Free Speech Press

Docket Number 24-781Date Argued: 12/02/25

Docket Number: 24-777 Date Argued 12/01/25

Docket Number: 24-171Date Argued: 12/01/25https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-171_ap6c.pdf

Docket Number: 24-820Date Argued: 11/12/2524-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904QUESTION PRESENTED:The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an "extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, id .; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act. The question presented is:Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025---24-860 CARTER V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5339852LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1115QUESTION PRESENTED:Congress empowered district courts to reduce sentences of federal prisoners for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." Congress did not define the terms "extraordinary and compelling" but instead expressly delegated to the United States Sentencing Commission the authority to describe what types of circumstances qualify. Exercising that authority, the Sentencing Commission adopted a provision, Section 1B1.13(b)(6), that permits district courts to consider a sentence reduction where, among other things, the defendant has served at least ten years of an unusually long sentence and a nonretroactive change in law produces a "gross disparity" between that sentence and the one likely to be imposed at the time of the motion. The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question presented here:Whether the Sentencing Commission acted within its expressly delegated authority by permitting district courts to consider, in narrowly cabined circumstances, a nonretroactive change in law in determining whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction.CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-820.CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-820_f2ah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-556Date Argued: 11/12/2524-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122QUESTION PRESENTED:Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is:Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compeling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF “EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS” THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER 28 U. S. C. §2255.CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-556_1bn2.pdf

Docket Number: 24-758Date Argued: 11/10/2524-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCALDECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409QUESTION PRESENTED:Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such "collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity.The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-758_3f14.pdf

Docket Number: 23-1197Date Argued: 11/10/2523-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONSDECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686QUESTION PRESENTED:Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq ., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq . In Tanzin v. Tanvir , 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical.The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/23-1197_3d9g.pdf

Docket Number: 24-1287Date Argued: 11/05/2524-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMPDECISION BELOW:LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202QUESTION PRESENTED:The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest[.]" Id. § l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to the executive orders challenged here.The question presented is:Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025-----25-250 TRUMP V. V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC.DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2490634LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2025-1812, 2025-1813QUESTION PRESENTED:1. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump pursuant to the national emergencies declared or continued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders 14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the President.THE MOTION TO EXPEDITE AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-1287 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf

Docket Number: 24-724Date Argued: 11/04/2524-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUISTDECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197QUESTION PRESENTED:Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York, and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely diverse parties before it.The questions presented are:1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claimCERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-724_ebgj.pdf

Docket Number: 24-808Date Argued: 11/04/2524-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTONDECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881QUESTION PRESENTED:Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).The question presented is:Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-808_k53l.pdf

24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994QUESTION PRESENTED:Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims Act.Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken "federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the government for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against the contractor. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits over Boyle's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by invoking §2680(j).The question presented is:Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-924_c18e.pdf

24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662QUESTION PRESENTED:Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1056_4gd5.pdf

24-624 CASE V. MONTANADECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136QUESTION PRESENTED:Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025See transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-624_3eah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-109Decision Below: 732 F.Supp.3d 574Question Presented Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals.In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questions presented are:1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?4. Is this action non-justiciable?CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-110. THESE CASES ARE RESTORED TO THE CALENDAR FOR REARGUMENT. IN DUE COURSE, THE COURT WILL ISSUE AN ORDER SCHEDULING ARGUMENT AND SPECIFYING ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING.Order of August 1, 2025:THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS ADDRESSING THE FOLLOWING QUESTION RAISED ON PAGES 36—38 OF THE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: WHETHER THE STATE’S INTENTIONAL CREATION OF A SECOND MAJORITY-MINORITY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH OR FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION.JURISDICTION NOTED 11/4/2024---------------------------------------24-110 ROBINSON V. CALLAISDECISION BELOW: 732 F.Supp.3d 574LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 3:24-cv-00122-DCJ-CES-RRSThe questions presented are:1. Did the District Court err in concluding that race predominated in the design of CD6 based on the Legislature's stated intent to comply with the rulings of the Robinson courts without presuming the good faith of the legislature, attempting to disentangle the Legislature's racial and political considerations, or requiring an alternative map that satisfied both §2 and the Legislature's political objectives, as required by Alexander v. S. C. State Conf. of NAACP , 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1233-1234 (2024)?2. Did the District Court err when it disregarded the rulings of the courts in Robinson that the Gingles preconditions could be (and had been) satisfied and instead required that the State's enacted map satisfy the first Gingles precondition to survive strict scrutiny?3. Did the District Court err in failing to accord the Louisiana Legislature sufficient breathing room to account for political considerations that resulted in a less compact district than necessary to satisfy §2?4. Did the District Court err in relying on extra-record evidence and ignoring the evidence in the record on SB8's respect for communities of interest in concluding that SB8 failed to satisfy strict scrutiny?5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by unnecessarily expediting the proceedings and limiting the evidence presented in this complex, fact-intensive case?See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-109_feah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-482Decision Bellow: 113 F.4th 839 (8th Cir. 2024)Question PresentedWhether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.John F. Bash, Esquire, of Austin, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgement below.Cert. Granted April 7, 2025See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-482_6j37.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5438Decision Below: CA 11 Order 6/27/2024Lower Court Case Number: 24-11704Question Presented Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), "[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed." (emphasis added).The first question presented is:Whether 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 22 U.S.C. § 2255.* * *Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), "[t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari." (emphasis added).The second question presented is:Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.Kasdin M. Mitchell, Esquire, of Dallas, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below as to question 1 presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari. Cert. Granted January 17, 2025See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5438_2dp3.pdf

Docket Number: 24-351Date Argued: October 8, 2025Decision Below: 96 F.4th 799 (5th Cir. 2024)Lower Court Case Number: 23-10179Question PresentedWhether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Services employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).Rule PresentedThe Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq.), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b). Cert. Granted April 21, 2025See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-351_6jfl.pdf

Docket Number: 24-568Date Argued: October 8, 2025Decision Below: 114 F.4th 634 (7th Cir. 2024)Lower Court Case Number: 23-2644Question PresentedFederal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.The sole question presented is whether Petitioners, as federal Candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections. Cert. Granted June 2, 2025.See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-568_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5774Decision Below: 102 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024)Lower Court Case Number: 21-1379Question Presented1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).Petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to question 1 presented by the petition. Charles L. McCloud, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below.Cert. Granted March 3, 2025.See transcripthttps://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5774_7648.pdf

Docket Number: 24-539Date Argued: October 07, 2025Decision Below: 116 F.4th 1178Question PresentedKaley Chiles is a licensed counselor who helps people by talking with them. A practicing Christian, Chiles believes that people flourish when they live consistently with God's design, including their biological sex. Many of her clients seek her counsel precisely because they believe that their faith and their relationship with God establishes the foundation upon which to understand their identity and desires. But Colorado bans these consensual conversations based on the viewpoints they express. Its content- and viewpoint-based Counseling Restriction prohibits counseling conversations with minors that might encourage them to change their "sexual orientation or gender, identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions," while allowing conversations that provide "[a]ccpetance, support, and understanding for ... identity exploration and development, including ... [a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transition." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5).The Tenth Circuit upheld this ban as a regulation of Chiles's conduct, not speech. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split between the Eleventh and Third Circuits, which do not treat counseling conversations as conduct, and the Ninth Circuit, which does. The question presented is:Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause. Cert. Granted March 10, 2025.See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-539_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-440Decision Below: 2024 WL 5354482Lower Court Case Number: 23-1620Question Presented This case presents a clear, recognized, entrenched conflict over an important question about the application of state procedural rules in federal court.Delaware, like numerous states, requires that in certain actions the plaintiff must also file an affidavit of merit ("AOM") with the complaint. See 18 Del. C. § 6853. An AOM is an affidavit signed by an expert stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each defendant has committed the alleged misconduct. See id.§ 6853(a)(l). The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits hold that AOM provisions and comparable statutes do not govern actions in federal court because they answer the same question as-and therefore conflict with-several different Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third and Tenth circuits, in contrast, hold that they present "no conflict" with any Federal Rules.In the decision below, the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, for at least the fifth time, refused to hold that an AOM statute conflicts with any Federal Rules. Judge Phipps "concur[red] in only the judgment." Third Circuit precedent required him to vote to affirm, he explained, but ''writing on a clean slate ... he may not [have] arrive[d] at that same conclusion."The question presented is:Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.Cert. Granted March 10, 2025See Transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-440_q86b.pdf)

Docket Number: 24-557Date Argued: October 6, 2025Decision Below: 707 S.W.3d 138Lower Court Case Number: Pd-0048-20Question PresentedWhether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess. Cert. Granted April 7, 2025See transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-557_6j7a.pdf)

24A884 TRUMP V. CASA, INC.DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 654902LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:--24A885 TRUMP V. WASHINGTONDECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 553485LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:--24A886 TRUMP V. NEW JERSEYDECISION BELOW: 131 F.4th 27LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:--QUESTION PRESENTED:THE APPLICATIONS (24A884, 24A885, AND 24A886) FOR PARTIAL STAYS ARE CONSOLIDATED AND DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT. THE APPLICATIONS ARE SET FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT AT 10 A.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025. SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 4/17/2025You can read the oral argument transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24a884_2c83.pdf

24-394 OK CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD V. DRUMMONDDECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694QUESTION PRESENTED: This Court has "repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits." Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022). Three times, the Court hasapplied that principle to strike down "state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations." Id. at 778-79 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church ofColumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)). Contrary to those precedents, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly fundededucation. These rulings implicate an entrenched circuit split and present two questions for review: o Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students. o Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-396 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART.EXPEDITED BRIEFING.CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025----24-396 ST. ISIDORE OF SEVILLE SCHOOL V. DRUMMONDDECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694QUESTION PRESENTED: This Court has repeatedly held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits a state from denying generally available benefits to a school solely because it is religious. That principle should have resolved this case. Petitioner is a private religious institution. Itseeks to partake in the benefits of Oklahoma's charter school program. But the court below invalidated Petitioner's contract with the charter school board. The court disregarded this Court's Free Exercise precedents because, in its view, Petitioner had become an arm of the government by virtue of that contract. It thus held that the Establishment Clause and Oklahoma laws aimed at creating "a complete separation ofchurch and state" compelled the court to deny Petitioner-on religious grounds-the benefits created by Oklahoma's Charter Schools Act. The questions presented are: o Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students. o Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter school program solely because the schools arereligious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-394 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART.EXPEDITED BRIEFING.CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025You can read the oral argument transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-394_1b72.pdf

24-304 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. DAVISDECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 489288LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55873QUESTION PRESENTED: o Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A FEDERAL COURT MAY CERTIFY A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(B)(3) WHENSOME MEMBERS OF THE PROPOSED CLASS LACK ANY ARTICLE III INJURY. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025You can read the oral argument transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-304_3e04.pdf

24-362 MARTIN V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 1716235LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10062QUESTION PRESENTED: Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit. The questions presented are: o Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees "have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law." Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted). o Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION’S SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT WHEN THE NEGLIGENT OR WRONGFUL ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HAVE SOME NEXUS WITH FURTHERING FEDERAL POLICY ANDCAN REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLYING WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FEDERAL LAW. 2) WHETHER THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION IS CATEGORICALLY INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO TO THE INTENTIONAL TORTS EXCEPTION. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.CHRISTOPHER MILLS, ESQUIRE, OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION IDENTIFIED IN THE ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.CERT. GRANTED 1/27/2025You can read the oral argument transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-362_8njq.pdf

24-320 SOTO V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 1094LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2022-2011QUESTION PRESENTED: This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculatethe period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment. Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement." The question presented is: o When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: GIVEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION UNDER 10 U. S. C. §1413a IS A CLAIM "INVOLVING ... RETIRED PAY" UNDER 31 U. S. C. §3702(a)(1)(A), DOES 10 U. S. C. §1413a PROVIDE A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM THAT DISPLACES THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES AND LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE BARRING ACT?CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025You can read the oral argument here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-320_5436.pdf

24-249 A.J.T. V. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLSDECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 1058LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1399QUESTION PRESENTED: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a. That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As theEighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. The question presented is: o Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025You can read the oral argument here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-249_lkgn.pdf

24-7 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC V. EPADECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 288LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1081, 22-1083, 22-1084, 22-1085QUESTION PRESENTED: Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B). In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers. The questions presented are: (1) Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties. (2) Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.CERT. GRANTED 12/13/2024You can read the oral argument transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-7_d1o3.pdf

24-416 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. ZUCHDECISION BELOW: 97 F.4th 81LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-2244QUESTION PRESENTED: o Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.CERT. GRANTED 1/10/2025You can read the oral argument here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-416_3e04.pdf

24-297 MAHMOUD V. TAYLORDECISION BELOW: 102 F.4th 191LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1890QUESTION PRESENTED: Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out-but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read. Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct." The question presented is: o Do public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out?CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025You can read the oral argument transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-297_j426.pdf

24-275 PARRISH V. UNITED STATESDECISION BELOW: 74 F.4th 160LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-1766QUESTION PRESENTED: Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. The Question Presented is whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened.MICHAEL R. HUSTON, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW.CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025You can read the oral argument transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-275_6j37.pdf

24-316 KENNEDY V. BRAIDWOOD MANAGEMENT, INC.DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 930LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10326QUESTION PRESENTED: The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1). The question presented is as follows: o Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.CERT. GRANTED 1/10/2025You can read the oral transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-316_e29g.pdf

23-1275 MEDINA, DIRECTOR SC DEPT OF HEALTH V. PLANNED PARENTHOODDECISION BELOW: 95 F.4th 152LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1043QUESTION PRESENTED: More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceableright to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferredright is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar." The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question. Those questions are:1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.CERT. GRANTED 12/18/2024You can read the transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1275_0pl1.pdf

24-20 FULD V. PLODECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 74LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-76, 22-496QUESTION PRESENTED: The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B). The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct thattriggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit.The question presented is:Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-151 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENTCERT. GRANTED 12/6/2024----------------------------------------------------------24-151 UNITED STATES V. PLODECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 74LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-76, 22-496QUESTION PRESENTED: In the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA), Pub. L. No. 116-94, Div. J, Tit. IX,§ 903, 133 Stat. 3082, Congress provided that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in certain terrorism-related civil suits if they took specified actions in the future: (a) made payments to designees or family members of terrorists who injured or killed U.S. nationals, or (b) maintained certainpremises or conducted particular activities in the United States. 18 U.S.C. 2334(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2022). The question presented is whether the PSJVTA's means of establishing personal jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-20 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT.CERT. GRANTED 12/6/2024You can read the transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-20_f2bh.pdf

23-1345 RIVERS V. GUERRERODECISION BELOW: 99 F.4th 216LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-11031QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, thestringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initialhabeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing. The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categoricallyapplies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).The question presented is:Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after CERT. GRANTED 12/6/2024final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.CERT. GRANTED 12/6/2024You can read the transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1345_9ol1.pdf

QUESTION PRESENTED: Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes." Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations.The questions presented are:1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet thestate's criteria for religious behavior?2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"ORDER OF 12/16/2024:THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.CERT. GRANTED 12/13/2024You can read the transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-154_5h26.pdf

24-354 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V. CONSUMERS' RESEARCHDECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 743LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60008QUESTION PRESENTED: In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatorycontributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries. The questions presented are as follows:1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-422 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENTIN ADDITION TO THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONS, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS CASE IS MOOT IN LIGHT OF THE CHALLENGERS' FAILURE TO SEEK PRELIMINARY RELIEF BEFORE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.CERT. GRANTED 11/22/202424-422 SHLB COALITION V. CONSUMERS' RESEARCHDECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 743LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60008QUESTION PRESENTED: In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress required the FCC to update existing subsidy mechanisms in order to promote "universal service," supported by statutorily required contributions from carriers offering interstate telecommunications service. Congress defined universal service and adopted specific, detailed principles to guide and cabin the FCC's exercise of delegated authority. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(b), (c), (h).Following Congress's directive in Section 254, the FCC has administered the Universal Service Fund ("USF" or "the Fund") for decades, with support from the Universal Service Administrative Company ("USAC"). The FCC's rules limit USAC's role to administrative matters, prohibit USAC from making policy decisions, and provide for de novo FCC review of any USAC decision upon request.The questions presented are: 1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund. 2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using USAC's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates. 3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to USAC violates the nondelegation doctrine.CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-354 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT.IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONS, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS CASE IS MOOT IN LIGHT OF THE CHALLENGERS' FAILURE TO SEEK PRELIMINARY RELIEF BEFORE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.CERT. GRANTED 11/22/2024Read the transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-354_2co3.pdf

23-1067 OKLAHOMA V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCYDECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 1262LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-9514QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgatingany implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits. The question presented is: Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all statesCONSOLIDATED WITH 23-1068 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE ALITO TOOK NO PART.CERT. GRANTED 10/21/202423-1068 PACIFICORP V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACENCYDECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 1262LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-9512QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs andpurports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.CONSOLIDATED WITH 23-1067 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE ALITO TOOK NO PART.CERT. GRANTED 10/21/2024Read the transcript here:https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1067_6647.pdf

23-1229 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY V. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFININGDECISION BELOW: 86 F.4th 1121LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60266, 22-60425, 22-60433, 22-60434QUESTION PRESENTED: In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard Program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit. The question presented is as follows: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).CERT. GRANTED 10/21/2024Read the Transcript Here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1229_qol1.pdf

QUESTION PRESENTEDPetitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE RESPONDENT’S BRIEF1. Whether the 30-day deadline in 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1) for filing a petition for review of an order of removal is jurisdictional.2. Whether a noncitizen satisfies the deadline in Section 1252(b)(1) by filing a petition for review challenging an agency order denying withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture within 30 days of the issuance of that order.STEPHEN J. HAMMER, ESQUIRE, OF DALLAS, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOWhttps://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1270_j4el.pdf

QUESTION PRESENTED:Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which wouldalmost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereignredistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achievedits political goals.In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questionspresented are:1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?4. Is this action non-justiciable?CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-110https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-109_7l48.pdf

Trump v. HawaiiDocket Number: 17-965Date Argued: 04/25/18https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/17-965_l5gm.pdfQUESTION PRESENTEDThe Constitution and Acts of Congress confer on the President broad authority to prohibit or restrict the entry of aliens outside the United States when he deems it in theNation's interest. Exercising that authority after a worldwide review by multiple government agencies of whether foreign governments provide sufficient information to screen theirnationals, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). In accordance with the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security following the multi-agency review, the Proclamation suspends entry, subject to exceptions and case-bycase waivers, of certain categories of aliens abroad from eight countries that do not share adequate information with the United States or that present other risk factors. The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Proclamation's entry suspensions worldwide, except as to nationals of two countries. The court of appeals affirmed,except as to persons without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. The courts concluded that the Proclamation likely violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.The questions presented are:​ Whether respondents' challenge to the President's suspension of entry of aliens abroad is justiciable.​ Whether the Proclamation is a lawful exercise of the President's authority to suspend entry of aliens abroad.​ Whether the global injunction is impermissibly overbroad.In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue Question 3 presented by the brief in opposition.​ Whether Proclamation No. 9645 violates the Establishment Clause

CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.Docket Number: 23-1201Date Argued: 03/03/25https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1201_n758.pdfQuestion Presented:Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

DECISION BELOW: 832 F.3d 389LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569QUESTION PRESENTED:This Court's decision in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), holds that the Constitution's fundamental federal structure does not permit Congress to "directly . . . compelthe States to require or prohibit [certain] acts." Id. at 166. In September 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act("PASPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq., against a constitutional challenge under New York by construing PASPA’s proscription against States "authoriz[ing]" sports wagering "by law"narrowly to prohibit only the "affirmative 'authorization by law' of gambling schemes," and not repeals by States of existing sports wagering prohibitions. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gov. of N.J. (Christie I), 730 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2013). After New Jersey then proceeded to repeal certain of its prohibitions on sports wagering in specified venues in the State, the en banc court reversed course and interpreted PASPAa as making it "unlawful" for New Jersey torepeal its prohibitions and affirmed an injunction that requires the State to reinstate the repealed state-law prohibitions. The court then held that it was constitutional for federal law todictate the extent to which States must maintain their prohibitions on sports wagering.The question presented is:Does a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of States in contravention of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)?CONSOLIDATED WITH 16-477 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT.

NRC v. TexasDocket Number: 23-1300Date Argued: 03/05/25Interim Storage Partners, LLC v. Texas (23-1312)Consolidated23-1300_e29g.pdf23-1300 NRC V. TEXAS DECISION BELOW: 78 F.4th 827 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-60743 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority. 2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated. CONSOLIDATED WITH 23-1312 FOR ONE HOUR ARGUMENT

Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos MexicanosDocket Number: 23-1141Date Argued: 03/04/2523-1141_8m59.pdfDECISION BELOW: 91 F.4th 511 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1823 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Mexican Government has sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico. 2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked

BLOM Bank SAL v. HonickmanDocket Number: 23-1259Date Argued: 03/03/2523-1259_3e04.pdf23-1259 BLOM BANK SAL V. HONICKMAN DECISION BELOW: 6 F.4th 487 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1039 QUESTION PRESENTED: For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60 (b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up). In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint. The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint

Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth ServicesDocket Number: 23-1039Date Argued: 02/26/25https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1039_1an2.pdfDECISION BELOW: 87 F.4th 822LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-3341QUESTION PRESENTED:Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant isthat unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." App. 5a.

Perttu v. RichardsDocket Number: 23-1324Date Argued: 02/25/25https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1324_bq7d.pdfDECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 911LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1298QUESTION PRESENTED: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regardingexhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?