house alone, rather than despair, she made a start on Ms Endo’s commission. Nushu made her cry too, but fortified her more. It was precious as gold to see the determined progress of the characters down the page. Her story poured out of her as if she had only been waiting to recover this near-dead language in order to speak. There was so much to say. She was still a baby when her father was killed by a rapacious landlord, knocked to the ground and hit until his blood ran out. After childhood, she had barely one good day. With her father gone, no man sowed rice for them; at 19, she had to be married off. She refused, skipped the ceremony and for a few years was happy to live apart from him. When she finally went to her husband’s house, it was pure oppression. She felt like a baby bird that could not chirp, let alone fly. Her mother-in-law hovered in the kitchen, criticising her cooking and complaining to her son, who then “served up the beating”. Having abandoned his studies, he tried farming, while she hauled rocks in the mines. This bitter therapy of nushu inspired her for the next two decades to help scholars research it. She also accepted the status of an “inheritor”, the last woman to learn nushu naturally, in the family. She even acquired a nushu sister, Hu Xin, an eager young student, and helped her through her divorce as well as her chanting exercises. They would walk through the streets of Heyuan with their arms around each other. She still had huge reservations, though. The nushu of the 21st century was not what she had learned. Men had now found uses for it, as a tourist lure. In Jiangyong you could buy trinkets with nushu inscriptions, often misspelled, and get a fan free with a bucket of fried chicken. In Pumei village an imposing nushu museum offered writing courses. But the songs were bland and pretty now, and young women very different. No one needed to understand—as she, now, fully understood—why her grandmother had so often wept as she inscribed the words of ants. ■ 何燕心是女性專屬語言的守護者 自然傳承女書的最後一人於10月23日辭世，享壽86歲 2025年11月27日｜5分鐘閱讀 女書，又名江永女書，是一種獨特的漢語書寫系統。女書是一種專門由女性使用的文字，起源於中國湖南省南部永州的江永縣一帶，一般用於書寫當地的漢語方言（土話）。女書早期在江永縣及其毗鄰的道縣、江華瑤族自治縣的大瑤山、以及廣西部分地區的婦女之間流行、傳承。由於女書在文化大革命期間被嚴重破壞，再加上隨著時代的發展及人口外流，現在女書正瀕臨失傳 2004年9月20日，女書的最後一位自然傳人陽煥宜去世。 1949年夏天，也就是共產黨在中國掌權的那一年，你或許會看到當時只有十歲的何燕心，和她的祖母坐在一棵樹下。白天的酷熱中，那裡比較涼爽。那是一個再普通不過的場景，唯一不同的是，她的祖母正把文字寫在燕心小小的手掌上。每寫一個字，燕心就會把那個字唱出來，接著跳起來，用一根小樹枝在沙地上描畫。對她來說，這些課程很有趣。但她不明白，為什麼書寫這種文字會讓祖母哭泣，有時甚至哭得什麼都看不清。 歲月流逝；文化大革命猛烈地來了，又過去了；她在貧窮與艱難的婚姻中撫養了六個孩子。接著，從1980年代初開始，研究者開始尋找她。她並不容易被找到。她的家鄉何園村，隱藏在湖南省江永縣霧氣瀰漫、陡峭險峻的砂岩山峰之中。但訪客仍然前來，因為江永是唯一已知仍存在一種神祕古老語言的地方——一種只由女性使用的語言。他們聽說燕心懂得這種語言，是極少數之一；但當他們終於找到她時，面對她堅毅的神情與筆直的目光，她會堅定地告訴他們：不。 這種語言叫做女書，「女人的文字」。字形纖細、傾斜而優雅；在當地被稱為「長腳蚊子」或「螞蟻的字」。相比之下，標準漢字顯得厚重笨拙。從視覺上看，它很容易學，每個字代表一個音節；但要唱得好（因為它是唱出來的，而不是說出來的），就必須懂得當地的方言。因此，對於那些被剝奪教育機會的農村女性而言，這是一種自然的表達媒介——直到毛澤東時代之前，所有女性皆如此。尤其是未婚的年輕女子，常常聚在一起唱誦女書，並將它繡在扇子、手帕與腰帶上。當新娘離開娘家、搬進夫家時，為她準備的「三朝書」(「三朝書」是新娘出嫁第三天，由女性親人或閨中密友所贈特定形式的女書作品，讓我們從它開始，傾聽女書訴可憐的故事。 這是寫在一條藍色布帕上的「女書」(圖一)。 「女書」指的不僅是婦女的書寫創作，更是女人用自己所創造出來的文字，書寫而成的作品)——寫滿安慰與祝福——理所當然地是以女書書寫，由女人寫給女人。 沒有人確切知道女書有多古老。有人說它是中世紀宋朝一位美麗的妃子所創；也有人說它出自雲雨女神瑤姬之手。它是否祕密流傳，也眾說紛紜。女性確實只在彼此之間使用它，但男性本來也會忽視它。中國是一個——至今仍然是——父權社會。女書的內容，幾乎完全充滿了女性的悲傷與苦澀：她們離開原生家庭，換來的是暴力的丈夫、刻薄的婆婆，以及把她們困在家中的纏足。女書中最常見的意象，不是月光與花朵，而是封閉的房間、失散的朋友，以及如刀劍劃過般的疼痛。燕心最喜愛的一個意象，是覆著霜雪的梅花：殘酷的美，卻摧毀生命。然而，這並不是一種反抗的語言。許多三朝書都提醒女子她的「三從」：幼時從父、出嫁從夫、夫死從子。新娘被告誡要「笑臉侍奉公公」。 到1960年，無論是出於絕望或認命，燕心已不再需要這些歌。在更早的年代，歌唱女書的女性之間會結成「結拜姊妹」，稱為「同根紫藤」，其情誼往往比血緣更深。但她自己只有一位結拜姊妹，而且早已失去聯絡。學習女書曾經也是一種教育，但在毛澤東治下，女孩與男孩一樣可以上學。之後，她為家庭勞碌奔波，沒有時間再碰它。她的一個女兒曾問她是否願意教她，她拒絕了。那有什麼用？能賺多少錢？毫無價值。 然而，她後來聲稱自己對女書一無所知，並沒有維持太久。一位日本研究者遠藤織枝，在門口得到這樣的否認後，把筆和紙遞給她。她笨拙地、因為久未使用而生疏地，開始描畫那些字；但很快地，字形又變得優雅起來。遠藤女士鼓勵她繼續寫下去，寫她的一生。那時，她的丈夫正重病住院。即便如此，他仍然責怪她。她去探望他，但就像一艘無風的船，她什麼也做不了。某個夜晚，她獨自在家，沒有陷入絕望，反而開始動筆，完成遠藤女士的請託。女書也讓她落淚，但同時給了她力量。看著那些字堅定地一行行往下延伸，彷彿黃金般珍貴。她的故事從她心中傾瀉而出，彷彿她只是一直在等待重新找回這種幾乎死去的語言，好讓自己得以說話。 她有太多要說的事。她還是個嬰兒時，父親就被一名貪婪的地主殺害——被打倒在地，反覆毆打，直到血流乾為止。童年之後，她幾乎沒有過一天好日子。父親死後，家中沒有男人耕田；十九歲時，她被迫出嫁。她拒絕了，跳過婚禮，並在幾年內與丈夫分居，過得還算快樂。當她終於搬進夫家，那完全是一場壓迫。她覺得自己像一隻不會鳴叫、更別說飛翔的小鳥。婆婆在廚房裡盤旋，批評她的菜、向兒子抱怨，而他隨後便「端出一頓打」。他放棄了學業，嘗試務農，而她則在礦場裡搬運石頭。 這種苦澀的女書療癒，激勵她在接下來的二十年間協助學者研究女書。她也接受了「傳承人」的身分，成為家族中最後一位自然學習女書的女性。她甚至結交了一位女書姊妹——一名熱心的年輕學生胡欣——不僅在誦唱練習上指導她，也陪伴她度過離婚的艱難。她們常常手挽著手，走在何園村的街道上。 然而，她心中仍有極深的保留。二十一世紀的女書，已不是她所學的那個樣子。男人如今也找到了利用它的方式，把它變成觀光誘餌。在江永，你可以買到刻著女書（往往拼寫錯誤）的紀念品，只要你買一桶炸雞還會附送一把扇子。在蒲美村，一座氣勢宏偉的女書博物館提供書寫課程。但現在的歌詞變得平淡又漂亮，年輕女性也已大不相同。沒有人再需要理解——正如她如今完全理解的那樣——為什麼她的祖母在書寫那些「螞蟻的字」時，會一再落淚。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Nov 10th 2025 4 min read By Tom Standage, Editor, The World Ahead 2026 This is Donald Trump’s world—we’re all just living in it. The disruptor-in-chief was the biggest factor shaping global affairs in 2025, and that will be the case for as long as he remains in the White House. His norm-shattering approach has caused turmoil in some areas (as in trade) but has also delivered diplomatic results (as in Gaza) and forced necessary change (as with European defence spending). As the Trumpnado spins on in 2026, here are ten trends and themes to watch in the coming year. 1. America’s 250th. Expect to hear wildly diverging accounts of America’s past, present and future, as Republicans and Democrats describe the same country in irreconcilably different terms to mark the 250th anniversary of its founding. Voters will then give their verdict on America’s future in the midterm elections in November. But even if the Democrats take the House, Mr Trump’s rule by bullying, tariffs and executive orders will go on. 2. Geopolitical drift. Foreign-policy analysts are divided: is the world in a new cold war, between blocs led by America and China, or will a Trumpian deal divide the planet into American, Russian and Chinese “spheres of influence”, in which each can do as they please? Don’t count on either. Mr Trump prefers a transactional approach based on instinct, not grand geopolitical paradigms. The old global rules-based order will drift and decay further. But “coalitions of the willing” will strike new deals in areas such as defence, trade and climate. 3. War or peace? Yes. With luck, the fragile peace in Gaza will hold. But conflicts will grind on in Ukraine, Sudan and Myanmar. Russia and China will test America’s commitment to its allies with “grey-zone” provocations in northern Europe and the South China Sea. As the line between war and peace becomes ever more blurred, tensions will rise in the Arctic, in orbit, on the sea floor and in cyberspace. 4. Problems for Europe. All this poses a particular test for Europe. It must increase defence spending, keep America on side, boost economic growth and deal with huge deficits, even though austerity risks stoking support for hard-right parties. It also wants to remain a leading advocate for free trade and greenery. It cannot do all of these at once. A splurge on defence spending may lift growth, but only slightly. 5. China’s opportunity. China has its own problems, with deflation, slowing growth and an industrial glut, but Mr Trump’s “America First” policy opens up new opportunities for China to boost its global influence. It will present itself as a more reliable partner, particularly in the global south, where it is striking a string of trade agreements. It is happy to do tactical deals with Mr Trump on soyabeans or chips. The trick will be to keep relations with America transactional, not confrontational. With rich countries living beyond their means, the risk of a bond-market crisis is growing 6. Economic worries. So far America’s economy is proving more resilient than many expected to Mr Trump’s tariffs, but they will dampen global growth. And with rich countries** living beyond their means**, the risk of a bond-market crisis is growing. Much will depend on the replacement of Jerome Powell as chair of the Federal Reserve in May; politicising the Fed could trigger a market showdown. 7. Concerns over AI. Rampant spending on infrastructure for artificial intelligence may also be concealing economic weakness in America. Will the bubble burst? As with railways, electricity and the internet, a crash would not mean that the technology does not have real value. But it could have wide economic impact. Either way, concern about AI’s impact on jobs, particularly those of graduates, will deepen. 8. A mixed climate picture. Limiting warming to 1.5°C is off the table, and Mr Trump hates renewables. But global emissions have probably peaked, clean tech is booming across the global south and firms will meet or exceed their climate targets—but will keep quiet about it to avoid Mr Trump’s ire. Geothermal energy is worth watching. 9. Sporting values. Sport can always be relied upon to provide a break from politics, right? Well, maybe not in 2026. The football World Cup is being jointly hosted by America, Canada and Mexico, whose relations are strained. Fans may stay away. But the Enhanced Games, in Las Vegas, may be even more controversial: athletes can use performance-enhancing drugs. Is it cheating—or just different? 10. Ozempic, but better. Better, cheaper GLP-1 weight-loss drugs are coming, and in pill form, too. That will expand access. But is taking them cheating? GLP-1s extend the debate about the ethics of performance-enhancing drugs to a far wider group than athletes or bodybuilders. Few people compete in the Olympics. But anyone can take part in the Ozempic games. Wherever you stand on performance-enhancing drugs, I hope you will find The World Ahead 2026 to be a valuable and effective supplement to your media diet, boosting clarity and foresight. 2025 年 11 月 10 日｜4 分鐘閱讀 作者：Tom Standage，《The World Ahead 2026》主編 這是唐納・川普的世界——我們都只是生活在其中而已。這位「破壞式領導人」在 2025 年對全球局勢造成的影響最大，只要他仍在白宮，情況就會如此。他打破慣例的作風在某些領域帶來動盪（如貿易），卻也在其他地方取得外交成果（如加薩），並迫使一些必要的改變（例如歐洲的國防支出）。隨著「川普龍捲風」在 2026 年持續旋轉，以下是明年值得關注的十大趨勢與主題。 1. 美國 250 週年。 你將會聽到共和黨與民主黨對於美國過去、現在與未來截然不同的敘述，幾乎無法調和，以紀念建國 250 週年。選民會在十一月的期中選舉中對美國的未來作出裁決。但即使民主黨奪回眾議院，川普透過施壓、關稅與行政命令的治理方式仍將持續。 2. 地緣政治漂移。 外交政策分析人士意見分歧：世界是否正步入由美國與中國主導的新冷戰，或是會被川普式交易切割成美國、俄羅斯與中國各自為政的「勢力範圍」？兩者都別太指望。川普偏好憑直覺、以交易為導向的方式，而非宏大的地緣政治框架。舊有的全球規則秩序將進一步漂移與衰退，但「志願者聯盟」會在國防、貿易、氣候等領域達成新協議。 3. 戰爭或和平？答案是：兩者皆是。 運氣好的話，加薩脆弱的和平會維持下去。但烏克蘭、蘇丹與緬甸的衝突將持續。俄羅斯與中國會透過「灰色地帶」挑釁來測試美國對盟友的承諾，包括北歐與南海。隨著戰爭與和平的界線愈加模糊，北極、太空軌道、海底與網路空間的緊張局勢會升溫。 4. 歐洲的難題。 上述情勢對歐洲特別是考驗。歐洲必須增加國防預算、維持與美國的關係、提升經濟成長並處理龐大赤字，但緊縮政策又可能推升極右派的支持度。歐洲同時想維持自由貿易與綠色政策的倡導者角色，但不可能一次做到所有事。大幅提升國防開支也許能提振成長，但幅度有限。 5. 中國的機會。 中國面臨通縮、增速放緩與產能過剩等問題，但川普「美國優先」的政策為中國拓展全球影響力帶來新契機。中國將自我定位為更可靠的合作夥伴，尤其是在全球南方，並積極簽署一系列貿易協定。中國樂於與川普在黃豆或晶片等個別議題上做戰術性交易。關鍵在於保持雙邊關係以交易為主，而非走向對抗。 6. 經濟憂慮。 到目前為止，美國經濟面對川普關稅的韌性比許多人預想的更高，但這些關稅終究會拖累全球成長。另外，隨著富裕國家透支生活，債券市場危機的風險正在上升。五月美聯儲主席鮑威爾的接任者將備受關注；若將聯準會政治化，可能引發市場對決。 7. AI 的隱憂。 人工智慧基礎設施的瘋狂投資，可能掩蓋了美國經濟的潛在疲弱。泡沫會破嗎？就像鐵路、電力與網際網路一樣，就算泡沫破裂，也不代表這項科技沒有真正的價值。但它可能帶來廣泛的經濟衝擊。不論如何，大眾對 AI 取代工作、特別是大學生工作的憂慮，將加深。 8. 氣候的複雜局面。 將升溫控制在 1.5°C 已不可能，而川普厭惡再生能源。但全球排放量可能已經見頂，綠色科技在全球南方蓬勃發展，企業也將達成甚至超越其氣候目標——但會低調行事，以避免惹怒川普。地熱能源值得關注。 9. 運動與價值衝突。 運動向來是逃離政治的途徑，不是嗎？2026 年未必如此。足球世界盃由美國、加拿大、墨西哥共同主辦，而三國關係緊張；球迷可能減少前往。但在拉斯維加斯舉辦的「增強運動會」（Enhanced Games）可能更具爭議：選手可以使用提升表現的藥物。這是作弊，還是另一種競賽方式？ 10. 更好的 Ozempic。 更有效、價格更低的 GLP-1 類減重藥物即將問世，還會推出口服版本，讓更多人能使用。但使用這些藥算作弊嗎？GLP-1 讓提升表現藥物的倫理辯論擴大到遠超過運動員或健美者。能參加奧運的人很少，但「Ozempic 競賽」人人都能參加。 無論你對提升表現藥物的看法如何，我希望《The World Ahead 2026》能成為你媒體飲食裡一種有價值且有效的補充品，提升你的清晰度與前瞻視野。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

The hidden risks in Taiwan’s boom A weak-currency policy is punishing consumers and storing up financial risk Taiwan is ENVIED for its exporting prowess: it is home to all of the world’s cutting-edge chipmaking. Just as extraordinary, but much less appreciated, is its towering current-account surplus, the result not just of a trade boom but of a long-undervalued currency. This aided Taiwan’s export-led rise, but it has long outlived its purpose. While manufacturers have been coddled, ordinary Taiwanese consumers have been deprived of the fruits of growth, and financial risks are building up. It is time for Taiwan to loosen its grip on its currency. Taiwan’s vast surpluses have been years in the making. For decades its central bank, known as the cbc, has kept the currency undervalued, giving manufacturing exporters a competitive boost. According to the GDP-adjusted Big Mac index, our measure of how far exchange rates depart from their underlying values, the Taiwan dollar is 55% undervalued against the American dollar—the most in the world. As a consequence, in this century Taiwan has run the world’s biggest current-account surplus as a share of output, once entrepots and petrostates are excluded. And lately, thanks to the artificial-intelligence boom, Taiwan’s imbalances have gone into overdrive. In October its goods-trade surplus hit a record high of 31% of GDP in annualised terms—a quadrupling since the pandemic. According to the latest data for this year, Taiwan’s current-account surplus has reached 16% of gdp. By comparison, China, the archetypal **surplus **economy, is running a current-account surplus of just 3%. The problem with all this is that the cheap currency has become a costly and dangerous anachronism. For a start, it no longer delivers the benefits it once did. Taiwan is no longer an industrialising economy; its annual GDP per person now exceeds that of Japan. Its stock of foreign reserves, at $600bn, is large enough to cushion the impact of a Chinese blockade or a financial crisis. And the best of Taiwan’s chip- and computer-makers, which are responsible for three-quarters of total exports and nearly half of nominal GDP, can shrug off a stronger currency. A 20% appreciation in the Taiwan dollar would knock perhaps eight percentage points off the operating margins of TSMC, the world’s leading chipmaker—still leaving them plumper than Alphabet’s or Apple’s. At the same time, the costs and distortions of having an undervalued currency are mounting. First, it is a tax on consumers. In an economy that depends on imports for food, fuel and goods, the cheap currency has shifted purchasing power from ordinary households to exporters. The result has been that even by export-economy standards, Taiwan saves too much and consumes too little. Since 1998 private consumption as a share of output has tumbled by 20 percentage points. A policy that was meant to help Taiwan get rich is now depriving ordinary Taiwanese. Another distortion is that the cheap currency is inflating property prices. Printing currency to buy foreign exchange has flooded Taiwan’s financial system with liquidity and pushed down interest rates. That combination lies behind a quadrupling of house prices since 1998. And the weak-currency policy has seeded risk deep in the heart of Taiwan’s financial system—a third** distortion.** To recycle the proceeds of its surpluses Taiwan has leant on its life-insurance industry, which has poured nearly $1trn of households’ savings largely into American Treasuries. But that has created a giant currency mismatch, because Taiwan-dollar liabilities are being funded with American-dollar assets. An abrupt move in either currency could wipe out the insurers, threatening a financial crisis. Why, then, has the policy persisted? One reason is the export lobby. Taiwan’s chipmakers could withstand a stronger currency, but existing policy has propped up a cohort of manufacturers that subsist on thin margins and would be severely hurt by an appreciation. Such firms make up perhaps 70% of manufacturing employment. Another reason is the CBC’s unusual power. Printing Taiwan dollars to hoover up foreign-currency assets has minted handsome profits, which are remitted to the government and have become a big source of revenue. Central-bank transfers make up 6% of total government receipts, compared with a rich-world average of 0.4%. This bolsters the CBC’s political authority, allowing its powerful governor to cow critics into submission (something the CBC denies). The situation is becoming increasingly precarious. One risk is that further depreciation in the American dollar destabilises Taiwan’s life insurers, which have become too big to fail. A second danger is that American trade-surplus hawks take flight again, using tariffs and their security leverage to force Taiwan to revalue. That could happen at any time: unlike South Korea, Japan or China, Taiwan has yet to clinch a trade deal with Donald Trump. Fears of such a clash after “Liberation Day” were enough to spark an abrupt 9% appreciation of the currency against the greenback in May. That is why Taiwan must unpick its outdated economic model—and build a better one. The CBC should gradually loosen its grip on the currency. Inevitably, the transition will be fraught with political and financial risks. Manufacturers kept on life-support by Taiwan’s export subsidy will have to scale back or shut down. Too rapid an appreciation could blow up the life-insurance industry. But these risks can be managed. Taipei 101 Taiwan’s government, with gross debt of just 23% of GDP, has room to help retrain laid-off workers. Insurers will suffer losses, but can manage the transition if they are given time. The CBC also has a crucial advantage: gently strengthening a currency is easier than doing the opposite, as Javier Milei is discovering in Argentina. The cbc can always print Taiwan dollars to fend off speculators pre-empting a stronger currency. The key is for the cbc to establish a long-term path for the currency, as Singapore does. China, too, has managed a modest yuan appreciation in recent decades. And in return, ordinary Taiwanese will at last be able to enjoy more of the fruits of their country’s** extraordinary export miracle**. ■ 台灣繁榮背後的隱藏風險 ** 疲弱匯率政策正在懲罰消費者並累積金融風險** 台灣因其出口實力而備受稱羨：它掌握了全球所有最先進的晶片製造技術。同樣非凡但較不被注意的，是其龐大的經常帳順差，這不僅源自貿易熱潮，也歸因於長期被低估的貨幣。這種政策曾助長台灣的出口導向成長，但如今早已不合時宜。製造業者雖受庇護，普通台灣消費者卻被剝奪了成長的果實，而金融風險也正在累積。台灣應是時候放鬆對匯率的控制。 台灣龐大的順差已經累積多年。數十年來，其中央銀行（央行）刻意維持貨幣低估，讓製造業出口商享有競爭優勢。依據經濟學人利用 GDP 調整的巨無霸指數（衡量匯率偏離其基本價值的程度），新台幣相對美元被低估達 55%——為全球最高。 因此，本世紀以來，在剔除轉口國與產油國後，台灣的經常帳順差占 GDP 比重為全球之最。近來拜人工智慧熱潮所賜，台灣的不平衡更達到極致。今年 10 月，其貨物貿易順差在年化計算下達 GDP 的 31%，創下歷史新高——是疫情前的四倍。依據最新資料，今年台灣的經常帳順差達到 GDP 的 16%。相比之下，被視為順差典型國的中國，經常帳順差僅為 3%。 問題在於，這種便宜的匯率已成為昂貴且危險的時代錯誤。首先，它已不再帶來過去的好處。台灣不再是工業化初期的國家；其人均 GDP 已高於日本。其外匯存底高達 6000 億美元，足以緩衝中國封鎖或金融危機的衝擊。而台灣頂尖的晶片與電腦製造商——負責三分之二的出口及近一半的名目 GDP——完全有能力承受較強的匯率。即便新台幣升值 20%，對全球領先的台積電而言，營業利益率或許只會減少約八個百分點，仍將高於 Alphabet 或 Apple 的水準。 同時，低估匯率所造成的成本與扭曲正不斷升高。首先，這相當於對消費者課稅。在高度依賴進口食物、能源與商品的經濟體中，便宜匯率將購買力從家庭移轉至出口商。結果是，即使以出口導向國家來看，台灣的儲蓄仍過高而消費過低。自 1998 年以來，民間消費占 GDP 比重下降了 20 個百分點。這項原本要協助台灣致富的政策，如今反而剝奪了一般民眾的福祉。 另一項扭曲是房價飆漲。為買進外匯而印製新台幣，使台灣金融體系充斥流動性並壓低利率。這個組合促成自 1998 年以來房價的四倍成長。同時，疲弱匯率政策也在台灣金融體系核心埋下風險——第三項扭曲。為了消化龐大的順差，台灣依賴壽險業者，他們將近 1 兆美元的家庭儲蓄主要投入美國公債。然而，這造成巨大的貨幣錯配，因為新台幣負債由美元資產支撐。一旦匯率劇烈變動，可能使保險公司遭受重創，甚至引發金融危機。 那麼，為何此政策仍持續？其一是出口利益集團。晶片製造商雖可承受更強的新台幣，但既有政策卻支撐著一群依賴微薄利潤的製造商，這些企業在升值下將遭受重擊。此類公司約占製造業就業的 70%。另一原因是央行的特殊權力。為購入外匯而印鈔，使央行獲得可觀收益，並繳回政府，成為重要財源。央行移轉收入占政府總收入的 6%，遠高於富裕國家平均的 0.4%。這增強了央行的政治影響力，使其強勢總裁得以壓制批評者（央行否認此說）。 情勢正變得愈發危險。一項風險是美元若進一步走弱，台灣壽險業可能動搖，而它們已經「大到不能倒」。另一個風險是美國再度出現打擊貿易順差的鷹派，利用關稅及安全槓桿逼迫台灣升值。這情況可能隨時發生：與南韓、日本或中國不同，台灣至今仍未與特朗普達成貿易協議。今年「解放日」之後，人們對此可能性的擔憂，便引發新台幣在 5 月對美元突然升值 9%。 因此，台灣必須拆解其過時的經濟模式，並打造更健全的體系。央行應逐步放鬆對匯率的控制。不可避免地，這段過程將伴隨政治與金融風險。那些靠出口補貼維生的製造商將不得不縮編或關閉。升值過快則可能引爆壽險業。但這些風險皆可管理。 台灣政府的優勢在於，其公共債務僅占 GDP 的 23%，有能力協助受影響的勞工再培訓。保險公司雖將承受損失，但若給予時間，仍能完成調整。央行也握有一項關鍵優勢：溫和升值比反向操作容易得多，正如阿根廷的米雷伊（Javier Milei）所體會的。央行隨時可以印鈔，阻止投機者提前押注升值。 關鍵在於，央行應比照新加坡，制定明確的長期匯率路徑。中國過去數十年也曾成功推動人民幣溫和升值。作為回報，普通台灣人終於能享受到其國家驚人成就的更多果實。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

All over the rich world, fewer people are hooking up and shacking up Social media, dating apps and political polarisation all play a part Nov 6th 2025|New York and Singapore|14 min read “I don’t date conservative or moderate men,” says Nancy Anteby, a 30-year-old New Yorker who works in social media. “I only date** liberal **men.” Politics is not her only concern. She is also looking for someone ambitious, with a stable career, who is Jewish and, perhaps most important, shares her desire to start a family. Finding dates who tick all of these boxes is not easy. “Very often a man will disappoint you,” she laments. Then again, she recently realised, “I don’t need to rely on a man to have the life that I dream of.” Ms Anteby is far from unusual. Across America 41% of women and 50% of men in her age band (25-34) were single in 2023, a share that has doubled over the past five decades. Nor is America exceptional in this regard. Between 2010 and 2022 the share of people living alone (an admittedly imperfect measure of singlehood, but one for which data are more widely available) rose in 26 of the 30 members of the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. Marriage rates are falling across much of Asia, including in China and India and especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. And singlehood is accelerating across different age cohorts. In Europe each new generation is less likely to be married or living with a partner than previous ones at the same age (see chart). This relationship recession is hitting not just those wanting to marry or move in with a steady partner, but also those looking for a date or casual sex. Younger people are socialising less, dating less and starting to have sex later in life than previous generations. They are also having less sex in general (as, alas, are most of us). Michael Rosenfeld, a sociologist at Stanford University, has found that the reduction in dating owing to the covid-19 pandemic produced 13.7m more singles in America in 2022 than if the singlehood rate (conservatively defined) had stayed at the level of 2017. To generate an estimate of the global increase in plus-nones, The Economist extrapolated from his data, while also taking into account sharp falls in marriage rates in a number of Asian countries, which predate the pandemic. We calculate that over the past decade such effects have swollen the ranks of single people around the world by at least 100m. Two’s a crowd Dating, sex, marriage and divorce are all intensely personal choices, and their effects are felt most directly by those making them. The fact that more people feel able to choose to be single now than in the past, when there was far greater social and economic pressure to marry, could be considered one of the great emancipations of the past half century. Untold numbers have been liberated from unhappy unions. But not all those who remain single have chosen to do so. A study of singles in 14 countries found that only 40% said they were “not interested in being in a relationship”. A smaller survey of single Americans by the Pew Research Centre in 2019 did find that 50% were not interested in dating. Yet only 27% said they were not dating because they enjoyed being single. The rest gave reasons including being too busy, too old, or because no one would want to date them. No less than 34% of singles in the 14-country study said they did not want to be alone but found it “difficult to attract a mate”, with 26% describing themselves as “between relationships”. In short, there are growing numbers of lonely hearts, pining for a partner but unable to secure one. Don’t want a ring on it There is an alarming mismatch in this regard between women and men. In the Pew survey, 62% of single women did not want to date, whereas only 37% of single men felt the same way. America and South Korea, among other countries, have big, vocal movements of young men who feel they have been unfairly deprived of romantic opportunities. All over the world, a high proportion of unmarried young men is strongly associated with elevated levels of violence and crime. Even relatively small shifts in coupling rates, when multiplied across a whole population, can have far-reaching effects on society as a whole. The biggest impact will be on fertility rates, since married women tend to have more children than single ones. This will be especially marked in East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, where only 2-4% of babies are born to unmarried mothers. All the world over, however, the rise of singlehood will be a further drag on already slowing birth rates. The effects will also be felt in property markets (more demand for housing, since more people will be living alone) and government finances (less public spending on maternity wards and schools and, in time, more on care homes). The fact that a large proportion of single people would rather be in a relationship (whether they are still looking for one or have given up hope) suggests that either there is some sort of dating-market failure that is preventing compatible people from finding one another, or that society is changing in ways that are making large numbers of singles incompatible. In practice, it seems to be a bit of both. In Asia, where singlehood is growing fastest, a mix of structural and cultural changes is increasing incompatibility. Start with demography. China’s one-child policy has created a huge imbalance in the ratio of men to women. When it comes to those of peak marriageable age, the country will have 119 men for every 100 women by 2027. In all, there may be 30m-50m “excess men” in China, reckons Xiaoling Shu of the University of California, Davis. Singlehood in China, like most places, is not evenly distributed. Instead, it is disproportionately concentrated among men who are poorer and poorly educated, and thus less attractive as mates, and among highly educated women (of which more later). China’s one-child policy makes it an outlier, but heterosexual men in other countries with a strong cultural preference for sons will also struggle to find partners. Sex-selective abortions resulted in 111 boys being born in India in 2011 for every 100 girls, according to census data. The natural ratio is about 105. Although the distortion has since become less extreme, we calculate that around 20m more boys than girls were born in India in 2000-15. Improved opportunities for women to go to university and enter the workplace are also fuelling the growth in singlehood in East Asia, argues Wei-Jun Jean Yeung of the National University of Singapore. As women gain financial independence, they no longer need a husband to support them. They also have more to lose by getting married. “There’s still a culture of patriarchy in Asia where women carry most of the responsibilities of caring for children and domestic housework,” says Dr Yeung. “The opportunity cost of getting married may be high: women think that if they get married they may have to give up working to take care of their in-laws, parents and children, plus do housework.” One result of this is that well-educated women are also disproportionately likely to be single in a number of Asian countries. “The best-educated, urban, college-educated women are becoming more egalitarian in their gender attitudes,” says Dr Shu of women in China. “Many college-educated men are hostile towards feminist ideas or even feminists…[they] think these women are hurting their prospects and interests at a personal level.” In South Korea the gap between women’s opportunities and men’s sexist expectations is particularly wide. Around half of young Korean men think they are discriminated against (other than having to do military service, they are not). Some 60% complain that feminism demeans them. They also tend to be terrible slouches when it comes to housework. Little wonder, then, that ambitious young women are far less keen on marriage than they are. A similar pattern of singlehood pertains in America and Europe, despite their less ingrained gender roles. Until roughly the middle of the 20th century, far more men went to university than women. As a result there were far more couples in which the man was better educated than the other way round. More recently, however, women have surpassed men in studiousness. Across the OECD on average 51% of women aged 25-34 had a university degree in 2019, compared with 39% of men. That makes the old pattern impossible to sustain. “Highly educated women who still want to marry up won’t find enough candidates,” says Albert Esteve, the director of the Centre for Demographic Studies in Barcelona. “So the question is, are they going to start marrying down?” If mathematics were the only driving force, rather than cultural norms, there would have been a big rise in the share of couples where the woman is better educated. Yet the expectation that women should marry up is hard to dispel. Researchers in Germany, for example, found that highly educated women over the age of 30 were more likely to remain single than settle for a man with less education. There is some evidence that more women are beginning to marry down in terms of education, but it is not happening to nearly the degree that might have been expected. What is more, Mr Esteve has found that educated women are “picking the best non-educated men” by coupling with those who earn more than they do. In effect, they are simply switching from one form of marrying up to another. Educated women’s hesitance to marry down is not wholly irrational. In a number of countries, men are not adapting well to changing times. In Australia, for example, those who earn less than their female partners are more likely to beat or berate them. But people can change. A study in America found that marriages where the woman is better educated than the man were more likely to break down among older cohorts, but not among younger ones. Changes in relative levels of education explain some of the increase in singlehood in Western countries, but not all of it. Another part of the explanation lies in technology, and the huge shifts it has brought in how people meet their mates. For about 60 years after the end of the second world war, the most common way that heterosexual couples met was through friends, according to a study published in 2019 by Mr Rosenfeld and colleagues. But after the introduction of smartphones in the late 2000s, the proportion who met online surged. In 2013 that became the most common way for couples to get together. Yet online dating is fundamentally different from the old-fashioned sort. When looking for a date, Kristian Del Rosario, a 27-year-old lawyer who lives in New York City, is able to winnow down matches on Hinge, a popular app, using all manner of criteria. She looks at a man’s age (no more than six years older than her, but “beggars can’t be choosers”), job, religion, political views, whether they smoke marijuana (“I cross them off”) and how tall they are, which is important to her. “I’m five-six and I’ve literally had men who were like five-five, who tried to match with me,” she says. “Well, that’s definitely not happening.” People have always been finicky when choosing a long-term mate, at least when sober. But social media and online dating have turbo-charged pickiness, allowing people to filter candidates not just for the sorts of things that have always been important (age, religion, ethnicity and education), but also for all sorts of other attributes, such as their political views or narcotic preferences, not to mention their height and weight. One consequence is that many people now lie: researchers in Germany found that online daters claim to be a little taller and a little less overweight than the average person. Another is that many struggle to find dates. Reporting in the Wall Street Journal suggests that most women on Bumble, an online dating app, screen out all men who are less than six feet tall. That rules out about 85% of men at a stroke. To be sure, women have long tended to prefer taller men—but not to such an extreme. Most young British women say that kindness, honesty and a sense of humour are far more important in a partner than looks, according to polling by Ipsos. So why do so many online daters write off all kind, honest, funny men of average height? Part of the answer is found in online and social-media cultures that promote unrealistic ideals. In the “manosphere”, online communities united by the idea that men are oppressed, young “incels” (involuntarily celibate men) complain that women are selfish and manipulative for not sleeping with them. Misogynistic social-media influencers such as Andrew Tate advise them to become hyper-masculine and to dominate women. Women have their own (less nasty) version of this echo chamber. Some vet potential dates on private social-media forums where others post the names and pictures of men they say have cheated on them or are abusive. That may help make dating safer, but some women use them simply to complain about bad dates or men who spurned them. This can be off-putting for the 41% of women who say they often come across videos or social-media posts in which women share negative dating experiences. It is also daunting for men, who are afraid of asking women out in case they are publicly shamed, says Daniel Cox of the Survey Centre on American Life, part of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank. Some social-media personalities with big followings create unrealistic expectations about courtship, says Sabrina Zohar, a dating coach based in Los Angeles with 1.3m followers on TikTok. She charges clients $9,999 for a three-month membership, during which she feels obliged to spell out such basic principles as, “If somebody doesn’t text you every day, it doesn’t mean that they don’t like you.” Unrealistic expectations are probably as old as dating and relationships, but a generation of young people who have grown up with personalised music playlists and online entertainment may be less willing to set their preferences aside. “You can filter your news feeds, right? You can curate your online life,” says Mr Cox. “How easy is it to do that when you’re thinking about prospective relationships?” That also extends to ideology. As men have drifted to the right and women have become more liberal in America and parts of Europe, politics is getting in the way of pillow-talk, he says. Wedded to devices New technology not only fosters pickiness about whom to date, it also absorbs a lot of time, leaving less for socialising and group activities—tried-and-tested ways of meeting partners. In America the amount of time 15-to-24-year-olds spend hanging out face-to-face has fallen by more than a quarter over the past decade, whereas the amount of time spent gaming has increased by about half (and nearly doubled for young men). Time spent streaming, surfing or gaming even seems to be displacing sex. Almost everywhere in the rich world people are having sex less often than before, and many more are having none at all. Brits aged 18-44, for instance, have gone from copulating five times a month in 1990 to twice a month in 2021, notes Soazig Clifton of University College London. Researchers have posited, variously, that this is because they are too busy, more stressed, are watching porn instead, or are simply distracted by Netflix. As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes more adept, growing numbers of people are turning to it, rather than humans, for intimate relationships. People who spend their late teens and 20s watching television, playing computer games or chatting with AIs may be reducing their chances of ever finding a mate, since they are missing their best chance to hone their dating skills and learn how to weather the ups and downs of relationships. “Dating is really not like riding a bike,” says Mr Rosenfeld. “You need constant practice to be good at it and if you are out of practice for a while, it’s harder.” In other words, singlehood, which is already reshaping Western society, is likely to keep growing for some time to come, with all the consequences—good and bad—that it entails. At some point it will surely plateau, but it shows no signs of doing so yet. Until recently, demographers had thought that, once men’s attitudes caught up with women’s emancipation, a new equilibrium would be reached. “Men would do a bit of cleaning and housework to be attractive, and happy families would be produced again,” says Mr Esteve. Yet even in egalitarian Scandinavia, he notes, “regardless of how beautiful are the men”, marriage and fertility rates are still falling. “Why is this happening?” he asks. It is the 100m plus-nones question. ■ 全世界富裕國家中，越來越多人不交往、不同居 社群媒體、交友軟體與政治對立，都扮演了重要角色 2025 年 11 月 6 日｜紐約、新加坡｜閱讀時間 14 分鐘 「我不跟保守派或中間派男性約會。」30 歲、在紐約從事社群媒體工作的南希·安特比（Nancy Anteby）這麼說。「我只跟自由派的男人約會。」 她的條件不只政治立場。她希望對方有上進心、穩定工作、是猶太人，最重要的是，願意和她一起組家庭。要找到符合這些條件的人並不容易。「很多時候男人會讓你失望。」她感嘆。但她最近也發現：「就算沒有男人，我也能過上自己想要的生活。」 安特比並不特別。美國 25～34 歲的人中，2023 年有 41% 的女性與 50% 的男性是單身，這比例在五十年間幾乎翻倍。 這現象也不只出現在美國。2010～2022 年間，在 OECD 30 個主要富裕國家中，有 26 國的獨居人口增加。亞洲的結婚率也大幅下降，包括中國、印度，尤其是日本、韓國與台灣。 不只追求婚姻或同居的人受到影響，連只是想談戀愛或尋求性關係的人也愈來愈少。年輕人社交變少、約會變少、開始發生性行為的年齡更晚，整體行為次數也都大幅下降。 史丹佛大學社會學家羅森菲爾德（Michael Rosenfeld）發現，疫情造成的約會減少，使美國 2022 年約多出 1370 萬名單身者。 《經濟學人》根據此資料並考量多個亞洲國家婚姻率下降後推估，過去十年間，全球至少增加 1 億名單身者。 兩個人的世界，也可能變得擁擠 戀愛、性、婚姻與離婚都是個人選擇，影響最直接的是當事人。如今更多人能自由選擇單身，而非因社會壓力被迫結婚，這對許多人來說是一種解放。但並非所有單身者都「想」單身。對 14 國的研究顯示，只有 40% 的單身者說他們不想進入關係。 2019 年美國皮尤調查也發現，50% 的單身美國人不想約會；但真正因「喜歡單身」而不約會的只有 27%。其他人則是太忙、太老，或覺得沒人會想跟他們交往。 在 14 國研究中，有 34% 單身者表示不想孤單，但「難以吸引對象」；26% 說自己「正在兩段關係之間」。 總結來說，想要伴侶卻找不到的人越來越多。 男與女的期待差距正急速擴大 在皮尤研究中，62% 的單身女性不想約會，但同意的男性只有 37%。 一些國家（如美國、韓國）甚至出現一大群覺得自己被「剝奪戀愛機會」的男性團體。而全球統計顯示，未婚男性比例過高常與暴力與犯罪上升相關。即使是交往率的小變化，擴大到整個人口後，也會造成巨大影響。 其中最大效應是 生育率下降——已婚女性通常比單身女性更常生育。 對日本、韓國這種未婚生子極少（僅 2–4%）的國家影響更大。 此外，更多人獨居後，也會影響房市（更大量的小宅需求）、公共預算（托嬰與學校需求下降，但長照需求上升）。 許多想脫單的人之所以無法，是因為： 1. 交友市場失靈，讓適合的人找不到彼此 2. 社會變化加劇了人與人之間的不相容性 實際上，兩者同時發生。 亞洲：人口失衡與傳統文化，使單身潮更嚴重 首先是人口結構。中國的一胎化讓男女性比例嚴重失衡。到 2027 年，中國適婚年齡層中，每 100 名女性竟有 119 名男性。 整體而言，中國可能有 3000–5000 萬名「多餘的男人」——大多來自較貧困、教育程度較低的背景，不易找到配偶。 高度受教育的女性也更常保持單身。 印度也有類似情況。2011 年印度每 100 名女生出生就有 111 名男生。雖然情況略改善，2000–2015 年間仍多出生了約 2000 萬名男性，未來同樣會面臨婚配問題。同時，越來越多亞洲女性受高等教育並投入職場，經濟獨立後就不再需要靠婚姻生活。 但婚姻對女性的「代價」仍然很高： 她們常得承擔照顧公婆、父母與小孩的責任，外加大部分家務。 因此許多女性認為「結婚＝失去自由、職涯停滯」。 在中國、韓國等地，受高等教育的女性反而最不願結婚。 原因之一是：許多大學畢業男性仍抱持傳統、甚至反女權觀念，認為女性進步「損害」了他們的利益。 在韓國，情況更極端： · 一半年輕男性覺得自己被歧視 · 60% 認為女權主義貶低男性 · 男性在家務分擔上極度不均 難怪許多有抱負的女性更不願意結婚。 西方：教育、文化與科技，使配對更困難 在歐美，雖然性別角色較平等，但單身率也快速上升。 其中一個原因是教育。女性的受教育程度已全面超越男性。2019 年在 OECD，25–34 歲女性中 51% 有大學學歷，男性只有 39%。 傳統「男方學歷較高」的婚配模式因此無法維持。 理論上，女性應該開始願意「嫁給學歷較低但其他條件不錯的男人」。 然而研究發現，許多高學歷女性寧願保持單身，也不願降低標準。有些女性的確開始「學歷下嫁」，但比例遠比預期低。 而且即便如此，她們通常還是會選「收入比自己高的男性」——換句話說，從「學歷門當戶對」轉成「收入門當戶對」。 在一些國家，收入較低的男性對伴侶較容易有攻擊、貶低等行為，這也讓女性更猶豫。然而新研究顯示，年輕世代的「女高男低」婚姻，其實不一定比較容易破裂。 教育差異能解釋部分單身潮，但遠遠不是全部。 科技重塑了人們相遇的方式：更挑剔、更孤立 在二戰後的 60 年間，異性戀情侶最常透過朋友介紹而相識。但智慧型手機普及後，網路交友迅速崛起。 2013 年起，網路成為人們最主要的交友方式。 但網路交友跟傳統交往方式完全不同。 以 27 歲的紐約律師德爾羅薩里奧（Kristian Del Rosario）為例，她在 Hinge 上篩選對象的條件非常細：年齡、工作、宗教、政治立場、是否用大麻、身高…… 「我 5 呎 6（約 168 公分），很多 5 呎 5（165 公分）的男生想跟我配對——不可能。」 人們本來挑剔，但科技讓「挑剔」變成系統化。 不只基本條件，就連政治理念、使用什麼毒品、身高體重，都能瞬間排除。 許多人因此美化自己的個資，以免被刷掉。 有報導指出，Bumble 上大多數女性直接排除身高不足 6 呎（183 公分）的男性——一下就淘汰了約 85% 的男性。 雖然女性一向偏好高個子，但並沒有到這麼極端的地步。 同時，網路和社群文化也製造了不切實際的想像： · 男性圈子裡（manosphere）充斥抱怨女性不給機會的聲音 · 女性圈子裡則有私密社群公開「黑名單」 這些現象都讓人更害怕踏出第一步。 此外，花大量時間在滑手機、追劇、打遊戲，也大幅壓縮了社交和面對面互動的時間。 過去十年，美國 15–24 歲的面對面相處時間下降超過四分之一，遊戲時間則幾乎翻倍。 性行為頻率也在下降，某些人甚至轉向 AI 建立「親密關係」。 年輕時不練習社交與約會技能，未來要脫單的難度只會更高。 羅森菲爾德說：「約會不像騎腳踏車。你不練就會退步。」 單身潮短期內不會停止 單身正重新塑造西方社會，而且短期內看不出頂峰。 原本學者以為，隨著男性態度逐漸調整、與女性更平權後，會恢復平衡。 但即使在北歐等最平等的地方，婚姻與生育仍不斷下降。 這讓人口學家不禁問：「這到底是怎麼回事？」 答案，正是那個價值上百萬、遍布全球的—— 「1 億單身者」之謎。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Hong Kongers support gay marriage. Their leaders, not so much The city has rejected** reform** even as other places in Asia embrace it Nov 6th 2025|Hong Kong|3 min read In 2023 Hong Kong’s highest court ordered the city’s government to introduce rules offering a degree of legal recognition to unions between people of the same sex. That Hong Kong had no legal framework relating to civil partnerships, it argued, contravened freedoms enshrined in the city’s Bill of Rights. The justices ruled that this problem had to be remedied by the end of October 2025. That deadline has just come and gone—and with much less effect than campaigners had hoped. In September, as the deadline approached, Hong Kong’s executive asked lawmakers to vote on a bill that would have granted limited rights to gay couples who got married or entered into civil partnerships abroad. Yet the proposal was roundly rejected, with 71 of 87 lawmakers voting against it. The city’s government now says that it will protect same-sex partnerships using** “administrative measures”**. Hong Kongers are sceptical: “It’s difficult to see how a mere administrative framework can deal with the legal inequalities,” says Azan Marwah, a barrister. The handful of lawmakers who supported the bill argued that greater recognition of same-sex marriages would help reinforce Hong Kong’s claim to be an open and cosmopolitan world city. The dissenters pushed back; they argued that the bill could subvert “traditional values” and teach children that homosexuality is “normal”. Some have framed homosexuality as a Western import. “It is all misleading information that [the public have] been receiving,” says Donald, a gay man. “But unfortunately, we do not have a voice or a platform to let people know that these are all just lies.” Ordinary Hong Kongers are more supportive of gay rights than debates among their politicians might suggest. A survey in 2023 found that 60% of them support same-sex marriage, a big increase from only 38% a decade ago. Some of the city’s insurance companies have started to let gay people register partners on their life-insurance policies. The territory has hosted LGBT-friendly events such as the Gay Games, a sporting event, and Pink Dot, a festival similar to gay-pride gatherings in the West. Yet although most Hong Kongers are happy to know people from sexual minorities, says Priscilla, a trans woman, “if one of your family members is LGBT, this would be a disaster.” Civil-society groups that have worked to change perceptions and to stand up for the rights of sexual minorities have found it much harder to operate since China forced Hong Kong to pass a sweeping national-security law in 2020 (China’s Communist Party likes to promote “traditional” family values and is anyway deeply suspicious of any interest group that it cannot control). Activists say Hong Kong’s government has recently withdrawn financial support for LGBT-friendly events and rejected requests to hold them in public spaces. Nowadays politicians “look up north” to decide what policies to support, says Tim, a gay Hong Konger. “They don’t want to do anything progressive, because they don’t know what Beijing would think.” Many Asian countries stigmatise or even criminalise same-sex relationships. But things have been improving in parts of the continent: in January Thailand became the third Asian country to legalise same-sex marriage, after Taiwan and Nepal. All this amplifies frustration among Hong Kongers, who sense their lawmakers are growing less likely to take a similar step. Many LGBT people in the city think they are unlikely to see change within their lifetimes. But “you have to push with whatever freedom you have,” says Donald. “That is the only way we can get people to understand who we are, and accept us.” ■ 香港人支持同性婚姻，但領導人卻不太願意 城市拒絕改革，亞洲其他地方卻在前進 2025年11月6日｜香港｜閱讀時間約3分鐘 2023年，香港最高法院要求政府推出某種形式的法律，給予同性伴侶一定程度的法律承認。法官指出，香港完全沒有任何有關民事伴侶的法律制度，這違反了《香港人權法案》所保障的自由。法院裁定，政府必須在2025年10月底前解決這個問題。如今期限已經過了，但結果卻讓支持者非常失望。 隨著期限逼近，政府在9月提出一項法案，打算讓在海外結婚或登記民事伴侶的同性伴侶，在香港能獲得有限的權利。不過，這個提案被立法會以87票中的71票否決。政府現在表示，會用「行政措施」來保障同性伴侶。不過，香港人並不太相信這種說法。「很難想像光靠行政手段就能解決法律上的不平等，」大律師馬亞然（Azan Marwah）說。 支持法案的少數議員認為，更廣泛地承認同性婚姻，能夠加強香港作為一個開放、國際化城市的形象。但反對者則說，這會破壞「傳統價值」，甚至讓孩子以為同性戀是「正常的」。有些人還把同性戀說成是「西方輸入」的東西。「這些都是誤導性的資訊，」一名同性戀者唐納（Donald）說，「但可惜的是，我們沒有發聲的平台，讓大家知道這些其實都是謊言。」 事實上，普通香港人對同性戀的接受程度，比政客之間的辯論所顯示的要高得多。2023年的一項調查顯示，六成香港人支持同性婚姻，比十年前的38%大幅上升。部分保險公司也開始讓同性伴侶可以登記為受益人。香港也舉辦過多場LGBT友善活動，例如同志運動會（Gay Games）以及類似西方同志遊行的Pink Dot活動。 不過，跨性別女性Priscilla說：「雖然大家都說可以接受身邊有同志朋友，但如果家人其中一個是同志，那就變成災難了。」自從中國在2020年強迫香港通過《國安法》後，很多民間團體推動性小眾權益的活動變得困難許多。（中國共產黨強調「傳統家庭價值」，而且對任何它無法掌控的團體都非常警惕。） 有活動人士說，香港政府最近撤回對同志友善活動的資金支持，甚至拒絕讓他們在公共空間舉辦活動。同志人士Tim說：「現在的政客都『向北看』，他們不敢推動任何進步的政策，因為不知道北京會怎麼想。」 許多亞洲國家仍然歧視甚至刑罰同性戀關係，但部分地區情況已開始改善。今年1月，泰國成為繼台灣和尼泊爾之後第三個合法化同性婚姻的亞洲國家。這讓香港人更感到沮喪——因為他們的政府似乎越來越不可能跟上。 許多香港的同志覺得，在自己有生之年恐怕看不到真正的改變。不過，唐納說：「你還是要盡量去爭取，只要還有一點自由，就要繼續努力。因為這是唯一能讓人了解、接受我們的方式。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

What is Taiwan’s plan B? It is starting to hedge against the risk that America abandons it Oct 23rd 2025|Taipei|6 min read Officials in Taiwan were quietly optimistic when Donald Trump was re-elected. Among his advisers were several diehard China hawks determined that America stand by its vow to help Taiwan defend itself against any attack from the Chinese mainland. Taiwanese diplomats and military commanders also recalled Mr Trump’s first term, when he increased arms sales and official contacts with the island. Besides, Taiwan has a “silicon shield”: it is home to the world’s biggest producer of the semiconductors that are used by America’s AI industry. Less than a year later, Taiwan is confronting one of its deepest fears: what happens if America abandons it? Officially, American policy has not changed. But Mr Trump is preoccupied with negotiating a trade deal with China that could also encompass Taiwan. He hinted at that in May by suggesting that such a deal would be “great for unification and peace”. Although American officials later walked that back, Mr Trump jangled nerves in Taiwan again on October 19th by saying that he expected to discuss the island in a planned meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in South Korea at the end of October. And these are not the only shocks. Mr Trump has hit Taiwan with steeper trade tariffs than those he has imposed on Japan and South Korea; demanded that the island increase defence spending to 10% of GDP (from 2.5% last year); and asked TSMC, its chipmaking giant, to move much of its production to America. Other troubling signs include his putting off planned stopovers in America by Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, and failing to approve new arms sales to the island. Meanwhile, most of the China hawks have been purged from his administration, giving way to isolationist officials who want to secure the American homeland at all cost. And Chinese officials have been pressing long-standing demands for America to water down its commitment to Taiwan, possibly by explicitly opposing any move to declare formal independence. Taiwan’s government says its relationship with America remains strong. In recent weeks, however, Taiwanese officials have been scrambling to adjust their public messaging, private diplomacy, economic policy and defence planning in response to these developments. Their primary aim is to convince Mr Trump to sustain America’s commitment to Taiwan. But they are also starting to hedge against the risk that he makes a strategic “grand bargain” with Mr Xi at the island’s expense. The shift was evident in President Lai’s national-day address on October 10th. His remarks on mainland China were notably restrained. Since Mr Lai took office in 2024 he has made a series of public comments that have angered China and unnerved some American officials, including in last year’s national-day address. China has staged large military exercises in response, accusing Mr Lai of separatism and warning that he was “playing with fire”. This time, Mr Lai trod gingerly, apparently to avoid disrupting Mr Trump’s trade talks. Another contrast with last year’s address was Mr Lai’s pledge to boost defence spending. He vowed to increase it to more than 3% of GDP in 2026 and to 5% by 2030. He also unveiled plans to build an air-defence system called “T-Dome” over Taiwan. And he pledged to supplement regular defence spending with a “special defence budget” later this year. Although that may struggle to get through parliament, officials say it could be worth as much as $33bn and that a lot of it could be spent on American weapons. Those plans are part of an effort to convince Mr Trump that Taiwan is investing in its own defence. And the way they were presented reflects a recognition that previous lobbying in America was too geared towards China hawks whose influence is fading. Even the branding of “T-Dome” was meant to get Mr Trump’s attention by encouraging comparisons to his “Golden Dome” missile-defence system. Mr Lai also took the unusual step of appearing on a popular American right-wing radio show on October 7th. Not only did he tout his defence plans: he said Mr Trump should win a Nobel peace prize if he got Mr Xi to abandon the use of force against Taiwan. Shortly afterwards, Mr Lai met Matt Schlapp, a right-wing American political activist (Taiwan’s top military think-tank had invited him to visit Taipei). While this charm offensive plays out, Mr Lai has been quietly** boosting defence ties with partners other than America**. In his national-day address he said his government would “collaborate with the military industries of advanced nations”. Taiwanese officials are reluctant to be more specific, citing the risk that China penalises countries involved. But the focus is on drones and such “asymmetric” capabilities. And the outreach appears to have focused on Europe of late, as countries there increase their own defence spending in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. European governments and companies were somewhat better represented than usual at Taiwan’s biggest defence show in September. Germany’s trade office in Taipei took part for the first time; it set up a pavilion showcasing four German firms. Airbus turned up, too; it showed off a tactical aerial drone. In Poland that same month, a Taiwanese defence-industry delegation agreed with Polish and Ukrainian counterparts to co-operate in manufacturing aerial drones. European and other non-American partners are unlikely to provide Taiwan with big-ticket weapons, given the risk of Chinese recriminations. But there is scope for discreet co-operation between defence companies. Taiwan is an alternative supplier of high-tech electronic components for countries trying to become less reliant on China, including in the defence sector, says Lai Chun-kuei of the Taiwanese government’s Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology. In exchange, Taiwan wants technology and expertise to help build its own capabilities. Some critics say all this is too little, too late. Even if Mr Trump and his supporters approve of Taiwan’s defence spending, they have deeper differences with the island’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party on issues such as gender, green energy and the death penalty, says Alexander Huang, a former envoy in Washington for the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Mr Lai’s defence-spending plans could also face resistance between now and the island’s next presidential election in 2028. Cheng Li-wun, who was chosen as the KMT’s new leader on October 18th, is opposed to boosting the defence budget. Certainly none of these plans is sufficient to compensate should American security guarantees vanish. The hope in Taiwan, though, is not that it can find a substitute for America. It is that it can bolster its own capabilities just enough to keep Mr Xi convinced that the costs of an invasion, even if successful, outweigh the benefits. Without America, that may not be achievable. But there is no other good plan B. ■ 當美國拋棄台灣時：台灣的「B計畫」是什麼？ —— 台灣開始為「美國可能不再挺台」做準備 2025年10月23日｜台北｜約6分鐘閱讀 當川普再次當選美國總統時，台灣官員其實一開始還頗為樂觀。因為他的顧問團隊裡有幾位堅定的「反中鷹派」，主張美國應履行承諾，協助台灣抵禦來自中國大陸的攻擊。許多台灣外交與軍方人士也記得川普第一任期時，他曾增加對台軍售與官方往來。此外，台灣擁有所謂的「矽盾」—— 全世界最大半導體製造商就設在台灣，而美國的人工智慧產業仰賴這些晶片。 但不到一年，台灣便面臨最深的恐懼：如果美國真的拋棄台灣，該怎麼辦？ 表面上，美國的對台政策並未改變，但川普如今正全力推動與中國的貿易協議，而台灣問題似乎也在其中。他今年5月曾暗示，這樣的協議「有助於統一與和平」。雖然美國官員事後急忙澄清，但10月19日，川普又表示他預計月底在南韓與習近平會面時，會「討論台灣問題」，再度讓台北神經緊繃。 而這並不是唯一的警訊。川普對台灣祭出的貿易關稅比日本、南韓更高；他要求台灣將國防預算從去年的GDP 2.5%一口氣提高到10%；還要求台積電把大部分生產線搬到美國。此外，他推遲了賴清德總統原訂的美國過境行程，也遲遲未批准新的對台軍售案。 更糟的是，川普政府中的多位「挺台鷹派」已被撤換，取而代之的是一群「美國優先」的孤立主義官員，強調要不惜一切保護美國本土安全。同時，中國方面也持續施壓，要求美方在對台立場上「鬆綁」，甚至希望美國明確表態反對台灣任何形式的「法理獨立」。 儘管台灣政府對外仍強調「台美關係堅若磐石」，但近來可以明顯看出，台北正加緊調整其公開發言、外交策略、經濟政策與國防布局，以因應新局。主要目的是想說服川普維持美國對台的安全承諾，同時也要為最壞的情況——川普與習近平達成「大交易」犧牲台灣——預做準備。 這樣的轉變在賴清德10月10日的國慶演說中尤為明顯。相較去年，他談論中國的語氣顯得格外克制。自2024年上任以來，賴清德曾多次發表讓北京不滿、讓部分美國官員不安的言論，去年國慶演說後更引來中國大規模軍演，指控他是「頑固的分裂分子」。但今年，他明顯收斂，顯然是為了避免干擾川普的對中談判。 與去年相比，賴清德也在演說中宣布要大幅提升國防預算。他承諾2026年將提高至GDP的3%以上，2030年達到5%。同時，他宣布啟動名為「T-Dome」的全島防空系統計畫，並將在年底提出特別國防預算，估計規模可達330億美元，主要用於購買美國武器。 這些舉措旨在向川普展示：台灣願意自我防衛、分擔責任。甚至「T-Dome」這個名稱，也刻意呼應川普任內的「黃金圓頂」（Golden Dome）飛彈防禦系統，好讓他印象深刻。 賴清德甚至在10月7日罕見地登上美國右翼廣播節目，強調台灣的防衛努力，並稱如果川普能讓習近平放棄武力犯台，「那他值得拿諾貝爾和平獎」。之後，他還會見了美國保守派政治人物馬特・施拉普（Matt Schlapp），這是由台灣國防智庫邀請他訪台。 在積極拉攏美方的同時，賴清德也悄悄強化與其他國家的防務合作。他在國慶演說中提到，台灣將「與先進國家的軍工產業合作」。台灣官員對細節三緘其口，以免引來中國報復，但外界普遍認為重點在於無人機與「非對稱作戰」能力，最近則特別著眼於歐洲。 歐洲國家因應俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，國防支出大幅增加，也讓台歐互動升溫。九月舉行的台灣國防展上，歐洲代表團規模明顯擴大。德國經濟辦事處首度設立展區，展示四家德國企業；空中巴士（Airbus）也到場展示戰術無人機。同月，在波蘭，台灣代表團與波蘭、烏克蘭的國防業者簽署合作協議，共同生產無人機。 雖然歐洲與其他非美國夥伴不太可能提供台灣大型武器，以免激怒北京，但雙方在軍工企業層面的低調合作仍有空間。台灣本身也能為歐洲提供高科技電子零件，幫助他們降低對中國的依賴；作為交換，台灣希望獲得技術與專業，強化自己的軍工實力。 然而，也有批評者認為這一切為時已晚。前駐美代表、現任國民黨要角黃介正指出，即使川普陣營欣賞台灣提升國防支出，他們在性別議題、綠能政策與死刑等價值觀上，與民進黨仍存在深刻分歧。新任國民黨主席鄭麗文（10月18日當選）也公開反對提高國防預算。 可以肯定的是，這些措施都不足以彌補若失去美國安全保障所造成的缺口。但台灣的希望並非要找到取代美國的選項，而是要讓中國相信：即便能攻下台灣，代價也將高到不值得。 若沒有美國的支持，這目標恐怕難以實現。 但除了這條路，台灣也沒有更好的「B計畫」。 ■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

United States | Build, baby, build California tries to fix its housing mess The YIMBY movement wins a big victory Oct 14th 2025|Los Angeles|4 min read ONE OF THE most contentious and consequential housing reforms in California’s history was almost sunk by a former reality-TV star. American millennials might remember Spencer Pratt as the blonde bad boy they loved to hate on “The Hills”, an MTV show that chronicled the life of hot, young Angelenos in the noughties. More recently Mr Pratt has taken to podcasting from the empty lot where his home once stood. It burned in the Palisades Fire this year. He spreads the blame around. Gavin Newsom (the governor of California) and Karen Bass (the mayor of Los Angeles) are frequent targets. Mr Pratt also gets wonky. In a recent Instagram video he told fans to call Mr Newsom’s* office to* urge him to veto a housing bill: SB 79. SB 79 rezones state land around busy public-transport stops to allow for taller residential buildings. It also slaps hefty fines on cities that try to deny such buildings a permit. It was amended more than a dozen times to appease rural lawmakers, unions and tenants-rights groups—and it still barely passed the legislature. The bill spent weeks on the governor’s desk, which gave his pro-housing allies the willies and Mr Pratt some hope. But on October 10th Mr Newsom signed the law and delivered a huge win to the ascendantYIMBY (Yes In My Backyard) movement. The passage of SB 79 and more than 40 other housing reforms this year could be a turning point for a state that is crippled by its self-inflicted(自食惡果的)housing shortage. “The cost of inaction is simply too high,” wrote Mr Newsom upon signing the bill. He is right. Housing policy is not just a topic that “abundance bros”—Democratic thinkers who say their party needs to be more growth-friendly—debate on podcasts (though they do a lot of that). Building more homes is integral to California maintaining its political heft and again becoming a place where people want to live. The median sale price of **residential properties **in California is higher than in any other state. People are moving to cheaper places, and that exodus has become a political problem for Democrats. The Golden State could lose at least three congressional seats (and electoral votes) in the next reapportionment after the 2030 census. “Democrats need to be willing to say no to NIMBYs and to city councils that are yelling at them,” Scott Wiener, the bill’s author, told The Economist earlier this year. Mr Newsom, a Democrat, was also surely aware that he would have been labelled a hypocrite had he given in to pressure to veto the bill. The governor has consistently pushed to streamline the permitting process and to build more homes. (He even invited some of those abundance bros on his own podcast.) Mr Newsom’s record in California will be subject to intense scrutiny should he run for president in 2028. If things improve on his watch, it will be harder for Republicans to paint California as a hellscape with rampant homelessness and high costs (though they will certainly try). There are still plenty of details to be worked out. Housing wonks are already finding potential loopholes in the law that will need to be fixed. But it will be phased in over several years and allows for a lot of flexibility. Cities that don’t want to build where SB 79 tells them to can propose different locations—so long as the housing gets built somewhere. Daniel Lurie, San Francisco’s moderate mayor, is using the threat of state intervention to convince local NIMBYs that his plan to increase housing density is tame by comparison. Elsewhere, the state may need to be a bully. Contrary to Mr Pratt’s prattling, neither Pacific Palisades nor Altadena, another neighbourhood razed by fire, has transport stations big enough to trigger the law. Yet Ms Bass urged Mr Newsom to veto the bill so as not to “erode local control”—while still claiming that LA is a “pro-housing city”. The lack of progress the city is making on housing is clear. LA has only approved 13% of the units it says it needs to permit by 2029. “State intervention has been really the only pathway through which we’ve been able to make real progress on this issue,” says Nithya Raman, a rare YIMBY city-council member in Los Angeles. Now state intervention is coming. ■ 美國 | 蓋吧，寶貝，蓋吧 加州嘗試修復其住房困局 「YIMBY」（我家後院也行）運動迎來重大勝利 2025年10月14日｜洛杉磯｜閱讀時間約4分鐘 加州歷史上最具爭議、卻也最具影響力的住房改革之一，差點被一位前實境節目明星給搞砸。美國千禧世代或許還記得史賓塞‧普拉特（Spencer Pratt），那位在《The Hills》（《山丘青春誌》）中被觀眾又愛又恨的金髮壞男孩。這部MTV節目記錄了2000年代初洛杉磯年輕俊男美女的生活。近年來，普拉特轉向播客創作，錄音地點正是他原本的住處——在今年的「帕利塞茲大火」（Palisades Fire）中被燒成一片空地。他將責任歸咎於許多人，其中包括加州州長蓋文‧紐森（Gavin Newsom）與洛杉磯市長凱倫‧巴斯（Karen Bass）。 普拉特偶爾也談些政策。最近他在Instagram影片中呼籲粉絲致電紐森辦公室，要求他否決一項住房法案：SB 79。 SB 79將繁忙公共交通站周邊的州有土地重新劃區，以允許興建更高的住宅建築。該法案還對那些拒發建照的城市施以重罰。為了安撫農村議員、工會與租屋者權益團體，法案在立法過程中被修改十多次，但仍僅以微弱票數通過。此法案在州長辦公桌上擱置了數週，讓支持興建住房的一方緊張不安，也讓普拉特燃起希望。然而，10月10日，紐森簽署了該法，替迅速崛起的「YIMBY」（Yes In My Backyard，「我家後院也行」）運動送上重大勝利。今年通過的SB 79及其他四十多項住房改革，可能成為這個因自我造成的住房短缺而陷入困境的州的轉捩點。紐森在簽署法案時寫道：「不作為的代價實在太高。」 他說得沒錯。住房政策不再只是所謂「豐饒派」（abundance bros「豐饒派」通常指的是2025年在美國興起的一種政治和經濟思潮，稱為**「豐饒議程」（Abundance Agenda）**。 該思潮旨在透過增加供給、推動科技創新、改革限制性政策，以解決高生活成本和經濟成長緩慢等問題。）——那些主張民主黨應更加友善於經濟成長的進步派思想家——在播客上辯論的話題而已。大量興建住宅，是加州維持政治影響力、並重新成為人們嚮往居住之地的關鍵。加州住宅的中位售價高於全美任何州。人們正搬往較便宜的地方，而這股外流潮已成為民主黨的政治難題。加州在2030年人口普查後的重新分配中，可能至少失去三個國會席次（與選舉人票）。該法案作者、州參議員史考特‧維納（Scott Wiener）今年稍早對《經濟學人》表示：「民主黨人必須敢於對那些『NIMBY』（Not In My Backyard，「別在我家後院蓋」）派，以及那些在咆哮抗議的市議會說『不』。」 身為民主黨人的紐森，也深知若屈服於否決法案的壓力，必將被批評為偽善。這位州長一貫主張簡化核准流程、加速住宅建設。（他甚至邀請過幾位「豐饒派」人士上自己的播客節目。）若他在2028年競選總統，外界必將嚴格檢視他在加州的施政成果。倘若加州情況在他任內改善，共和黨將更難再把加州描繪成充斥無家可歸者與高物價的「人間地獄」——儘管他們仍會努力這麼做。 儘管如此，仍有許多細節有待釐清。住房政策專家已在新法中發現可能需要修補的漏洞。不過，該法將在數年內分階段實施，並保留高度彈性。若城市不願在SB 79指定地點興建，仍可提議替代地點——前提是最終確實要蓋出住宅。舊金山的溫和派市長丹尼爾‧盧瑞（Daniel Lurie）正利用州政府干預的威脅，來說服地方反對者接受他相對溫和的住宅密度提升計畫。 在其他地區，州政府可能需要更強硬的手段。與普拉特的喋喋不休相反，無論是帕利塞茲還是另一個曾被大火摧毀的社區奧塔迪納（Altadena），都沒有足夠大型的交通站會被此法涵蓋。然而，巴斯市長仍敦促紐森否決該法，聲稱不應「削弱地方自治」，同時又宣稱洛杉磯是個「支持興建住房的城市」。事實卻顯示，該市的住房進展極為有限——至今僅核准了其設定到2029年目標的13%。 洛杉磯少數支持「YIMBY」的市議員妮西亞‧拉曼（Nithya Raman）表示：「州政府的介入，其實是我們唯一能在這議題上取得實質進展的途徑。」如今，這樣的介入即將正式展開。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Kim Seong Min risked everything to escape from North Korea The activist, poet and broadcaster died on September 12th, aged 63 Sep 25th 2025|5 min read He could not shake the shackle off. At the other end of it was a North Korean officer, who went with him everywhere. If Kim Seong Min as much as used the lavatory, the officer came along too. For three days they were yoked like this, hostile twins, while the train crept through northern North Korea. The punishment for his crime, leaving North Korea without permission as a captain in the army, was public execution. But he was hatching a plan. As the lavatory became ever filthier, the officer at last let him go by himself. Once in, jumping to swing on a ceiling beam, he kicked out the wood-frame window and tumbled after. The train was going at around 50 miles an hour, but he was lucky; he landed in the soft-turned soil of a sesame field. Then, his broken shackle still dangling, he ran away. It was his second escape. On his first, a well-tried route from Pyongyang to China by wading across the Yalu river, he had been picked up by the Chinese police, lightly tortured, handed to North Korean agents, tortured more and put on the train. After his jump, he was more successful. Undetected he got back to China, worked in a coal-briquette factory, managed to get counterfeit papers and three years later, in 1999, flew to South Korea as easily as any businessman. Yet his business was very different. It was to broadcast truth, by all means possible, back into his home country. His reasons for escaping from North Korea were both proximate—disciplinary trouble in his army unit, illegal letters to his uncle in China—and slower-growing. For all his boyhood and for most of his ten years of military service he was completely loyal to the Supreme Leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il: singing the songs of gratitude, cursing his country’s enemies. He never made much of a soldier, because he wanted to be a poet; a fine poet, like his father. It was rare that he even put on a uniform; assigned as he was to the arts and propaganda unit in Camp 620, he sat writing most of the time.** On marches or when training he made up poems to help the tedious stuff along.** What began to bother him more were the leaflets. On some mornings, when he left his tent, the ground would be white with them, dropped from South Korean planes. They described how much food there was in South Korea, and how high car production was. He also had a radio, illegally tinkered with, that could pick up South Korean signals. These told him one day that Kim Jong Il had been born not under a rainbow on the slopes of sacred Mount Paektu, but in a military camp in Russia’s far east. He wanted to dismiss these tales as propaganda, which of course he wrote himself. All the same, he knew that North Korea made relatively few cars, and that not only scarcity, but famine, stalked the land. In one scathing poem he talked of a man sacrificing his sister’s chastity for a handful of rice, and wondered why that rice should be cherished “above all else”. It was common to see corpses in the streets; he had once come upon a pile of 20, emaciated and writhing with maggots, outside a railway station. As for the Supreme Leader’s newly humdrum birthplace, it sounded like a lie, but could be true. A doubt was sown. The leaflets also talked a lot about “freedom”. He was not sure exactly what that meant. But if it was a place, it might be worth going to. By 2004, after five years in South Korea, he knew it was. Freedom was “our breath”. Since the South Korean government, under its short-lived “Sunshine” policy of conciliation with the hermit kingdom, had stopped proclaiming freedom northwards, he set up Free North Korea Radio (FNKR) to do the job instead. He used short-wave to reach them; his tiny staff, almost all exiles, used pseudonyms. A brave band of stringers north of the demilitarised zone interviewed ordinary North Koreans, using small digital recorders, phones with prepaid Chinese SIM cards and Chinese memory sticks. Those were transferred hand-to-hand back to Seoul. When any of his team in the North fell silent, presumably arrested or killed, he was devastated. North Koreans who dared to tune in found a station that was, in some ways, familiar: broadcasting in their own dialects, often on subjects they especially enjoyed. “Hello, my compatriots!” cried Mr Kim. Quite unfamiliar was the sound of their own countrymen (their voices electronically distorted) attacking the regime. They could also hear from exiles in Seoul about bright clothes, mains hot water and overflowing food tables, the things that had most dazzled Mr Kim. At his first debrief in 1999 he had not only been offered a Coke, a Sprite and rice wine, but a different drink for every day of the year. In the buffet, realising his new power, he took five fried eggs. The cook merely replaced them. Money for his station was a struggle. The Americans gave funding, and also helped send out his programmes, but he did not want to be seen as their puppet. Attacks on FNKR were legion, as were threats to himself. He was sent untraceable, disturbing packages containing dolls stuck with knives, or dead mice. But nothing could deter him. His countrymen had been told repeatedly that they lived in heaven on earth. He and his team told them, for one hour twice a day, 365 days a year, that on the contrary they were slaves of the dictator, trapped like frogs in a deep well. Real heaven was freedom: to dress, to practise religion, to hold contrary opinions, as you liked. Heaven was freedom of choice. Several of his poems, though, told a more nuanced story. He mourned the things he could not forget: the white forsythia at the foot of Moran Hill, the path at the edge of his village, the shyness of a sister, one of four, he had left behind. He remembered his mother in her sweat-stained apron, knitting late at night, or standing by the Taedong river in her homespun jacket. She was always smiling. **But he felt he had “gently laid a handful of dirt” on her. In South Korea, “this foreign land that is not foreign”, he kept calling for her. **Some ties were more easily cast off than others. ■ 〈金成民——用自由的聲音打破北韓沉默〉 一位真正勇敢的人——金成民。 他是一位脫北者、詩人、也是廣播主持人。 他在 2025 年 9 月 12 日離世，享年 63 歲。 但他的一生，像是一首關於自由的長詩。 金成民曾是北韓軍隊的上尉。 他的「罪行」，就是想離開北韓。 那在北韓，是會被公開處決的。 他第一次逃跑失敗，被抓回去，又被拷打。 第二次，他被鐵鍊綁在一名軍官身邊，一起搭著慢慢行駛的火車。 上廁所時，軍官也要跟著。 三天後，廁所髒得軍官受不了，終於讓他自己去。 他一進去，就跳起來，用力踢破窗戶，從火車上滾了出去。 時速大約 80 公里，但他幸運地落在鬆軟的芝麻田裡。 鐵鍊還掛在腳上，他就這樣拼命地跑。 他再次逃到中國，在煤磚工廠打工，靠假證件過活。 三年後，也就是 1999 年，他終於飛到了南韓。 但他的「新事業」，不是賺錢，而是用廣播把真相傳回北韓。 他年輕時，其實是忠於金日成與金正日的。 他會唱頌揚領導者的歌，也寫愛國詩。 但有一天，他在軍營外看到地上滿滿的傳單， 上面寫著：「南韓有很多食物，有汽車工廠。」 他起初不信，還以為那是敵人的宣傳。 直到他偷偷改裝收音機，聽到了南韓的節目。 那裡說，金正日不是在白頭山的彩虹下出生， 而是在俄羅斯遠東的一個軍營。 那一刻，他心裡的信念開始動搖。 他看到飢荒，看過街上餓死的人。 他寫詩，寫一個男人為了米飯犧牲妹妹的尊嚴。 他開始懷疑： 「如果自由是一個地方，那應該值得去一趟。」 到了南韓，他明白—— 自由就是「我們的呼吸」。 於是他創立了「自由北韓廣播電台」， 用短波把節目傳進北韓。 節目裡的聲音有時會被改音， 但聽眾聽得出，那是他們自己的語言。 「北韓的同胞們，你們好！」 節目裡，他這樣喊著。 他講南韓的生活：五彩的衣服、熱水、滿桌的食物。 這些，讓他第一次覺得自己真正活著。 資金不多，美國給了一些幫助， 但他不想被說成是美國的傀儡。 他收到過恐嚇信，甚至有人寄來插著刀的娃娃、死老鼠。 可他從未退縮。 他說：北韓人被告訴自己住在「人間天堂」， 但真正的天堂，是「選擇的自由」。 在他的詩裡，也有溫柔的一面。 他想念母親，想念村口的小路， 想念那株白色的迎春花。 他說：「我好像在母親的墳上，輕輕放下一把土。」 即使在南韓——這個「不陌生的異鄉」， 他仍然不停呼喚母親的名字。 有些枷鎖，可以掙脫。 但有些牽掛，永遠留在心裡。 è 這就是金成民的故事—— 一個用詩與廣播，讓北韓聽見自由聲音的人。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Are red-light face masks worth the hype? Used properly, the right ones can help combat the signs of ageing Sep 26th 2025|3 min read HOLED UP AT home when no one else is looking, people indulge in their covert, sometimes embarrassing, self-care routines. One of the newest involves donning a mask that would make the greatest movie villains envious. Strap it around the face, switch it on and ominous coloured light starts to emanate from the eye and mouth holes. All in the name of eternal youth and vitality. Light-emitting diode (LED) face masks are all the rage. Depending on the colour you choose, manufacturers promise they will rid your face of acne, reverse skin discolouration and even fight off wrinkles. The most popular is the red-light mask, which uses red and near-infrared (NIR) light. These, designers claim, stimulate skin regeneration and reverse the signs of ageing. Such claims are more than marketing hype. Red light has the longest wavelengths in the visible spectrum, and so can safely penetrate deeper into the skin than light with shorter wavelengths. The light then stimulates colour-sensitive molecules called chromophores in subsurface skin layers. These encourage the growth of cells called fibroblasts, which are among the first to respond to injuries or damage to the skin. They are responsible for the production of two skin proteins, collagen and elastin. High amounts of collagen are important for youthful-looking skin, boosting its elasticity and firmness. Numerous experiments bear out the positive effects that red and NIR light can have on skin. A study published in 2007 in the Journal of Photochemistry and Photobiology asked 76 people aged between 35 and 55 who showed visible signs of ageing to use red light on the right half of their faces, leaving the left as a control. Four weeks later, the authors concluded that the right sides of participants’ faces already looked younger. Biopsies taken from some confirmed the presence of increased collagen. Shoshana Marmon, director of dermatological research at New York Medical College, notes that small studies have indeed shown benefits for acne, skin texture and wrinkles. But those benefits are modest. For best results, she recommends using red-light masks at least three times a week for 8-12 weeks, alongside moisturisers, a broad-spectrum sunscreen and a retinoid (a class of products derived from vitamin A). “You can add the light mask on top of those basics,” says Dr Marmon, “but it shouldn’t replace them.” Anti-ageing is the tip of the iceberg. Tests conducted in the 1990s by researchers at NASA—first in plants, then on rats and human tissue—found that light from LEDs helped wounds heal faster (as cell growth is slowed in zero gravity, astronauts who were injured in space would have a harder time healing than they do on Earth). Light can also be harnessed to treat a variety of skin ailments from psoriasis and vitiligo, by way of acne scarring and rosacea, to cancer. New research has even demonstrated that light’s ability to heal subsurface tissue means it may be useful in treating traumatic brain injuries. Not every face mask can deliver the full benefits of red-light therapy. Research shows the optimal treatment for minimising wrinkles and rejuvenating skin would use a combination of red light, with a wavelength of at least 633nm, and NIR light of at least 830nm. The built-in bulbs must also produce light of sufficient power density, ideally 10-50 milliwatts per square centimetre—a new definition, perhaps, of youthful glow. 《紅光面罩真的那麼神嗎？》 📅 2025年9月26日｜約3分鐘閱讀 你有沒有在家偷偷做過一些只有自己知道的「美容小儀式」？ 像是敷面膜、貼痘痘貼、還是用那種會發光的奇怪機器？ 最近，一種「紅光面罩」的美容產品超級紅。 戴上去整張臉都發亮，看起來就像電影反派登場一樣， 但大家說它能讓你變年輕、變緊緻——真的嗎？ 這些所謂的「LED光療面罩」可不只一種顏色。 不同顏色的光據說有不同功效： 像是藍光可以對付痘痘，綠光能改善膚色不均， 而最受歡迎的，就是「紅光面罩」。 廠商宣稱紅光能刺激皮膚再生、減少皺紋， 還能讓肌膚更有彈性、更年輕。 聽起來是不是很夢幻？ 但其實，這些說法並非全是噱頭。 紅光的波長比其他可見光長， 這代表它能「更深入」地穿透皮膚， 而不會造成傷害。 當紅光進入皮膚後， 會刺激到一種叫做「發色團」（chromophores）的分子， 它們能活化皮下的細胞， 特別是「纖維母細胞」（fibroblasts）。 這些細胞在皮膚受傷或老化時會率先行動， 負責製造膠原蛋白（collagen）和彈性蛋白（elastin）。 這兩者正是讓肌膚看起來緊緻、有彈性的關鍵。 那紅光真的有效嗎？ 根據2007年一項發表在《光化學與光生物學期刊》的研究， 76位年齡介於35到55歲、有明顯老化跡象的受試者， 被要求只在臉的右半邊照紅光， 左半邊則作為對照組。 四週後，右邊的臉竟然看起來真的比較年輕！ 而且皮膚切片也證實——膠原蛋白真的增加了。 美國紐約醫學院皮膚研究主任 Shoshana Marmon 醫師指出， 小規模的研究確實顯示紅光對於改善痘痘、膚質和皺紋有幫助， 但效果「有限」。 她建議想要看到明顯變化的人， 最好一週使用三次，連續八到十二週， 同時搭配保濕霜、防曬乳，還有A醇產品。 她說：「紅光面罩可以加在你的保養程序裡， 但不能取代它們。」 事實上，抗老只是光療應用的一小部分。 早在1990年代，美國NASA的研究人員 就在植物、老鼠和人體組織上做過實驗。 他們發現LED光可以加速傷口癒合。 這對太空人來說特別重要—— 因為在太空失重環境下，細胞修復會變慢。 除此之外，光療還能用來治療多種皮膚問題， 像是牛皮癬、白斑、痘疤、酒糟性皮膚炎，甚至癌症。 最近的研究甚至發現， 紅光可能也能幫助治療創傷性腦損傷。 不過，可不是每一款紅光面罩都有效。 研究顯示，真正能減少皺紋、活化肌膚的關鍵在於： 紅光波長要至少 633奈米， 近紅外線（NIR）則要達到 830奈米。 燈的能量密度也要夠強—— 理想值大約是 每平方公分10到50毫瓦。 只有符合這些條件， 你才可能真的「由內而外」發出青春的光芒。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Culture | Back Story First, they come for the comedians But, try as strongmen might, the jokes always get away Sep 22nd 2025|4 min read Josef Stalin loses his pipe and informs his security chief. Later he finds it behind the sofa. “That’s impossible,” says the henchman (黨羽), “three people have confessed to stealing it!” Lots of jokes were told about the Soviet generalissimo, proliferating long after he died. For instance: Stalin’s ghost visits Vladimir Putin. “Kill your opponents and paint the Kremlin blue,” he advises. “Why blue?” asks Putin. The ghost smiles. “I knew you wouldn’t query the first part.” While the tyrant lived, it was reckless to tell such jokes in public or to anyone who might report them. Even hearing them could be calamitous. “Who built the White Sea canal?” runs a gag about a monstrous infrastructure project. “The right bank was dug by the joke-tellers—the left by those who heard them.” “Every joke”, wrote George Orwell, “is a tiny revolution.” To silence the comedians, some autocrats use torturers and the gulag; in today’s Egypt and other stifled places, the penalties for ridicule can be prison and exile. In America the relatively mild tools include menacing regulators, as Jimmy Kimmel, a talk-show host, has learned. Yet whatever the comics’ fate, the jokes themselves get away. Authoritarians are inherently funny. Humour thrives on pretence and delusion—and the strongman is always pretending. He poses as a saviour but is actually a brute; he purports to be omnipotent but is as flawed as other mortals, or more. If he has an ideology, it is deficient too. Prickly and narcissistic, strongmen can rarely take jokes, which makes them risky but funnier. The Nazis banned “The Great Dictator” (pictured), in which Charlie Chaplin sent up Adolf Hitler, but the Führer reputedly watched it twice. Saddam Hussein tried to murder the cast of a satirical film. Political jokes, meanwhile, are the ideal weapon of the weak. Even without the internet, they travel at warp speed, traversing a country before the censors have their pens out. (According to a report cited in a BBC documentary, the KGB found a joke could cross Moscow in a matter of hours.) Crucially, a good gag is collusive, recruiting listeners to the teller’s side—or rather, making clear which side they are already on. They can’t help finding it funny, and it is funny because, at bottom, it is true. This bond can be a launch pad for politics, as it was for Beppe Grillo in Italy and Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine. Naturally, autocrats fret about people knowing that other people are thinking like them. According to the maximalist logic of repression, the fact that laughter is intimate, spontaneous and ephemeral heightens its appeal as a target: if rulers can suppress wit, they can control everything. But they can’t. As Ben Lewis recounts in “Hammer & Tickle”, a book about humour under communism, trying to squish a joke tends to spread it instead. When the laughter police give up this unequal fight, it is sign of liberalisation, voluntary or otherwise. At the fag-end of the Soviet Union, even Mikhail Gorbachev, its last leader, wisecracked about discontent and shortages. (“The working classes consume plenty of cognac—through their chosen representatives.”) A big comedy festival in Riyadh, beginning on September 26th, is supposed to advertise Saudi Arabia’s new freedoms. Hmmm: Tim Dillon, an American stand-up due to attend, says he was disinvited over a riff the organisers didn’t like. Canny authoritarians see the benefits of letting the gags flow. “If they are telling jokes about me,” Leonid Brezhnev is said to have remarked, “it means they love me,” and he wasn’t altogether wrong. Scabrous as it may be, satire always contains a trace of homage; after all, nobodies are never satirised. Humour can be a safety-valve for dissent and a homeopathic dose of plurality. It can also offer raw intel on the national mood, relaying hard truths and bad news as medieval jesters sometimes did to kings. But the wiliest strongmen, including some populists today, commandeer the audience. In an age when the struggle for power is a battle for attention, they are the carnival-barkers of the public square, dealing as much in one-liners and theatrical taunts as in policy. As politics is repackaged as entertainment, crackdowns—on comics and others—become part of the show, the threat to free expression blurred by the spectacle. The story of Bim-Bom, a circus-clown duo, is an ominous parable. Performing in Moscow in 1918, they made jokes about the Bolsheviks that the secret policemen in attendance disliked. The goons rushed the stage to arrest them. Thinking the chase was part of the act, the crowd hooted with laughter.■ 文化｜幕後故事 首先，他們來抓喜劇演員 但無論強人如何用力，笑話總能逃脫 2025年9月22日｜閱讀時間4分鐘 約瑟夫‧史達林丟了他的菸斗，並通知他的安全主管。後來他在沙發後找到了它。那名黨羽驚訝地說：「這不可能，已經有三個人承認偷了它！」關於這位蘇聯獨裁者的笑話層出不窮，甚至在他死後仍廣為流傳。例如：史達林的幽靈造訪弗拉基米爾‧普丁，建議道：「殺掉你的對手，然後把克里姆林宮漆成藍色。」普丁問：「為什麼是藍色？」幽靈微笑說：「我就知道你不會質疑第一部分。」 當暴君在世時，公開講這類笑話或向可能告密的人說，都極為冒險。甚至只是聽到也可能招致災禍。有一個關於殘酷基建工程——白海運河的笑話是這樣的：「誰建造了白海運河？右岸是講笑話的人挖的，左岸是聽笑話的人挖的。」 喬治‧歐威爾曾寫道：「每一個笑話，都是一場小小的革命。」為了讓喜劇演員閉嘴，有些獨裁者使用刑求與勞改營；在今日的埃及與其他受壓抑的地方，對諷刺的懲罰可能是監禁或流亡。在美國，手段相對溫和——例如脅迫性的監管，正如脫口秀主持人吉米‧金莫（Jimmy Kimmel）所體會到的那樣。無論喜劇演員的下場如何，笑話本身總能逃脫。 獨裁者天生具有可笑性。幽默植根於虛偽與妄想——而強人永遠在假裝。他假扮救世主，實則是暴君；他假裝全能，實際上卻與凡人一樣有缺陷，甚至更糟。若他有意識形態，那通常也是不堪一擊的。敏感而自戀的獨裁者鮮少能承受嘲諷——這使他們既危險又更具笑料。納粹禁止播放卓別林諷刺阿道夫‧希特勒的電影《大獨裁者》（見圖），但據說元首本人偷偷看了兩遍。薩達姆‧海珊甚至試圖暗殺一部諷刺電影的演員。 政治笑話則是弱者的理想武器。即使沒有網際網路，它們也能以極快速度傳播——往往在審查者動筆前便遍布全國。（根據英國廣播公司一部紀錄片引用的報告，蘇聯國安委員會發現，一個笑話可在數小時內傳遍莫斯科。）最關鍵的是，好笑話具有共謀性：它使聽眾自然而然站在講者那一邊——或更準確地說，讓人明白他們原本就屬於那一邊。因為那是真的，所以他們忍不住發笑。這種情感連結甚至能成為政治的跳板，正如義大利的貝佩‧葛里洛（Beppe Grillo）與烏克蘭的弗拉基米爾‧澤倫斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）所示。 自然地，獨裁者會擔心人民知道其他人也有同樣的想法。依據極權鎮壓的邏輯，笑聲的親密、自發與短暫特質反而讓它成為更具吸引力的打擊目標：若統治者能壓制幽默，他們便能掌控一切——但他們做不到。班‧路易斯在其著作《鐵鎚與咯咯笑》（Hammer & Tickle）中記錄道，試圖扼殺笑話往往只會讓它傳得更廣。 當「笑聲警察」放棄這場不對等的鬥爭時，往往象徵著自由化的到來——無論是自願還是被迫。在蘇聯垂死之際，最後一任領導人米哈伊爾‧戈巴契夫也開始開自己與體制的玩笑：「工人階級消費了大量干邑——透過他們的代表。」沙烏地阿拉伯將於9月26日舉辦大型喜劇節，宣傳所謂的新自由。然而，美國脫口秀演員提姆‧狄倫（Tim Dillon）表示，他因一句令主辦方不悅的段子而被取消邀請——令人玩味。 精明的獨裁者則懂得讓笑話流通的好處。據說列昂尼德‧布里茲涅夫曾說：「如果他們講我的笑話，代表他們愛我。」這話也不全錯。再辛辣的諷刺，也帶有一絲敬意——畢竟，無名之輩從不被諷刺。幽默可作為反抗的安全閥，也是多元的一劑微量疫苗。它同時能傳遞民意，讓統治者得知如實的壞消息，正如中古時代的宮廷弄臣向國王傳達真話那樣。 然而，最狡猾的強人——包括當今一些民粹領袖——會奪取觀眾的注意力。在這個權力鬥爭與注意力爭奪合而為一的時代，他們成為公共廣場上的叫賣藝人，操弄的既是政策，也是笑話與嘲諷。當政治被包裝成娛樂，對喜劇演員與其他人的鎮壓本身也變成表演的一部分，自由受威脅的真相被秀場的煙火模糊了。 馬戲團小丑雙人組「比姆與邦」（Bim-Bom）的故事是一則不祥的寓言。1918年他們在莫斯科演出，開了布爾什維克的玩笑，惹惱了在場的祕密警察。特務衝上舞台準備逮人，觀眾卻以為那是表演的一部分，哄堂大笑。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

United States | Stay in place It is getting much harder to get evicted in New York City Tenants win. Potential** tenants** lose One in one out Sep 25th 2025|NEW YORK |3 min read There are few things that unite all New Yorkers, but one is an obsession with talking about the housing market. And so it is no surprise that it is dominating the city’s mayoral election on November 5th. The Democratic candidate (and front-runner) Zohran Mamdani has made a slogan out of his promise to “freeze the rent” on the 50% of flats that are rent-stabilised. The trailing candidates have scraped together their own housing plans. Yet for all the noise, one thing has been missed: New York City’s rental sector has already changed rather dramatically. Last year the city had the lowest apartment-vacancy rate in almost 60 years. And yet at the same time, landlords filed almost 50% fewer eviction cases than in 2016. Completed evictions are down by a quarter. New rights and procedures introduced over the past decade have transformed the legal landscape for tenants. A decade ago, one in ten New York City renters faced eviction proceedings every year. Evictions are costly, financially and in human and social terms. After being evicted, renters tend to see their incomes fall, they are more likely to become homeless and they visit hospital emergency rooms more often. For children, being evicted has roughly the same impact on high-school graduation rates as being in juvenile incarceration. For landlords, evictions can cost the equivalent of two to three months of rent, not including the vacancy rent gap while new tenants are found. The first big change came in 2017, when the city introduced a right for poor tenants to legal representation. This was followed by a new tenants’ rights law passed by the state government in 2019. The effects of both seem to have been dramatic (see chart). Before the representation law came in, just one in 100 tenants had counsel, compared with 95% of landlords. On paper, tenants in New York benefit from powerful legal protections, but in practice, without lawyers, these are hard to enforce. Since the change, landlords do seem to have stopped filing as many legally weak eviction cases. That is despite limited funding. Munonyedi Clifford of New York’s Legal Aid Society says she has been hiring “like gangbusters” but it is not enough. Ms Clifford also says that the 2019 law passed by the state “really changed the landscape”. Landlords agree. The law “systematically changed the economics of housing”, says Kenny Burgos of the New York Apartment Association, which represents property owners. More change came last year: the state limited rent increases further and now requires some landlords to renew most leases automatically. The trouble with all this is that there is inevitably a trade-off. Existing tenants are certainly better off. But newcomers and movers find it harder and more expensive to find a place to live, as landlords become more cautious. Nicole Upano of the National Apartment Association, a landlord trade association, says many are already introducing stricter screening to exclude risky tenants. In Washington, DC, pandemic-era rules made evictions harder and slower. Unpaid rent rose from $11m in 2020 to $100m in 2025. Affordable housing disappeared from the market, as landlords became more conservative. The city is now rolling back many of the changes. ■ 我們要聊一個幾乎所有紐約人都會談的話題——房市。是的，不管立場怎麼分，紐約人都對住房市場特別「執著」。所以一點也不意外，今年 11 月 5 日的市長選舉，房租問題成了主戰場。 民主黨候選人、目前的領先者 Zohran Mamdani，打出了「凍結房租」的口號，特別針對那一半屬於租金管制的公寓。其他落後的候選人，也急忙拚湊出各自的住房政策。不過在這些喧鬧聲裡，有個事實被忽略了：紐約市的租屋市場，其實已經發生了很大的變化。 去年，紐約的空屋率降到將近 60 年來的最低。但有趣的是，房東提出的驅逐案件，比 2016 年少了將近一半。最終真的被趕走的租客，也下降了四分之一。過去十年裡，市府陸續推出了新的租客權益和法律程序，徹底改變了遊戲規則。 十年前，每十個租客裡，就有一個人每年要面臨驅逐官司。對租客來說，驅逐不只是金錢損失，更是人生和社會上的重擊。收入下降、增加無家可歸的風險、醫院急診室報到的次數也變多。對孩子來說，被趕出家門，對高中畢業率的打擊，差不多就像進了少年感化院一樣。至於房東，驅逐同樣很傷，成本大概等於兩到三個月的租金，還不包括空屋時的租金損失。 2017 年，第一個大轉變出現：市政府宣布低收入租客有權獲得法律代理。2019 年，州政府又通過一套新的租客權益法。這些改變帶來的影響相當驚人。 在法案通過之前，幾乎只有 1% 的租客有律師幫忙，而房東有 95% 都請得起律師。紙面上，租客看似有強大的保護，但沒有律師，這些保護根本很難落實。自從政策改變後，房東明顯少提一些「站不住腳」的驅逐案。 紐約法律援助協會的 Clifford 說，她正在「瘋狂招人」，但仍然不夠用。她也提到 2019 年的新法，真的「徹底改變了局勢」。連房東也承認，這部法律「改變了住房經濟的規則」。接著，去年又有新規：州政府限制了更多的租金漲幅，並要求部分房東必須自動續約。 不過，事情也有另一面。現有的租客的確更有保障，但新搬來的人，或是想換房子的人，反而更難找到可負擔的住處。因為房東變得更謹慎，開始設更嚴格的審核，直接把「高風險租客」排除在外。 其實在華盛頓特區也有類似的經驗。疫情期間，他們讓驅逐變得更困難、更緩慢，結果未繳租金的金額，從 2020 年的 1100 萬美元，暴增到 2025 年的 1 億美元。可負擔住房消失，房東更保守。現在，華府正在逐步取消這些規定。 總結來說，保護租客和維持市場之間，始終存在一個拉鋸。舊租客受益，卻可能讓新租客更難進入。那麼紐約要怎麼平衡？也許這會是選戰裡最難解的題目。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

United States | Lexington The real collusion between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin It may be scarier than their critics long suspected Aug 14th 2025|5 min read To DEFY Donald Trump is to court punishment. A rival politician can expect an investigation, an aggravating network may face a lawsuit, a left-leaning university can bid farewell to its public grants, a scrupulous civil servant can count on a pink slip and an independent-minded foreign government, however determined an adversary or stalwart an ally, invites tariffs. Perceived antagonists should also brace for a hail of insults, a lesson in public humiliation to potential transgressors. Vladimir Putin has been a mysterious exception. Mr Trump has blamed his travails over Russia’s interference in the 2016 election on just about everyone but him. He has blamed the war in Ukraine on former President Joe Biden, for supposedly inviting it through weakness, and on the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for somehow starting it. Back when Russia invaded in February 2022, Mr Trump praised Mr Putin’s “savvy”. For months, as Mr Putin made a mockery of Mr Trump’s promises to end the war in a day and of his calls for a ceasefire, the president who once threatened “fire and fury” against North Korea and tariffs as high as 245% against China indulged in no such bluster. He has sounded less formidable than plaintive. “Vladimir, STOP!” he wrote on social media in April. His use of the given name betrayed a touching faith that their shared intimacy would matter to his reptilian counterpart, too. When Mr Putin kept killing Ukrainians, Mr Trump took a step that was even less characteristic: he admitted to the world that he had been played for a fool. “Maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along,” he mused on April 26th. A month later, he ventured that his friend must have changed, gone “absolutely CRAZY!” Then on July 8th he acknowledged what should have been obvious from the start: “He is very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.” Mr Trump threatened secondary sanctions on Russia but then leapt at Mr Putin’s latest mixed messages about peace, rewarding him with a summit in America. Why, with this man, has Mr Trump been so accommodating? Efforts by journalists, congressional investigators and prosecutors to pinpoint the reason have often proved exercises in self-defeat and sorrow. The pattern seemed sinister: Mr Trump praised Mr Putin on television as far back as 2007; invited him to the Miss Universe Pageant in Moscow in 2013 and wondered on Twitter if he would be his “new best friend”; sought his help to build a tower in Moscow from 2013 to 2016; and tried unsuccessfully many times in 2015 to secure a meeting with him. Then came Russia’s interference in the election in 2016, including its hack of Democrats’ emails to undermine the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton. Some journalists fanned suspicions of a conspiracy—“collusion” became the watchword—by spreading claims Mr Putin was blackmailing Mr Trump with an obscene videotape. The source proved to be a rumour compiled in research to help Mrs Clinton. Nine years later Mr Putin’s low-budget meddling still rewards America’s foes by poisoning its politics and distracting its leaders. Pam Bondi, the attorney-general, has started a grand-jury investigation into what Mr Trump called treason by Barack Obama and others in his administration. The basis is a misrepresentation of an intelligence finding in the waning days of Mr Obama’s presidency. Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, has said that because Mr Putin did not hack voting machines, the finding that he tried to help Mr Trump was a lie. The conclusion under Mr Obama was instead that Mr Putin tried to affect the election by influencing public opinion. The exhaustive report released in 2019 by an independent counsel, Robert Mueller, affirmed on its first page that “the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome.” Mr Mueller indicted numerous Russians, and he also secured guilty pleas from some Trump aides for violating various laws. But he did not conclude the campaign “conspired or co-ordinated” with the Russians. To wade through the report’s two volumes is to be reminded how malicious the Russians were and how shambolic Mr Trump’s campaign was. It is also to lament the time and energy spent, given how little proof was found to support the superheated suspicions. And it is to regret how little Mr Trump was accorded a presumption of innocence. In the final words of the report, Mr Mueller noted that while it did not accuse Mr Trump of a crime, it also did “not exonerate him”. One might understand his bitterness. The puzzle of Mr Trump’s admiration for Mr Putin may have been better addressed by psychologists. Certainly Mr Putin, the seasoned KGB operative, has known how to play to his vulnerabilities, including vanity. Mr Trump was said to be “clearly touched” by a kitschy portrait of himself Mr Putin gave him in March. Putin on the blitz Yet that patronising speculation may be unfair to Mr Trump, too. It certainly understates the hazard. He has weighty reasons to identify with Mr Putin. Since the 1930s a cornerstone of American foreign policy has been that no country can gain territory by force, a principle also enshrined in the charter of the United Nations. Yet in his first term, in pursuit of his vision of Middle East peace, Mr Trump twice granted American recognition of conquered territory, for Israel’s claim to the Golan Heights and Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara. He appears to envisage an end to the war in Ukraine that would also award Russia new territory. This is how “savvy” people like Mr Trump and Mr Putin believe the world actually works, or ought to: not according to rules confected by stripy-pants diplomats to preserve an international order, but in deference to power exercised by great men. A world hostage to that theory may be the legacy of their true collusion. 川普與普丁之間真正的「合作」 或許比批評者原先懷疑的更可怕 2025年8月14日｜閱讀時間約5分鐘 挑戰唐納·川普，往往等於自找麻煩。 一位政壇對手可能會遭到調查，一家不順眼的媒體可能被告上法庭，一所左傾大學可能失去政府資助，一名堅持原則的公務員可能拿到解僱通知；而若是一個獨立自主的外國政府，不論是盟友還是敵人，也得準備面對關稅報復。任何被川普視為敵對的人，都要提防公開羞辱與一連串的嘲諷。 然而，弗拉基米爾·普丁卻一直是個神秘的例外。 川普對於2016年俄羅斯干預美國大選的麻煩，幾乎怪遍了所有人，卻從不怪普丁。他把烏克蘭戰爭歸咎於前總統拜登，認為拜登的「軟弱」招致戰火；也怪烏克蘭總統澤連斯基，說他 somehow 是挑起戰爭的人。當俄軍在2022年2月入侵時，川普還稱讚普丁「精明」。 數月以來，普丁不斷嘲笑川普「一天內結束戰爭」的承諾，也無視他呼籲停火的喊話。這位曾經對北韓放話「烈火與怒火」、對中國威脅高達245%關稅的總統，如今卻顯得軟弱而哀求。今年四月，他在社群媒體上寫下：「Vladimir，停手吧！」直接喊對方名字，彷彿相信兩人的私交能打動這位冷血的前克格勃。 當普丁繼續轟炸烏克蘭時，川普做了一件更罕見的事：他承認自己被耍了。 「也許他根本不想停戰，只是在拖我時間。」川普在4月26日這樣嘆道。一個月後，他甚至說普丁「完全瘋了！」到7月8日，他終於承認：「他一直表現得很友善，但結果毫無意義。」川普雖然放話要對俄國加碼制裁，但不久又被普丁若即若離的「和平」訊號所打動，立刻邀請他來美國舉行高峰會。 為什麼川普在普丁面前總是這麼低聲下氣？ 多年來，媒體、國會調查與檢察官都想找出答案，卻往往徒勞無功。這段關係看起來確實可疑：早在2007年，川普就在電視上稱讚普丁；2013年邀請他出席莫斯科的環球小姐選美，還在推特上問他會不會成為「新好朋友」；2013到2016年間，他努力推動莫斯科川普大樓計畫；2015年多次想安排與普丁會面卻失敗。接著就是2016年大選，俄國駭入民主黨郵件、打擊希拉蕊·柯林頓。部分記者更傳出普丁握有川普「不雅錄影帶」勒索他的謠言，後來證實只是競選對手聘請的研究拼湊而成。 九年後，普丁低成本的干預仍然持續製造混亂，削弱美國政治。 司法部長潘·龐迪已經著手大陪審團調查，指控歐巴馬政府「叛國」。依據的卻是對當年情報的一個扭曲解讀。情報總監圖爾西·蓋伯德甚至聲稱，既然俄國沒有入侵投票機，當年「普丁想幫助川普」的結論就是謊言。其實，歐巴馬政府的原始判斷是：普丁透過輿論操作，意圖影響大選。 2019年，特別檢察官穆勒的報告開宗明義寫道：「俄羅斯政府認為川普當選有利於它，並努力促成這個結果。」 穆勒起訴了多名俄國人，也讓一些川普幕僚因觸法認罪。但他並未認定川普陣營「共謀或協調」俄方行動。讀完那兩卷厚重的報告，人們不僅看到俄國的惡意、川普團隊的混亂，也不得不感嘆：投入的時間與精力與證據不成比例，結果只是空轉。報告最後一句話更留下餘韻：「本報告不指控川普犯罪，但也不為他洗清嫌疑。」可以理解為何川普心存怨恨。 或許，川普對普丁的迷戀更適合交給心理學家解釋。 普丁這位老練的前特務，非常懂得如何迎合川普的弱點，尤其是他的虛榮心。據說，今年三月普丁送給川普一幅俗氣的肖像畫，他看了「非常感動」。 不過，把這解釋為單純的個性缺陷，可能也低估了危險。川普與普丁其實有深層的共同點。 自1930年代以來，美國外交政策的一大基石，就是「不能透過武力獲取領土」，這一點也寫進了聯合國憲章。但川普在第一任期卻打破慣例：承認以色列對戈蘭高地的主權，承認摩洛哥對西撒哈拉的主權。他如今似乎打算讓俄國在烏克蘭戰爭中也保有新的領土。 這正是川普與普丁眼中的「聰明」世界：不是依靠國際秩序與外交規則，而是由強人憑藉權力決定邊界。 如果世界最終被這種理論所俘虜，那才是真正的「合作」遺產。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Business | Marketing missteps How do you pronounce Biemlfdlkk? The brands lost in translation As they race to go global, many Chinese companies are choosing new names A brand you’ll never forget Sep 11th 2025|SHANGHAI|3 min read Biemlfdlkk is a mouthful. It is not exactly clear how to enunciate the eight-consonant jumble in the Chinese golf-apparel brand’s English name. It is even hard to write. But the company is expanding overseas, recently acquiring two foreign brands. This was probably a factor that led it to ditching the odd string of letters it had operated under for 21 years. This year it is swapping the old name for one that is a bit more intelligible: Biemlofen. Chinese brands are moving into foreign markets as never before. The way they **are perceived **when they arrive depends not just on the quality of their product but also on their name. A few companies are already mastering foreign branding. Haidilao, a restaurant chain specialising in spicy soups, has started using the word Hi as a simplified name at its overseas shops. Pop Mart, the toy company that makes the sensational Labubu dolls, looks right at home in America or Europe. Shein, an online fashion firm, based its Chinese name, pronounced xi yin, on its English one (an abbreviation of SheInside). These are the few that are getting it right. Many others struggle. Take, for example, Mixue, a cold drinks and ice-cream chain that is opening thousands of shops outside China. The company’s name translates to “honey snow”, but instead of making use of that overseas it has employed the phonetic version of its Chinese name, which is not easy to pronounce. The name will limit the brand’s growth abroad, predicts Chris Pereira of iMpact, a consulting firm, since people will not know how to say it when recommending it to friends. Many Chinese companies chose ill-conceived foreign names decades ago and have simply stuck with them. Perhaps White Elephant, a Chinese battery brand that is becoming popular in Africa, should have stuck with its phonetic Chinese name. Chint, an electronics maker founded in 1984, chose an English name that faintly reflects its Chinese one but sounds closer to “chintzy”, American slang for cheaply made. Many firms try to turn their Chinese name into one that sounds Western, but end up with nonsense: Youngor, a fashion brand, is one example. And yet this is often preferable to experimenting with symbolism in a foreign tongue, as demonstrated by the Chinese sunglasses brand that named itself after the world’s most famous blind person, Helen Keller. Foreign-sounding names that provide international flair at home can be less helpful in overseas markets. Adolph, a Chinese shampoo-maker, might have convinced some Chinese people that it is German, but it may find the name does not help it sell products in Germany. Cracking the language and culture of any foreign market is tough. Western firms in China know this all too well. Peugeot, a French carmaker (owned by Stellantis, whose largest shareholder part-owns The Economist), has an unremarkable Chinese name when said in Mandarin, the national language. But in Cantonese, a southern dialect, the name Peugeot sounds unfortunately close to “bitch”.■ 商業｜行銷失誤：Biemlfdlkk 該怎麼唸？當品牌遇上翻譯困境 在全球化的浪潮下，許多中國品牌正在積極走向海外。但名字選得好不好，往往會決定一個品牌在國際市場上能不能被記住。 以中國的高爾夫服飾品牌 Biemlfdlkk 為例。這個名字光是拼寫就夠讓人頭痛，更別說要正確念出來了。經營了 21 年後，這家公司終於決定換掉這串八個子音拼湊出來的怪名字，改成稍微順口一點的 Biemlofen。這一決定，正好發生在他們併購了兩個海外品牌、積極拓展國際市場之後。 不過，也不是所有中國品牌都在國際化命名上摔跤。像是火鍋連鎖 海底撈，在海外乾脆簡化成「Hi」，讓外國顧客一看就懂。又或者是爆紅的玩具公司 泡泡瑪特 Pop Mart，名字放在歐美市場完全沒有違和感。快時尚品牌 Shein 更是取巧，從英文「SheInside」簡化而來，中文名字「希音」也呼應了英文發音。 相比之下，有些品牌就顯得吃力。比方說冷飲和冰淇淋連鎖 蜜雪冰城。它的中文意思是「蜂蜜雪」，很有意境，但到了海外卻堅持使用「Mixue」這個拼音。結果外國人不僅難以發音，更難把這名字傳口碑。顧問公司 iMpact 的 Chris Pereira 就直言，這樣會限制品牌在國際市場的成長。 還有一些公司，早年隨便挑了英文名字，結果一路用到現在。電池品牌 白象 White Elephant，在非洲很受歡迎，但用「大象」的拼音可能更直白。電子公司 正泰，在 1984 年創立時選了英文名 Chint，雖然勉強算呼應了中文，但聽起來卻和英文的「chintzy」（意指廉價的）很接近。服裝品牌 Youngor，名字雖然帶點西化的味道，但實際上毫無意義。 還有更尷尬的例子。中國太陽眼鏡品牌居然取名 Helen Keller——就是那位最有名的盲人作家。至於洗髮精品牌 Adolph，或許在中國人眼裡帶點德國風格，但若真想在德國賣，恐怕只會引來誤會。 其實這樣的挑戰，各國品牌在異地市場都會遇到。像法國車商 Peugeot（標致），中文名字在普通話裡沒什麼問題，但在廣東話裡，聽起來卻和「婊子」非常接近。這種文化與語言的差異，讓跨國行銷充滿了難題。 所以說，走向世界光靠產品力還不夠，品牌名字能不能被外國人念對、記住，往往就是成敗的關鍵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

不唸書的下場是我們的政治越來越愚蠢了? Is the decline of reading making politics dumber? As people read less they think less clearly, **scholars **fear Sep 4th 2025 The experiment was simple; so too, you may have thought, was the task. Students of literature at two American universities were given the first paragraphs of “Bleak House” by Charles Dickens and asked to read and then explain them. In other words: some students reading English literature were asked to read some English literature from the mid-19th century. How hard could it be? Very, it turns out. The students **were flummoxed by legal language and baffled by **metaphor. A Dickensian description of fog left them totally fogged. They could not grasp basic vocabulary: one student thought that when a man was said to have “whiskers” it meant he was “in a room with an animal I think…A cat?” The problem was less that these students of literature were not literary and more that they were barely even literate. Reading is in trouble. Multiple studies in multiple places seem to be showing the same thing. Adults are reading less. Children are reading less. Teenagers are reading a lot less. Very small children are being read to less; many are not being read to at all. Reading rates are lower among poorer children—a phenomenon known as “the reading gap”—but reading is down for everyone, everywhere. In America, the share of people who read for pleasure has fallen by two-fifths in 20 years, according to a study published in August in iScience, a journal. YouGov, a pollster, found that 40% of Britons had not read or listened to any books in 2024. Reading for displeasure is little better: as Sir Jonathan Bate, an English professor at Oxford University, has said, students “struggle to get through one novel in three weeks”. Even the educated young, another greybeard said, have “no habits of application and concentration”. Such laments should be treated with caution: almost the only thing bookish sorts love more than books is complaining about books and reading. They always have done: the greybeard above was Dickens in, ironically, “Bleak House”. Almost as soon as people stopped fretting about the arrival of reading—Socrates feared it would “produce forgetfulness” in those who used it; Ecclesiastes says that “of making many books there is no end”—people started fretting about its decline. As Ecclesiastes also says, “there is nothing new under the sun”. Arguably, however, what is happening now is new. It is not just that people are reading less, though they are; the texture of what is being read is changing, too. Sentences are getting shorter and simpler. We analysed hundreds of New York Times bestsellers and found that sentences in popular books have contracted by almost a third since the 1930s. Open the Victorian bestseller “Modern Painters” by John Ruskin and you will find that its first sentence is 153 words long. It contains the stern advice that you should not trust the “erroneous opinion” of the public and includes a subheading that reads: “Public opinion no criterion of excellence”. Open Amazon’s current non-fiction bestseller, “The Let Them Theory” by Mel Robbins, and you will find that its first sentence is just 19 words long. A subheading reads “How I Changed My Life”. Among its stern advice is that, to get things done, you should count backwards like NASA at a rocket launch because, “Once you start the countdown, 5-4-3-2-1, there’s no turning back.” This is a reminder that Ruskin knew a thing or two. Smartphones are blamed for dwindling reading habits—and certainly the number of distractions has increased. But reading has always been a bother. “A big book”, said Callimachus, an ancient Greek poet, “is a big evil.” This is particularly true after lunch. You sit down to read then, as one writer noted, the sun streams in, the day feels “50 hours long”, the reader “rubs his eyes” then finally places the book “under his head and…falls into a light sleep”. Given that that particular reader was a fourth-century monk and ascetic he was probably not distracted by Snapchat. So it is not merely that distractions have increased: the sheer desire to read seems to have declined. In the Victorian era, self-improvement societies flourished. In the Scottish hills, shepherds “maintained a kind of circulating library”, writes Jonathan Rose in his magnificent book “The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes”. Each shepherd left books in the crannies of walls for other shepherds to read. In Victorian mill towns, workers saved up to buy books. In one Scottish locale, a boy noticed a ragman reading a book. The book—which the ragman lent him—was Thucydides. The boy was Ramsay MacDonald, who would go on to become Britain’s first Labour prime minister. Today that zeal for personal advancement has diminished. Some blame the high cost of books and closing of libraries for modern intellectual apathy—but books have never been cheaper. In Roman times, a book cost three-quarters of a camel (ie, a lot). In the Victorian era, a copy of Lord Byron’s “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage” cost a labourer about half a week’s income. And yet, by the end of the 18th century, literacy rates among Scotland’s autodidacts were among the highest in the world. Today “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage” is free on Kindle, and readers can find plenty of other books that cost less than a coffee. But reading rates keep falling. A blunter explanation is that people just cannot be bothered. Professor Bate got everyone in a bate with his comments about students not reading: saying such things, he admits, might seem “old fogeyish”. Speak to professors, however and they all lament their students’ waning attention spans. When Professor Rose began teaching, he taught “Bleak House”. He would not attempt it today, he says, partly because of “constant pressure” from university deans to “assign less and less and less reading” and partly because “students simply won’t read it”. In multiple surveys young people describe reading as “boring” and “a chore”. It is possible to say: who cares? English professors may well lament a fall in literacy, but that may be simple self-interest: less a concern about a declining custom than a declining number of customers. Yet literacy affects more than university reading lists. For one thing, increasing literary sophistication seems to lead to increasing political sophistication. At its simplest, Athenians in the fifth century BC could begin to practise “ostracism”—voting to banish people by writing their name on ostraka, scraps of pots—because, as William Harris, an academic, points out, they had achieved “a certain amount of literacy”. By contrast, decreasing** literary sophistication** may lead to decreasing political sophistication. Our analysis of Britain’s parliamentary speeches found that they have shrunk by a third in a decade. We also analysed almost 250 years of inaugural presidential addresses using the Flesch-Kincaid readability test. George Washington’s scored 28.7, denoting postgraduate level, while Donald Trump’s came in at 9.4, the reading level of a high-schooler. This is not inherently a bad thing. Often simple prose is good prose, and few people have ever wished politicians’ speeches to be longer. Professor Bate is more pessimistic. Lose the ability to read complex prose and he fears you may also lose the ability to develop complex ideas that “allow you to see nuance and to hold two contradictory thoughts together”. The medium is the message, and the message is currently 280 characters long. (“Bleak House”, by contrast, weighs in at around 1.9m characters.) There will be other losses from a reading decline. Few engines of social mobility are more effective than reading: just ask the Scottish shepherds. Rich children may do it more, but reading is an egalitarian invention. No one—not your nanny, not your tutor, your friends or your posh school—can impel you to devour a book except you. Reading is not merely a tool: it is also one of life’s great pleasures, as Dickens knew well. As Joe, the kind blacksmith in “Great Expectations”, says: “Give me a good book…and sit me down afore a good fire, and I ask no better.” Once people forget that, things really will feel bleak. ■ 大家好，今天要跟大家聊一個有點沉重，但也很有趣的主題：「閱讀的衰退，會不會讓政治變笨？」 故事要從一個實驗開始。美國兩所大學的文學系學生，被要求閱讀狄更斯《荒涼山莊》開頭的幾段文字，然後解釋其中的意思。聽起來簡單吧？結果——非常難。學生們完全被法律語言搞糊塗，被隱喻卡住。甚至有人以為「whiskers（鬍鬚）」是指「房間裡有動物吧？像是貓？」——可以想像教授們有多頭大。 問題不只是學生「不夠文學」，而是，他們甚至「不太識字」。 📉 各種研究都指出：我們正在「集體不讀書」。成年人讀得少，孩子讀得少，青少年讀得更少。連小朋友被爸媽念故事書的機會也下降了，許多甚至完全沒有。這就是所謂的「閱讀鴻溝」。 在美國，20 年內，閱讀休閒書籍的人數下降了 40%。英國情況也差不多：2024 年，四成的英國人一本書都沒讀。即使是大學生，他們也覺得讀一本小說要三週以上，好像在爬山。教授們說得更直接：年輕人「沒有專注的習慣」。 當然啦，學者抱怨年輕人不讀書，好像從古至今都一樣。蘇格拉底就曾擔心，文字會讓人健忘。《傳道書》裡也寫過：「著書多，沒有窮盡。」但現在的狀況似乎真的有點不一樣。 📖 文章裡提到一個有趣的發現：我們的句子越來越短。 《紐約時報》暢銷書裡的句子，平均比 1930 年代縮短了三分之一。 維多利亞時代的暢銷書《現代畫家》第一句長達 153 個字，還附帶哲學性的標題：「大眾的意見不是衡量優秀的標準。」對照現在 Amazon 的暢銷書，開頭只有 19 個字，標題則是「我如何改變人生」。更別提「方法」是：倒數 5 秒就能逼自己行動，像火箭發射一樣。 這種對比，不只是風格變了，而是「思維的深度」也可能跟著流失。 📱 很多人怪智慧型手機，說它搶走了我們的注意力。確實，分心比以前更容易。但其實「讀書本來就麻煩」。古希臘詩人就說過：「大本的書，就是大麻煩。」甚至在四世紀，一位修士寫道：讀到一半就打瞌睡，把書當枕頭。顯然，他也不是因為 Snapchat而分心的。 真正不同的是：想要讀的慾望，變少了。 維多利亞時代，工人和牧羊人拼命自學。他們會把書藏在石牆縫裡，輪流傳閱。有人甚至因為向破布商借到一本修昔底德，而啟發了政治志向，最後成為英國第一位工黨首相。那種對「知識改變命運」的熱情，如今似乎消失了。 有人說，是因為書太貴或圖書館關閉。但事實上，現在的書比歷史上任何時候都便宜。《哈羅德遊記》當年要一個工人半週工資才能買，而現在 Kindle 上免費。問題不是買不起，而是：大家懶得讀。 📚 教授們無奈地承認，他們已經不敢再開《荒涼山莊》這樣的大本書課程了。原因不只是學校壓力，而是學生根本「讀不下去」。在調查裡，年輕人直接說：讀書「很無聊」、「很累」。 那問題來了：我們真的需要擔心嗎？ 其實，閱讀和政治之間有著微妙的關係。古雅典能夠實行「陶片放逐法」，就是因為有足夠的識字率。識字能力，直接影響了政治參與和思考深度。 現代數據也反映了這點。英國國會的演講篇幅，十年內縮短了三分之一。美國總統的就職演說，用可讀性測試來比：華盛頓的演講屬於研究所等級；川普的演講，只有高中程度。 這不一定是壞事。簡單的文字，往往也能清楚有力。但學者們擔心的是：如果我們失去閱讀複雜文本的能力，就可能也失去思考複雜問題的能力。 無法同時容納矛盾，無法理解細微差異。當政治只剩下 280 個字的推文，深度自然也消失了。 最後還有一個更現實的問題：閱讀是社會流動的最佳工具之一。當年蘇格蘭牧羊人靠閱讀跨越階級，今天卻連免費的經典書籍都吸引不了人。閱讀，不只是學習的工具，更是一種生活的樂趣。 正如狄更斯筆下的鐵匠 Joe 說的：「給我一本好書，再加上一個暖爐，我就心滿意足。」 如果我們忘記了這種樂趣，人生可能真的會變得更「荒涼」。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

**The rise of **beer made by AI Customers love it Aug 27th 2025 WHEN BECK’S, a storied German brewery founded in the city of Bremen in 1873, celebrated its 150th anniversary in 2023 it decided to bring in a new brewmaster to mark the occasion: ChatGPT, an artificial-intelligence (AI) chatbot. The company asked it to whip up a recipe using only hops, yeast, water, and malt. The result was “Beck’s Autonomous”, a lager with a subtle sweetness, a hoppy** texture**, and quite a head. One Daily Mail reporter considered it better than the brewery’s standard lager. Beer and AI may seem an unlikely pairing, but Beck’s is far from the only brand to have asked for input from the technology. Atwater Brewery, an American firm, introduced an AI-designed citrusy India pale ale (IPA) in 2023 and last year St Austell Brewery in Britain used AI to create a tropical IPA dubbed “Hand Brewed by Robots”. In March Coedo Brewery in Japan asked an AI model to analyse the preferences of people in their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s, and then developed four craft beers, one for each age range. In general the response from customers, brewers say, has been overwhelmingly positive. “It gives us access to new recipes that we didn’t think about before,” says Prinz Pinakatt, boss of the beer business for Tilray Brands, Atwater’s New York-based parent company. Machine-learning tools can parse the minutiae of complex flavours, analyse the ingredients and equipment that an individual brewery has available, and then concoct new recipes while tweaking sweetness, acidity, hop level and other attributes to ensure the end product appeals to discerning customers. Beau Warren, who opened the Species X Beer Project brewery in America in 2021, knows this firsthand. In 2022 he started training AI models on a number of parameters—his proprietary recipes, different types of yeast, water acidity, various hops, the ingredients in the brewery cellar, the typical makeup of lagers, stouts and other beers—and, by 2024, began using it to guide the brewing process. In one instance, after being asked to make a new lager, the bot suggested mixing Maris Otter malt, usually found in stouts, with Belgian candi syrup. “I would never have thought of doing that in a lager, ever,” he says. “We brewed it anyway, and I thought it was one of the best lagers I’ve ever made.” His customers apparently thought the same: Mr Warren says patrons usually rated the AI-crafted beers better than any of the beers thought up by he and his fellow brewers. (That said, the AI beers at Species X are no more: the brewery closed down last autumn owing to financial difficulties.) Scientists are also intrigued about what bots might tell them about the chemistry of beer. In 2024 researchers from KU Leuven, a university in Belgium, analysed the chemical makeup of 250 Belgian beers, including lagers, blonds and West Flanders ales. They then trained machine-learning algorithms to model the effects of adding or subtracting different aroma compounds, such as glycerol and lactic acid, on the taste. “The models we develop help us to understand the complex relationship between the chemistry of a beer, its taste, and how consumers will like it,” says Kevin Verstrepen, a bioscience engineer who led the research team. Of course, it will take more than a chatbot to replace a human brewer. Ingredients must be poured, brew kettles must be tended and the beers must be tasted—whether they were made totally by human hands, or brewed, at least in part, by robots. “Yes, AI will become more and more part of the brewing process, but the brewing itself, the craft, is still the emphasis,” says Mr Pinakatt. “It will be very difficult to have machines make our beers.” ■ 當 Beck’s——這家創立於 1873 年、位於德國不來梅的老字號啤酒廠——在 2023 年迎來 150 週年慶時，他們決定邀請一位特別的釀酒師：人工智慧聊天機器人 ChatGPT。 公司要求它只使用啤酒的基本原料——啤酒花、酵母、水和麥芽——來設計一份新配方。最後誕生的是一款名為「Beck’s Autonomous」的拉格啤酒。這款酒帶有微微的甜味、濃郁的酒花香氣，還有豐厚的泡沫。根據《每日郵報》的記者試喝後表示，甚至比 Beck’s 的經典款還要好。 乍聽之下，啤酒和 AI 好像是八竿子打不著的組合，但 Beck’s 絕不是唯一嘗試的品牌。美國的 Atwater Brewery 在 2023 年推出了一款由 AI 設計的柑橘風味 IPA。隔年，英國的 St Austell Brewery 也用 AI 釀造出一款熱帶風味的 IPA，名字叫「Hand Brewed by Robots」。2024 年 3 月，日本的 Coedo Brewery 更是請 AI 分析不同年齡層——20、30、40、50 歲——的口味喜好，再釀出四款各自對應的精釀啤酒。總體來說，消費者的反應非常正面。 「這讓我們得到以前從沒想過的配方。」Atwater 母公司 Tilray Brands 啤酒業務負責人 Prinz Pinakatt 說。機器學習工具能精細分析複雜的風味、配料和釀酒設備，接著設計出新配方，並調整甜度、酸度、啤酒花的濃度等元素，確保最終的產品能打動挑剔的消費者。 美國的 Species X Beer Project 釀酒廠創辦人 Beau Warren 就深有體會。他在 2022 年開始訓練 AI 模型，輸入了自己的獨家配方、各種酵母、水的酸鹼度、不同的啤酒花、以及啤酒的種類數據。到 2024 年，他正式讓 AI 參與釀造過程。有一次，他要求 AI 設計一款新的拉格，結果 AI 建議把通常用在世濤啤酒的「Maris Otter 麥芽」，與比利時糖漿混合在一起。Warren 說：「我從來沒想過拉格會這樣做，但我們還是照著釀了，結果發現這是我喝過最好喝的拉格之一。」顧客的評價也很高，普遍認為 AI 釀造的酒比他和同事設計的更好。不過，儘管酒很受歡迎，Species X 最後還是在去年秋天因財務問題關閉了。 不只是釀酒師，科學家也對 AI 在啤酒化學上的應用充滿興趣。2024 年，比利時魯汶大學的研究團隊分析了 250 款當地啤酒，從拉格、金色啤酒到西佛蘭德艾爾。他們用機器學習模型來模擬不同化學物質——像是甘油和乳酸——對風味的影響。研究負責人、生命科學工程師 Kevin Verstrepen 說：「我們開發的模型能幫助理解啤酒化學成分、口感，以及消費者喜好的複雜關係。」 當然，AI 不會完全取代釀酒師。畢竟，原料要有人投入，釀酒槽要有人照看，啤酒最後也必須有人品嚐。Pinakatt 說：「是的，AI 會越來越多地參與釀酒過程，但釀酒的核心仍然是工藝與手藝。要完全靠機器來釀酒，是非常困難的。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Erotic writing is becoming more explicit Gardening metaphors are out. Other things are very much in Feb 27th 2025 START WITH the nipples. The lover does in “Mistress and Mother”, a steamy romantic novel from the 1990s. Though, since it was written three decades ago, they are not always called “nipples”. Instead, the author also discreetly describes them as “little buds”. Other erotica from this era has a similarly hearty, horticultural air: in another novel, the paramour enjoys his lover’s “rosebuds”; in a third, he moves lower to her enfolding “petals”. In other books there is swelling, blooming and, of course, “seed”. The aim is oblique eroticism. The overall effect is of an unexpectedly energetic gardening catalogue. But eroticism is changing. Open “Onyx Storm”, the latest romantasy book (a genre that blends romance and fantasy) by Rebecca Yarros, and things are rather clearer. Hardy perennials are out. Words like “hard” are in—as too are words including “cock”, “fuck” and “straddle”. And people are buying it. Sales of erotica are booming: thanks to pre-orders, “Onyx Storm” had already been on Amazon’s bestseller list for 19 weeks by the time it was published in January. After release, it shifted almost 3m copies in a week. It sold faster than any novel in America in the past 20 years. There is now a vast variety of erotica available, including cosy erotica (knitwear is torn off), Austen erotica (Mr Darcy has assets even more impressive than £10,000 a year) and fairy erotica. There is even erotica featuring—readers may wish to brace themselves—physicists. These titles contain such explicit lines as, “Your dissertation on liquid crystals’ static distortions in biaxial nematics was brilliant, Elsie.” Sex is not entirely novel for the novel, as readers of E.L. James and Alan Hollinghurst will know. But it is more frank and frequent. “The spiciness seems to be increasing,” says James Daunt, chief executive of Barnes & Noble and Waterstones, two bookshop chains. Look at the corpus of English fiction and the word “nipples” has doubled in frequency since the year 2000, while “orgasm” has quintupled; use of the word “clit” is 14 times higher. In some ways this is unexpected. It was once assumed that erotica was a male pursuit and that its appeal was not merely the sex but the sin. Obscenity was legally defined in Britain in 1868 by a judge called—in a detail no novelist would dare attempt—Justice Cockburn. “Nine-tenths of the appeal of pornography”, wrote Bertrand Russell, a philosopher, “is due to the indecent feelings concerning sex which moralists inculcate in the young.” Obscenity laws were relaxed in Britain in the 1960s in the wake of the “Lady Chatterley’s Lover” trial, but the illicit thrill remained. The world has changed since then. The moralists have faded. Whatever hold the patriarchy had on publishing has waned. Yet the sex remains, and it is women who are driving it. Most of these books are being written, edited and published by women. They are bought, in vast numbers, by women. The novels are promoted by women on social-media platforms, particularly TikTok, using hashtags such as #Spicybooks and #Steamyreads, then appear on Amazon with the phrase “TikTok made me buy it!”, which sounds less like an endorsement than a defence. As the interest in #Darkromance shows, this sex is not all nice. In Ms Yarros’s books, the hero pins the heroine violently to the floor in wrestling matches; in the romantasy novels of Sarah J. Maas, who has sold almost 40m copies, faeries do things that would make Tinker Bell blush. What has driven this is new digital formats, such as audiobooks. (Ms Yarros and Ms Maas dominate those charts, too.) The e-book has been especially consequential. It is discreet—no one can see what you are reading on a tablet. And it lets authors self-publish cheaply, as Ms James did in 2011 with “Fifty Shades of Grey”, a story of sadomasochism. It was later republished by Vintage, but romance lovers retained the habit of reading books digitally. Authorial autonomy online means it is “impossible to police” what goes into books, says Hal Gladfelder of the University of Manchester. The ubiquity of internet pornography means that even to try to do so would feel “ridiculous”. In one sense this new generation of erotic prose is more realistic than what came before. Floral analogies are out; proper body parts are in. But in another sense, it is not remotely realistic. Everyone is gorgeous; names like “Xaden” and “Aetos” dominate; most characters have remarkable powers, if not superpowers. In Ms Yarros’s books, the hero and heroine, who are long-term lovers, can creep into each other’s minds, where they find each other thinking hot thoughts in an italic font, such as “How do you want me to take you?” and “You’re astounding” rather than, as might be the fear, “Did I switch the tumble dryer on?” or “It was definitely your turn to take the bins out.” It is easy to smirk, but writing about sex is tricky—as a trawl through the back catalogue of the Bad Sex in Fiction Awards shows. The now-defunct prize, which ended during the pandemic, was set up in 1993 by Britain’s Literary Review to “highlight and gently discourage redundant, poorly written or unnecessarily pornographic descriptions of sex in fiction”. Given that the contenders in its final years included such phrases as she “offer[ed] her moist parts to my triumphant phallus” and her vagina was “slowly chugging my organ as a boa constrictor swallows its prey”, perhaps the discouragement was too gentle. Part of the difficulty in writing about sex is what Julian Barnes, an English writer, called “the naming of parts”: “At the basic level, he put his what into her—or indeed his—what?” “Boa constrictor” is probably best avoided, but, as Mr Barnes observed, almost all terms are tricky. “Where between the Latinate and the Anglo-Saxon do you pitch it?” Being biological can be as bad as being too oblique, as a contender for the Bad Sex award in 2019 clearly showed. “I have 8,000 nerves in my clitoris,” explained one character. “Your penis gets by on 4,000.” (Such a pronouncement would leave most lovers unsure whether to take notes or take flight.) At times characters seem to be enjoying sex as little as the reader. In a nominated work of 2019 a character, in a moment of high passion, “screamed as though [she] were being run over by a train”. The reader can only sympathise. Most winners of the prize were, unsurprisingly, men: the male gaze does not always improve male prose. But the internet is changing the balance of power in fictional sex, just as it has in actual sex. Male misbehaviour is called out by such things as the “menwritingwomen” Reddit thread. (John Updike—the “penis with a thesaurus”—features heavily.) A popular parody pokes fun at a man writing a woman’s morning: “Cassandra…breasted boobily to the stairs, and titted downwards.” Eroticism always “reflects what is going on in society at the time”, says Sharon Kendrick, a popular British romantic author. In the liberal 1970s, literary lotharios were in fashion. The arrival of the AIDs pandemic in the 1980s brought on a period of “sexual fastidiousness” and heroes who had one true love and a condom. The new generation of erotic prose may be easy to mock. But it is reflecting a society in which women can often get precisely what they want. That should give any feminist a bit of a thrill. ■ 情色寫作變得更加直白 園藝隱喻退場，露骨詞彙登場 從乳頭開始。至少在《情婦與母親》這本1990年代的火辣愛情小說中，戀人是這樣的。不過，三十年前的作品裡，它們不一定被稱為「乳頭」，作者還會含蓄地稱之為「小花苞」。 那個年代的情色作品普遍有著濃厚的「園藝風格」：另一部小說裡，情人讚嘆伴侶的「玫瑰花蕾」；在第三部作品中，他往下移動，探索她環抱的「花瓣」。書中不乏「膨脹」「綻放」，甚至「種子」的意象。當時追求的是含蓄的情慾，整體讀來更像一本精力充沛的園藝型錄。 如今情色風格已然轉變。打開麗貝卡．亞羅斯（Rebecca Yarros）的最新浪漫奇幻小說《縱橫風暴》（Onyx Storm），場景截然不同。多年生植物退場，取而代之的是「硬」這樣的直白字眼——以及「屌」「幹」「跨坐」等詞彙。讀者也買單。情色文學銷量正大幅成長：靠著預購，《縱橫風暴》在1月出版前已連續19週位居亞馬遜暢銷榜。出版後一週內就賣出近300萬冊，成為過去20年美國銷售速度最快的小說。 現在市面上情色作品種類繁多，包括「溫馨型情色」（毛衣被撕裂）、「奧斯汀風情色」（達西先生的資產不僅僅是一年一萬英鎊）以及「精靈情色」。甚至還有主角是物理學家的作品，其中出現這樣火熱的句子：「你那篇關於液晶雙軸靜態扭曲的論文真是太出色了，艾爾希。」 性在小說中並非全新元素，EL．詹姆斯（E. L. James）與艾倫．霍林赫斯特（Alan Hollinghurst）的讀者早就知道。但現在它更直接、更頻繁。Barnes & Noble 與 Waterstones 兩大連鎖書店的執行長詹姆斯．道恩特（James Daunt）說：「辣度似乎在提升。」英語小說語料庫顯示，自2000年以來，「nipple（乳頭）」的使用頻率翻倍，「orgasm（高潮）」增加五倍，「clit（陰蒂）」更是高出14倍。 某種程度上，這樣的轉變出乎意料。過去人們認為情色主要是男性的嗜好，其吸引力來自於「性」與「禁忌」。1868年英國對「猥褻」的法律定義，由一位名叫——小說家恐怕不敢編造——寇克本（Cockburn）的大法官所作出。哲學家羅素曾寫道：「色情吸引力的九成，源於道德家在年輕人心中灌輸的猥褻情緒。」英國的猥褻法在1960年代《查泰萊夫人的情人》審判後逐漸鬆動，但禁忌帶來的刺激仍然存在。 而今世代不同了。道德家退場，父權在出版界的掌控力也減弱。然而性仍在，只是推動它的已是女性。這些作品大多由女性撰寫、編輯與出版，也被女性大量購買。社群媒體上，特別是在TikTok，女性讀者以 #Spicybooks 與 #Steamyreads 等標籤推廣，最後在亞馬遜出現「TikTok讓我買的！」的字樣——聽起來更像是一種辯解，而非背書。 不過，這些作品的性愛並非總是溫柔。#Darkromance 的流行便是一例。亞羅斯的小說裡，男主角會在角力中將女主角猛然壓倒在地；莎拉．J．馬斯（Sarah J. Maas）的浪漫奇幻小說裡，精靈的行徑足以讓小叮噹(奇妙仙子)臉紅。 推動這股浪潮的，是新的數位載體，例如有聲書（亞羅斯與馬斯在榜上同樣稱霸）。電子書尤其關鍵：它能保有隱私——沒人能看出你在平板上讀什麼；它也讓作者能以低成本自費出版，正如2011年E. L.詹姆斯的《格雷的五十道陰影》，後來雖由Vintage再版，但浪漫讀者已經習慣於數位閱讀。 曼徹斯特大學的哈爾．格拉德費爾德（Hal Gladfelder）指出，網路讓作者完全自主，因此「幾乎不可能審查」。在網路色情遍布的今天，即使想管制也顯得「荒謬」。 某種程度上，這一代的情色小說比過去更「寫實」：花卉隱喻消失，身體部位直接點名。但另一方面，它又一點也不寫實。角色人人俊美，名字不是「薩登」（Xaden）就是「艾托斯」（Aetos），多數還擁有非凡甚至超能力。亞羅斯筆下的情侶甚至能進入彼此的心靈，讀到對方用斜體字傳遞的火熱心思，例如「你想要我怎麼要你？」或「你太驚人了」，而不是「我有把烘衣機關掉嗎？」或「今天明明是你該倒垃圾吧？」 固然容易譏諷，但性愛描寫確實困難。《壞性描寫獎》（Bad Sex in Fiction Award）的歷年入圍作證明了這點。該獎於1993年由《英國文學評論》創立，目的是「提醒並溫和地勸阻多餘、拙劣或過度色情的性描寫」。不過，最後幾年的參賽句子像是「她將濕潤的部位奉獻給我勝利的陽具」或「她的陰道像蟒蛇吞食獵物般，慢慢啃食我的器官」，恐怕勸阻力道還不夠。 英國作家朱利安．巴恩斯（Julian Barnes）曾指出，寫性愛最大的困難在於「命名部位」：「最基本的層面就是，他把他的什麼放進了她——或他的——什麼？」「蟒蛇」的比喻或許最好避免，但正如他所說，幾乎所有詞彙都帶有難題——要在拉丁學術語與盎格魯粗俗語之間找到平衡並不容易。 過於生物學化同樣尷尬。2019年某部入圍作品中，角色竟在高潮時宣稱：「我的陰蒂有八千條神經，你的陰莖只有四千。」（這樣的話恐怕會讓伴侶不知該做筆記還是落荒而逃。）另一位角色則在激情時刻「尖叫得像被火車輾過」，讓讀者不禁同情。 這個獎項多數得主毫不意外地都是男性：男性凝視並不總能讓文字更好。而網路正在改變情色書寫中的權力分配，就像在真實性別關係中一樣。男性的失誤經常被公開嘲諷，例如 Reddit 的「menwritingwomen」版面（常客包括「拿著字典的陽具」約翰．厄普代克）。還有人戲仿男性筆下的女性日常：「卡珊卓……胸部晃動地走下樓梯，並一路抖動著往下走。」 英國暢銷愛情作家莎朗．肯德里克（Sharon Kendrick）說，情色書寫一向「反映當下社會氛圍」。在自由奔放的1970年代，浪子角色當道；1980年代愛滋疫情帶來「性謹慎」時代，小說英雄變成只有一位真愛、而且會戴保險套。 新一代情色小說或許容易被取笑，但它反映的，正是一個女性常能獲得她們真正渴望的社會。這對任何一位女權主義者而言，應該都能帶來一絲快意。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China | For good or ill Hong Kong is super superstitious Why** prophetic artists** and feng-shui masters hold such sway Aug 14th 2025|Hong Kong|3 min read TATSUKI RYO is the finest diviner since Nostradamus, in the view of many Hong Kongers. In 1999 the Japanese manga artist published a collection of supposedly prophetic dreams warning of a “great disaster, year 2011, month 3.” In March 2011 Japan suffered from an earthquake, tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear meltdown; perhaps 18,000 people died. So when her manga predicted that a mega-tsunami would strike Japan on July 5th 2025, it caused alarm. Luckily, like her 16th-century antecedent (who thought the world would end in 2012), Ms Tatsuki often gets things wrong. She thought Mount Fuji would erupt in August 2021. And July 5th came and went. But on July 30th there was a magnitude 8.8 earthquake off Russia’s eastern coast, which prompted tsunami warnings around the Pacific. Fortunately no one died and the tallest tsunami waves to reach Japanese shores were only 1.3m high. (In 2011 they reached almost 40m.) Yet fans and anxious theorists saw the event on July 30th as another confirmation of her powers. The prophecy sent tremors of fear across Asian social media in June. But Hong Kongers took it particularly seriously. Several prominent feng-shui masters, experts in ancient Chinese geomancy, warned locals to heed Ms Tatsuki’s advice not to visit Japan ahead of July 5th. The number of Hong Kongers who did so plunged by more than a third in June compared with a year earlier, while visitor numbers from almost all other places rose. Local carriers, such as Hong Kong Airlines, suspended flight routes to Japan because of the drop in demand. Japan will sting from all this. Though only home to 7.5m people, Hong Kong was the fifth-largest source of international visitors to Japan last year and its holidaymakers spent HK$33bn ($4bn) there. Even hard-nosed types stayed away. One Hong Kong-based financial consultant reports that his boss has refused to take in-person meetings in Japan all summer; she made him attend them in her stead. This is all a reminder of how pervasive superstition is in Hong Kong, even compared with the rest of Asia. Tower blocks frequently skip all floors with the number “four” because its Cantonese pronunciation is similar to the word for “death”. Properties thought to be inhabited by ghosts lose a fifth of their value on average, according to a paper in 2020 by Utpal Bhattacharya of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. And feng shui guides the design of even the most sober organisations’ offices. HSBC’s headquarters has escalators reportedly angled to ward off evil spirits. The Economist’s offices contain old coins for prosperity and a dragon image for good luck, left by a visiting feng-shui master in recent years. There is little harm in any of this. But superstition shouldn’t supersede science. The Hong Kong Observatory, a public body, was forced to release numerous statements in recent months reminding locals that it is impossible to predict an earthquake. Seismologists and disaster experts also weighed in. Even Ms Tatsuki cautioned her fans to heed scientific advice. But their urgings did little to quell the disquiet. Something similar happened during the SARS outbreak in 2003: many Hong Kongers spurned official disease-prevention steps, instead turning to herbs to **ward off **the virus. You don’t need to be a soothsayer to see that sometimes superstition can have rather frightening consequences. ■ 香港極度迷信 為何預言藝術家與風水師能掌握如此大的影響力 2025年8月14日 | 香港 | 閱讀時間 3 分鐘 在許多香港人眼中，**龍樹徹（Tatsuki Ryo）**堪稱繼諾查丹瑪斯之後最優秀的預言家。1999年，這位日本漫畫家出版了一本收錄所謂「預知夢」的漫畫集，當中警告「2011年3月將有大災難」。果然在2011年3月，日本遭遇大地震、海嘯與福島核災，或許多達1.8萬人喪生。因此，當她的漫畫預言「2025年7月5日將有超級海嘯襲擊日本」時，引發了極大的恐慌。 幸運的是，和16世紀的前輩（他曾斷言世界將在2012年終結）一樣，龍樹女士的預言往往錯誤百出。她認為富士山會在2021年8月噴發，但並未成真。而7月5日也平安無事。不過在7月30日，俄羅斯遠東海域發生規模8.8的強震，並一度引發太平洋沿岸的海嘯警報。幸好並無人員傷亡，日本沿岸最高的海嘯浪高僅1.3公尺（2011年時則接近40公尺）。然而，許多粉絲與焦慮的論者仍將7月30日的事件視為她「靈驗」的又一證據。 這項預言早在6月便在亞洲社群媒體掀起恐慌，香港人尤其當真。幾位著名的風水師——古老中國堪輿學的專家——警告大眾要遵循龍樹女士的建議，不要在7月5日前往日本。結果，6月香港赴日人數較去年同期銳減逾三分之一，而幾乎所有其他國家的訪日人數卻上升。由於需求驟降，香港航空等當地航空公司被迫暫停部分日本航線。 對日本而言，這無疑是一大打擊。雖然香港僅有750萬人口，但去年卻是日本第五大國際旅客來源地，港人旅日消費達330億港元（約40億美元）。就連精於算計的專業人士也不例外。一名在港的金融顧問透露，他的上司整個夏天都拒絕赴日開會，最後只能派他代為出席。 這再一次提醒世人，香港的迷信氛圍之濃厚，即便與亞洲其他地方相比亦不遑多讓。許多大樓乾脆跳過所有帶有「四」的樓層，因為「四」的廣東話發音近似「死」。據香港科技大學的巴塔查里亞（Utpal Bhattacharya）2020年的研究，傳聞鬧鬼的房產平均會跌價兩成。就連最嚴肅的機構辦公室設計也遵循風水之道。滙豐銀行總部的自動扶梯據說是以特殊角度安裝，用以驅邪避煞。《經濟學人》的香港辦公室內則留有幾枚古錢幣與一幅龍圖騰，據說是近年一位風水師來訪時留下的吉祥佈局。 這些做法大致無傷大雅。但迷信卻不該凌駕科學。近月來，香港天文台不得不多次發表聲明，提醒市民地震無法預測。地震學家與防災專家也紛紛表態。甚至龍樹本人也勸告粉絲要聽從科學建議。 然而，這些呼籲對平息不安收效甚微。2003年SARS爆發時，情況亦曾類似：許多香港人不遵循官方防疫措施，反而轉向草藥以求避疫。不需要做預言家也能看出，迷信有時會帶來相當可怕的後果。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

**“Comrade” **is making a comeback in China Or so the government hopes Jul 24th 2025|Beijing DURING THE decades when Mao Zedong ruled China, it was common for people to address each other as tongzhi: “comrade”. Like its English equivalent, the word has an egalitarian ring, as well as a hint of revolutionary fervour. But after Mao’s death in 1976, and the market reforms that followed, the term tongzhi started to feel a little dated. Less** ideological** greetings took its place: like xiansheng (“mister”), meinu (“beautiful woman”) and laoban (“boss”). So** it caused a stir **when the People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece, published an opinion piece this month calling for the word tongzhi to return to everyday speech. Modern greetings can sound frivolous or phoney, the author complained. Some are even “sugar-coated bullets”, they warned, using a Maoist term for bourgeois customs that *corrupt* the working class. Better, then, to return to the greeting used “back when people were simple and honest”. The party often tries to stoke nostalgia for the days of high socialism in order to bolster its support. In recent years local governments have encouraged “red tourism” at sites like Mao’s hometown to teach people about the history of the party (needless to say, they are given a version without all the bloodshed). Some firms send employees on “red” teambuilding courses where they dress up as **guerillas **from the 1930s and trek along muddy mountain paths. In 2015 party members, though not the general public, were told to call each other tongzhi again as a way of “purifying” political culture. The term seems unlikely to make a comeback outside the party, however. For one thing, since the 1990s tongzhi has become a popular slang term for gay people, catching on because it sounded neither pejorative nor clinical, unlike most of the alternatives. For a time one of China’s biggest LGBT-rights organisations, based in the capital, was known as the “Beijing tongzhi Centre” (it closed in 2023 under political pressure). But many people have criticised the idea for another reason. Since the death of Mao, China has become far richer—but the wealth has not been spread evenly. The country’s Gini coefficient , a common measure of** income inequality,** rose sharply in the 1990s and is now higher than that of America, according to official estimates. Inequalities have particularly started to sting as the economy has sputtered. “Who should you call tongzhi?” asked one person in a post on Weibo, a social-media platform. “Someone with the same rights, assets…work and salary. Those earning 2,000 yuan ($280) a month can hardly call those earning 20,000 yuan their tongzhi.” There is little sense of camaraderie between China’s haves and have-nots. ■ 「同志」在中國重現風潮？ ** 政府寄望重新流行** ** 2025年7月24日｜北京** **在毛澤東主政的數十年間，中國人彼此之間常以「同志」相稱。這個詞彙與英文 **comrade 相似，既帶有平等意味，也蘊含革命熱情。然而， 1976年毛澤東逝世、隨後市場改革推行後，「同志」逐漸顯得過時，取而代之的是更少意識形態色彩的稱呼，例如「先生」、「美女」與「老闆」。 因此，當中共喉舌《人民日報》本月發表評論文章，呼籲讓「同志」回歸日常用語時，引起了社會關注。文章批評現代稱呼顯得輕浮甚至虛假，部分更是「糖衣炮彈」——這一毛澤東時期的用語指資產階級風俗對工人階級的腐蝕。評論認為，應回到「人們樸實誠懇的年代」的稱呼方式。 中共時常試圖喚起對高社會主義時代的懷舊情緒，以鞏固支持。近年地方政府推廣「紅色旅遊」，引導民眾參觀毛澤東故鄉等景點，學習黨史（當然，版本中略去血腥部分）。部分企業也會安排員工參加「紅色」團建活動，換上上世紀三○年代游擊隊裝束，踏上泥濘山道。2015年，黨員（但非公眾）曾被要求恢復以「同志」相稱，以「純化」政治文化。 然而，「同志」重回大眾語境的可能性似乎不大。其一，自1990年代起，「同志」在中國成為同志族群的流行稱謂，因為它既不帶貶義，也不似其他詞語般生硬。一度，中國最大之一的同志權益組織——「北京同志中心」便以此為名（該中心於2023年在政治壓力下關閉）。 此外，更多人批評的原因在於現今社會的巨大貧富差距。毛澤東去世後，中國雖然更加富裕，但財富分配並不均衡。中國的吉尼係數 (收入平等的指數) 在1990年代急劇上升，目前官方估計高於美國；相比之下，。隨著經濟放緩，不平等感尤為強烈。有人在社交媒體微博上發文質疑：「你要叫誰同志？權利、資產、工作和薪水都一樣的人嗎？月薪2000元的人，怎麼能叫月薪2萬元的人同志？」如今，中國的貧富兩端之間，已難再找到真正的同志情誼。 ■ -> 小分享 男性廢退：失落、孤僻、漫無目的，生而為「男」我很抱歉？苦苦掙扎的男性困境，我們能怎麼做。 Of Boys and Men: Why the Modern Male Is Struggling, Why It Matters, and What to Do about It -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Science & technology | Well informed Do** probiotics** work? For a healthy microbiome, eating your greens is a surer bet Jul 18th 2025|3 min read A DAZZLING menagerie of microbes live inside the human gut—by some counts a few thousand different species. Most residents of this gut microbiome are not the disease-causing kind. In fact, many do useful jobs, such as breaking down certain carbohydrates, fibres and proteins that the human body would otherwise struggle to digest. Some even produce essential compounds the body cannot make on its own, like B vitamins and short-chain fatty acids, which help regulate inflammation, influence the immune system and affect metabolism. As awareness of the microbiome has grown, the shelves of health-food shops have become stocked with products designed to boost good bacteria. These usually fall into two categories: probiotics, capsules containing live (but freeze-dried) bacteria that, in theory, spring back to life once inside your gut; and prebiotics, pills made of fibres that beneficial bacteria feed on. There may be good scientific reasons to tend one’s microbiome. Having a diverse array of gut bugs, with plenty of the good kind, seems to confer broad health benefits. A varied microbial population can fend off pathogens by competing with them for nutrients and space. Reduced diversity, by contrast, has been linked to obesity, type-2 **diabetes *and* irritable bowel syndrome (IBS)**. Evidence for causal links is growing: randomised-controlled trials have shown that tweaking the microbiome can accelerate weight loss, reverse insulin resistance and improve IBS symptoms. The microbiome’s influence may stretch well beyond the gut. Microbes seem to be important for mood: people with depression have less microbial variety in their guts than those without do, for example. One study from 2016, published in the Journal of Psychiatric Research, even found that transplanting the microbiome of a depressed person into a rat caused the animal to display behaviour characteristic of depression. An off-kilter microbiome has also been linked to respiratory infections: mice with fewer gut microbes are more likely to catch pneumonia or influenza. For a diverse microbiome, diet matters. Microbes thrive on foods rich in fibre and digestion-resistant starch, so munching on fresh fruit, vegetables, legumes and nuts is a good place to start. Fermented foods and drinks, such as yogurt, sauerkraut and kombucha, also contain friendly micro-organisms like Lactobacillus. Avoiding unnecessary antibiotics is important, as they wipe out good bacteria along with the bad. Supplements seem equally appealing, but because they are not regulated as medicines, many have not been rigorously tested. “It is absolute cowboy territory in terms of marketing”, says Ted Dinan, a psychiatrist at University College Cork who studies the influence of the microbiome on mental health. Fortunately for consumers based in America, Britain and Canada, academics in those countries have developed apps (each called The Probiotic Guide) that can be used to search for probiotic products and check what scientific evidence, if any, backs them up. Nothing so comprehensive exists for prebiotics, as yet. Taking the wrong product may not do much good, but it probably won’t do much harm either. “You really cannot overdose on probiotics,” says Glenn Gibson, a microbiologist at the University of Reading. Taking too many prebiotics, however, could temporarily disrupt the microbiome. The likely side-effect? “Gas,” he says. “But that’s more just antisocial than anything else.”■ 科學與科技｜資訊豐富 益生菌真的有效嗎？ 若想擁有健康的腸道菌叢，多吃蔬菜才是更穩妥的方法 2025年7月18日｜閱讀時間約3分鐘 人類腸道內住著絢麗多樣的微生物群——據說有數千種不同的物種。大多數腸道微生物並不會引發疾病。事實上，許多微生物對人體有益，例如分解某些碳水化合物、纖維與蛋白質，這些是人體本身較難消化的食物。有些微生物甚至能合成人體無法自行製造的必要化合物，如B群維生素與短鏈脂肪酸，這些物質有助於調節發炎反應、影響免疫系統以及新陳代謝。 隨著大眾對腸道菌叢的認識日益增加，健康食品商店的貨架上也擺滿了旨在促進好菌生長的產品。這些產品主要分為兩類：益生菌——含有活性（但經冷凍乾燥處理）細菌的膠囊，理論上可在進入腸道後復活；以及益生元——由纖維製成的膠囊，提供益菌生長所需的營養來源。 從科學角度來看，照護腸道菌叢確實有其益處。擁有種類多樣的腸道菌群，尤其是大量的有益菌，似乎能帶來整體健康的好處。多樣化的微生物群可透過與病原菌競爭營養與空間來抑制其生長。相反地，腸道菌叢缺乏多樣性則與肥胖、第二型糖尿病以及腸躁症（IBS）相關。這些關聯的因果證據也日益充足：隨機對照試驗顯示，調整腸道菌群可加快體重減輕、逆轉胰島素阻抗，並改善腸躁症症狀。 腸道菌群的影響可能遠超出腸道本身。研究指出微生物對情緒也具有關鍵作用：例如，患有憂鬱症的人，其腸道內的微生物多樣性通常低於未罹病者。一項2016年刊登於《精神病學研究期刊》的研究甚至發現，將一位憂鬱症患者的腸道菌叢移植至老鼠體內，會導致該老鼠出現類似憂鬱的行為反應。失衡的腸道菌叢也與呼吸道感染相關：腸道微生物較少的老鼠更容易感染肺炎或流感。 若想擁有多樣的腸道菌群，飲食至關重要。微生物偏好富含纖維與抗性澱粉的食物，因此多攝取新鮮水果、蔬菜、豆類與堅果是一個良好的起點。發酵食品與飲品，如優格、德國酸菜與康普茶，也含有益菌如乳酸桿菌。此外，避免不必要的抗生素使用也很重要，因為抗生素不分好壞菌，一併清除。 營養補給品看似同樣吸引人，但由於不像藥品那樣受到嚴格監管，因此許多產品尚未經過嚴謹的科學測試。研究腸道菌叢對心理健康影響的愛爾蘭科克大學精神科醫師泰德·迪南（Ted Dinan）表示：「目前的市場行銷簡直就是狂野西部的無政府狀態。」 所幸，對於美國、英國與加拿大的消費者來說，這些國家的學者已開發出名為《益生菌指南》（The Probiotic Guide）的應用程式，幫助用戶搜尋益生菌產品，並查詢是否有科學證據支持其功效。不過，目前尚無同樣完善的益生元產品指南。 選錯產品可能不會帶來太大好處，但通常也不至於造成嚴重傷害。「你基本上不可能攝取過量的益生菌，」雷丁大學微生物學家格倫·吉布森（Glenn Gibson）說。但若攝取過多益生元，則可能暫時擾亂腸道菌叢。最常見的副作用是什麼？「脹氣排氣，」他說，「但這頂多只是讓他人不太舒服罷了。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Why all Indians are** rule-breakers** Because the state makes it impossible not to be Jul 3rd 2025|4 min read IF YOU HAVE ever relaxed with a cold Kingfisher beer at the end of a long, sweaty day in Mumbai, the party capital of India, you have almost certainly broken the law. Specifically, you violated section 40 of the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949, under which you must hold a permit to drink booze. A first offence is punishable by a fine of 10,000 rupees ($115) and up to six months in prison. Welcome to India, where everything is against the law. According to Vidhi, a legal think-tank in Delhi, India has 7,305 crimes at the national level, three-quarters of which attract imprisonment. India is hardly alone in overcriminalisation. But even America, not exactly known as soft on crime, had a more modest 5,199 federal crimes at last count in 2019. China imposes the death penalty for 46 crimes. In India the number is 301 (though rarely applied). The central government’s ardour for lawmaking and punishment is infectious. India’s 28 states, which control vast swathes of policy, are no less assiduous in regulating everyday life. The state of Uttarakhand, to pick one, requires couples in live-in relationships to register (and pay a fee) within 30 days of shacking up. Failure to comply attracts a fine and up to three months in prison. What of love lost? The unhappy couple must de-register (and pay another fee). Uttarakhand is particularly energetic but few states pass up the chance to make citizens visit the registrar. Then there are tax rules that make almost everyone cower. Renters paying over a lowish threshold must withhold a proportion of the rent from landlords and deposit it with the state as tax, which can involve obtaining a special tax number and hiring an accountant. Some people must pay income tax four times a year. Penalties for errors or delays are high. In June the authorities increased fines for misreported income or false deductions to “up to 200% of the tax due, 24% annual interest, and even prosecution”. There is no leeway for honest mistakes. Businesses have it worse. Companies that grow beyond even a small size must compulsorily register for a goods-and-services tax, disincentivising expansion. They must register in each state in which they have any activity, even if they have no physical presence there. They must also pay taxes withheld from buyers every month, regardless of whether they have been paid. Big companies have legal and compliance departments. Small ones struggle. A convoluted tax code means it is easy to mess up. Beyond the big-ticket items of crime and tax there exists a third category of rules so baffling it defies labels. Cities build fancy new elevated roads only to set speed limits as low as 30km per hour (18mph). Local authorities brick up entrances to public spaces for “safety reasons”. Airport security confiscates packets of spice mixes but allows packets of noodles that contain packets of spice mixes. It is hard to escape the sense that there is no logic behind the rules. That is because there isn’t, say people who have worked with government. Policy can be made just because an official says “I think it’s a good idea.” To save energy, a central-government minister says air-conditioners should function only between 20°C and 28°C,** boasting of** a “first-of-its-kind experiment”. A minister in Kerala wants to fine people who use their phones while crossing the street. In Goa, a holiday state, a new policy makes it mandatory for beach shacks to serve “freshly cooked Goan cuisine”. The tourism minister stipulates that this means fish curry and rice, though there is no such clause. The usual excuse for India’s surfeit of laws and rules is colonialism’s legacy. Indeed, in 2023 India decriminalised 183 defunct provisions in 42 laws. The government is working on a second rationalisation and setting up a deregulation commission to ease the burden on business. A tax bill is in the works. These are welcome moves. But the deeper problem lies in the attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats. “We think the state must have a say in every aspect of an individual’s life,” says Arghya Sengupta of Vidhi. “Everything is game for legislation.” The outcome is to make Indians less law-abiding, not more. Why follow the rules when everything is verboten? Why start a business or expand a successful one if it will only attract attention and more compliance? One high-ranking official complains that the state sets impossibly high standards and then claims that Indians are lawless. But “You have made it impossible for them to follow the law.” ■ 為什麼印度人都違規？ 因為國家讓人無法不違規 2025年7月3日 如果你曾在孟買──印度的派對之都──結束一整天汗流浹背的日子後，輕鬆地來一瓶冰涼的金飛蛇啤酒，那麼你幾乎可以確定已經違法了。具體來說，你違反了《1949年孟買禁酒法》第40條，根據該法令，飲酒必須持有特別許可證。首次違規可處10,000盧比（約115美元）罰金，甚至可被判處6個月徒刑。 歡迎來到印度——一個萬事皆可能違法的國度。根據德里法律智庫 Vidhi 的統計，印度全國層級的刑事罪行多達7,305項，其中四分之三可處以監禁。印度並非唯一法律過度氾濫的國家；但即使是對犯罪向來強硬的美國，2019年統計時聯邦刑事罪也只有5,199項。中國對46種罪行處以死刑，而印度的數字是301項（雖然極少執行）。 聯邦政府對立法與懲罰的熱情，已傳染至地方。印度的28個邦也熱衷於干預日常生活。舉例來說，北阿坎德邦規定同居情侶必須在30天內登記並繳交費用，否則將面臨罰款與最高三個月的徒刑。若情變分手，還需重新登記取消，並再次繳費。雖說北阿坎德的作法格外積極，但其他邦也幾乎不放過任何一次讓人民跑一趟登記處的機會。 然後是令人膽寒的稅務規定。租金超過一定門檻的房客必須預扣部分租金作為稅金代繳給政府，這往往涉及申請特殊稅號，甚至需聘請會計師。有些人一年必須報繳四次所得稅。錯誤或延誤的罰金極高。今年6月，當局更提高了錯報收入或虛報扣除的罰則：罰金最高為應繳稅額的200%、年息24%，甚至可能遭起訴。誠實錯誤亦無從通融。 企業的處境更為艱難。公司一旦規模稍有擴張，便強制要求登記營業稅（GST），反而成為擴張的阻力。此外，只要企業在某個邦有業務行為（即使沒有實體據點），就必須向該邦登記並繳稅。即使尚未收款，也要預繳從買家那邊預扣的稅金。大公司尚有法務與稽核部門處理，小公司則苦不堪言。複雜的稅制也讓出錯變得再容易不過。 除了刑事與稅務這類重大事項外，還有一類荒謬至極、難以歸類的規定。城市建好高架道路，卻將限速設為30公里／小時。地方政府為了「安全」封磚公園出入口。機場安檢沒收香料包，卻放行內含香料的泡麵包。這些規則彷彿毫無邏輯。 事實上，這正是問題所在。與政府合作過的人坦言，政策常常是官員一句「我覺得這是個好主意」就拍板定案。例如中央部長為了節能，宣稱冷氣溫度應限定在20°C到28°C之間，還說這是「全球首創實驗」。喀拉拉邦的部長建議，行人過馬路時若滑手機應處罰。在渡假勝地果阿邦，新規定則強制海灘小吃店必須供應「現煮的果阿料理」，觀光部長進一步定義為「魚咖哩與米飯」，但法條中卻未明文規定。 這一切的常見藉口，是「殖民遺產」。確實，印度於2023年廢除42部法律中的183條過時條文，並正著手進行第二波法規清理，同時設立「去管制委員會」以減輕企業負擔，稅改法案也正在制定中。這些都是正向發展。 然而，根本問題出在官僚與政治人物的思維模式。Vidhi 的阿加雅‧森古塔（Arghya Sengupta）指出：「我們總認為，國家應該參與個人生活的每一個層面，什麼都可以立法。」 這樣的結果不是讓人民更守法，而是更習於違法。當所有事都被禁止，誰還想遵守規則？誰又願意創業或擴張事業，只為招來更多監管？一名高層官員不滿地說，國家設定了高不可攀的標準，卻又責怪印度人無視法律。但真正的問題是：「你讓他們根本無法守法。」 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Simon Groot scattered better plant seeds across the world The seedsman from Enkhuizen died on July 6th, aged 90 What started him thinking was a cabbage. Not any old cabbage, but the variety, “Glory of Enkhuizen”, which his family company, Sluis and Groot, had produced in that town in North Holland in 1899. It was a beautiful cabbage, round, compact, with a light-green head framed in darker leaves. It could weigh as much as three kilograms, had a sweet flavour, and was easy to grow, as it did all over Europe. But not here. Simon Groot was walking in the highlands of Java, on a sales trip for the company in 1965, when he came across a field of them. They were a sorry sight, sparse and with misshapen heads. Clearly the seed was not quite right, messed up or mixed in, adulterated somehow; he hated nothing more than bad seed. But it was also clear that these cabbages, which shrugged off frost, did not enjoy a semitropical climate and could not cope with local pests and diseases. Meanwhile the farmers who had sown them, unable to sell them, remained as poor as ever. For 16 years he brooded on this. It became his mission. In 1981, when Sluis and Groot was sold to Sandoz, he branched out on his own to improve the seeds, crops, trade and nutrition of the tropical parts of the world. **The staple grains *(especially wheat in India and rice in China) had been hybridised already, with great success, but lowly vegetables had been ignored. He, by contrast, loved them. Producing fine vegetable and flower seed had been the family business since 1867, when venerable, bearded Groots had* pioneered **the work in Enkhuizen. Seeds had been lucky for the town, too; because of close contacts with local farmers, it did not suffer the famine that followed the war. For him the vegetables of tropical Asia were a cornucopia of species he had never met before. Amaranth, with grain-heads like huge catkins; kangkong, or water spinach, growing in any fresh water; mung beans, full of protein in both seeds and sprouts; daikon, tatsoi, choy sum. All were packed with vitamins and good nutrition. As a seedsman more used to cauliflowers and potatoes, he was fascinated. As a market man, here was a huge chance. He surpassed his own expectations. By the 2020s the seeds produced by his company, East-West Seed, had improved the incomes of 20m small farmers in more than 80 countries, from Asia to Latin America to Africa. The company’s red-arrow logo was as well-known to them as the sign for Coca-Cola. He also set up a programme in which successful farmers trained their neighbours. With better seed, farmers stayed in farming, market traders had more to sell and consumers had healthier diets. That simple formula lifted everyone. Seeds came first, carefully bred by cross-pollination to produce the right traits. But the farmers were key. He talked to them constantly, a tall and almost colonial figure in his white clothes and sun-hat, to learn to think with them. Most of them had plots of only one or two hectares, so vegetables were an ideal crop. Routinely, though, the glossy packets they started with had bad genetics inside. They then saved the seed from their crop from year to year, because they were poor and it cost nothing. So, inevitably, their harvests declined. Yet they were most reluctant to change. When he set up his first base in the Philippines in 1982 and, after many months, produced his first **hybridised **seed, farmers were loth to try it. The plant was ampalaya or bitter gourd, not unlike a fat, warty cucumber, astringent but useful to bulk out a stir-fry; so many farmers already grew it. The new variety was called “Jade Star”. It could resist downy mildew, its chief threat, but almost all the trial crops failed. Hence the importance of any farmer who had succeeded passing on his knowledge of how to handle the seeds, space them, **fertilise and irrigate **them. Seed was all about trust: trust that the tiny speck you sowed would grow into the plant you imagined. Both would take time to appear. Over decades, though, the farmers were won over. When the crops did well, they were extraordinary: healthy, profuse and vigorous. As more vegetables were hybridised, tomatoes began to flourish in the Indonesian lowlands, where they could not grow before; productivity per plant of bird’s eye chili, a Thai favourite, increased by 30-40%, and long beans grew like forests. Farm incomes doubled and sometimes even tripled. Certain cases became famous. One woman did so well with chai sim, a leaf vegetable, that she built a kitchen and bought a motorbike. Another produced a pile of pumpkins worth $3,500 from $6-worth of seed. Hybridisation meant that seed from the crop could not be kept, because the second crop would be unreliable. But he set the price of new seed as low as he could. In 2017 the company sold 24m “value-packs”, enough for a small plot, for the equivalent of a dollar each. Any profits went to growth and research. The farmers seemed to take this system in their stride. When he visited them in later years they cheered for joy and held parties for him. In 2019 he was awarded the World Food Prize, a nutritional equivalent of the Nobel. His work, however, was far from done. In Asia he still hoped to shift more farmers away from rice; the world had plenty of that, and carbohydrates, as well as meat, were starting to feature too much in Asian diets. Plants needed constant fortifying to adapt to climate change. And he had barely made a start on Africa, where small farmers were struggling terribly and the potential for growth was so obvious. In one of his late interviews he appeared with an array of home-grown vegetables in front of him. His tomatoes and French beans, laid out on a dark-wood table, looked as glossy and beautiful as a still life from the Dutch Golden Age. The vegetable he most often chose to pose with, however, was not the “Glory of Enkhuizen”. It was the warty, bitter, ugly “Jade Star”, which had transformed the lives of his farmer-friends 6,000 miles away. ■ 西蒙・格魯特將更優良的種子撒播至全球各地 來自恩克赫伊曾（Enkhuizen）的種子商於7月6日辭世，享壽90歲。 讓他開始思考的，是一顆高麗菜。不是普通的高麗菜，而是「恩克赫伊曾的榮耀」（Glory of Enkhuizen）這個品種，早在1899年，他的家族公司 Sluis and Groot 就在荷蘭北部的這座小鎮育出這種高麗菜。這是一種漂亮的高麗菜，圓潤緊實，淺綠色的菜心外圍包著深綠色葉片。重量可達三公斤，味道甘甜，容易種植，在歐洲各地都表現良好。 但在這裡卻不行。1965年，西蒙・格魯特在爪哇高地為公司出差推銷種子時，發現一片種滿這種高麗菜的田地。這些菜看起來慘兮兮，稀疏又畸形。很明顯，種子有問題，可能是品質不佳、混雜或遭到摻假；而他最痛恨的，正是壞種子。更重要的是，這種耐霜的高麗菜根本不適合在亞熱帶氣候中生長，也無法抵禦當地的病蟲害。種下它們的農民無法出售這些作物，仍一貧如洗。 他為此苦思了16年，最終這成了他的使命。1981年，Sluis and Groot 被賣給了瑞士的山多士公司（Sandoz），他決定自行創業，致力於改善熱帶地區的種子、農作物、貿易與營養狀況。當時主要糧食（特別是印度的小麥與中國的稻米）已透過雜交育種成功改良，但蔬菜這類「不起眼」的作物卻遭到忽視。然而，他恰恰最愛蔬菜。自1867年起，他家族便開始培育優良的蔬菜與花卉種子，那些鬍鬚滿面的格魯特祖先在恩克赫伊曾率先展開這項事業。種子對這座城鎮也是福氣，因為與農民密切合作，它在戰後逃過了飢荒。 對他來說，熱帶亞洲的蔬菜簡直像是裝滿新奇物種的寶庫：像巨大花穗的莧菜、可在淡水中生長的空心菜、種子與芽都富含蛋白質的綠豆、白蘿蔔、塌棵菜與菜心……它們全都營養豐富、含有大量維生素。對這位習慣花椰菜和馬鈴薯的種子商來說，一切都令人著迷。從市場角度來看，這更是個巨大機會。 他甚至超越了自己最初的期望。到了2020年代，他創立的「東西種子公司」（East-West Seed）所生產的種子，已提升了全球80多國、2千萬小農的收入，範圍涵蓋亞洲、拉丁美洲與非洲。公司那個紅箭頭的標誌對他們而言如同可口可樂的標誌般熟悉。他還建立了一套制度，讓成功的農民教導鄰里。種子好，農民就能繼續耕作，市場有更多貨源，消費者也吃得更健康。這簡單的循環讓所有人受益。 種子是根本，透過雜交育種培育出理想性狀。但農民才是關鍵。他常常親自與農民對話，一身白衣、戴著太陽帽，身形高大、神似殖民地官員，只為學著與他們一同思考。他們大多只有一兩公頃的小田地，因此蔬菜是理想作物。然而，開始種植時買的精美包裝裡，常常裝著劣質基因的種子。他們因貧窮而習慣自行留種，年復一年，導致產量不斷下滑。 但他們極不願意改變。1982年，他在菲律賓設立第一個基地，花了好幾個月才培育出第一批雜交種子。當時的作物是「苦瓜」（Ampalaya），一種像疙瘩黃瓜、味道澀卻常用來炒菜的蔬菜；許多農民本來就種它。他的新品種名為「翡翠之星」（Jade Star），可抵抗霜黴病——這是主要威脅——但幾乎所有試驗作物都失敗了。這也凸顯出，成功的農民如何傳授種植技巧（如種子處理、株距、施肥、灌溉）至關重要。種子全憑信任：相信那顆微小的顆粒會長成你心中想像的植株。而這兩者都需要時間培養。 數十年過後，農民終於被說服。當作物成功時，成果驚人：健壯、繁茂又旺盛。隨著越來越多蔬菜被雜交改良，番茄在印尼低地得以生長，這 在以前是不可能的；泰國愛吃的朝天椒單株產量提高三到四成；長豆長得像森林一樣。農民收入翻倍甚至三倍。有些案例成了佳話。有位婦人種菜心賺了足夠的錢蓋廚房、買機車；另一位用6美元的種子種出價值3500美元的南瓜。 雜交種的缺點是：收成後的種子無法再用，第二代品質不穩。但他總是盡可能將種子售價壓低。2017年，公司販售了2400萬包「超值小包裝」種子，足夠種一小塊地，每包只要一美元左右。利潤全投入成長與研發。農民對這制度似乎欣然接受。多年後他回訪時，農民會歡呼迎接，還為他開派對。 2019年，他榮獲「世界糧食獎」，這被視為營養界的諾貝爾獎。但他自認任務遠未完成。在亞洲，他仍希望更多農民轉作非稻米作物——世界上稻米與碳水已過剩，亞洲飲食中碳水與肉類佔比過高。他還指出，植物需不斷強化，以因應氣候變遷。而在非洲，他才剛起步；那裡的小農情況艱難，但潛力巨大。 在晚年一次受訪時，他面前擺滿自家種的蔬菜。紅蕃茄、四季豆擺在深色木桌上，彷彿一幅荷蘭黃金時代的靜物畫。但他最常與之合影的蔬菜，卻不是那顆「恩克赫伊曾的榮耀」，而是那顆疙疙瘩瘩、苦澀難看、卻改變了6000英里外農民命運的「翡翠之星」。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

United States | Welcome to Trader Zoh’s Should cities run their own supermarkets? New York’s mayoral front-runner thinks so Many a New Yorker dreams of not paying rent. So do New York’s shops; **retail space **there is pricier than anywhere else in America, by a lot. Seldom is this wish granted. But for a select few publicly owned grocery stores, Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic nominee for New York City mayor, hopes to do just that. Alongside more typical left-wing fare, like rent controls and free buses, he pitched a more novel idea: a “public option” for groceries in the form of a state-run rival that would undercut existing supermarkets. Food prices have spiralled, Mr Mamdani argues, and New Yorkers shouldn’t “subsidise private grocery-store operators” during their weekly shop. Another problem he flags is that some New Yorkers live in “food deserts”, without ready access to fresh produce (the US Department of Agriculture found that New York had fewer such areas than any other state). The plan is to** pilot **one store in each of the city’s five boroughs, and scale up if those succeed. This is a curious proposal. Grocery stores have among the lowest margins of any business in America: they generally make 1-2% in profit after tax. New York City, with a dense population, aggressive competition and high rental and wage costs, is particularly competitive. Mr Mamdani’s stores would not pay rent or property taxes—he wants to put them on city-owned land. But denying New York’s government the revenue those plots would otherwise have earned amounts to a chunky subsidy. If Mr Mamdani’s stores do manage to offer lower prices than privately run peers, it will be thanks to that implicit subsidy, funded by New Yorkers’ taxes. At best, then, these stores might sell groceries** a smidge more** cheaply than conventional grocers, largely due to back-door taxpayer funding. For a government concerned about affordability for the poorest New Yorkers, indiscriminately part-financing **the grocery haul **of anyone who steps into one of Mr Mamdani’s stores is a curious way to do it. Worse, private supermarkets could get run out of business, because even squeezing their margins to zero wouldn’t be enough to match a competitor that doesn’t pay rent. All this presumes that Mr Mamdani’s stores are run as well as a conventional supermarket or bodega. But from affordable housing to subway extensions, American cities have a sorry record of letting costs spiral. New York has been** trial**ling a new set of *no-frills public toilets*, and budgeted about $1m for each one. Rather than creating a cheap and hyper-efficient city-owned grocery chain, a more plausible outcome is that mismanagement will eat up any savings made from not needing to pay rent or turn a profit. ■ 許多紐約客都夢想著不用付房租。紐約的商店也一樣；那裡的零售空間租金比全美其他地方都高得多。這樣的願望鮮少實現，但民主黨籍紐約市長候選人左赫蘭·曼達尼（Zohran Mamdani）希望能讓少數幾家公營雜貨店例外。除了較典型的左翼政見，如租金管制和免費公車外，他還提出了一個更新穎的構想：推出一種“公營選項”，讓州政府開設超市來與現有的超市競爭並壓低價格。 曼達尼認為，食品價格已經飆漲，而紐約客在每週採買時不該“補貼私人雜貨店業者”。他還指出，部分紐約客居住在“食物荒漠”地區，無法方便取得新鮮農產品（美國農業部的調查發現，紐約州的此類地區比全美其他州都少）。曼達尼的計畫是先在紐約市的五個行政區各試辦一家公營雜貨店，如果成效良好再進一步擴大規模。 這是一個頗為奇特的提案。雜貨店是全美利潤率最低的行業之一：稅後淨利通常僅有 1-2%（見圖表）。紐約市人口稠密、競爭激烈，且租金與人事成本都極高，使得經營環境更加艱困。曼達尼計劃讓這些公營雜貨店免付租金和地產稅——他希望將它們設於市政府擁有的土地上。然而，這等於讓市政府損失原本可以從這些土地獲得的租稅收入，形同提供大筆補貼。若曼達尼的雜貨店真能比私人同業提供更低的價格，這也將歸功於這種隱性補貼，而這筆錢最終由納稅人負擔。 即便如此，這些店家最多也只能因為背後有納稅人資助，而稍微便宜一些。對於一個關心最貧困紐約客生活負擔的政府來說，這種不分對象地部分資助任何走進曼達尼雜貨店的人，實在是個耐人尋味的做法。 更糟的是，私人超市可能會被迫退出市場，因為即便把自身利潤擠壓到零，也無法與一家免付租金的競爭對手匹敵。以上還假設曼達尼的店能像傳統超市或便利商店一樣有效營運。然而從平價住宅到地鐵延伸線，美國城市在控制成本方面的記錄一向不佳。紐約市近來試辦新型簡易公廁，每一座的預算竟高達約 100 萬美元。與其說會誕生一條廉價且高效的市營雜貨連鎖，更可能的結果是，管理不善將吞噬掉省下的租金和利潤。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Can men and women be just friends? The answer matters more than you think Jun 19th 2025|Istanbul and Seoul “Men and women can’t be friends because the sex part always gets in the way,” says Harry in When Harry Met Sally (1989). Decades later, Turkey’s religious authority echoed this sentiment, warning that friendships between men and women lead to adultery. While studies show men in platonic friendships often overestimate women’s attraction to them, it doesn’t mean such friendships are doomed. Most people can control their urges, and cross-sex friendships bring important social benefits. A large study by Meta and NYU analysed 1.8 billion Facebook users, creating a “cross-gender friendship index” (WHMSI). A score of zero means complete gender segregation; one means equal numbers of same- and cross-sex friends. Conservative Muslim societies like Libya and Iraq score just 0.1, while countries in Africa and South America show higher mixing. Western countries average around 0.5-0.6. Interestingly, regions with higher female labour-force participation have more cross-sex friendships. Nigeria, where women work nearly as much as men, scores 0.67; India, with far fewer women working, scores 0.34. Sexual freedom also correlates with cross-sex friendships. In conservative societies, women’s behaviour is seen as tied to family honour, discouraging interaction with men. In Turkey, where few women work outside the home, informal gender segregation persists. This limits women’s career progress and reinforces stereotypes that women are emotional or unreliable. In East Asia, South Korea’s WHMSI score is low. Many men there don’t consider being friends with women, believing their interests are too different. This cultural divide contributes to workplace inequality and even a rise in involuntary celibacy among men. Do cross-sex friendships make people less sexist, or do less sexist cultures produce more of them? Likely both. A German study found that boys with female friends became more egalitarian over time, while girls’ views were unaffected. Encouraging cross-gender friendships early may help. In an experiment called “Buddy Up”, preschoolers paired with opposite-sex classmates later showed more willingness to play together. This supports the idea that positive contact between groups reduces prejudice, whether between ethnicities or genders. Cross-sex friendships, though simple, may be a key step toward real equality. 「男人和女人不能當朋友，因為性總是會介入。」這是1989年電影《當哈利碰上莎莉》中的一句台詞。幾十年後，土耳其宗教機構也發表類似警告，認為男女友誼會導致通姦。研究發現，男性在柏拉圖式友誼中常高估女性對自己的好感，但這並不代表這類友誼注定失敗。大多數人能控制欲望，且異性友誼對社會有重要益處。 Meta和紐約大學分析了18億名Facebook用戶，建立了「跨性別友誼指數」（WHMSI）。分數0表示完全性別隔離，1表示同性與異性朋友數量相等。保守的穆斯林社會如利比亞和伊拉克得分僅0.1，而非洲及南美一些國家異性友誼較常見。西方國家平均約0.5-0.6。有趣的是，女性勞動參與率較高的地區，異性友誼也較多。例如，奈及利亞女性工作比例接近男性，得分0.67；印度女性工作比例低，得分僅0.34。 性自由也與異性友誼有關。在保守社會，女性行為被視為家庭榮譽的象徵，限制了與男性的交往。在土耳其，少數女性能在外工作，非正式性別隔離盛行，阻礙女性職場晉升並加深「女性情緒化、不可靠」的刻板印象。 在東亞，南韓的異性友誼指數很低。許多男性認為男女興趣差異太大，難以成為朋友。這種文化隔閡助長了職場不平等，也讓非自願單身男性增加。 異性友誼是否讓人更不性別歧視，或是較不性別歧視的文化產生更多這類友誼？答案可能是雙向的。德國一項研究發現，與異性朋友相處的男孩，隨時間變得更支持性別平等，而女孩觀點則未受影響。 從小鼓勵異性友誼或許能改善現況。美國一項「Buddy Up」實驗讓學齡前兒童與異性搭檔進行遊戲，數月後，參與實驗的男孩更願意與女孩一起玩耍。這印證了「正向接觸能減少偏見」的理論，無論是族群間還是性別間。 異性友誼看似簡單，卻可能是實現真正平等的重要一步。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Is the “manopause” real? If it is, it is nothing like the menopause HOT FLUSHES; insomnia; joint pains; loss of libido: for many women, the menopause is no fun. Why exactly women become infertile decades before they die is a much-debated mystery in evolutionary biology. Besides humans, the only other mammals whose females experience so early a menopause in the wild seem to be some species of whale. But equal opportunity is the spirit of the age. These days health influencers, supplement companies and even some doctors talk about a male version of the menopause—variously called the “manopause”, “andropause”, or, for acronym-lovers, “ADAM”, which stands for “androgen deficiency in the ageing male”. Symptoms include a flagging libido, tiredness, shrinking muscles and growing body fat. Do men really suffer from menopause, or something like it? On one level, obviously not. Menopause is defined by the end of a woman’s** menstrual periods**, and therefore the loss of her ability to reproduce, usually by her early 50s. Men, by contrast, can stay fertile well into old age. For instance, Al Pacino, an American actor, fathered a child at 83. In menopause, a woman’s levels of the sex hormones oestrogen and progesterone fall sharply and suddenly. In most men levels of testosterone, the main male sex hormone, likewise start falling during middle age. But unlike in women there is no sudden drop. Levels decline gently, at a rate of around 1% a year, and often stay within the normal range for a man’s entire life. Sometimes symptoms that might be ascribed to a manopause may arise from the realities of middle-aged life. Tiredness is a common result of juggling work with family responsibilities. Flabbiness and atrophying muscles are the wages of years of sedentary office work and too little exercise. That being said, some proportion of men do suffer from male hypogonadism, a medical condition in which the testicles do not produce as much testosterone as they should. Estimates of its prevalence vary widely: one review paper, published in 2020, cited one American study of ageing men that estimated 20% of those in their 60s might be sufferers. But a separate European study put the figure for the same age group at just 3.2%. The causes of hypogonadism are not always clear (though obesity seems not to help). But unlike the female menopause, it is not an inevitable consequence of ageing. Menopausal women can be treated with hormone-replacement therapy (HRT). This aims to replace the missing sex hormones, and thus relieve unpleasant symptoms, using tablets or gels. Similarly, a growing number of men take testosterone-replacement therapy (TRT) to the same ends. Prescriptions have boomed in the past 20 years, **though there is not yet a firm consensus **on when men actually need it. Still, testosterone—the original anabolic steroid—really is, in some ways, a fountain of youth. Men taking it will put on muscle, lose fat and recover faster from exercise (hence why taking testosterone is considered doping in most sports). The pros and cons of TRT are a subject for another article. But take care: side-effects can include baldness and, ironically, infertility. Add external testosterone and the body will compensate by making less. Reduced production in the testes can slow or even stop sperm production. By trying to relieve the symptoms of the supposed male menopause, men who take TRT risk replicating the defining feature of the female original. ■ 熱潮紅、失眠、關節疼痛、性慾減退：對許多女性而言，更年期並不好受。 女性為何會在死亡前數十年便喪失生育能力，一直是演化生物學中的一大謎團。除了人類之外，目前已知在野外出現如此早期更年期的哺乳動物，似乎只有某些種類的鯨魚。 然而，「平權」是當今時代的精神。如今，健康意見領袖、保健品公司，甚至一些醫生，開始談論一種男性版的「更年期」——這種現象有各種名稱，如「男性更年期」（manopause）、「雄性更年期」（andropause），或對喜愛縮寫的人而言，稱作「ADAM」，即「老年男性雄激素缺乏症」（Androgen Deficiency in the Ageing Male）。其症狀包括性慾減退、疲倦、肌肉萎縮與體脂增加等。 但男性真的會經歷更年期，或者說類似的情況嗎？ 某種程度上，答案顯然是否定的。更年期是指女性月經的停止，從而失去生育能力，通常發生於50歲出頭。而男性則不同，他們即使進入老年仍能保持生育能力。例如，美國演員艾爾·帕西諾（Al Pacino）在83歲時仍育有一子。 女性在更年期間，雌激素與黃體素等性激素會急遽且迅速地下降。而男性的主要性激素——睪固酮，則多半從中年開始逐年緩慢下降。但與女性不同的是，這種下降沒有劇烈斷崖式的變化，其速率大約每年1%，且通常一生中都仍維持在正常範圍內。 有時，被歸咎為「男性更年期」的症狀，其實可能源自中年生活的現實。工作與家庭責任兩頭燒導致的疲倦極為常見；身體鬆弛與肌肉萎縮則多半是長年久坐辦公、缺乏運動的後果。 儘管如此，的確有部分男性罹患「男性性腺機能低下症」（male hypogonadism），即睪丸無法產生足夠睪固酮的醫學狀況。其盛行率因研究而異。一篇2020年發表的綜合文獻指出，美國一項針對老年男性的研究估計，60多歲男性中約有20%可能患病。但另一項歐洲研究則認為，同齡族群的患病率僅為3.2%。其成因不總是明確（但肥胖似乎無助於改善）。不過，與女性更年期不同，這並非老化過程的必然結果。 女性更年期可透過荷爾蒙補充療法（HRT）進行治療，使用藥丸或凝膠補充缺乏的性激素，以緩解不適症狀。類似地，越來越多男性也選擇接受睪固酮補充療法（TRT）以達成同樣目的。過去20年間，相關處方快速增加，但何時應該開始治療，目前醫界尚未有明確共識。 不過，睪固酮——這種最早的合成代謝類固醇——在某些層面上確實堪稱「青春之泉」。服用睪固酮的男性會增肌、減脂，且運動後恢復得更快（這也是為何在大多數運動項目中，睪固酮被視為禁藥的原因）。至於TRT的利與弊，則是另一篇文章的主題。但必須小心：副作用可能包括禿頭，以及具有諷刺意味的——不孕。因為外源性睪固酮會使身體自我調節，減少睪固酮的自然產量。睪丸內的生成量降低後，可能導致精子產量減少，甚至完全停止。換句話說，為了緩解所謂男性更年期的症狀，服用TRT的男性反而可能重現女性更年期最關鍵的特徵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

1. If China invaded Taiwan, who would enter the war? Japan and the Philippines would struggle to stay out. But what about the rest? At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, French President Emmanuel Macron raised a key question: What if China launches a major military operation against Taiwan? His cautious stance reflects broader global uncertainty. A report by the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) warns that if the U.S. stays out of such a conflict, most other countries likely would, too. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth countered that China would face “devastating consequences” if it attacked Taiwan. But confidence in America's commitment is fading, especially after Donald Trump’s suggestion that Taiwan aid would be negotiable. Some in the Pentagon even doubt Taiwan’s ability to resist. If the U.S. does intervene, Japan and the Philippines would be most directly affected. Japan might limit its role to missile and submarine support. The Philippines, with 175,000 nationals in Taiwan, would be cautious, though tensions in the South China Sea could escalate if China gets bogged down. South Korea, Australia, and India would be under U.S. pressure to help. South Korea would focus on deterring North Korea, offering logistics support at most. Australia, a key U.S. partner, has made no commitment but risks straining ties if it stays out. India would likely remain on the sidelines militarily but assist with intelligence and naval operations. Southeast Asia—home to 900,000 nationals in Taiwan—would mostly try to stay neutral due to trade ties with China, though the U.S. would seek base access in Thailand and Singapore. In Europe, concern is growing. France, Italy, and Britain have deployed naval assets to the region. While direct military support is unlikely, EU-wide sanctions—particularly trade restrictions—could significantly impact China, though such a move remains a difficult political challenge. 1. 如果中國入侵台灣，誰會參戰？ 日本與菲律賓最難置身事外，但其他國家又會怎麼選擇？ 在新加坡舉行的香格里拉對話中，法國總統馬克宏提出了一個關鍵問題：如果中國對台灣發動大規模軍事行動，世界各國會如何反應？他的謹慎態度反映了全球對此情勢的普遍不確定。一份由美國智庫「新美國安全中心」（CNAS）發表的報告警告，如果美國選擇不介入，大多數其他國家也可能選擇袖手旁觀。 美國國防部長皮特‧赫格塞斯反駁稱，中國若動武將面臨「毀滅性後果」。但對美國承諾的信心正在減弱，尤其是在川普曾表示援助台灣需經過「協商」之後。一些五角大廈官員甚至懷疑台灣有能力堅持抵抗。 若美國選擇介入，最直接受影響的將是日本與菲律賓。日本可能僅限於提供飛彈或潛艦支援。擁有17.5萬名國民在台灣的菲律賓將更為謹慎，不過若中國軍隊陷入苦戰，南海的緊張局勢可能升高。 南韓、澳洲與印度也會面臨美國的施壓。南韓將優先關注北韓可能趁機挑釁，頂多提供後勤支援。澳洲雖是美國的重要盟友，卻尚未做出承諾，若選擇不參與，可能損及與美方的關係。印度則多半會專注於中印邊界防禦，但預料會在情報與反潛作戰上提供協助。 東南亞地區約有90萬持護照者在台灣工作與生活，考量與中國的貿易依賴，多數國家可能選擇保持中立；不過，美國可能尋求使用泰國與新加坡的空軍與海軍基地。 至於歐洲方面，對中國可能入侵台灣的擔憂也日益升高。法國、義大利與英國已向亞太地區派遣軍艦。雖然直接軍事支援可能性不高，但歐盟若能統一對中國實施制裁，特別是貿易限制，可能對中國造成重大衝擊，儘管這樣的決定在政治上仍極具挑戰性。 2. Taiwan thinks the unthinkable: **resisting China **without America Its plan was to hold off a Chinese attack until America turned up. What now? Taiwan’s defence strategy has long hinged on surviving a Chinese assault for at least a month—enough time for the U.S. to intervene. But confidence in that rescue is weakening, especially as American political rhetoric grows more uncertain. Donald Trump’s ambivalence on defending Ukraine and previous remarks belittling Taiwan’s chances have rattled nerves on the island. “Strategic ambiguity,” the U.S. policy of neither committing to nor denying military support, was meant to deter reckless moves by either China or Taiwan. But now, ambiguity fuels anxiety. Taiwan’s opposition accuses America of being unreliable, while Beijing remains unsure whether a quick win is even possible after observing Russia’s failed blitz on Ukraine. The ongoing war in Ukraine has shifted Taiwan’s focus. Now the goal is prolonged resistance. At a recent Taiwan Trilateral Forum in Berlin, Taiwanese officials stressed the need to demonstrate the island’s ability to fight over an extended period. The logic: buying time for international aid and challenging China’s legitimacy. There’s growing awareness of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities—from its reliance on imports for chip manufacturing to its energy dependence. Public sentiment is shifting too: previously anti-nuclear groups are reconsidering for national security’s sake. Taiwan is boosting civilian resilience through stockpiles, training drills, and learning from countries like Israel and Finland. New President Lai Ching-te is more open than predecessor Tsai Ing-wen, publicly leading resilience efforts to bridge partisan divides. Diplomatically, such efforts let allies support Taiwan without provoking China through arms deals. Some Taiwanese quietly debate a final step: preparing for resistance even under occupation. Though controversial, it reflects a sobering realization from Ukraine—survival requires preparation, unity, and the will to endure. 台灣思考難以想像的未來：在沒有美國援助下抵抗中國 台灣的防衛策略長期以來依賴於一個前提：能夠撐過中國的攻擊至少一個月，好讓美國有時間介入。然而，對這場「及時救援」的信心正日益動搖，特別是在美國的政治言論越來越不確定的情況下。川普對烏克蘭防衛問題的模糊態度，以及過去輕視台灣自保能力的言論，已讓台灣人心惶惶。 美國長期奉行的「戰略模糊」政策──不明確表示是否會軍援台灣──原意是為了防止中台任何一方魯莽改變現狀。但如今，這種模糊反而成了焦慮的來源。台灣在野黨指責美國靠不住，而北京則因俄羅斯閃電戰在烏克蘭的失敗，也開始懷疑自己是否真能迅速取勝。 烏克蘭戰爭的持久性也迫使台灣重新思考防禦戰略。如今的重點轉為長期抗戰。在最近於柏林舉行的台灣三方論壇中，台灣官員強調，必須向國際展示其具備持久作戰的能力。其戰略邏輯在於拖延時間以等待國際支援，並挑戰中國的正當性。 對台灣脆弱性的認識也在上升，從對半導體製造原料的進口依賴，到能源供應的脆弱性。輿論也出現轉變：原本反對核能的團體，現在也開始重新評估能源政策與國安的關係。政府正透過糧食、水、藥品和能源儲備、全民演習等方式，強化民間韌性，並向以色列和芬蘭等國學習。 新任總統賴清德比前總統蔡英文更願意公開推動這些防衛努力，希望彌合黨派分歧。這也為盟友提供不需出售武器就能援助台灣的外交空間，減少激怒中國的風險。 一些台灣人也開始默默討論最後一步：即便被佔領，也要準備抵抗。雖然這在島內極具爭議，但從烏克蘭的經驗來看，這反映出一個嚴峻的現實：要生存，必須提前準備、保持團結，並有堅持到底的決心。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn