Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

This episode explores an important distinction that is often missed when discussing diving incidents: the difference between a cause, a reason, and an excuse. A cause explains what contributed to an event, a reason explains why a person's actions made sense to them at the time, and an excuse uses those reasons to avoid accountability. Understanding these differences helps us learn from accidents without simply assigning blame or letting people off the hook. The discussion shows why complex incidents usually have many interacting causes, why understanding local decision-making is essential for improving safety, and how separating learning from punishment leads to better conversations, stronger investigations, and safer diving for everyone.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/cause-reason-excuseLinks: Accountability blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-want-accountabilityRaDonda Vaught case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-notStop rules blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-investigations-stop-where-they-stopRichard Cook’s diagram: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/joining-dots-is-easy-if-you-know-the-outcomeMore about the RaDonda Vaught case: https://humanfactors101.com/2022/05/08/is-human-error-a-crime/The eight question review: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/eight-questions-about-maldives-accident“Learning” the same lessons: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-does-nothing-changeTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores why accident investigations often stop long before they uncover the full picture. Drawing on research from safety science, it argues that the “cause” of an incident is not simply discovered—it is shaped by who is investigating, what they are able to change, and what explanations their community accepts. In diving, investigations often focus on the actions of individual divers or instructors because these are the easiest problems to address, while deeper issues such as organisational culture, commercial pressures, and industry practices are left unexplored. The episode examines how different people can interpret the same event in very different ways, why every investigation helps shape the community’s understanding of safety, and why asking “Why did the investigation stop here?” can lead to far richer learning than simply accepting the reported cause.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-investigations-stop-where-they-stopLinks: The most complete data on diving fatalities from 2008: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19175195/Blog exploring the purposes of running an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLFEO program: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoHFiD conference: https://www.hf-in-diving-conference.com/What you look for is what you find: https://doi-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1016/j.ssci.2009.01.004What you find is what you fix: https://doi-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1016/j.aap.2010.07.003Blog about agency/organisation standards: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floorSpeaking truth to power: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-im-fine-isnt-trueStructural conditions that produce decisions: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-notOther references:Blazsin, H. & Guldenmund, F. (2015). The social construction of safety: Comparing three realities. Safety Science, 71, 16–27.Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C. & Hollnagel, E. (2009). What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find — The consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals. Safety Science, 47(10), 1297–1311.Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C. & Hollnagel, E. (2010). What you find is not always what you fix — How other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 42, 2132–2139.Rasmussen, J. (1990). Human error and the problem of causality in analysis of accidents. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 327, 449–462.Rochlin, G. I. (1999). Safe operation as a social construct. Ergonomics, 42(11), 1549–1560.Shreeves, K., Buzzacott, P., Hornsby, A., & Caney, M. (2018). Violations of safe diving practices among 122 diver fatalities. Int. Marit. Health, 69(2), 94–98. https://doi.org/10.5603/imh.2018.0014van der Schaaf, T. W., Lucas, D. A. & Hale, A. R. (1991). Near miss reporting as a safety tool. Butterworth-Heinemann.Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores why diving accidents are so often explained by individual mistakes instead of the wider conditions that made those mistakes possible. Using the case of a fatal medication error in healthcare alongside the recent Maldives cave diving tragedy, it examines how hindsight, blame, and our natural tendency to focus on people rather than systems can prevent meaningful learning. The discussion highlights how unsafe practices can become normal when they repeatedly appear to work, and why serious accidents often reveal long-standing weaknesses that existed long before the final event. Rather than asking "Who is at fault?", the episode argues that the better question is "What conditions made these decisions seem reasonable at the time?"—because understanding those conditions offers the best chance of preventing similar tragedies in the future.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-notLinks: Martin Anderson’s write-up: https://humanfactors101.com/2022/05/08/is-human-error-a-crime/Andrzej Gornicki’s Eight Question Review: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/eight-questions-about-maldives-accidentGareth’s blog about accountability: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-want-accountabilityAssumptions and worn paths: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-rules-get-brokenConsensus is because people don’t want to disagree: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floorConditions produce outcomes: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-conditionsUseful illegality in action: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-rules-get-brokenTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores why rule-breaking in diving is often more complicated than simply “breaking the rules.” It looks at the difference between shortcuts that organisations quietly depend on to keep operating and personal shortcuts taken for convenience or ego. Through real-world examples, the discussion explains how hindsight can unfairly turn system-wide problems into individual blame after an incident occurs. The episode also examines why teams often stay silent when they notice problems, how social pressure affects decision-making, and why genuine learning requires understanding the reality of how diving actually works rather than relying on simple explanations. Ultimately, it challenges divers, instructors, and leaders to recognise the difference between necessary adaptations and risky personal shortcuts before something goes wrong.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-rules-get-brokenLinks: Blog about how conditions shape actions: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-conditionsMaster thesis about storytelling to learn: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spaceGuide to speaking truth to power: https://www.thehumandiver.com/resourcesTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode examines the deaths of five Italian divers in the Maldives and a Maldivian military diver who later died during the recovery operation, using the tragedy to explore how Just Culture approaches accidents in high-risk environments. Rather than rushing to blame individuals, the discussion walks through the Eight-Question Review framework, which looks first at the wider system: authority, procedures, training, resources, organisational culture, operational norms, and the pressures influencing decisions. The episode highlights how experienced scientific divers can still face hidden competence gaps when moving into technical cave environments, how commercial and research pressures can shape risk-taking, and how safety rules may drift away from everyday practice over time. It also explores the dangers of hindsight bias and why meaningful investigations must focus on understanding how decisions made sense to those involved at the time, not simply judging outcomes after the fact. The central message is that accidents rarely come from one bad decision alone, but from interacting conditions within a wider system—and that real learning only happens when we are willing to ask difficult questions before assigning blame.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/eight-questions-about-maldives-accidentLinks: Blog about the Chac Mool deaths: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatalityFurther reading on The Human Diver:Change your Language, Change the WorldThey Lost Situation AwarenessThe Eight-Question Review — LFEO courseTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode reflects on the tragic deaths of five Italian divers in the Maldives and a Maldivian military diver who died while trying to recover them, using the event to explore what real accountability should look like after a diving accident. Rather than rushing to blame or making assumptions based on limited information, the discussion challenges the diving community to resist quick judgement and focus instead on understanding the conditions, decisions, and systems that may have shaped the outcome. It examines the difference between backward-looking accountability, which seeks someone to blame, and forward-looking accountability, which asks better questions about training, equipment, oversight, environmental conditions, and the support given to those involved in both the original dive and the recovery effort. At a time when facts are still emerging, the episode argues that meaningful learning begins with humility, patience, and a commitment to understanding what really happened—because only then can the diving community improve and better protect those who dive and those asked to rescue others.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-want-accountabilityTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode challenges the instinct to explain diving accidents by focusing only on individual mistakes or broken rules. Instead, it explores how social, cultural, organisational, and environmental conditions shape the decisions divers make, even when those decisions seem irrational in hindsight. Using recent diving incidents as examples, the discussion highlights how behaviour that appears risky often made sense to those involved at the time, influenced by pressures such as authority, identity, time, and the expectation to “get the job done.” The episode introduces the PETTEOT framework—Person(s), Environment, Tasks, Tools and Technology, External Influences, Organisation, and Time—as a way to better understand how different parts of the diving system interact to create both success and failure. By moving beyond blame and examining the wider system, divers, instructors, and leaders can uncover the hidden conditions that shape performance and learn where meaningful improvements can be made, helping the community become better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-conditionsLinks: Blog about LEODSI and PETTEOT: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode challenges the common belief that following diving standards automatically makes diving safe. It explores how industry standards, while important, can create an illusion of safety when compliance becomes the main goal rather than improving real-world performance. The discussion examines how many diving standards are written and assessed by the same organisations they are meant to guide, creating a closed system that can protect institutions legally while limiting opportunities for deeper learning and improvement. It also looks at why accident investigations often focus on individual mistakes rather than questioning whether the procedures, training, or standards themselves are fit for purpose. Drawing on research from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the episode argues that safer diving requires more than rule-following—it needs independent oversight, greater transparency, and a willingness to learn from outside safety science. True progress comes not from assuming yesterday’s standards are enough, but from building systems that can recognise their own limits and continually improve.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floorLinks: Diving Talks: 'Compliance provides an illusion for safety in divingInDepth article: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/Suggested further readingAmalberti, R. (2001) The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety Science, 37(2–3), pp. 109–126. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092575350000045XCarpenter, D. and Moss, D. (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture (Cambridge University Press, 2014). https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/preventing-regulatory-capture/Dekker, S., The Safety Anarchist (Routledge, 2018) and Compliance Capitalism (Routledge, 2022). https://www.amazon.co.uk/Safety-Anarchist-innovation-bureaucracy-compliance-ebook/dp/B0FCCZCTG5Dixon-Woods, M., Yeung, K., & Bosk, C. L. (2011). Why is UK medicine no longer a self-regulating profession? The role of scandals involving “bad apple” doctors. Social Science & Medicine, 73(10), 1452–1459. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.08.031Hopkins, A., Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster (CCH Australia, 2008). https://www.amazon.co.uk/Failure-Learn-Texas-Refinery-Disaster/dp/1921322446Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., and Hollnagel, E., What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find: The consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals, Safety Science 47(10), 2009. https://www-sciencedirect-com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/science/article/pii/S0925753509000137Meyer, J. and Rowan, B., Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology 83(2), 1977. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2778293.pdfRae, A., Provan, D., Weber, D., and Dekker, S., Safety Clutter: The Accumulation and Persistence of 'Safety' Work That Does Not Contribute to Operational Safety, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 16(2), 2018. https://doi.10.1080/14773996.2018.1491147Thompson, D., Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands, American Political Science Review 74(4), 1980.Tags: THD-English| THD-Operations & Procedures

This episode explores the growing recognition that safe and effective scientific diving depends on more than technical skill, equipment, and certification. Prompted by new research into applying Crew Resource Management (CRM) to scientific diver training, it examines why communication, leadership, teamwork, and decision-making are essential in complex underwater operations where divers must manage both life support and scientific tasks under pressure. Drawing on lessons from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the discussion highlights key challenges such as cognitive overload, distributed situational awareness, and authority gradients that can prevent divers from speaking up or adapting effectively when conditions change. It also reviews the existing research, training tools, and practical frameworks already available to support this shift, while recognising that long-term improvement depends on treating diving safety as an ongoing process of learning rather than a box-ticking exercise. The message is clear: true safety is built through the conditions teams create, the culture they sustain, and how they respond when concerns are raised—always striving to be better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/CRM-and-Scientific-DivingLinks: Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/raymond-arce-528304355_cd37166-scientificdiving-divertraining-share-7460336156979888128-ASrc/?utm_source=social_share_send&utm_medium=member_desktop_web&rcm=ACoAAAELqPcBwf1_VKIPpplosn5XZ02d6xlOzRs9th Annual European Conference on Scientific Diving: https://ecsd9azores.com/Resilient Performance Model blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-modelOutcomes are a Function of…..: https://youtu.be/nkdVHBDnCjc?t=2293Looking at CRM relevant failures: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotGuide to Diving Crew Resource Management: https://www.thehumandiver.com/commercial-occupational-divingMoving beyond the position that compliance means safety: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/ReferencesCaramanna, G., & Strickland, B. (2023). Risk Management for Diving Operations: How to enhance the safety and proficiency of diving teams. Self-published. ISBN: 979-8988399612.CSA Group (2026). CSA Z275.2: Occupational Health and Safety Code for Diving Operations. Toronto: CSA Group.Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 350–383.Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 32–64.Flin, R., & Maran, N. (2004). Identifying and training non-technical skills for teams in acute medicine. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 13(suppl 1), i80–i84.Flin, R., O'Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to Non-Technical Skills. Farnham: Ashgate.Health and Safety Executive (2011). Research Report RR871: Assessment of Manual Operations and Emergency Procedures for Closed Circuit Rebreathers. London: HSE Books.International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2018). Report 503: Introducing Behavioural Markers of Non-Technical Skills in Oil and Gas Operations. London: IOGP.Lock, G. (2019). Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors. Milton Keynes: Human in the System Consulting.Lock, G. (2023). Human factors and rebreather diving. In: Pollock NW, ed. Rebreather Forum 4. Proceedings of the April 20-22, 2023 workshop. Valletta, Malta; 2024. p. 57–69.O'Brien, E., & Caramanna, G. (2017). Human factors in scientific diving: an experimental approach. In Proceedings of the AAUS Diving for Science Symposium 2017. Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary: American Academy of Underwater Sciences.Piispanen, W., Lundell, R., Tuominen, L., & Räisänen-Sokolowski, A. (2021). Assessment of alertness and cognitive performance of closed circuit rebreather divers with the Critical Flicker Fusion Frequency Test in Arctic diving conditions. Frontiers in Physiology, 12, 722915.Reader, T. W., & O'Connor, P. (2014). The Deepwater Horizon explosion: non-technical skills, safety culture, and system complexity. Journal of Risk Research, 17(3), 405–424.Reitz, M., Nilsson, V., Day, E. and Higgins, J. (2019). Speaking truth to power at work. Hult Research.Sinek, S. (2019). The Infinite Game. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.Stanton, N. A., Stewart, R., Harris, D., Houghton, R. J., Baber, C., McMaster, R., Salmon, P., Hoyle, G., Walker, G., Young, M. S., Linsell, M., Dymott, R., & Green, D. (2006). Distributed situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development and application of an ergonomics methodology. Ergonomics, 49(12–13), 1288–1311.Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: effects on learning. Cognitive Science, 12(2), 257–285.Yule, S., Flin, R., Paterson-Brown, S., & Maran, N. (2006). Development of a rating system for surgeons' non-technical skills. Medical Education, 40(11), 1098–1104.Tags: THD-English| THD-CRM, Leadership & Teamwork

This episode explores a diving incident where nothing officially “went wrong,” yet a series of small decisions and social pressures nearly led to tragedy. A newer CCR diver and his wife joined more experienced divers on an unfamiliar shore dive, and although they surfaced safely, the dive revealed how easily people can ignore warning signs when they feel pressure to fit in, avoid disappointing others, or challenge more experienced teammates. Drawing on research into speaking up, psychological safety, and stop-work authority, the episode examines why divers often stay silent even when they feel uncomfortable, and why near-misses are rarely reported or discussed. It argues that the absence of accidents does not mean a system is safe, and that real safety depends less on rules and policies and more on leadership, team culture, and how people respond when someone calls a dive. The discussion highlights the importance of curiosity, open communication, and creating environments where stopping a dive is treated as good judgement rather than failure, helping divers and teams learn before luck runs out.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-im-fine-isnt-trueLinks: Resources page including the DEBrIEF guide and building psychological safety: https://www.thehumandiver.com/resourcesTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores what people really mean when they talk about “human factors” in diving—and why the term can sometimes create more confusion than clarity. It looks at four different ways the phrase is commonly used: blaming “the human factor” when something goes wrong, focusing on what is happening inside the diver such as stress or decision-making, examining the external conditions that shape performance like equipment, procedures, and team dynamics, and finally viewing diving as a complex socio-technical system where people, technology, organisations, and the environment all interact. While the first three approaches can offer useful insights, they often miss the bigger picture. Real learning and lasting safety improvements come from understanding how the whole system works together, not just identifying individual mistakes. By shifting from blame to systems thinking, instructors and divers can better understand why outcomes occur and make meaningful changes that help everyone become better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/four-ways-of-hfTags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type

Discussions about diving incidents on social media often follow a predictable pattern: a short, simplified post describes what happened, and comments quickly focus on blaming the individual involved, creating a sense of clear-cut failure and easy lessons. This happens not because people have bad intentions, but because simple, linear stories and knowing the outcome push our brains toward hindsight judgement, making complex situations seem obvious after the fact. As a result, important factors like conditions, pressures, communication, and decision-making context are ignored, limiting real learning. Over time, this blame-focused culture encourages people to share less detail or avoid posting altogether, which removes the very information needed to understand incidents properly. To improve learning, the community needs to shift from asking “what went wrong” to “why it made sense at the time,” and respond to posts with curiosity rather than judgement, creating an environment where fuller, more useful stories can be shared and understood.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/clickbait-trolls-and-commentsTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

Over the past decade, diving fatalities have remained stubbornly consistent despite better equipment, more training, and growing participation, suggesting the problem isn’t just technical or individual error. Current safety approaches focus on equipment, skills, and counting deaths, but often ignore deeper issues like communication, teamwork, decision-making, and the wider system divers operate in. Research shows that most contributing factors in incidents come from these “upstream” conditions—such as training culture, social pressure, and organisational practices—rather than the diver’s final actions. A major gap is the lack of training and assessment in non-technical skills, which are critical for managing real-world situations under pressure. At the same time, diving lacks an effective system for learning from incidents, as divers are reluctant to report issues to organisations they believe won’t act on them. To improve safety, the industry needs a shared language around human performance, better systems for collecting and learning from data, and a culture that supports open, blame-free discussion—because without addressing these deeper factors, meaningful change is unlikely.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-does-nothing-changeLinks: Rebreather fatality documentation from RF4.0: https://indepthmag.com/rebreather-forum-4-proceedings-are-available-for-free-download/DCS study from DAN: https://journals.viamedica.pl/international_maritime_health/article/view/108038If Only… documentary: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonlyLinnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensDivers Alert Network reporting: https://dan.org/research-reports/research-studies/diving-incident-reporting-system/BSAC reporting: https://www.bsac.com/home/DOSA reporting: https://duikongevallen.nl/LEODSI and PETTEOT: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotBlogs about learning from incidents: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/category/learning-JC-incidentsTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This final blog explores what the research means and how the diving community can realistically improve learning and safety. It argues that the problem is not broken individuals but a system that quietly encourages blame and silence, making it hard for divers to share honest stories about mistakes and near-misses. Fear—of legal action, criticism, or damage to reputation—plays a big role, even when that fear is not based on real outcomes. The result is weak feedback loops, where lessons from real experiences never reach the people who design training or shape the culture. The blog suggests shifting focus from the idea of a formal “just culture” to a more practical “culture of justness,” where fairness, understanding, and learning are encouraged at a local level by respected leaders. It also highlights how sharing more context reduces blame and improves learning, but notes that most divers are never taught how to do this. While there is no single fix, the way forward includes clearer language, better-designed reporting systems, role modelling by instructors and experienced divers, and introducing honest discussions about incidents into training. Ultimately, meaningful change will come from gradually shifting behaviours and norms, so that sharing real experiences becomes normal, supported, and valued across the diving community.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-3-the-outcomesLinks: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spacePart 2: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-resultsThe full thesis, Storytelling to Learn: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater, was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in Human Factors and System Safety at Lund University, 2024. Gareth Lock is the founder of The Human DiverReferences:Dekker, S. (2009). Just culture: Who gets to draw the line? Cognition, Technology & Work, 11(3), 177–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-008-0110-7EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Exley, S. (1986). Basic cave diving: A blueprint for survival. National Speleological Society – Cave Diving Section. https://nsscds.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Blueprint-for-Survival.pdfHeffernan, M. (2011). Wilful blindness: Why we ignore the obvious. Simon and Schuster.Hoffman, B. G. (2012). American icon: Alan Mulally and the fight to save Ford Motor Company. Crown.Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem. Safety Science, 27(2–3), 183–213.Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This blog explains how a mixed-methods study explored why divers struggle to share honest, learning-focused stories about incidents. Using a large international survey, focus groups, and expert interviews, the research found that storytelling is strongly shaped by organisational culture, fear, and trust. Many divers—especially instructors—fear legal consequences, criticism, or damage to their reputation, which stops them from speaking openly, particularly in public settings. At the same time, there is confusion about key ideas like what counts as an “incident,” what “risk” really means, and what a “just culture” looks like, with very few divers linking incidents to learning. The study also showed that when stories include more context, people are less likely to judge and more likely to learn, but most divers are not taught how to do this. Overall, the findings suggest the diving community knows that sharing near-misses and building a just culture would improve safety, but lacks the trust, understanding, and organisational support needed to make that happen.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-resultsLinks and references: British Diving Safety Groiup: https://bdsg.org.uk/Chan, W. T.-K., & Li, W.-C. (2023). Development of effective human factors interventions for aviation safety management. Frontiers in Public Health, 11, 1144921. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1144921EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode introduces the problem behind learning in diving safety, using the 2020 death of Linnea Mills to highlight how incidents are often caused by deeper system issues, not just individual mistakes. While near-misses and accidents happen regularly in diving, most are never shared or analysed, meaning valuable lessons are lost. Unlike industries such as aviation or healthcare, diving lacks strong reporting systems, regulation, and reliable data, so decisions are often based on uncertainty rather than evidence. Existing reports tend to focus on immediate causes like equipment failure or diver error, but miss the wider social, organisational, and environmental factors that shape outcomes. The episode argues that meaningful learning comes from “context-rich” stories that explain not just what happened, but why it made sense at the time. Drawing on safety research from other industries, it highlights the need for a stronger reporting culture, psychological safety, and system-level thinking to improve learning and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spaceReferences: Dekker, S. (2017). Just culture: Restoring trust and accountability in your organization (3rd ed.). CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.Drupsteen, L., & Guldenmund, F. (2014). What is learning: A review of the safety literature to define learning from incidents, accidents and disasters. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 22(2), 81–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12039EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk savvy. Viking. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Risk-Savvy-Make-Good-Decisions/dp/1846144744Lock, G. (2011). The application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to improve diving safety. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Iz3qRRyo2NjdiBGbPcRhj14NoCTuuM4/view?usp=share_linkMills v Gull Dive Center PADI (2022). https://www.scribd.com/document/555406095/Mills-v-Gull-Dive-Center-PADI-2nd-Amended-ComplaintOrlady, H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (2017). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations (1st ed.). Routledge.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Snowden, D. (2002). Complex acts of knowing: Paradox and descriptive self-awareness. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(2), 100–111. https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270210424639Waring, J. J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Social Science & Medicine, 60(9), 1927–1935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.055Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode examines a 2012 triple fatality at Cenote Chac Mool in Mexico using a Human Factors approach, showing how accidents are rarely caused by a single mistake but by a combination of small, interacting factors. A guide took two recreational divers beyond safe limits into an overhead cave environment without a continuous guideline, and all three ran out of gas and died. Instead of simply blaming the guide, the analysis explores how things made sense at the time, including authority gradients that stopped the divers from questioning decisions, fatigue from multiple dives, pressure to show something impressive, and increasing task load in a complex environment. Using the PETTEOT framework, the case highlights how people, environment, equipment, organisational culture, and time pressures combined to reduce safety margins until there was no capacity left to recover. The key lesson is that safety depends on understanding these system interactions, building psychological safety so people can speak up, and reinforcing clear rules and preparation to prevent small, “normal” deviations from turning into fatal outcomes.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatalityLinks: Full CREER manual: https://creer-mx.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Manual-for-Cenote-Dive-Guides-vs010324.pdfThe Thumb rule: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-psychological-safety-and-the-thumb-ruleLearning from Emergent Outcomes course waiting list: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores the fatal case of 18-year-old Linnea Mills to show how visible hazards can go unnoticed when an instructor lacks the mental capacity to recognise them. Linnea was overweighted, unable to inflate her drysuit, and using equipment that couldn’t provide enough lift—risks that seem obvious in hindsight but were missed due to a combination of inexperience, time pressure, unfamiliar gear, and commercial expectations. Using models like ECOM and COCOM, the episode explains how an instructor’s attention can be consumed by immediate tasks, leaving no capacity to monitor the bigger picture or reassess whether a dive should proceed. This isn’t about blaming an individual, but understanding how systems, workload, and limited experience can overwhelm decision-making. The key lesson is that effective instructors don’t just rely on skill, but on preparation—setting clear plans, checks, and limits before the dive—to protect their ability to recognise problems when it matters most.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedLinks: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkThe Linnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology

This episode explores why divers don’t truly “lose” situation awareness, but instead run out of the mental capacity needed to maintain it. Through the story of James on a challenging wreck dive, it shows how increasing demands—like current, task focus, and effort—can quietly narrow attention until the bigger picture is lost, even when skills and training are sound. Using two human factors models, COCOM and ECOM, the discussion explains how control shifts from broad, strategic thinking to narrow, reactive behavior as workload rises, and how different layers of awareness—from basic task execution to overall planning—can break down under pressure. It highlights that mistakes are often not about poor decisions, but about limited cognitive resources in the moment. The episode also emphasizes the importance of good preparation, clear decision thresholds, teamwork, and deliberate pauses to manage workload, while showing how reflection after the dive helps improve future performance. Ultimately, it reframes the difference between novice and experienced divers as the ability to manage attention and maintain the bigger picture, not just technical skill.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkLinks: A 2026 study in Safety Science by Woltjer and colleagues: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753526000822Part two: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology

Divers make many decisions quickly, often without realising it, by using heuristics—mental shortcuts that help us act fast when time and information are limited. These shortcuts are essential and often effective, especially with experience, but they can also lead to predictable errors called biases when used in the wrong situation. Common examples include relying too much on recent experience, sticking to an original plan despite changing conditions, or only noticing information that supports what we already believe. In diving, where conditions vary and feedback is often limited, these biases can quietly increase risk. The key is not to avoid intuition, but to understand when it might be misleading and to slow down when needed. Tools like checklists, realistic training, and open team communication help balance fast thinking with more careful decision-making, improving safety and helping divers make better choices underwater.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/shortcuts-errors-and-the-gapLinks: Gigerenzer’s push for people to be “risk savvy”: https://www.jasoncollins.blog/posts/nudging-citizens-to-be-risk-savvyBlog about the Scylla wreck tragedy: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiBlog about the IJN Sata incident: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Tags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology

Diving operations rarely fail because people lack skill; they fail when skilled individuals are not supported by the systems around them. The Resilient Performance Model from The Human Diver explains that performance comes from the interaction of three areas: technical skills, non-technical skills like communication and decision-making, and the wider context such as culture, workload, and resources. When one of these areas is weak or missing, problems appear—such as highly skilled divers working in silence, well-coordinated teams lacking critical skills, or strong systems where people feel unable to challenge decisions. True resilience happens when all three are aligned, allowing teams to adapt when things go wrong and still achieve safe outcomes. The key lesson is that improving safety isn’t just about better training or stricter procedures, but about creating an environment where people can speak up, make good decisions under pressure, and learn from both successes and failures to improve over time.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-modelTags: Commercial Diving

When something goes wrong in diving, people often ask “who made the mistake?”, but that question usually oversimplifies what really happened and stops us from learning. The Learning from Emergent Outcomes framework (LEODSI) takes a different approach by looking at diving as a system, where outcomes are shaped by many interacting factors rather than one person’s actions. It examines seven key elements—people, environment, tasks, equipment, external pressures, organisation, and time—to understand how decisions made sense in the moment and how conditions combined to produce the result. Instead of blaming individuals, LEODSI focuses on why events unfolded the way they did, recognising that both successes and failures come from the same system. By using this approach in everyday debriefs, not just after incidents, divers and teams can learn more effectively, improve safety, and make meaningful changes that reduce risk in the future.https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This piece explores how diving incidents are often misunderstood by focusing too quickly on blame rather than learning. It explains the important difference between responsibility (who was involved) and accountability (who answers for the outcome), showing that incidents are usually caused by a chain of decisions, pressures, and system factors—not just one person’s mistake. By comparing “blame questions” (who is at fault?) with “learning questions” (why did it make sense at the time?), it highlights how real improvement comes from understanding the conditions that led to an error. Through examples like missed safety checks, risky habits becoming normal, ignored concerns, and unreported near-misses, the text shows how blame cultures stop people speaking up and allow problems to grow. Instead, it argues for a learning-focused approach where divers, instructors, and organisations reflect on decision-making, encourage honest reporting, and examine the wider system. The key message is that accountability should not be about punishment, but about creating an environment where people can speak openly, learn from mistakes, and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/youre-accountable-youre-responsible-youre-itLinks: Blog about the Scylla wreck incident: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiIJN SATA case study: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensPDF guide: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ugx0lQM5am2gQ9rJa4aCq39JBukGZyLK/view?usp=sharingRuth Parris: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ruth-parris-76a53635/Ruth’s thesis: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9186204Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This blog by Michael John Snow explores how small equipment issues on a remote expedition vessel can gradually become accepted as “normal,” not because of poor decisions, but because of how isolated systems work. In these environments, teams are skilled and focused on keeping operations running, especially when guests, tight schedules, and limited support make stopping costly. With fewer external checks and less immediate feedback, minor irregularities are often monitored rather than acted on, and over time they fade into the background. This process, known as normalization of deviation, slowly shifts what is seen as acceptable without anyone clearly deciding to take a risk. When a problem finally forces action, it can look sudden, but it is usually the result of many reasonable choices made over time. The key message is that this isn’t about individual failure, but about system design: isolation reduces challenge, delays response, and makes it easier for risk to build unnoticed. To manage this, the blog argues that remote operations need stronger structures—like clear governance, tracking, and shared visibility of equipment performance—so that small issues stay visible and are addressed before they become bigger problems.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/isolation-amplifies-driftLinks: Governance mechanisms: https://remoteassetgovernance.com/frameworkTags: English| Operations & Procedures

This episode looks at the 2021 wreck diving tragedy on HMS Scylla, where three experienced divers entered the wreck and only one survived. It first examines the kind of reaction often seen on social media, where the incident is explained as a series of obvious mistakes made by individuals. It then explores the same event using a human factors and systems approach called LEODSI, which looks at how people, environment, equipment, tasks, organisational culture, and time interact to shape decisions and outcomes. Instead of asking “who failed?”, this perspective asks how normal behaviour, built on experience, trust, and familiar conditions, can combine with changing environments, increasing stress, and limited time to slowly reduce safety margins. By understanding how these factors interacted to produce the outcome, the aim is to help the diving community learn in a deeper way and improve the overall system so that safer decisions become easier and tragedies like this are less likely to happen.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiLinks: Interview with Adam on the Deep Wreck Diver Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMYKjZocinsLinnea Mills Case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensDeath of a 12 year old in Texas during Open Water training: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhLearning from Emergent Outcomes: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoDive Talk review of the interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvCr3_pX4a4Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores the serious incident in which two divers were accidentally left behind by a dive boat near Rottnest Island while diving with Perth Diving Academy. Rather than treating it as the failure of one operator, the discussion looks at how a simple error—such as a headcount mistake—can reveal deeper weaknesses in safety systems that may exist across the dive charter industry. It explains how many operations rely on habits, assumptions, and informal checks that usually work, but can fail when conditions change. The episode also looks at the limits of fines and punishment, which rarely help the wider industry learn unless there is transparency about what actually went wrong. Instead of blaming a “bad operator,” the focus is on understanding how safety systems drift over time, why single points of failure are dangerous, and how stronger safety comes from multiple checks, open feedback from staff and customers, and a culture of continuous improvement that looks for problems before they turn into accidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/this-could-happen-to-any-dive-operatorLinks: Australian Maritime Safety Authority: https://www.amsa.gov.au/How we measure safety in diving: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-does-safe-meanSystems in diving: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-road-to-excellence-systems-and-structure-form-the-foundation-of-a-culture-of-improvementTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode looks at how diving incidents are often explained by blaming the last person involved, much like blaming the person who pulls the final brick from an already unstable Jenga tower. While that person may be the last to act, many other factors—such as environment, equipment, training, social pressure, and organisational practices—may already have weakened the system. Through several real diving examples, the episode shows how accidents usually develop from a combination of conditions rather than a single mistake. It also explains why people are quick to blame individuals: it is easier, it protects our sense of safety, and it is what we are used to seeing in the media and official reports. Instead of asking what someone “should have done,” the more useful question is how their actions made sense at the time with the information and resources they had. By shifting from judgement to curiosity and looking at the wider system, divers and instructors can learn more from incidents and improve both their technical and non-technical skills to make future dives safer.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/and-still-the-tower-is-standingLinks: “Blaming a bad apple is like wetting your pants”:https://indepthmag.com/do-bad-apples-actually-exist/Blog about the death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensBlog about the death of a 12 year old child in Texas: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhWait list for Learning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoFacebook group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/184882365201810/permalink/2729409417415746/Tags: English| Safety & Risk Management

This episode looks at how quick judgement, especially online, can block learning and make diving less safe. Using a real example of an adaptive scuba training video that received harsh criticism, it explains how people often react without understanding the full context. The episode introduces two key ideas from Human Factors: psychological safety, where people feel safe to ask questions and speak up, and just culture, where the focus is on learning instead of blame. The main message is simple: when people judge, learning stops, but when people stay curious, learning begins. By slowing down, asking questions, and trying to understand why decisions made sense at the time, dive teams and the wider community can make better choices, create safer environments, and build a healthier culture for everyone.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/be-curious-not-judgementalLinks: Original Facebook post and video: https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1DnwV8qM1r/Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores why people often go diving even when something feels “off,” and how risk usually starts before anyone gets in the water. It explains that danger doesn’t come from one big mistake, but from small pressures like stress, tiredness, rushing, poor communication, and cutting corners that slowly build up and start to feel normal. Over time, these small compromises become habits, and people stop seeing them as problems at all. The key message is that safety isn’t just about following procedures underwater — it’s about noticing when your safety margin is already shrinking on the surface. Real safety comes from having the courage to stop, slow down, and ask not “Can we do this dive?” but “Do we still have enough room for things to go wrong?”Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/you-are-entering-water-with-known-problemsLinks: Work as Imagined vs Work as Done blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/Work-as-Imagined-vs-Work-as-DoneTags: English| Safety & Risk Management

This episode explores what real safety improvement in diving could look like if we stop copying other industries and start designing for the reality of diving itself. It explains that diving is commercial, lightly regulated, and full of everyday trade-offs between safety, money, time, and training, which means risk can’t be removed — only managed. Instead of relying only on rules and checklists, the focus should be on building “margin” into the system: better training time, safer conditions, lower ratios, rested instructors, better decision-making, and a culture where stopping a dive is normal, not failure. The key message is that safety doesn’t come from paperwork alone, but from building real capacity — skills, time, support, learning systems, and honest culture — so people can make good decisions under pressure and prevent small compromises from slowly turning into serious danger.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/no-silver-bullets-build-capacityTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode looks at the tragic death of 12-year-old D.H. during a scuba training dive and explains it not as one person’s mistake, but as a failure of the whole system around her. Using court documents and a safety science approach, the analysis shows how many “normal” things came together — rushed training, poor visibility, tired staff, missing safety equipment, weak rules, money pressure, and lack of oversight — to create a situation where there was no real safety margin left. The key message is that this was not a random accident or a single bad decision, but the result of a system that allowed risky practices to become normal. The goal is not blame, but learning: understanding how everyday routines, shortcuts, and pressures can slowly increase danger, and how changing the system — not just individuals — is the only real way to prevent this from happening again.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhLinks: Court filings: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/26789283-dylanharrisonlawsuit/Purpose of investigation blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLearning from Emergent Outcomes and LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoPsychological safety: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9151225Research around “stop work” orders: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352017590_Deciding_to_stop_work_or_deciding_how_work_is_donehttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753517308871RSTC guidance and Standards: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNRrrosDJYsTrade off between performance, cost and resources: https://youtu.be/vtgIwHrUWVQ?list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&t=555Regulated environments such as military aviation: https://www.mdpi.com/2313-576X/8/2/37Barriers to learning from adverse events: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9151225Social acceptance of drift: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/normalisation-of-deviance-not-about-rule-breakingWork as Imagined vs Work as Done: https://youtu.be/vtgIwHrUWVQ?list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&t=962Performance Influencing Factors: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-performance-influencing-factorsThe shoot down of two Black Hawks: https://www.mindtherisk.com/literature/150-friendly-fire-the-accidental-shootdown-of-u-s-black-hawks-over-northern-iraq-by-scott-a-snookRebreather Forum 4.0 talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkdVHBDnCjcChallenger and Columbia disasters: https://www.montana.edu/rmaher/engr125/CAIB-History%20as%20a%20cause.pdfLoss of HMNZ Manawanui: https://nzdf.mil.nz/court-of-inquiry-hmnzs-manawanuiThe death of LCpl Partridge: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d305623ed915d2feeac4a0f/LCpl_Partridge_Service_Inquiry_Parts_1.1._to_1.6_REDACTED_ONLINE_VERSION.pdfThe death of ADR Yarwood: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Redacted-Death-Able-Diver-COI-Rpt-for-publication.pdfSafety Science for Outdoor and Experiential Learning book: https://www.amazon.com/Safety-Science-Outdoor-Experiential-Education-ebook/dp/B0G99BD12G/ref=sr_1_1The death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores why asking “why did this happen?” after a diving accident is important — but not enough on its own. It explains that investigations often stop too early, not because everything is understood, but because people reach a point that feels comfortable, simple, or easy to fix. Many reports focus on equipment failures or individual mistakes, while deeper causes like pressure, workload, training culture, time limits, and business realities are left out. The episode shows that real learning comes from looking at how normal routines, shortcuts, and everyday decisions shape what people do, not just what went wrong at the end. The main message is clear: the goal of asking “why” isn’t to find someone to blame, but to understand the system well enough to change future behaviour — so the next dive is safer, even under pressure and imperfect conditions.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-do-we-stop-asking-whyLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes and LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoSome relevant blogs: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-story-gets-told-what-words-are-usedhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-the-story-hurts-too-muchhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationReferences:Kletz, T. A. (2006). Accident investigation: Keep asking “why?”. Journal of hazardous materials, 130(1-2), 69-75.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge.Reason, J. (1991). Too little and too late: A commentary on accident and incident reporting systems. In Near miss reporting as a safety tool (pp. 9-26). Butterworth-Heinemann.Rasmussen, J. (1990). Human error and the problem of causality in analysis of accidents. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences, 327(1241), 449-462.Rasmussen, J. (1988). Coping safely with complex systems. In AAAS Annual Meeting 1988.Cedergren, A., & Petersen, K. (2011). Prerequisites for learning from accident investigations–a cross-country comparison of national accident investigation boards. Safety Science, 49(8-9), 1238-1245.Lessons from Longford: the Esso Gas Plant Explosion. Andrew Hopkins. CCH Australia, Sydney. 2000Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnagel, E. (2010). What you find is not always what you fix—How other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(6), 2132-2139.Manuele, F. A. (2016). Root-Causal Factors: Uncovering the Hows & Whys of Incidents. Professional Safety, 61(05), 48-55.Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode looks at two very different ways of telling the same tragic story — the death of a 12-year-old girl during a scuba training dive in Texas — and why the way we tell these stories matters for real safety. The first version focuses on blame, emotion, and individual failure, which feels powerful but pushes people toward anger instead of learning. The second version looks at how the whole system shaped what happened, including training pressure, poor visibility, equipment choices, fatigue, class structure, and missing safety checks. Instead of asking “who failed,” it asks how normal practices, routines, and decisions slowly combined to create dangerous conditions. The key message is simple: real prevention doesn’t come from blaming people, it comes from understanding how systems work in everyday conditions — and changing those systems so tragedies like this are far less likely to happen again.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-story-gets-told-what-words-are-usedLinks: Why hurting prevents changeWhat is the purpose of an investigationSharing stories: https://youtu.be/DRXqeQvRFK0Linnea Mills case: https://youtu.be/lu4tc8gtNioTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores how divers often overlook the richness of underwater environments they think they already know, and how greater awareness can transform both safety and understanding. Using real examples from rivers, lakes, and glacial landscapes, it shows how underwater spaces are shaped by nature, history, and human activity, even when they look simple on the surface. The episode explains how human factors help divers make better decisions, communicate clearly, and work more effectively as teams, while citizen science gives divers a way to contribute real knowledge to research and conservation. The core message is that when divers learn to look more carefully, every dive becomes more meaningful — improving safety, protecting underwater heritage, and turning ordinary dives into opportunities to learn, discover, and contribute.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/seeing-what-is-unseen-scientific-divingTags: Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology

This episode explores why diving accidents involving children create such strong reactions and deep divisions, and how our need for simple explanations often gets in the way of real learning. It explains how people quickly form strong opinions after tragedies, not because they don’t care about safety, but because events like this challenge their beliefs about control, training, and protection. To feel safe again, communities often rush to blame individuals, which brings emotional comfort but blocks deeper understanding. The episode shows how psychology, identity, and group thinking shape these reactions, and why early public stories become hard to question. The key message is that real safety comes from slowing down, asking harder questions, and looking at the wider system — the pressures, culture, and conditions that shape decisions — instead of just asking who is at fault.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-the-story-hurts-too-muchLinks: The moral dimension of an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationCognitive dissonance: https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/cognitive-dissonanceBlame providing moral comfort: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationSuppressing events: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRXqeQvRFK0The death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode explores how accidents in diving and other high-risk jobs are often blamed on individuals, even when the real causes are deeper problems in the system, such as pressure, poor communication, lack of support, broken procedures, and unsafe cultures. Using real examples from rescue diving, healthcare, aviation, and emergency services, it shows how “blame cultures” create fear, silence, and hidden mistakes, which makes future accidents more likely. In contrast, “learning cultures” focus on understanding how systems shape behaviour, encourage people to speak up, and treat mistakes as chances to learn rather than punish. The message is clear and practical: safety improves when organisations build trust, psychological safety, and open reporting, so problems can be fixed before they turn into tragedies — because you can’t fix what people are too afraid to talk about.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/safe-diving-starts-from-the-system-not-from-the-humanLinks: Report about the search operation (in Polish): https://www.trojmiasto.pl/wiadomosci/Zarzuty-za-smierc-strazaka-Zginal-podczas-poszukiwan-Grzegorza-B-n203080.htmlWhen CRM isn’t implemented (in Polish): https://remiza.pl/nik-grupy-psp-potrzebuja-wsparcia-a-system-reform/2025 Mid-air collision: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Potomac_River_mid-air_collision#Blog about the reasons for undertaking an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationBlameless post mortems: https://sre.google/sre-book/postmortem-culture/Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode looks at how diving accidents are often explained in simple ways that blame individuals, instead of exploring the deeper systems and pressures that shape what really happens. It explains that investigations are not just about facts, but about meaning, comfort, and fear after someone has died, which often leads to stories that focus on “human error” instead of learning. Using real examples, it shows how simple explanations may feel reassuring, but they don’t make diving safer. Real prevention comes from understanding how people, training, culture, pressure, equipment, and organisations interact in complex ways. The key message is that safety doesn’t come from finding someone to blame — it comes from changing the conditions that shape decisions and behaviour, so future dives are genuinely safer, not just easier to explain.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLinks: Dekker’s four competing purposes: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1463922X.2014.955554Fatal maritime collision investigation: https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-ro-ro-passenger-vessel-scottish-viking-and-prawn-trawler-homeland-off-st-abb-s-head-scotland-with-loss-of-1-lifeNon-fatal maritime collision investigation: https://dmaib.com/reports/2014/kraslava-and-atlantic-lady-collision-on-1-november-2014Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensIf Only… documentary: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonlyLearning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoReferences:Dekker: The psychology of accident investigation: epistemological, preventive, moral and existential meaning-making. 2015. Another link. https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/items/d0de2c1f-08f8-43b2-9d30-2a4ff6baea09/fullMAIB Report: https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-ro-ro-passenger-vessel-scottish-viking-and-prawn-trawler-homeland-off-st-abb-s-head-scotland-with-loss-of-1-lifeDMAIB Report: https://dmaib.com/reports/2014/kraslava-and-atlantic-lady-collision-on-1-november-2014A fellow graduate from Lund University wrote about this “Why do we ask why? Finding meaning after a violent loss.”Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This blog explains why hiding mistakes in diving training and leadership is dangerous, and why honesty builds safer, stronger teams. Using real examples from military service and diving, it shows that when leaders admit errors, teams learn faster, trust each other more, and make better decisions. When mistakes are hidden, people stop asking questions, small problems become normal, and serious risks grow over time. The article introduces the idea of psychological safety — creating an environment where people feel safe to speak up, admit mistakes, and challenge unsafe actions without fear. It argues that real credibility comes from honesty, not pretending to be perfect. By encouraging openness, shared responsibility, and learning instead of blame, dive teams can prevent accidents, improve performance, and build a culture where safety, trust, and learning come first.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-hidden-cost-of-never-show-weakness-why-hiding-instructor-errors-undermines-dive-safetyTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology

This episode explores the link between diving, mental health, and trust, showing that anxiety, depression, and therapy are common parts of normal life and are also present in the diving community. Many divers hide mental health challenges or medication use because they fear judgment, exclusion, or losing opportunities, which actually makes diving less safe. The key message is that safety underwater depends more on trust between people than on equipment, and that honesty and psychological safety in a dive team allow divers to support each other properly. The episode explains that common treatments like antidepressants are not the real risk — the real danger comes from silence, stigma, and poor communication. It also highlights how diving can improve mental wellbeing, helping people feel calm, focused, and connected. Overall, the message is simple: openness about mental health is not weakness — it’s responsibility, professionalism, and an important part of keeping each other safe underwater.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/diver-s-depression-it-s-time-to-tackle-stigma-and-taboosSourcesSt Leger Dowse, M. et al. (2019) – Diving and mental health: The potential benefits and risks from a survey of recreational scuba divers.A study of 729 recreational divers in the UK shows that divers have similar levels of mental health problems to the general population, with as many as 90% reporting an improvement in their well-being thanks to diving.Diving and Hyperbaric Medicine JournalMorgan, A. et al. (2019) – Can scuba diving offer therapeutic benefit to military veterans…An analysis of the Deptherapy UK program for veterans, confirming the therapeutic effects of diving in the treatment of PTSD and psychological trauma.Disability and Rehabilitation JournalSoldiers Undertaking Disabled Scuba (SUDS) – How Scuba Diving & SUDS Help War Veterans.Description of a therapeutic program in which diving helps war veterans regain their mental and physical balance.sudsdiving.orgUndersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society (UHMS) – Diving Medical Guidance to the Physician (2023).The latest medical guidelines on diving, psychotropic drugs, and mental health.uhms.orgWorld Health Organization (WHO) – Depression and Other Common Mental Disorders: Global Health Estimates (2022).Epidemiological data showing that approximately 25% of adults worldwide experience mental disorders.who.intGascon, M. et al. (2015) – Mental health benefits of long-term exposure to blue spaces.A review of research on the positive effects of aquatic environments (“blue spaces”) on mental health.International Journal of Environmental Research and Public HealthWhite, M. P. et al. (2010) – Blue space: The importance of water for preference, affect, and restorativeness ratings.A study confirming that being in a water environment has a strong relaxing effect and reduces stress. Journal of Environmental PsychologyTags: - english andrzej górnicki

This episode looks back on a big year for Human Factors in Diving and shares what The Human Diver community has achieved, along with what’s coming next. It highlights how real change in diving doesn’t come from new gear or technology, but from learning, reflection, and improving how people think, communicate, and make decisions. The episode celebrates global training programmes, online courses, podcasts, blogs, and free resources that have helped thousands of divers grow their skills and awareness. It also looks ahead to new projects, including international events, new learning programmes, and wider access to training in 2026. The core message is simple: progress comes from consistent learning, honest self-reflection, and small daily improvements — being better than yesterday, not perfect today.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/a-review-of-2025-looking-forward-to-2026-2597Links: Courses: HFiD: Essentials, HFiD: Applied Skills, Masterclass seriesHF in Diving ConferenceLearning from Emergent Outcomes (LFEO)Ambassador network (sign up here: https://www.thehumandiver.com/partner-mandated-instructor-application)YouTube channelGet in touchTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

This episode looks at a real cave diving tragedy and uses it to explain how accidents often happen because of human thinking, not just broken rules or bad equipment. Instead of focusing on blame, it shows how choices made underwater can seem logical at the time, even when they lead to disaster. The episode explores key ideas like awareness, decision-making, teamwork, leadership, and psychological safety, and explains how stress, distraction, group pressure, and complex plans can affect how people think and act. It also highlights why good briefings, open communication, and honest debriefs matter, and why teams must feel safe to speak up and challenge decisions. The main message is that safer diving comes from understanding human behaviour, learning without blame, and building strong teams that plan well, communicate clearly, and adapt when things don’t go as expected.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/analysis-from-a-human-factors-perspective-cave-double-fatality-calimba-2004Links: Blueprint for Survival: https://nsscds.org/blueprint-for-survival/Identifying lessons and learning from them vs blame and punishment: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/blame-or-learnonline resources that have a compendium of reports on cave diving fatalities:CREER https://creer-mx.com/accident-incident-analysis/NSS-CDS https://nsscds.org/accident-analysis/IUCRR - https://iucrr.org/more/accident-analysis/incident-reports/Jenny’s blog “Incompetent and Unaware”: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/the-dunning-kruger-effect-incompetent-or-competent-and-unawareYouTube channel: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/hf-for-dummies-part-1-human-factorsTags: - english accident analysis cave diving lanny vogel

This episode explains that real teamwork in diving is much more than just staying close to your buddy. Using a real incident where a diver tried to handle a serious problem alone, it shows how this can create new risks for the whole team. The key idea is that strong teams are built through clear roles, planning, and communication, not luck. When everyone knows who is responsible for things like navigation, monitoring the group, managing equipment, or handling problems, dives run more smoothly and safely. The episode highlights how assigning roles before a dive, confirming them in the briefing, and learning from them in the debrief helps reduce confusion, stress, and mistakes. The main message is simple: good teamwork doesn’t happen by accident — it is created through clear planning, shared responsibility, and learning together after every dive.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/teamwork-in-diving-the-power-of-clear-roles-task-divisionLinks: Blogs about leadership: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-leadership-creating-the-space-for-others-to-be-heardhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/the-diving-professional-leadership-is-not-optionalhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/top-tips-for-beginner-divers-leadership-and-followership

This episode tells the story of a calm, well-planned dive that still ended with an unexpected case of decompression sickness, and uses it to explore how people react when things go wrong. Even when the dive was conservative, the team experienced, and everything seemed to be done “right,” a diver still became unwell — showing that not all risks can be controlled or explained. The episode looks at our natural need to find someone or something to blame after accidents, and how this search for causes often comes from fear, not facts. It explains how people try to protect their sense of safety by creating simple explanations, even when reality is uncertain and complex. The core message is that true safety in diving doesn’t come from believing we can control everything, but from accepting uncertainty, staying humble, learning from events without blame, and building resilience, awareness, and reflection into every dive.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/desperate-need-for-blameResources: Dekker, S., ’t Hart, P. (2010). Judgment and decision making in complex systems.Mezulis et al. (2004). A meta-analytic review of self-serving attribution bias.Baumeister (1999). Self-concept, self-esteem, and self-deception.Reason, J. (1990). Human Error.Dekker, S. (2014). The Field Guide to Understanding 'Human Error'.Skinner, E. (1996). A guide to constructs of control.Rotter, J. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement.Lerner, M. (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion.Hafer & Bègue (2005). The Belief in a Just World and Reactions to Innocent Victims.Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings.Jones & Harris (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Tags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology

This episode explains how Non-Technical Skills (NTS) and Human Factors in Diving (HFiD) only work when they become part of everyday diving culture, not just a course or a checklist. Real safety comes from how divers think, communicate, make decisions, and work as teams, not just from technical skills or equipment. It highlights the importance of shared language, reducing hierarchy, encouraging people to speak up, honest debriefs, and creating psychological safety so divers feel comfortable asking questions and raising concerns. For teams and dive centres, this means building strong technical foundations, teaching communication and decision-making skills, talking openly about risk versus reward, and making reflection and learning part of daily practice. The key message is that safer diving comes from habits, culture, and behaviour over time — not one-off training — where teams learn together, support each other, and keep working to be better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-practical-ways-of-bringing-hf-nts-into-divingLinks: Last weeks blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/would-you-speak-up-to-the-commanderBehavioural Marker SchemeBuilding psychological safety blogs: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/team-building-psych-safety-1Nic Emery’s blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/what-are-we-pretending-not-to-knowDEBrIEF framework: https://www.thehumandiver.com/debriefTags: English| Operations & Procedures

This episode explores why real learning in diving is harder than buying new gear or following checklists. It explains how divers, like firefighters and oil and gas workers, often struggle to change habits, question tradition, and speak up in teams, even when something feels wrong. The problem isn’t a lack of training or information, but culture — things like hierarchy, fear of blame, and not feeling safe to challenge more experienced people. The key message is that safer diving doesn’t come from more equipment or more rules, but from better communication, shared learning, honest debriefs, and strong non-technical skills like teamwork, awareness, and decision-making. Real change only happens when these behaviours become everyday habits, not one-off courses, and when teams create an environment where people feel safe to learn, ask questions, and improve together.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/would-you-speak-up-to-the-commanderLinks: If Only… documentary and workbook: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonly2026 HFiD: Conference: https://www.hf-in-diving-conference.com/Nic’s blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/what-are-we-pretending-not-to-knowScuba Adventures, TX: https://www.scubaplano.com/TekDeep Asia: https://tekdeep.com/author/marccrane/Part 2: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/the-practical-ways-of-bringing-hf-nts-into-divingTags: English| Operations & Procedures

This episode looks at the limits of planning and equipment in technical and cave diving, and explains why true safety comes from adaptability, not control. Using a powerful real-life cave diving story, it shows how even the best plans can fail, and how survival often depends on calm thinking, core skills, and the ability to solve problems when things go wrong. The key idea is that risk can’t be removed from diving — it can only be managed — and focusing only on gear and procedures can create a false sense of security. Real safety comes from strong fundamentals, simple systems, realistic training, and learning how to stay calm and think clearly under pressure. The message is clear: the safest divers aren’t the ones with the most equipment or the most detailed plans, but the ones with the skills, mindset, and resilience to adapt when the unexpected happens.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-technical-cave-divers-decision-making-to-manage-risk-we-have-to-be-exposed-to-uncertainty-and-harmTags: English| Education & Content Type

This episode challenges the idea that more experience automatically means safer diving. Using research from aviation and real diving examples, it shows that what really matters is not how many dives you’ve done, but how you see and understand risk. Two people can face the same situation and make very different choices, not because of skill, but because of how dangerous it feels to them. The key message is that experience without reflection can lead to complacency, where risky behaviour starts to feel normal. Safer divers are the ones who think about their decisions, talk openly with their team, learn from near-misses and “no-go” choices, and keep questioning what feels routine. True competence comes from awareness, reflection, and honest communication, not just time underwater or the number of dives in a logbook.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-technical-cave-divers-situation-awareness-risk-perception-is-a-critical-skill-experience-doesn-t-equal-judgementLinks: Normalisation of deviance blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/normalisation-of-deviance-not-about-rule-breakingDrinkwater, J. L., & Molesworth, B. R. C. (2010). Pilot see, pilot do: Examining the predictors of pilots’ risk management behaviour. Safety Science, 48(10), 1445–1451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2010.07.001Tags: English| Education & Content Type

This episode explores how everyday conversations between divers, even simple small talk, play a powerful role in building trust and safety. It introduces the idea of the “Communication Triangle,” showing how teams move from polite, surface-level talk to deeper, more honest communication that allows people to speak up, share concerns, and admit mistakes. Using real diving examples, it shows how accidents are often caused not by lack of skill, but by people not feeling safe enough to say something. The core message is simple: strong diving teams are built through open communication, trust, and psychological safety, where everyone feels able to speak honestly. When divers move beyond politeness and build real connection, decision-making improves, learning grows, and safety becomes a natural result.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-technical-cave-divers-psychological-safety-and-just-cultureTags: English| Education & Content Type

Technical diving often looks like it’s all about planning, rules, and equipment, but the biggest risk factor is still the human. This episode explores how “Performance Influencing Factors” (PIFs) like fatigue, stress, environment, team pressure, and mental overload can affect even experienced divers, sometimes without them realising it. Using a real dive story, it shows how small human issues can stack up and lead to mistakes, even when procedures are followed. The key message is that safe technical diving isn’t just about good gear and checklists, it’s about self-awareness, teamwork, honest communication, and planning for human error. When divers understand their limits, support each other, and build safety margins into every dive, they don’t just dive better — they dive safer.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-technical-divers-performance-influencing-factors-even-the-best-of-us-are-only-humanLinks: Showing vulnerability: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/the-challenge-of-psychological-safetyNormalisation of Deviance: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/normalization-of-deviance-risk-how-socially-accepted-drift-can-impact-your-divingTags: English| Education & Content Type

This episode looks at the idea that all technical divers are leaders, even if they don’t see themselves that way, because their experience, behaviour, and decisions influence others in the water. Leadership in diving isn’t about giving orders; it’s about building trust, staying calm, communicating clearly, and creating an environment where everyone feels safe to speak up. The discussion explains how leadership roles in technical diving can change during a dive and highlights key qualities of good leaders, such as technical competence, good decision-making, strong situation awareness, and leading by example. It also shares practical tips, like fostering psychological safety, being consistent with procedures, understanding and explaining the reasons behind decisions, and always trying to improve. The main message is simple: as a technical diver, you are a role model, and by being the diver you would want to follow, you can help your whole team dive more safely and effectively.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/top-tips-for-technical-cave-divers-leadershipTags: - english cave diving human factors lanny vogel leadership psychological safety technical diving