Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

Send us Fan Mail First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amend ment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court held that Louisiana’s congressional map (SB8), which created an additional majority-Black district, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because race predominated in its design without a sufficient justification. The Court clarified that while compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 can qualify as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, §2 properly interpreted only requires proof of intentional discrimination—not mere disparate impact—and thus did not require Louisiana to add another majority-minority district. The Court revised the Thornburg v. Gingles framework to align with that interpretation, requiring plaintiffs to show race—not partisanship—drives voting patterns and to produce illustrative maps that satisfy all legitimate state districting goals without relying on race. Applying this updated framework, the Court found the earlier Robinson plaintiffs failed to establish a §2 violation, so Louisiana lacked a compelling interest to use race in drawing SB8, leading the Court to affirm the lower court’s ruling that the map violates the Fourteenth Amendment.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Because §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal was untimely. Pp. 5–14. (a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in §1446(b)(1) is non jurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable toll ing. While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and “do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdic tional force . . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdic tional rules remain “mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid. The Court need not decide whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling 

Send us Fan MailTotality of the Circumstances is required in considering Probable Cause for a temporary stop. Probable Cause being defined as: "Articulable reasonable suspicion for the officers belief that 'criminal activity is afoot.'"

Send us Fan MailA U.S. Army specialist injured while stopping a Taliban suicide bomber at a base in Afghanistan sued military contractor Fluor Corporation for negligence after the attacker—an Afghan hired under the military’s “Afghan First” program—was allegedly poorly supervised. Lower courts dismissed the case, holding that state-law claims against contractors are preempted during wartime under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception. The Supreme Court rejected that view, ruling that the claims are not preempted because neither the Constitution nor federal statutes bar them, and the FTCA exception does not extend to contractors. Relying on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. was misplaced, the Court explained, because preemption applies only where a contractor follows specific government directives, not where it allegedly violates them. Since Fluor’s conduct was neither ordered nor authorized by the military—and resolving the case would not second-guess military decisions—there is no significant conflict with federal interests, and traditional state tort law may proceed.

Send us Fan Mail Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas refining duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one—and has therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal of ficer removal statute. Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Court held that Colorado’s ban on “conversion therapy,” as applied to a licensed counselor providing only talk therapy, likely violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the law does not merely regulate professional conduct but directly restricts what the counselor may say to clients—permitting affirming discussions of a client’s sexual orientation or gender identity while prohibiting speech that seeks to change them. Such viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and must satisfy strict scrutiny, not the deferential rational-basis review applied by the lower courts. The Court rejected the idea that “professional speech” receives lesser protection and found that Colorado’s law does not fall within any recognized exception (such as regulating conduct, commercial disclosures, or historically unprotected categories of speech). Because the Tenth Circuit applied the wrong level of scrutiny, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

Send us Fan Mail The Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit courts to automatically extend a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant absconds, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s rule that treated time on the run as “tolled.” Isabel Rico’s supervised release had been set to expire in 2021, but after she absconded and later committed a state drug offense in 2022, the Ninth Circuit allowed the district court to treat that offense as a federal supervised‑release violation by deeming her term extended until her arrest in 2023. The Court rejected that approach, explaining that Congress provided specific mechanisms for extending, tolling, or revoking supervised release—and none authorize automatic extension for abscondment, which risks exceeding statutory maximums and contradicts the Act’s detailed structure. The government’s textual, precedential, and common‑law arguments failed to justify such a rule, and policy concerns about gaps in §3583(i)’s warrant requirement must be addressed by Congress, not judicial invention. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court; Justice Alito dissented. Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, which can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement; Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement; accordingly, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail2nd Circuit held an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court Disagrees and Reverses the order of the 2nd Circuit.By the Supreme Courts facts (which it was required to consider in the light least favorable to the Plaintiff Below). The officer warned Linton, and then used a simple rear wrist lock to gain compliance before shortly after needing the assistance of 2 other officers to fully carry the plaintiff below out of the capital building.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail a claim for “prospective injunctive relief ”—the use of fairer procedures in the future—may “properly be brought under §1983,” because it does not depend on showing the “in validity of a previous” sentencing decision. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Urias‑Orellana v. Bondi, the Supreme Court unanimously held that courts of appeals must apply the substantial-evidence standard when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that a set of facts does not amount to “persecution” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court explained that although the persecution determination involves applying legal standards to facts—a mixed question—Congress, through 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B), required deferential review of the agency’s conclusion unless the evidence compels a contrary result. In addressing the petitioners’ reliance on Wilkinson v. Garland and Guerrero‑Lasprilla v. Barr, the Court clarified that those cases concerned jurisdiction, holding that mixed questions can qualify as “questions of law” that remain reviewable despite the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions. But the Court emphasized that classifying an issue as a “question of law” for purposes of whether courts may review it at all does not determine how courts must review it once jurisdiction exists; the standard of review is instead governed by §1252(b)(4)(B), which mandates substantial-evidence deference to the agency. Applying that deferential standard, the Court affirmed the First Circuit’s decision upholding the denial of asylum because the record did not compel a finding that the threats and harm described rose to the level of persecution. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn 1979, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) as a “body corporate and politic with corporatesuccession” and constituted it as an “instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions” but “independent of any supervision or control” by the New Jersey Department ofTransportation. N. J. Stat. §27:25–4(a). The State gave NJ Transitsignificant authority, including the power to make bylaws, sue and besued, make contracts, acquire property, raise funds, own corporate entities, adopt regulations, and exercise eminent domain powers.§§27:25–5, 27:25–13. NJ Transit’s organic statute provides that “[n]odebt or liability of the corporation shall . . . constitute a debt [or] liability of the State,” and that “[a]ll expenses . . . shall be payable fromfunds available to the corporation.” §27:25–17. NJ Transit is governedby a board of directors (Board). §27:25–4(b). The Governor may remove Board members and may veto Board actions; the Legislaturemay veto some eminent domain actions. §§27:25–4(b), (f); §27:25–13(h). NJ Transit is now the third largest provider of bus, rail, andlight rail transit, operating within an area that includes New Jersey,New York City, and Philadelphia. In 2017, Jeffrey Colt was struck by an NJ Transit bus in MidtownManhattan; a year later, Cedric Galette was injured when an NJTransit bus crashed into a car in which he was a passenger in Philadelphia. Both sued NJ Transit for negligence in their respective homestate courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both lawsuits, arguing thatit is an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite, concluding NJTransit is an arm of New Jersey. This Court consolidated the casesand granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.Held: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus isnot entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. Read by Attorney Jake Leahy. Support the show

Send us Fan MailIt's a ruling about procedure, but they'd like you to know how they believe the Court below should rule. That Free Exercise of Religion should Trump the State of California's right to tell Schools to withold knowledge of a students' decision to transition genders from the parents of that child.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn a decision affirming the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may, during an overnight recess that interrupts a defendant’s testimony, prohibit counsel from “managing” or shaping the defendant’s ongoing testimony without violating the Sixth Amendment. Drawing on Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that any restriction during an overnight recess is unconstitutional, explaining that once a defendant takes the stand, he retains his right to counsel but also assumes the burdens of a witness, including limits designed to protect the trial’s truth-seeking function. The Court clarified that the constitutional line is content-based, not purely temporal: while a defendant may consult with counsel about trial strategy, plea negotiations, evidentiary issues, or other matters beyond the substance of his testimony, he has no protected right to discuss “testimony for its own sake” in a way that could shape or adjust it midstream. Support the show

Send us Fan MailPetitioner GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under a contract with U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Respondent Alejandro Menocal, a former detainee at the Aurora facility, initiated this class action, alleging GEO’s work policies for detainees violate a federal bar on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on unjust enrichment. GEO responded that the suit must be dismissed under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U. S. 18, which held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct that the Government has lawfully “authorized and directed” the contractor to perform. Id., at 20–21. GEO argued that ICE had authorized and directed it to carry out the challenged labor policies. But the District Court did not read GEO’s contract with the Government to instruct GEO to adopt those policies. The District Court thus concluded that the Yearsley doctrine did not relieve GEO of legal responsibility and a trial would be necessary. GEO immediately filed an appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order denying Yearsley protection does not qualify for interlocutory review under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. Held: Because Yearsley provides federal contractors a potential merits defense rather than an immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable. Pp. 3–12. Read by Jake Leahy, more here. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Held: Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when this case was removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judg ment in Hain’s favor. Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Fed Government retains sovereign immunity under the FTCA for intentional non-delivery of mail.Support the show

Send us Fan MailNo one Authorized President Trump to impose these "Emergency" Tariffs under the IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act).Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe Court Below granted relief when it should have not.Judge Niemeyer of the 4th Circuit was the lone dissent--contending that the majority had defied AEDPA’s standard of review--the 84 year old Jurist with 36 years service on that court was correct.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail The Court unanimously held that restitution imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a form of criminal punishment, meaning it cannot be applied to conduct that occurred before the statute was enacted without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Although Ellingburg’s offense predated the MVRA, he was sentenced under it and ordered to pay restitution. The Eighth Circuit had treated MVRA restitution as a civil, nonpunitive measure, but the Supreme Court rejected that view. Looking to the statute’s text, structure, and placement within the criminal code, the Court emphasized that restitution is imposed only on convicted defendants, at sentencing, alongside imprisonment and fines, and through procedures governing criminal penalties. Prior precedents likewise treated MVRA restitution as punitive. While restitution also serves compensatory aims, victims cannot control or negotiate it as they could in a civil action, underscoring its criminal nature. The Court therefore reversed and remanded. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail1. The Court has jurisdiction because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion.  Pp. 5–19. (a) Section 2244(b)(3)(E) provides that the denial of authorization “to file a second or successive application” shall not be the subject of a certiorari petition.  That provision does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed within §2244, which imposes several strict requirements that apply only to state prisoners.Support the show

Send us Fan MailState Courts may not grant releif from FEDERAL causes of action by reference to state statute.Support the show

Send us Fan Mailan appeal of a VOID judgement under federal rule 60 is still subject to the statutory text's "within a reasonable time" limit.Support the show

Send us Fan MailSupreme Court refuses to assume that Congress intended to disregard Blockburger and allow someone to be convicted of two crimes in the same statute. Congress' clear intent here was to create two potential sentencing schemes, not allow someone to be convicted twice.Support the show

Send us Fan MailSupreme Court Upholds Montana's Community Caretaker exception to the 4th amendment prohibition on warrantless searches.Support the show

Send us Fan MailIn Clark v. Sweeney, the Supreme Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that had granted habeas relief on a theory the petitioner never raised. A Maryland jury convicted Jeremiah Sweeney of second-degree murder, and his convictions were affirmed on appeal. In postconviction proceedings, Sweeney argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request voir dire of the full jury after a juror conducted an unauthorized visit to the crime scene. State courts rejected that claim, and the federal district court likewise denied habeas relief, concluding that the state court’s application of Strickland was not objectively unreasonable.The Fourth Circuit reversed, not on the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually asserted, but on a new theory that a combination of failures by the juror, the judge, and counsel violated Sweeney’s confrontation and jury rights. The panel ordered a new trial despite the State never having the opportunity to address that theory. A dissent criticized the majority for disregarding fundamental principles of party presentation.The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit had “departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” In the Court’s view, federal courts may not grant relief on claims the petitioner did not present and that the State had no chance to contest. The case is remanded for the Fourth Circuit to evaluate only the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually pursued, under AEDPA’s deferential standards governing federal review of state adjudications of Strickland claims. Support the show

Send us Fan MailThe United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court upholding the use of a physical screen that prevented a four-year-old child witness from seeing the defendant during trial. Mississippi law mandates the use of such screens for child witnesses in abuse cases. Relying on that statute, the trial court permitted the screen without taking evidence or making any case-specific finding that the arrangement was necessary to protect the witness.On review, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the statute, combined with state constitutional victims’ rights provisions, distinguished the case from Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, which require individualized findings before limiting face-to-face confrontation. The dissent argued that those precedents squarely controlled and that the trial court failed to comply with their requirements.The U.S. Supreme Court held that Coy and Craig govern: a deviation from face-to-face confrontation is permissible only after the trial court hears evidence and finds that testifying in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma that impairs the child’s ability to communicate. The mandatory nature of Mississippi’s statute could not substitute for those constitutional findings, and the trial court’s reliance on the statute alone was insufficient.The Court remanded for consideration of whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Support the show

Send us Fan MailGoldey v. FieldsPER CURIAM. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials. ...This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388. Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special factors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less  equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135. This case arises in a new context, and “special factors” counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148– 149. In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the “inordinately difficult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such “procedures are ‘not as effective as an individual damages remedy.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Trump v. CASA, Inc. Held: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. Pp. 4– 26. Support the show

Send us Fan MailKennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that formulates evidence-based recommendations regarding preventive healthcare services. Congress codified the Task Force’s role in 1999, establishing it as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in HHS’s Public Health Service. The Task Force currently consists of 16 volunteer members appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Before 2010, Task Force recommendations were purely advisory. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 changed this by requiring most health insurers and group health plans to cover without cost sharing those preventive services that receive “A” or “B” ratings from the Task Force. The Act also amended the governing statute to describe the Task Force as “independent” and to provide that members and their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U. S. C. §§299b–4(a)(1), (6). Plaintiffs, individuals and small businesses who object to the Affordable Care Act’s preventive-services coverage requirements, sued in federal court. Lead plaintiff Braidwood Management runs a health and wellness center offering insurance coverage to its approximately 70 employees through a self-insured plan. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal officers under the Appointments Clause who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” Art. II, §2, cl. 2, not by the Secretary. The District Court agreed, recognizing that Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary but concluding they are principal officers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646. While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary in June 2023 ratified existing appointments made by the AHRQ Director and began personally appointing Task Force members. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that while Task Force members are removable at will, they are not inferior officers because they cannot be “ ‘independent’ ” and “free from ‘political pressure’ ” while simultaneously being supervised by a political appointee.  Held: Task Force members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause. Read by RJ Dieken. Support the show

Send us Fan MailFCC v. Consumers’ Research The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and instructed it to make available to “all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151. That objective is today known as “universal service.” The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some population segments—such as the poor and those in rural areas—without access to needed communications services. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC pursued universal service primarily through implicit subsidies, using its rate-regulation authority to lower costs for some consumers at the expense of others. Congress created a new framework of this Act in 1996. Section 254 now requires every carrier to "contribute" to the Universal Service Fund. The FCC then uses this money to pay for universal service programs. The statutory scheme designates certain beneficiaries of these subsidies--such as low-income consumers, rural areas and hospitals, schools, and libraries. It also provides details for how to determine what services should be accessible. To determine what to subsize, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service is “essential to education, public health, or public safety” and has “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(B). It also must determine if a service can be provided at an affordable rate.  §254(b)(1). There are also certain principles the FCC is told to base its policies, including Section 254 also sets forth “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” its universal-service policies. §254(b). Among other things, those principles direct that all consumers, “including low-income consumers” and those in “rural” areas, should have access to quality services at affordable prices. See ibid. The FCC also may add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7). To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected quarterly expenses (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is contributing carriers’ total projected quarterly revenue. A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. §54.709(a)(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Each quarter, the Administrator projects the Fund’s expenses, adds up revenue estimates it receives from carriers, and submits those figures to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the combination of Congress’s delegation to the FCC and the FCC’s “subdelegation” to the Administrator violated the Constitution, even if neither delSupport the show

Send us Fan MailHeld: Parents challenging the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction. Read by Jeff  Barnum. Support the show

Send us Fan MailFree Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton Texas, like many States, prohibits distributing sexually explicit content to children. In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, requiring certain commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content that is obscene to minors to verify that visitors are 18 or older. Knowing violations subject covered entities to injunctions and civil penalties. Petitioners—representatives of the pornography industry—sued the Texas attorney general to enjoin enforcement of H. B. 1181 as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. They alleged that adults have a right to access the covered speech, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them. The Fifth Circuit held that an injunction was not warranted because petitioners were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court viewed H. B. 1181 as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors.” 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271. It therefore determined that the law is not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. Held: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. Read by RJ Dieken. Support the show

Send us Fan MailHewitt v. United StatesBefore the First Step Act was enacted in 2018, federal judges were required to sentence first-time offenders convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—a law that criminalizes possessing a firearm while committing other crimes—to “stacked” 25-year periods of incarceration. The First Step Act eliminated this harsh mandatory minimum penalty. Section 403(b) of the Act also made its more lenient penalties partially retroactive. Specifically, if a sentence “has not been imposed” upon an eligible §924(c) offender as of the date of the First Step Act’s enactment, the Act applies. The question presented here concerns an edge case: What penalties apply when a §924(c) offender had been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment, but that sentence was subsequently vacated, such that the offender must face a post-Act resentencing? In 2009, petitioners Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, along with corresponding §924(c) offenses for use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Each petitioner received a mandatory 5-year sentence for his first §924(c) count of conviction and, despite being first-time offenders, each received 25-year mandatory sentences on every §924(c) count beyond his first. Thus, each petitioner’s sentence exceeded 325 years. Petitioners successfully challenged some of their convictions on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit vacated petitioners’ sentences. In 2012, the District Court resentenced each petitioner to between 285 and 305 years on the counts that remained.  In 2019, the Court held that the “crime of violence” definition the Government routinely used to support some §924(c) convictions was unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470. Because that holding potentially affected some of petitioners’ remaining convictions, the Fifth Circuit granted petitioners authorization to file a second or successive postconviction motion. The District Court then vacated the impacted §924(c) convictions, as well as petitioners’ sentences. When the District Court held resentencings for the remaining convictions, petitioners argued that the First Step Act’s 5- year—not 25-year—mandatory minimum penalties applied. Petitioners argued they were entitled to retroactive application of the Act’s more lenient penalties because a vacated prior sentence is not a sentence that “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of §403(b). The District Court disagreed and resentenced petitioners under the pre-Act sentencing scheme, giving them stacked 25-year mandatory minimums for each §924(c) count of conviction beyond their first. Petitioners thus each received sentences of 130 years or more. On appeal, petitioners and the Government agreed that the First Step Act should have applied at petitioners’ resentencings. The Fifth Circuit denied their joint request for vacatur. In that court’s view, §403(b) applies only “to defendants for whom ‘a sentence . . . ha[d] not been imposed’ as of the enactment date.” 92 F. 4th 304, 310. Because each petitioner had been sentenced (twice) prior to the Act’s enactment, the panel concluded that petitioners were not eligible for the First Step Act’s more lenient mandatory minimums. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. Pp. 6–12. 92 F. 4th 304, reversed and remanded.  JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, Support the show

Send us Fan MailMedian v. Planned ParenthoodHeld: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under §1983. Support the show

Send us Fan MailRiley v. Bondi The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. §1228(b)(3), aliens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Jamaica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which prohibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later, Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” proceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claimsprocessing rule. Held: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” proceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1). Support the show

Send us Fan MailStanley v. City of SanfordKaryn Stanley worked as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, starting in 1999. When Ms. Stanley was hired, the City offered health insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those with 25 years of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. In 2003, the City changed its policy to provide health insurance up to age 65 only for retirees with 25 years of service, while those who retired earlier due to disability would receive just 24 months of coverage. Ms. Stanley later developed a disability that forced her to retire in 2018, entitling her to only 24 months of health insurance under the revised policy. Ms. Stanley sued, claiming the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by providing different health-insurance benefits to those who retire with 25 years of service and those who retire due to disability. The district court dismissed her ADA claim, reasoning that the alleged discrimination occurred after she retired, when she was not a “qualified individual” under Title I of the ADA, 42 U. S. C. §12112(a), because she no longer held or sought a job with the defendant. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Read by Jeff Barnum.Support the show

Send us Fan Mail Held: The PSJVTA’s personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. Read by Jeff Barnum. Support the show

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Send us Fan MailIn 2023, Tennessee joined the growing number of States restricting sex transition treatments for minors by enacting the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity, Senate Bill 1 (SB1). SB1 prohibits healthcare providers from prescribing, administering, or dispensing puberty blockers or hormones to any minor for the purpose of (1) enabling the minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s biological sex, or (2) treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s biological sex and asserted identity. At the same time, SB1 permits a healthcare provider to administer puberty blockers or hormones to treat a minor’s congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury. Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor challenged SB1 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court partially enjoined SB1, finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, that SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex and transgender status, and that SB1 was unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the law did not trigger heightened scrutiny and satisfied rational basis review. This Court granted certiorari to decide whether SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Held: Tennessee’s law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. Support the show

Send us Fan MailRivers v. GuerreroPetitioner Danny Rivers was convicted in Texas state court of continuous sexual abuse of a child and related charges. After unsuccessfully seeking direct appeal and state habeas relief, Rivers filed his first federal habeas petition under 28 U. S. C. §2254 in August 2017, asserting claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and other constitutional violations. The District Court denied the petition in September 2018, and Rivers appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which granted a certificate of appealability on his ineffective-assistance claim in July 2020. While his appeal was pending, Rivers obtained his trial counsel’s client file, which contained a state investigator’s report that he believed was exculpatory. After the Fifth Circuit denied his request to supplement the record on appeal, Rivers filed a second §2254 petition in the District Court based on this newly discovered evidence. The District Court classified this second-in-time filing as a “second or successive” habeas application under §2244(b) and transferred it to the Fifth Circuit for authorization to file. Rivers appealed the transfer order, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the fact that Rivers’s first petition was still on appeal did not permit him to circumvent the requirements for successive petitions under §2244 as to his second filing. Held: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a firstfiled habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a “second or successive application” properly subject to the requirements of §2244(b). Pp. 5–14. Read by Jeff Barnum. Support the show

Send us Fan MailCommissioner v. ZuchThis case involves the jurisdiction of the United States Tax Court over appeals from collection due process hearings when there is no longer an ongoing levy. The dispute here began in 2012, when Jennifer Zuch and her then-husband Patrick Gennardo each filed an untimely 2010 federal tax return. Gennardo subsequently submitted an offer in compromise to resolve outstanding tax liabilities. This offer implicated $50,000 in estimated tax payments that the couple had previously sent to the IRS; following the offer, the IRS applied these payments to Gennardo’s account. For her part, Zuch later amended her 2010 tax return to report additional income, which resulted in an additional $28,000 in taxes due. But Zuch maintained that the IRS should have credited the couple’s $50,000 payment to her account, entitling her to a $22,000 refund. The IRS disagreed and sought to collect her unpaid taxes by placing a levy on her property pursuant to its authority under 26 U. S. C. §6331(a). Zuch requested a collection due process hearing to contest the levy. The appeals officer rejected Zuch’s argument about the misapplied $50,000 tax payment and issued a Notice of Determination sustaining the levy action under §6330(c)(3). Zuch then appealed to the Tax Court under §6330(d)(1). During the multi-year proceedings before the agency and the Tax Court that followed, Zuch filed several annual tax returns showing overpayments. Each time, the IRS applied these overpayments to her outstanding 2010 tax liability rather than issuing refunds. Once Zuch’s liability reached zero, the IRS moved to dismiss the Tax Court proceeding as moot, arguing that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because the IRS no longer had a basis to levy on Zuch’s property. The Tax Court agreed. But on appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the dismissal, holding that the IRS’s abandonment of the levy did not moot the Tax Court proceedings. Held: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under §6330 to resolve disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy. Support the show

Send us Fan MailParrish v. United StatesFederal inmate Donte Parrish alleges that he was placed in restrictive segregated confinement for 23 months based on his suspected involvement in another inmate’s death. After a hearing officer cleared him of wrongdoing, Parrish filed suit in Federal District Court seeking damages for his time in segregated confinement. The District Court dismissed his case on March 23, 2020, holding that some claims were untimely and others unexhausted. When the court’s order reached the federal prison two weeks later, Parrish was no longer there, having been transferred to a different facility. Parrish received the dismissal order three months after it was issued and promptly filed a notice of appeal, explaining his delayed receipt. The Fourth Circuit recognized that Parrish’s notice of appeal came well after the 60-day appeal period for suits against the United States, so it construed Parrish’s filing as a motion to reopen the time to appeal under 28 U. S. C. §2107(c). On remand, the District Court granted reopening for 14 days. Parrish did not file a second notice of appeal. Although both Parrish and the United States argued that the original notice of appeal was sufficient, the Fourth Circuit held that Parrish’s failure to file a new notice of appeal within the reopened appeal period deprived the court of jurisdiction. Held: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted. Read by Jeff Barnum. Support the show

Send us Fan MailSoto v. United States The Barring Act, 31 U. S. C. §3702, establishes default settlement procedures for claims against the Government and subjects most claims to a 6-year limitations period. However, the Act includes an exception: If “another law” confers authority to settle a claim against the Government, that law displaces the Barring Act’s settlement mechanism, including its limitations period. §3702(a). In 2002, Congress enacted a statute providing “combat-related special compensation” (CRSC) to qualifying veterans who have suffered combat-related disabilities. 10 U. S. C. §1413a. Under federal law, retired veterans generally must waive a portion of their military retirement pay to receive Veterans Affairs (VA) disability benefits, but the CRSC statute allows combatdisabled retirees to receive special compensation up to the amount of waived retired pay. Petitioner Simon Soto served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006, including two tours in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was medically retired in 2006 and later received a 100-percent disability rating for post-traumatic stress disorder from the VA. In 2016, Soto applied for CRSC payments. The Secretary of the Navy approved his application but limited retroactive compensation to six years, citing the Barring Act’s limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the Barring Act’s 6-year limitations period does not apply to CRSC claims because the CRSC statute constitutes “another law” that provides its own settlement mechanism. The District Court granted summary judgment for the class, but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act. Held: The CRSC statute confers authority to settle CRSC claims and thus displaces the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. Read by Jeff Barnum. Support the show

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Send us Fan MailAJT v. Osseo Area SchoolsHeld: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined. Support the show

Send us Fan MailCatholic Charities v. WisconsinWisconsin law exempts certain religious organizations from paying unemployment compensation taxes. The relevant statute exempts nonprofit organizations “operated primarily for religious purposes” and “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” Wis. Stat. §108.02(15)(h)(2). Petitioners, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of its subentities, sought this exemption as organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the exemption, holding that petitioners were not “operated primarily for religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor limited their charitable services to Catholics. Held: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of §108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Support the show