Padgett Peterson, Implications of Mobile Code on Microsoft Platforms

With the advent of mobile code (excutable programs that are carried on web pages and inside E-Mail) in everyday use, the capability to include malicious software without the recipient's knowlege has been implicit. From the first crude examples ("Concept", 1995) through the "Russian New Year" exploits (1997-98), to the current surprises (Bubbleboy, 1999) there has been a continual advance in sophistication. Despite attempts by the manufacturer to provide mitigation, these patches are little known or applied and often apply only to the latest versions and not the bulk of the installed base. We shall examine the built-in capabilities that make this possible, the probable rationale behind such decisions, and the implication for future events. About the speaker: Mr. Peterson is currently the principal corporate information security architect for Lockheed-Martin Corporation. With over thirty years experience in computers, cryptography, and malicious software, he has written BIOS-level antivirus freeware (\"DIskSecure\", 1990) and macro-based WORD macro protection (\"Macrolist\", 1996). A frequent speaker at security conferences he is an internationally recognized expert in the field. He also collects Pontiacs