Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

Send us Fan Mail 1. Title IX allows schools to provide separate women’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex, and West Virginia has permissibly maintained female sports for biological females consistent with Title IX. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn NRSC v. FEC the Supreme Court granted Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to answer the question of whether the limits imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) on how much political parties can spend in direct coordination with their federal candidates violate the First Amendment. Held: FECA’s political party coordinated expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kagan, J. Filed a dissenting opinion in which Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., joined. Read by Jake A. Leahy. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Trump v. Barbara, the Supreme Court held that children born in the U.S. to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment, striking down Trump's executive order limiting birthright citizenship. The Court relied on the common law rule of jus soli and its precedent in Wong Kim Ark, rejecting the Government's domicile-based theory. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court; Kavanaugh concurred in part and dissented in part, while Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch each dissented.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail The federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days thereafter; nothing in the federal election-day statutes requires ballots to be received by election day. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Trump v. Cook, the Supreme Court denied the Government's application to stay an injunction reinstating Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, whom President Trump had fired over alleged mortgage fraud predating her appointment. The Court held that the Federal Reserve Act's "for cause" removal standard is judicially reviewable, that "cause" requires a substantial showing reflecting the Fed's unique independence, and—resolving the case on this narrow ground—that the President failed to give Cook the notice and opportunity to respond that the statute requires before removal. The Court also held that equity permits courts to reinstate an officer during litigation over a disputed removal. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, with Kavanaugh and Jackson concurring separately and Thomas, Alito (joined by Gorsuch), and Barrett each dissenting.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court held that the FTC's for-cause removal protection for its Commissioners violates the separation of powers, overruling Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) to the extent it survived. The Court reasoned that the Constitution vests executive power solely in the President, who must be able to remove at will any officer—like an FTC Commissioner—who exercises that power, a principle confirmed by the First Congress's "Decision of 1789" and by Myers v. United States (1926). It concluded that Humphrey's rested on an outdated and unworkable view of the FTC as merely "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial," when in fact the agency promulgates binding rules, adjudicates enforcement actions, and sues in federal court—all executive functions. The Court reversed the lower courts and reinstated President Trump's removal of Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, with Justice Gorsuch concurring and Justice Sotomayor dissenting, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, the Supreme Court held that FIFRA expressly preempts a state-law failure-to-warn claim demanding a cancer warning on Roundup's label, since the EPA had approved the label without one and federal law requires using the approved label. The Court (per Justice Kavanaugh) reversed a $1 million Missouri verdict; Justice Thomas concurred; Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented.Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, the Supreme Court held that an alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act by attempting and failing to set foot in the country; arrival occurs only when the alien crosses the border. The case arose from the Government's 2016 "metering" policy, under which border officials stood on the U.S. side and limited the number of asylum seekers allowed to enter and be processed each day; asylum seekers and the group Al Otro Lado challenged the policy, and the District Court and a divided Ninth Circuit panel held that an alien arrives—and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum—upon encountering a U.S. official at the border, even while still on the Mexican side. Reversing, the Court reasoned that "arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning of physically entering a place, that surrounding INA provisions distinguishing actual from attempted entry confirm this reading, and that the presumption against extraterritoriality cuts against applying the asylum provisions to aliens still outside the country. The Court found the respondents' anti-surplusage argument insufficient to overcome the text, rejected their treaty-based argument as foreclosed by precedent, and dismissed their policy concerns as overstated and tied to a hypothetical rather than the rescinded metering policy actually at issue. The Court first held the case was not moot, since the declaratory judgment still barred the Government from resuming metering. The decision reversed and remanded, drawing a concurrence from Justice Thomas and dissents from Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Blanche v. Lau, the Supreme Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating that resident as an applicant for admission. Lau, a lawful permanent resident, was charged with trademark counterfeiting, briefly traveled abroad, and on his return was paroled rather than admitted because of the pending charge; after he pleaded guilty, the Government initiated removal proceedings charging him as inadmissible. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order, holding that the officer needed clear and convincing evidence of the crime at the time of reentry to deny him already-admitted status. Reversing, the Court explained that removing a permanent resident on inadmissibility grounds involves two steps—commission of the crime suffices to treat him as seeking admission, while conviction is required to find him inadmissible—and that nothing in the statute imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers; the Board's evidentiary standard applies only at the removal hearing, where Lau's guilty plea easily satisfied it. The Court rejected Lau's argument that conviction must precede being treated as seeking admission, since the statute incorporates only the listed crimes and not their conviction requirement, and it remanded without deciding whether Lau's offense actually involved moral turpitude. Support the show

Send us Fan MailHawaii's rules about not allowing people to concealed carry on private property unless the owner posts consent is unconstitutional.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Individuals may not be held liable in their personal capacities under a Spending Clause statute unless those individuals have voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer lawsuits under the statute; because the individual defendants in this case did not voluntarily and knowingly consent to face RLUIPA liability in an agreement with the federal government, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them.Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe proper baseline for measuring “just compensation” following a tax sale is the auction sale price, not the property’s hypothetical fair market value, at least when the sale is fairly conducted in light of the country’s history of tax sales. Pp. 4–11.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail The Supreme Court held that federal courts may no longer create new causes of action for violations of international law under the Alien Tort Statute, effectively closing the narrow door that Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain had left open in 2004. Reasoning that judicial authority under Sosa's framework was narrow from the start and that the power to create causes of action belongs to Congress—particularly where the Constitution expressly assigns Congress the job of defining offenses against the law of nations—the Court concluded that ATS suits always implicate foreign policy in ways that supply a sound reason to defer to the political branches. The supposed narrow class of permissible ATS actions, the Court said, is in truth a null set, so there can be no ATS liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law. Separately, the Court held that the Torture Victim Protection Act, which creates liability for one who "subjects" another to torture, does not reach aiding-and-abetting conduct: drawing on Central Bank of Denver, the Court reasoned that the statute's silence on aiding and abetting settles the question, and that "subjects" implies a direct causal link between torturer and victim rather than the broader, more attenuated assistance that aiding-and-abetting liability would capture. The practical upshot is that the plaintiffs—who alleged that Cisco built surveillance technology enabling China to identify and persecute them—cannot hold the company or its executives liable under either statute. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Second Circuit’s grant of federal habeas relief to Pedro Hernandez, who was convicted of kidnapping and felony murder in the 1979 disappearance and death of Etan Patz. The Second Circuit had concluded that the state trial judge should have told the jury about the rule from Missouri v. Seibert governing when a confession obtained after a delayed Miranda warning may be tainted by an earlier unwarned confession. Because the judge instead answered the jury’s question with a simple “no,” the Second Circuit found that the state courts had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that Seibert concerns a judge’s decision whether to suppress a confession and says nothing about what juries must be instructed to consider. Because no Supreme Court precedent required the jury instruction the Second Circuit demanded, and because federal habeas courts may not overturn state convictions by extending existing precedents into new contexts, the Court held that AEDPA barred relief and reinstated Hernandez’s conviction.Support the show

Send us Fan MailWe speak today to say...nothing has changed...Support the show

Send us Fan MailBecause a criminal law appeal waiver must be both knowingly and voluntary a waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel is not really possible.Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Supreme Court held that the government's prosecution of Ali Hemani under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3)'s prohibition on firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. Justice Gorsuch, writing for seven Justices, concluded that the government failed to identify a historical tradition of firearm regulation analogous to its interpretation of §922(g)(3), which automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses a controlled substance regardless of whether the person is dangerous, intoxicated, or incapable of managing his affairs. The Court rejected the government's reliance on historical laws regulating "habitual drunkards," finding that those laws targeted individuals whose intoxication rendered them incapacitated, served different purposes, and generally required individualized proceedings before liberty could be restricted. Because Hemani was prosecuted solely for possessing a firearm while being an admitted marijuana user, and because the government failed to show that such a broad prohibition is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, the Court held the prosecution unconstitutional. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, leaving open the validity of laws targeting addicts, intoxicated persons, or individuals shown through individualized evidence to be dangerous because of their drug use. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the judgment.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court held that Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act does not create an implied private right of action allowing investors or other private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act. The case arose when activist investor Saba Capital challenged voting-right restrictions adopted by several closed-end mutual funds and sought rescission under Section 47(b). Writing for the Court, Justice Barrett explained that Congress, not the courts, determines who may enforce federal statutes, and Section 47(b)’s language is directed at courts’ remedial authority once parties are already before them rather than at creating enforceable rights for a particular class of individuals. The Court emphasized that the ICA establishes a comprehensive enforcement scheme centered on the Securities and Exchange Commission and expressly authorizes private suits in only limited circumstances, making it unlikely that Congress intended an additional implied cause of action. The Court also rejected reliance on Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, noting that Congress amended Section 47(b) in 1980 to remove the “shall be void” language that supported an implied remedy in that case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that Saba could not use Section 47(b) as a standalone basis to seek rescission of contracts allegedly violating the ICA.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court vacated a Fifth Circuit decision that had barred Thomas Keathley’s personal-injury lawsuit under the doctrine of judicial estoppel after he failed to disclose the claim during his ongoing Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Court held that when determining whether a debtor’s omission of a legal claim was inadvertent or mistaken, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances rather than applying the Fifth Circuit’s rigid rule that focused almost exclusively on whether the debtor knew of the claim and had a potential motive to conceal it. Emphasizing that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine requiring flexibility and case-specific analysis, the Court explained that the Fifth Circuit’s approach was both too narrow and too broad because knowledge of a claim and a theoretical incentive to conceal it are present in nearly every nondisclosure case. Without deciding whether judicial estoppel should apply in the bankruptcy context at all, or whether inadvertence is always an exception, the Court concluded that lower courts must evaluate all relevant evidence bearing on whether the omission was truly an honest mistake, and remanded for further proceedings.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a unanimous opinion by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court held that a prosecution for falsifying a document in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1519 must be brought in the district where the falsification occurred, not where the federal investigation that the defendant intended to obstruct was located. Ahmad Abouammo, while in Seattle, created and emailed a fake invoice to FBI agents conducting an investigation based in San Francisco, and was subsequently tried and convicted in the Northern District of California. The Court reversed, explaining that constitutional venue rules focus on the location of the offense’s “essential conduct elements,” and §1519 criminalizes only the act of falsifying a document with obstructive intent. Because the statute does not require any actual obstruction or effect on an investigation, the location of the investigation and any contemplated consequences are irrelevant to venue. Rejecting both the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the statute’s intent element and the Government’s argument that §1519 is an inchoate obstruction offense, the Court concluded that the only conduct constituting the crime occurred in Seattle, making the Western District of Washington the proper venue for trial.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a unanimous opinion by Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court held that Amarin failed to plausibly allege that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin’s patented cardiovascular-use methods for Vascepa. Although Hikma marketed a generic version of the drug using an FDA-approved “skinny label” that omitted the patented cardiovascular indication, Amarin argued that various statements in Hikma’s labeling, website, patient materials, and press releases nevertheless encouraged doctors to prescribe the drug for the patented use. The Court rejected that theory, emphasizing that inducement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b) requires affirmative, purposeful steps designed to encourage infringement, not merely statements that could conceivably lead someone to infringe. Many of Hikma’s challenged statements reflected legal requirements or standard industry practices, while others were omissions or vague references that did not plausibly show an intent to promote infringing use. Because Amarin’s allegations relied on speculation and attenuated chains of inference rather than concrete acts encouraging infringement, the complaint failed to state a claim, and the Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision allowing the suit to proceed.Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Supreme Court held that the FCC’s procedure for assessing monetary forfeitures against regulated entities does not violate the Seventh Amendment because the agency’s forfeiture orders do not themselves impose a legally enforceable obligation to pay and do not conclusively determine the facts underlying liability. Although the FCC may investigate alleged violations and issue forfeiture orders under 47 U.S.C. §503, payment can only be compelled through a separate enforcement action brought by the Department of Justice under §504, where the defendant is entitled to a de novo trial and a jury may make the ultimate factual determinations. Distinguishing its recent decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, where agency-imposed penalties were immediately enforceable without a jury determination, the Court emphasized that FCC forfeiture orders are merely preliminary steps that neither bind the recipient nor carry legal consequences absent a subsequent court proceeding. Because the statutory scheme preserves the opportunity for a jury trial before any enforceable obligation is imposed, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, which had found the scheme unconstitutional, and affirmed the Second Circuit, which upheld it. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail A showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may obtain a disgorgement award.  Support the show

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Send us Fan MailIn a brief per curiam order, the Supreme Court stayed a federal district court injunction that would have prevented Alabama from using its 2023 congressional map in the 2026 elections. The Court held that Alabama was likely to succeed on appeal because the district court failed to apply the standards the Supreme Court recently announced in Louisiana v. Callais. Under Callais, plaintiffs challenging a map under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must show that their proposed alternative map satisfies all of the State’s legitimate districting objectives just as well as the State’s map and must demonstrate racial bloc voting independent of partisan affiliation. The Court found that the district court nevertheless concluded Alabama’s map violated both Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment even though the plaintiffs’ alternative map did not perform as well on some of Alabama’s stated districting goals, including preserving the Gulf Coast community of interest and avoiding pairing incumbents. The Court also criticized the district court for treating Alabama’s disagreement with an earlier remedial order as evidence of discriminatory intent and for failing to account for the distinction between racial and partisan voting patterns required by Callais. Finally, the Court emphasized the principle that federal courts should avoid changing election rules close to an election and concluded that the balance of harms and public interest favored allowing Alabama to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections under the map enacted by its legislature while the litigation continues.Support the show

Send us Fan MailHeld: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Pp. 8–17.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIf anyone thinks I am pronouncing Giglio incorrectly, please see: https://documents.law.yale.edu/pronouncing-dictionaryIn a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated an Eleventh Circuit decision denying federal habeas relief to Florida death-row inmate Gary Whitton. Whitton argued that prosecutors violated Giglio v. United States by allowing jailhouse informant Jake Ozio to falsely testify that he had no prior criminal history, despite the State possessing juvenile records showing prior assault, threats, and burglary charges. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that Ozio’s testimony was false and that prosecutors knew it was false, but nevertheless found no prejudice because the evidence against Whitton was overwhelming. In reaching that conclusion, however, the court relied in part on DNA test results obtained years after Whitton’s trial showing that blood on Whitton’s boots matched the victim. The Supreme Court held that this was error: because the post-trial DNA evidence was never presented to the jury, it could not be considered when assessing whether the alleged constitutional violation had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. The Court did not decide whether Whitton is entitled to relief, whether the Florida Supreme Court’s harmless-error determination was reasonable based on the trial record alone, or whether Whitton properly exhausted his claim in state court. Instead, it sent the case back to the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider those issues without relying on evidence the jury never saw.Support the show

Send us Fan MailHeld: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.  Pp. 5–17. (a) Section 2255 governs collateral attacks on federal convictions and imposes tight procedural constraints, including: a 1-year statute of limitations, §2255(f); a general rule that prisoners get only one shot at collateral relief with narrow exceptions, §§2255(h)(1)–(2); a bar on relitigating claims already raised and rejected on direct review, see Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 227, n. 8; and procedural default rules requiring demonstration of “‘cause’” and “‘prejudice’” or actual innocence for claims not raised on direct review, Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 622.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably rejected death-row inmate Terry Pitchford’s claim under Batson v. Kentucky that prosecutors improperly excluded Black jurors during his capital murder trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge failed to complete Batson’s required third step by denying Pitchford’s counsel a meaningful opportunity to argue that the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations were pretextual and by never determining whether the strikes were motivated by racial discrimination. Because defense counsel repeatedly attempted to pursue the objection and was assured by the trial court that it had been preserved, the Court found it unreasonable for the Mississippi Supreme Court to rule that Pitchford had waived the issue. Applying the deferential federal habeas standard under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Court held that the state court had both unreasonably applied clearly established Batson precedent and unreasonably determined the facts, reversing the Fifth Circuit and remanding for further proceedings.Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Supreme Court in Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges reversed the Fourth Circuit for violating the principle of party presentation. The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) challenged a policy about immigration judge's public speaking in federal district court on First and Fifth Amendment grounds, but both the district court and the parties agreed that most employment-related claims are generally governed by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), which channels disputes through the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). NAIJ argued only that its specific claims were not covered by the CSRA and thus could proceed in district court. The Fourth Circuit, however, remanded the case based on a broader legal theory that neither party had raised—whether current conditions affecting the MSPB might undermine Congress’s intent to channel all covered claims. The Supreme Court held this violated the party-presentation principle, emphasizing that courts must decide only the issues presented by the parties and cannot invent new grounds for decision.Support the show

Send us Fan MailActuaries should probably use the best/most recent predictions about future stuff, and we should not try to tell them not to.Also lets keep track of how many times The Court says: "Stuff that's not in here is not in here for a reason, BONUS POINTS: when the excluded (or desired) terminology is in the same Congressional Act.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Held: The cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used “property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government”; Ha vana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines trafficked in Havana Dock’s property interest. Pp. 8–16. (a) Title III generally makes any person who “traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government . . . liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property.” §6082(a)(1)(A). This dispute turns on whether the relevant “property which was confiscated” must be Havana Docks’ property interest in the docks (the concession), or whether it could instead be the docks them selves. Support the show

Send us Fan MailA claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority Support the show

Send us Fan Mail A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending ac tion under §3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a result ing arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in §9 and §10 of the FAA; nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction regarding live claims pending before a federal court. LokiEsq.LawRev. RJ Dieken, EsqSupport the show

Send us Fan Mail First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amend ment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court held that Louisiana’s congressional map (SB8), which created an additional majority-Black district, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because race predominated in its design without a sufficient justification. The Court clarified that while compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 can qualify as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, §2 properly interpreted only requires proof of intentional discrimination—not mere disparate impact—and thus did not require Louisiana to add another majority-minority district. The Court revised the Thornburg v. Gingles framework to align with that interpretation, requiring plaintiffs to show race—not partisanship—drives voting patterns and to produce illustrative maps that satisfy all legitimate state districting goals without relying on race. Applying this updated framework, the Court found the earlier Robinson plaintiffs failed to establish a §2 violation, so Louisiana lacked a compelling interest to use race in drawing SB8, leading the Court to affirm the lower court’s ruling that the map violates the Fourteenth Amendment.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Because §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal was untimely. Pp. 5–14. (a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in §1446(b)(1) is non jurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable toll ing. While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and “do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdic tional force . . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdic tional rules remain “mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid. The Court need not decide whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling Support the show

Send us Fan MailTotality of the Circumstances is required in considering Probable Cause for a temporary stop. Probable Cause being defined as: "Articulable reasonable suspicion for the officers belief that 'criminal activity is afoot.'"Support the show

Send us Fan MailA U.S. Army specialist injured while stopping a Taliban suicide bomber at a base in Afghanistan sued military contractor Fluor Corporation for negligence after the attacker—an Afghan hired under the military’s “Afghan First” program—was allegedly poorly supervised. Lower courts dismissed the case, holding that state-law claims against contractors are preempted during wartime under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception. The Supreme Court rejected that view, ruling that the claims are not preempted because neither the Constitution nor federal statutes bar them, and the FTCA exception does not extend to contractors. Relying on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. was misplaced, the Court explained, because preemption applies only where a contractor follows specific government directives, not where it allegedly violates them. Since Fluor’s conduct was neither ordered nor authorized by the military—and resolving the case would not second-guess military decisions—there is no significant conflict with federal interests, and traditional state tort law may proceed.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas refining duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one—and has therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal of ficer removal statute. Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Court held that Colorado’s ban on “conversion therapy,” as applied to a licensed counselor providing only talk therapy, likely violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the law does not merely regulate professional conduct but directly restricts what the counselor may say to clients—permitting affirming discussions of a client’s sexual orientation or gender identity while prohibiting speech that seeks to change them. Such viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and must satisfy strict scrutiny, not the deferential rational-basis review applied by the lower courts. The Court rejected the idea that “professional speech” receives lesser protection and found that Colorado’s law does not fall within any recognized exception (such as regulating conduct, commercial disclosures, or historically unprotected categories of speech). Because the Tenth Circuit applied the wrong level of scrutiny, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail The Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit courts to automatically extend a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant absconds, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s rule that treated time on the run as “tolled.” Isabel Rico’s supervised release had been set to expire in 2021, but after she absconded and later committed a state drug offense in 2022, the Ninth Circuit allowed the district court to treat that offense as a federal supervised‑release violation by deeming her term extended until her arrest in 2023. The Court rejected that approach, explaining that Congress provided specific mechanisms for extending, tolling, or revoking supervised release—and none authorize automatic extension for abscondment, which risks exceeding statutory maximums and contradicts the Act’s detailed structure. The government’s textual, precedential, and common‑law arguments failed to justify such a rule, and policy concerns about gaps in §3583(i)’s warrant requirement must be addressed by Congress, not judicial invention. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court; Justice Alito dissented. Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, which can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement; Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement; accordingly, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail2nd Circuit held an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court Disagrees and Reverses the order of the 2nd Circuit.By the Supreme Courts facts (which it was required to consider in the light least favorable to the Plaintiff Below). The officer warned Linton, and then used a simple rear wrist lock to gain compliance before shortly after needing the assistance of 2 other officers to fully carry the plaintiff below out of the capital building.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail a claim for “prospective injunctive relief ”—the use of fairer procedures in the future—may “properly be brought under §1983,” because it does not depend on showing the “in validity of a previous” sentencing decision. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Urias‑Orellana v. Bondi, the Supreme Court unanimously held that courts of appeals must apply the substantial-evidence standard when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that a set of facts does not amount to “persecution” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court explained that although the persecution determination involves applying legal standards to facts—a mixed question—Congress, through 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B), required deferential review of the agency’s conclusion unless the evidence compels a contrary result. In addressing the petitioners’ reliance on Wilkinson v. Garland and Guerrero‑Lasprilla v. Barr, the Court clarified that those cases concerned jurisdiction, holding that mixed questions can qualify as “questions of law” that remain reviewable despite the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions. But the Court emphasized that classifying an issue as a “question of law” for purposes of whether courts may review it at all does not determine how courts must review it once jurisdiction exists; the standard of review is instead governed by §1252(b)(4)(B), which mandates substantial-evidence deference to the agency. Applying that deferential standard, the Court affirmed the First Circuit’s decision upholding the denial of asylum because the record did not compel a finding that the threats and harm described rose to the level of persecution. Support the show