All Episodes
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report — 183 episodes
183 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV Conclusion
182 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
181 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
180 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
179 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
178 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
177 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
176 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
175 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III The US government's role in fosteri
174 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II How 27 million NTMS precipitated a f
173 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II How 27 million NTMS precipitated a f
172 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II How 27 million NTMS precipitated a f
171 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6 Conclusion
170 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5 What was known about NTMs prior to th
169 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4 The origin and growth of subprime PMB
168 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3 Delinquency rates on nontraditional m
167 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2 The great housing bubble and its effe
166 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1 Government policies resulted in an un
165 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary
164 - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro
163 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing
162 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic
161 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure
160 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks fai
159 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxi
158 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble
157 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble global capita
156 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the
155 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis
154 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from o
153 - Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro
152 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22
151 - Ch 22 Neighborhood effects I'm not leaving
150 - Ch 22 Flaws in the process Speculation and worst-case scenarios
149 - Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures Persistently disregard
148 - Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise Hard to talk about any recovery
147 - Ch 21 The financial sector Almost triple the level of three years earlier
146 - Ch 21 Government State struggled to close shortfalls
145 - Ch 21 Commercial real estate Nothing's moving
144 - Ch 21 Businesses Squirrels storing nuts
143 - Ch 21 Households I'm not eating I'm not sleeping
142 - Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout Intro
141 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20
140 - Ch 20 Bank of America A shotgun wedding
139 - Ch 20 Citigroup Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman
138 - Ch 20 AIG We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient
137 - Ch 20 TARP Comprehensive approach
136 - Ch 20 Wachovia At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell
135 - Ch 20 Washington Mutual It's yours
134 - Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives A grinding halt
133 - Ch 20 Morgan Stanley Now we're the next in line
132 - Ch 20 Money market funds Dealers weren't even picking up their phones
131 - Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic Intro
130 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19
129 - Ch 19 Like a gnat on an elephant
128 - Ch 19 Spillover effect
127 - Ch 19 Current liquidity position is precarious
126 - Chapter 19 September 2008 The bailout of AIG Intro
125 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18
124 - Ch 18 A calamity
123 - Ch 18 The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail
122 - Ch 18 This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty
121 - Ch 18 Tell those sons of bitches to unwind
120 - Ch 18 Heads of family
119 - Ch 18 Imagination hat
118 - Ch 18 Spook the market
117 - Ch 18 This is not sounding good at all
116 - Ch 18 Get more conservatively funded
115 - Chapter 18 September 2008 The bankruptcy of Lehman Intro
114 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17
113 - Ch 17 Wasn't done at my pay grade
112 - Ch 17 The worst-run financial institution
111 - Ch 17 They went from zero to three with no warning in between
110 - Ch 17 Critical unsafe and unsound practices
109 - Ch 17 It will increase confidence
108 - Ch 17 The idea strikes me as perverse
107 - Ch 17 It's a time gamebe cool
106 - Ch 17 The only game in town
105 - Ch 17 A good time to buy
104 - Chapter 17 September 2008 The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Intro
103 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16
102 - Ch 16 Banks The markets were really really dicey
101 - Ch 16 Derivatives Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk
100 - Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC Weak liquidity position
099 - Ch 16 JP Morgan Refusing to unwindwould be unforgiveable
098 - Ch 16 The Federal Reserve When people got scared
097 - Chapter 16 March to August 2008 Systemic Risk Concerns Intro
096 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15
095 - Ch 15 It was heading to a black hole
094 - Ch 15 The Government would not permit a higher number
093 - Ch 15 Duty to protect their investors
092 - Ch 15 Turn into a death spiral
091 - Ch 15 We were suitably skeptical
090 - Ch 15 I requested some forbearance
089 - Chapter 15 March 2008 The fall of Bear Stearns Intro
088 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14
087 - Ch 14 Monoline Insurers We never expected losses
086 - Ch 14 Federal Reserve The discount window wasn't working
085 - Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman There could never be losses
084 - Ch 14 Citigroup That would not in any way have excited my attention
083 - Ch 14 Merrill Lynch Dawining awareness over the course of the summer
082 - Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008 Billions in subprime losses Intro
081 - Commission conclusions on Chapter 13
080 - Ch 13 Money funds and other investors Drinking from a fire hose
079 - Ch 13 SIVs An Oasis of Calm
078 - Ch 13 BNP Paribas The ringing of the bells
077 - Ch 13 Countrywide That's our 911
076 - Ch 13 IKB of Germany Real Money Investors
075 - Chapter 13 Summer 2007 Disruptions in Funding Intro
074 - Commission Conclusions on Ch 12
073 - AIG Well Bigger
072 - Rating Agencies
071 - Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds
070 - Ch 12 Goldman Let's be Aggressive
069 - Early 2007 Spreading Subprime Worries
068 - Commission Conclusions on Ch 11
067 - Ch 11 Losses Who Owns Residential Credit Risk
066 - Ch 11 Legal Remedies On the Basis of the Information
065 - Ch 11 CDOs Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending
064 - Ch 11 Rating Downgrades Never Before
063 - Ch 11 The Bust Delinquencies The Turn of the Housing Market
062 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10
061 - Moody's It Was All About Revenue
060 - Regulators Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing
059 - Merrill Lynch Whatever It Takes
058 - AIG I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks
057 - Citigroup I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless
056 - Ch 10 Credit Default Swaps Dumb Question
055 - Ch 10 CDO Managers We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager
054 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9
053 - Affordable housing goals GSEs cried bloody murder forever The impact of the goals
052 - Increase Our Penetration into Subprime 2007 Moving deeper into the credit pool
051 - Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Two Stark Choices
050 - Lehman From Moving to Storage
049 - Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate You've Got to Get Up and Dance
048 - Regulators markets will always self-correct
047 - Disclosure and due diligence A Quality Control Issue in the Factory
046 - Mortgage Fraud Crime-facilitative environments
045 - Chapter 9 The Bubble A Credit-induced Boom
044 - Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8
043 - Ch 8 SEC It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess
042 - Ch 8 Moody's Achieved Through Some Alchemy
041 - Ch 8 Goldman Sachs Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime
040 - Ch 8 AIGGolden Goose for the Entire Street
039 - Ch 8 Citigroup's Liquidity puts A Potential Conflict of Interest
038 - Ch 8 Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function
037 - Ch 8 We Created the Investor
036 - Ch 8 The CDO Machine
035 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7
034 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Less Competition in the Marketplace
033 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine Moody's Given A Blank Check
032 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product
031 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine Federal Regulators Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit
030 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine Mortgages A Good Loan
029 - Ch 7 The Mortgage Machine An Irresistible Profit Opportunity
028 - Ch 6 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6
027 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion Bank Capital Standards Arbitrage
026 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion Community-Lending Pledges What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention
025 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion States Long-Standing Position
024 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion Federal Rules Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending
023 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion Citigroup Invited Regulatory Scrutiny
022 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion Subprime Loans Buyers Will Pay A Premium
021 - Ch 6 Credit Expansion Housing A Powerful Stabilizing Force
020 - Ch 5 Subprime Lending The Regulators
019 - Ch 5 Subprime Lending Subprime Lenders in Turmoil
018 - Ch 5 Subprime Lending Greater Access to Lending
017 - Ch 5 Subprime Lending Mortgage Securitization
016 - Ch 4 Deregulation Redux Financial Sector Growth
015 - Ch 4 Deregulation Redux The Wages of Finance
014 - Ch 4 Deregulation Redux Dot-Com Crash
013 - Ch 4 Deregulation Redux Long-Term Capital Management
012 - Ch 4 Deregulation Redux Expansion of Banking Activities
011 - Ch 3 Securitization and Derivatives The Growth of Derivatives
010 - Ch 3 Securitization and Derivatives Structured Finance
009 - Ch 3 Securitization and Derivatives Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
008 - Ch 2 Shadow Banking The Savings and Loan Crisis
007 - Ch 2 Shadow Banking Commercial Paper and Repos
006 - Ch 1 Before Our Very Eyes part 3
005 - Ch 1 Before Our Very Eyes part 2
004 - Ch 1 Before Our Very Eyes part 1
003 - Conclusions of the Commission concluded
002 - Conclusions of the Commission
001 - Preface