Does Ranked Choice Reduce Strategic Voting?

There’s a long standing debate in political science about the problem of strategic voting: when voters cast their ballots not in line with their true preferences, but for the candidate they hate the least whom they think is also most likely to win. In a new paper, University of Chicago political scientist Andrew Eggers shows that a completely different system, ranked-choice voting, could reduce strategic voting and create opportunities for people to vote in line with their true preferences. Paper link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/2komhumusf8yfr2/strategic_voting_in_AV_v29.pdf?dl=0

Episode 43 of the Not Another Politics Podcast podcast, hosted by University of Chicago Podcast Network, titled "Does Ranked Choice Reduce Strategic Voting?" was published on August 25, 2021 and runs 47 minutes.

August 25, 2021 ·47m · Not Another Politics Podcast

Summary

There’s a long standing debate in political science about the problem of strategic voting: when voters cast their ballots not in line with their true preferences, but for the candidate they hate the least whom they think is also most likely to win. In a new paper, University of Chicago political scientist Andrew Eggers shows that a completely different system, ranked-choice voting, could reduce strategic voting and create opportunities for people to vote in line with their true preferences. Paper link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/2komhumusf8yfr2/strategic_voting_in_AV_v29.pdf?dl=0

Episode Description