Beyond the Chokepoints: New Geopolitics of Arabian Seaports

This event is jointly organised by the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) & the Middle East Institute (MEI) at the National University of Singapore.   Around one-sixth of the global oil supply moves through the Strait of Hormuz, making this chokepoint perhaps the most crucial 21 miles in the world. Any minor disturbance or turmoil in these narrow waters can create ripples strong enough to rock the global economy. The US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies have long-held open and safe passage through the strait as their primary Middle East foreign policy goal. To secure these 21 miles, they built military bases all around the Gulf, stationed one of the largest floating bases with the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and struck alliances with Arab monarchs to lay the foundation of the region’s political dynamics. However, several recent infrastructural developments immediately to the east are set to move us beyond this chokepoint politics. Oman, Pakistan, and Iran — otherwise minor players in the oil game — have built, with the help of sizeable foreign investments, thoroughly modern ports in Duqm, Gwadar and Chahbahar. While unique in their own way, each of these ports shares the same advantage over the current leading ports in the region — they circumvent the strait to open into the Arabian Sea, which is much more difficult to obstruct.   This panel discussion will explore the broader implications of this possible shift by analysing the following: What will a region built around channelling traffic through the Arabian Sea, instead of protecting the Strait of Hormuz, look like? Are the oil-producing Gulf states going to support these projects to reduce vulnerabilities to oil flows? Can we see a more earnest Iran at the negotiation table if it can no longer play the blockade card? Will this finally allow the US to further cut back on boots on the ground in the Middle East? How will China regulate traffic between its open-sea ports in Oman and Pakistan? Will these ports maintain exclusivity or will they connect and share traffic with the Indian-backed Chahbahar port in Iran? Will India expand its security cooperation with the US to cover the Arabian Peninsula or pursue its own autonomous regional strategy towards Iran and other regional actors? How will the involved states balance between collaborating for nurturing the corridor and competing for traffic through various economic, political, and security enticements?