All Episodes

LXXXIV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS

LXXXV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT MADE OF GOD'S SUBSTANCE

LXXXVI. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN

LXXXVII. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT INTO BEING THROUGH CREATION BY GOD

LXXXVIII. ARGUMENTS FOR PROVING THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS FORMED FROM THE SEMEN

LXXXIX. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS

XC. THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS UNITED AS A FORM TO NO OTHER THAN THE HUMAN BODY

XCI. THAT THERE ARE SOME INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE NOT UNITED TO BODIES

XCII. OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

XCIII. THAT THERE ARE NOT SEVERAL SEPARATE SUBSTANCES OF ONE SPECIES

XCIV. THAT THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE AND THE SOUL ARE NOT OF ONE SPECIES

XCV. HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND GENUS AND SPECIES IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

XCVI. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT GATHER THEIR KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLES

XCVII. THAT THE INTELLECT OF A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE ALWAYS UNDERSTANDS ACTUALLY

XCVIII. HOW ONE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE UNDERSTANDS ANOTHER

XCIX. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW MATERIAL THINGS

C. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW SINGULARS

CI. WHETHER SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW ALL THINGS AT THE SAME TIME BY THEIR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

LXII. AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

LXIII. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A TEMPERAMENT, AS GALEN ASSERTED

LXIV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY

LXV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY

LXVI. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT INTELLECT AND SENSE ARE THE SAME

LXVII. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS THE IMAGINATION

LXVIII. HOW AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE FORM OF THE BODY

LXIX. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT WAS PROVED ABOVE THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SLBSTANCE CANNOT BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM

LXX. THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE WE JUST SAY THAT THE INTELLECT IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM

LXXI. THAT THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY IMMEDIATELY

LXXII. THAT THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH PART THEREOF

LXXIII. THAT THERE IS NOT ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IN ALL MEN

LXXIV. OF THE OPINION OF AVICENNA, WHO ASSERTED THAT INTELLIGIBLE FORMS ARE NOT PRESERVED IN THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

LXXV. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THE UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

LXXVI. THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE BUT PART OF THE SOUL

LXXVII. THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE AND ACTIVE INTELLECT TO CONCUR IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

LXXVIII. THAT ARISTOTLE'S OPINION CONCERNING THE ACTIVE INTELLECT WAS NOT THAT IT IS A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE, BUT RATHER THAT IT IS PART OF THE SOUL

LXXIX. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

LXXX. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

LXXXI. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

LXXXII. THAT THE SOULS OF DUMB ANIMALS ARE NOT IMMORTAL

LXXXIII. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL BEGINS TO EXIST WITH THE BODY

XXXVI. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS PRODUCED ON THE PART OF THE THINGS MADE

XXXVII. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE MAKING OF THINGS

XXXVIII. ARGUMENTS BY WHICH SOME ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL

XXXIX. THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT FROM CHANCE

XL. THAT MATTER IS NOT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS

XLI. THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF A CONTRARIETY OF AGENTS

XLII. THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT THE ORDER OF SECONDARY AGENTS

XLIII. THAT THE DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DOES NOT RESULT FROM SOME SECONDARY AGENT INTRODUCING VARIOUS FORMS INTO MATTER

XLIV. THAT DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DID NOT RESULT FROM THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS

XLV. WHAT IS IN TRUTH THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS

XLVI. THAT FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME INTELLECTUAL CREATURES

XLVII. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE CAPABLE OF WILLING

XLVIII. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE OF FREE-WILL IN ACTING

XLIX. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY

L. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE IMMATERIAL

LI. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A MATERIAL FORM

LII. THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AND WHAT IS

LIII. THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS ACT AND POTENTIALITY

LIV. THAT COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND BEING IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM

LV. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE INCORRUPTIBLE

LVI. IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE FOR AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY

LVII. THE OPINION OF PLATO CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE BODY

LVIII. THAT THE NUTRITIVE, SENSITIVE, AND INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES IN MAN ARE NOT THREE SOULS

LIX. THAT MAN'S POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE

LX. THAT MAN DERIVES HIS SPECIES NOT FROM THE PASSIVE, BUT FROM THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

LXI. THAT THE AFORESAID OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF ARISTOTLE

VIII. THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS SUBSTANCE

IX. THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS ACTION

X. IN WHAT WAY POWER IS ASCRIBED TO GOD

XI. THAT SOMETHING IS SAID OF GOD IN RELATION TO CREATURES

XII. THAT RELATIONS SAID OF GOD IN REFERENCE TO CREATURES ARE NOT REALLY IN GOD

XIII. HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD

XIV. HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD

XV. THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE CAUSE OF BEING

XVI. THAT GOD BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING OUT OF NOTHING

XVII. THAT CREATION IS NEITHER MOVEMENT NOR CHANGE

XVIII. HOW TO SOLVE THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST CREATION

XIX. THAT IN CREATION THERE IS NO SUCCESSION

XX. THAT NO BODY CAN CREATE

XXI. THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE

XXII. THAT GOD CAN DO ALL THINGS

XXIII. THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT OF NATURAL NECESSITY

XXIV. THAT GOD WORKS ACCORDING TO HIS WISDOM

XXV. HOW THE ALMIGHTY IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS

XXVI. THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN DETERMINED EFFECTS

XXVII. THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN EFFECTS

XXVIII. HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS

XXIX. HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS

XXX. HOW THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY IN CREATED THINGS

XXXI. THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR CREATURES TO HAVE BEEN ALWAYS

XXXII. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM GOD'S SIDE OF THE QUESTION

XXXIII. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CREATURES

XXXIV. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MAKING

XXXV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, AND FIRST OF THOSE THAT WERE TAKEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOD

I. CONNECTION OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE SEQUEL

II. THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR BUILDING UP OUR FAITH

III. THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES AVAILS FOR REFUTING ERRORS AGAINST GOD

IV. THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN TREAT OF CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS

V. ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID

VI. THAT IT BECOMES GOD TO BE THE SOURCE OF BEING TO OTHER THINGS

VII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS ACTIVE POWER