Oral Arguments - The Supreme Court of the United States

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. - Date Argued: 04/29/26

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell - Date Argued: 04/27/26

Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe - Date Argued: 04/29/26

Chatrie v. United State - Date Argued: 04/27/26

FactsThe case involves a challenge to the Biden administration's efforts to dismantle a Trump-era immigration program known as the "Remain in Mexico" policy (officially the Migrant Protection Protocols or MPP). The policy required certain asylum seekers arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border to wait in Mexico for their immigration court hearings. The Biden administration sought to terminate the program in 2021, but federal courts in Texas and Missouri blocked those efforts, finding that the administration had not adequately considered the policy's benefits or followed proper procedures. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Biden v. Texas (2022) that the administration had the authority to end the program, but lower courts continued to entertain challenges from states claiming they would suffer harm from increased immigration. The current case, brought by the states of Texas and Missouri, argues that the administration's latest termination attempt still violates federal immigration law (8 U.S.C. § 1225) and the Administrative Procedure Act. Acting Attorney General Blanche defends the administration's position that the executive branch has broad discretion over immigration enforcement and that MPP is no longer necessary or operationally feasible. The district court sided with the states and ordered the reinstatement of MPP, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether states have standing to challenge the termination and whether the administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

Case Summary:The FCC fined major wireless carriers over $100 million for unlawfully selling access to customer location data to third parties without consent. AT&T received a $57 million fine, and Verizon received nearly $47 million. The fines stem from an investigation prompted by reports that a Missouri sheriff obtained customer location data through a third-party service. The dispute reached the Supreme Court due to a circuit split on whether the FCC's forfeiture orders violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Second Circuit upheld the FCC's fine, ruling that an initial penalty assessment is constitutional as long as the party can later challenge collection efforts in court. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the FCC's initial assessment of wrongdoing and fine deprived AT&T of its constitutional right to a jury trial. The carriers argued that the FCC's in-house proceedings created a "penalty-now-trial-later" system. The FCC argued that its orders are not binding because if a company refuses to pay, the agency must file a collection lawsuit in federal court where the company gets a full jury trial. The case arrived shortly after the Supreme Court's 2024 ruling in SEC v. Jarkesy, which invalidated the SEC's in-house civil fraud enforcement system for violating the Seventh Amendment.

FactsOngkaruck Sripetch ran penny-stock "pump-and-dump" schemes, artificially inflating prices before selling to unwitting investors. He pleaded guilty to criminal securities fraud and served 21 months in prison. In a parallel civil proceeding, a California district court ordered him to pay $2.251 million in disgorgement plus over $1 million in prejudgment interest—approximately $3.2 million total. The court did not require the SEC to prove that specific investors suffered financial (pecuniary) harm.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that proof of pecuniary harm is not required for disgorgement. This deepened a circuit split:Second Circuit (SEC v. Govil): Proof of pecuniary harm requiredFirst & Ninth Circuits: No such proof requiredThe Supreme Court granted review on January 9, 2026, with both parties agreeing that resolution was needed.

Background & FactsThe case arises from an SEC civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch, who orchestrated a series of fraudulent "pump-and-dump" schemes involving penny-stock companies. Sripetch artificially inflated stock prices through manipulative trading and scalping campaigns before selling shares to unwitting investors at inflated prices .Sripetch admitted to securities law violations and was sentenced to 21 months in prison in a related criminal case . In the civil proceeding, a California district court ordered him to pay over $2.251 million in disgorgement plus more than $1 million in prejudgment interest—totaling approximately $3.2 million . Critically, the court did not require the SEC to demonstrate that specific investors suffered pecuniary (financial) harm from Sripetch's conduct .The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that a showing of pecuniary harm to investors is not a precondition for disgorgement under the relevant statutory provisions. This deepened an existing circuit split:Second Circuit (SEC v. Govil): Requires proof of pecuniary harm because disgorgement is equitable relief "for victims"First & Ninth Circuits: No such showing required; disgorgement is measured by the wrongdoer's gain, not victim lossThe Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 9, 2026, with the SEC's support—an unusual circumstance where both parties agreed review was needed .

Case Summary: In the case of Trump, President of the United States v. Barbara (Docket No. 25-365), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on April 1, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation is a landmark constitutional challenge to an Executive Order signed by President Donald Trump on January 20, 2025, which seeks to end the practice of automatic birthright citizenship for children born in the United States to parents who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents (specifically those present temporarily or unlawfully).The lead plaintiff, Barbara, represents a certified nationwide class of infants born after February 20, 2025, who would be denied U.S. citizenship under the terms of the order. The challenge was brought by a coalition of civil rights groups, including the ACLU and the Legal Defense Fund.The core legal and factual dispute centers on the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."The Trump administration, represented by Solicitor General D. John Sauer, argues that "subject to the jurisdiction" implies a requirement of "complete political allegiance." Under this theory, children of foreign nationals—who owe allegiance to a different sovereign—do not fall within the intended scope of the Amendment as it was understood by its framers in 1868.The plaintiffs contend that the Clause codified the centuries-old common law rule of jus soli (right of the soil), where birth within the territory is the sole requirement for citizenship. They rely on the 1898 Supreme Court precedent United States v. Wong Kim Ark, which affirmed citizenship for a child born in the U.S. to Chinese parents who were not eligible for naturalization.The factual record includes the administration's assertion that the order "restores" the original meaning of the Constitution to prevent "birth tourism" and the creation of a "permanent subclass" of individuals. Conversely, the plaintiffs provided evidence that the order would impact over 200,000 children annually, stripping them of access to passports, federal benefits, and protection from deportation.In July 2025, U.S. District Judge Joseph Laplante issued a preliminary injunction blocking the order, ruling that it likely contradicts "a century of untouched precedent." The First Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed that the President lacks the unilateral authority to redefine constitutional citizenship.During the oral arguments on April 1, 2026, the Supreme Court justices explored the "allegiance" distinction. Justice Amy Coney Barrett questioned whether the administration's logic would also exclude the children of tourists or diplomats, while other members of the Court scrutinized whether a change of this magnitude requires a Constitutional Amendment rather than an Executive Order.The hearing was marked by the unusual presence of President Trump himself in the courtroom, highlighting the high stakes of what is widely considered the most significant constitutional case of the decade.

Case Summary: In the case of Pitchford v. Cain (Docket No. 24-7351), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 31, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe case involves Terry Pitchford, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2006 for his role in a 2004 armed robbery and killing of a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi.The core factual dispute centers on the jury selection process. During voir dire, the prosecutor—Doug Evans (the same prosecutor involved in the landmark Flowers v. Mississippi case)—used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five eligible Black potential jurors, while striking only three of thirty-six eligible White jurors.When Pitchford's counsel raised a Batson objection, the trial court required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The prosecutor cited various justifications, such as a juror being fifteen minutes late, another having a family member with a similar criminal record, and one being a "known drug user" according to police reports.The trial judge accepted these reasons as credible and empaneled a jury that included only one Black member, in a county where the population is 40% Black.A critical factual and procedural issue in the record is whether Pitchford's counsel properly rebutted these race-neutral reasons at trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court later refused to consider Pitchford’s arguments that the prosecutor’s reasons were "pretextual" (fake), ruling that he had waived his right to make those arguments by not presenting a detailed comparative juror analysis during the original trial.Pitchford sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial transcript shows his counsel was actually cut off by the judge while attempting to argue pretext. The Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court's grant of relief, finding that the state court's waiver ruling was a reasonable application of the law.The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to a specific question under AEDPA (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act): whether the Mississippi Supreme Court made an "unreasonable determination of the facts" when it concluded that Pitchford waived his right to challenge the prosecutor's justifications.During the oral arguments on March 31, 2026, the justices focused on the "administrative reality" of trial practice. They scrutinized whether a defense attorney must exhaustively list every comparative example in the heat of jury selection or if a general objection to the prosecutor's strikes is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.The Court also weighed the significance of Prosecutor Doug Evans’s documented history of racial discrimination in jury selection, questioning if that history should have made the trial court—and subsequent appellate courts—more skeptical of his proffered "race-neutral" reasons in this specific case.

Case Summary:In the case of Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties (Docket No. 25-83), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 30, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation began when Adrian Jules, a former employee of the renowned Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles, filed a federal lawsuit in New York against hotelier André Balazs and associated entities, alleging wrongful termination and violations of federal and California labor laws.Because Jules’s employment contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, the district court stayed the federal proceedings under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and directed the parties to arbitration.The arbitration process was highly contentious; Jules unsuccessfully attempted to add new defendants and eventually attempted to withdraw from the proceedings. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against Jules, finding his claims lacked merit and issuing a sanctions award of approximately $34,000 against Jules and his attorney for bad-faith conduct during the process.The "winning" party (Balazs) returned to the federal district court—where the original suit was still stayed—and moved to confirm the arbitration award under Section 9 of the FAA. Jules cross-moved to vacate the award, but he also challenged the court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the motions at all.The core legal dispute centers on the "jurisdictional anchor" theory: Jules argues that under the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Badgerow v. Walters, a federal court must have an independent basis for jurisdiction (like a federal question or diversity) to hear post-arbitration motions. He contends that the mere fact that a court previously stayed a federal-question case does not give it "ancillary" power to confirm the resulting award if the award itself doesn't involve a federal question.The Second Circuit ruled against Jules, holding that because the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the initial lawsuit and merely "stayed" rather than dismissed it, the court retained the authority to oversee the conclusion of the case, including confirming the award. This created a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit, which requires a fresh jurisdictional analysis for post-arbitration motions.During the oral arguments on March 30, 2026, the Supreme Court justices grappled with the administrative burden of Jules's position. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh questioned whether it made sense to force parties to file a brand-new lawsuit in state court to confirm an award when a federal judge is already "sitting on" the stayed case.The Court also scrutinized the statutory text of the FAA, weighing whether Section 3 (stays) and Section 9 (confirmations) are separate silos or whether a stay acts as a "hook" that keeps the case within the federal court's reach until a final judgment is entered.

Case Summary: In the case of Abouammo v. United States (Docket No. 25-5146), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 30, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation involves Ahmad Abouammo, a former Media Partnerships Manager at Twitter, who was convicted of acting as an unregistered agent of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and falsifying records to obstruct a federal investigation.The core factual dispute concerns a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. In 2018, FBI agents interviewed Abouammo at his home in Seattle, Washington, regarding his alleged receipt of luxury goods and $300,000 from Saudi officials in exchange for the private data of dissident Twitter users.During that interview in Seattle, Abouammo excused himself, went to another room, fabricated a backdated $100,000 invoice to make the payments appear as legitimate "consulting fees," and emailed the document to the agents while they were still in his house.The government prosecuted Abouammo in the Northern District of California (San Francisco), arguing that venue was proper there because the underlying federal investigation he intended to obstruct was based in San Francisco, where Twitter is headquartered.Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count, arguing that under the Sixth Amendment and Article III of the Constitution, venue is only proper in the district where the "essential conduct" occurred. He contends that since the document was created and sent entirely within Seattle (the Western District of Washington), California was an unconstitutional venue for that specific charge.In 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that venue for a Section 1519 violation is proper either where the document was falsified or where the investigation it was intended to impede was located.During the oral arguments on March 30, 2026, the Supreme Court justices appeared skeptical of the government's "intended effects" theory. Justice Kagan noted that if the court looks strictly at the "essential conduct elements" of the statute—the act of falsifying—Abouammo would win, as the email to San Francisco was evidence of intent but not a required element of the crime itself.The Court explored the "vicinage requirement" and the historical origins of the Venue Clause, which was a reaction to the British practice of transporting American colonists to England for trial. The justices questioned whether allowing venue based on the location of a "contemplated effect" would give the government a "blank check" to manufacture venue by simply basing an investigation in a district favorable to the prosecution.

Case Summary:i saidIn the case of Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock (Docket No. 24-935), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 25, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation centers on Angelo Brock, an independent distributor in Colorado for Flowers Foods, the second-largest baking company in the U.S. (producer of brands like Wonder Bread and Nature's Own).The core factual dispute involves the "last-mile" delivery of baked goods. These products are manufactured at out-of-state bakeries, shipped to a warehouse in Colorado, and then picked up by Brock for final delivery to local retail and foodservice customers within the state.Brock filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that Flowers Foods misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees to avoid paying proper wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law.Flowers Foods moved to compel arbitration, citing a mandatory arbitration clause in the "Distributor Agreement" signed by Brock. Brock countered that he is exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under Section 1, which excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."A central factual and legal question is whether a driver who never crosses state lines can be "engaged in interstate commerce" if the goods they carry are in the "final leg" of a continuous journey from an out-of-state factory.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals previously ruled in favor of Brock, finding that his intrastate deliveries were part of a "continuous interstate journey" because Flowers Foods retained significant control over the products' pricing and destination throughout the entire process.Flowers Foods argues for a bright-line rule: that the Section 1 exemption should apply only to workers who physically cross state borders or directly interact with vehicles (like planes or trains) that do. They contend that once the bread is unloaded at the Colorado warehouse, the interstate journey has effectively ended.During the oral arguments on March 25, 2026, the Supreme Court justices explored the "Relay Hypothetical": a scenario where three different drivers move the same loaf of bread—one to the border, one across the border, and one (like Brock) from the border to the store. The justices questioned whether it was logical for federal law to exempt only the middle driver while the others performed the same essential transportation task.The Court also scrutinized the "intended final destination" test, weighing whether a manufacturer’s intent to sell to a specific retailer makes the entire trip interstate, or if the stop at a warehouse creates a sufficient "break" in commerce to make the final delivery a purely local, intrastate event.

Case Summary:In the case of Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security v. Al Otro Lado (Docket No. 25-5), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 24, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation is a class action challenge to the government's long-standing use of "metering" (or the "turnback policy") at Ports of Entry (POEs) along the U.S.–Mexico border.The plaintiffs, led by the non-profit organization Al Otro Lado, represent asylum seekers who reached the international boundary line at U.S. ports of entry but were told by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers that the facilities were "at capacity" and they had to wait in Mexico.A central factual and legal dispute rests on the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1225, which mandate that any noncitizen who "arrives in the United States" or is "physically present" shall be inspected and permitted to apply for asylum.The government, represented by the Secretary of Homeland Security (Kristi Noem), argues that individuals standing on the Mexican side of the international limit line have not yet "arrived in" the United States and therefore do not trigger the mandatory processing duties of U.S. immigration officers.Al Otro Lado contends that "arrival" at a Port of Entry includes the process of presenting oneself at the boundary, and that the government’s practice of physically blocking or turning people back before they cross the literal line is an unlawful attempt to evade statutory obligations.The factual record includes evidence of the "Transit Ban" (or "Third Country Transit Rule") and how it intersected with metering; plaintiffs argue that by forcing migrants to wait in Mexico, the government intentionally subjected them to new, more restrictive asylum rules that were implemented during their forced delay.In 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that held the turnback policy was unlawful, finding that the INA's protections apply to those "in the process of arriving" at a port, regardless of which side of the painted line they are standing on.During the oral arguments on March 24, 2026, the Supreme Court justices focused heavily on the presumption against extraterritoriality—whether U.S. laws can be interpreted to govern conduct or create rights for individuals who are technically on foreign soil.The Court also scrutinized the operational realities of border management, questioning whether a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs would strip the Executive Branch of its power to manage "orderly flow" and crowd control at busy international bridges.

Case Summary:In the case of Watson v. Republican National Committee (Docket No. 24-1260), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 23, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation concerns a challenge to a Mississippi state law (enacted in 2020) that permits the counting of absentee ballots that are postmarked on or before Election Day but received by election officials up to five business days later.The plaintiffs—the Republican National Committee (RNC), the Mississippi Republican Party, and the Libertarian Party of Mississippi—sued Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson, alleging that this "grace period" violates federal statutes that establish a single, uniform "Election Day" for federal offices.The central factual and legal dispute rests on the definition of an "election" under federal law. The RNC argues that an election is not "consummated" until the ballots are actually received by officials, meaning the five-day window improperly extends the election beyond the federally mandated Tuesday deadline.Secretary Watson and various intervenors (including voting rights organizations) contend that "Election Day" refers only to the deadline for voters to cast their choice, and that the subsequent receipt and counting of those choices is a matter of state administrative procedure.The factual record highlights that approximately 30 other states have similar postmark-deadline rules, many of which were specifically designed to protect the voting rights of military members and overseas citizens who face inherent mail delays.In 2024, a federal district court originally upheld the Mississippi law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that decision in 2025, holding that federal law preempts state statutes that allow for the receipt of ballots after Election Day.During the oral arguments on March 23, 2026, the Supreme Court justices focused heavily on historical practices dating back to the Civil War, when states first allowed soldiers to mail ballots that would inevitably arrive weeks after the formal election date.The Court also scrutinized the potential for "widespread disenfranchisement" if the Fifth Circuit's ruling were upheld, as it would effectively invalidate thousands of ballots cast by voters who followed existing state instructions but were subject to postal service fluctuations.

Case Summary:In the case of Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (Docket No. 25-6), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 24, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe case centers on Thomas Keathley, who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in late 2019. While his bankruptcy repayment plan was active, he was involved in a severe motor vehicle collision in August 2021 with a truck driven by an employee of Buddy Ayers Construction (BAC).Keathley promptly hired a personal injury attorney and filed a lawsuit against BAC in December 2021. However, he failed to disclose this new legal claim—which bankruptcy law views as a potential asset for creditors—to the bankruptcy court in several subsequent amended filings.The core factual and legal dispute involves the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prevents a party from taking a position in a legal proceeding that contradicts a position taken in a previous proceeding. BAC argued that because Keathley "hid" the asset from the bankruptcy court, he should be barred from pursuing the personal injury claim entirely.Lower courts, including the Fifth Circuit, agreed with BAC, applying a harsh standard that presumes bad faith whenever a debtor has a "motive to conceal" an asset, regardless of whether the omission was a genuine mistake or oversight by counsel.The factual record includes Keathley’s eventual disclosure of the lawsuit to the bankruptcy court, but only after BAC moved to dismiss his personal injury case. BAC maintains this "catch-me-if-you-can" approach undermines the integrity of the judicial system.During the oral arguments on March 24, 2026, the Supreme Court justices appeared skeptical of the Fifth Circuit's rigid rule. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Jackson questioned why the "windfall" should go to the construction company (the alleged wrongdoer) rather than the bankruptcy creditors who would actually benefit from the lawsuit's proceeds.The Court examined whether judicial estoppel should require a finding of subjective bad faith or if a mere "hypothetical motive" to conceal is sufficient to strip a plaintiff of their day in court.

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.

Case Summary:On March 4, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, a high-stakes case for the logistics industry that examines whether federal law protects freight brokers from state-law negligence lawsuits.The case arose after Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when a tractor-trailer struck his vehicle on the shoulder of an Illinois highway. Montgomery sued the broker, C.H. Robinson, alleging it was "negligent" for hiring a motor carrier with a known history of safety issues. The lower courts dismissed the claim, ruling that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA)—a 1994 law designed to deregulate the trucking industry—preempts such state-law claims.Core Legal IssuesThe justices are tasked with resolving a "circuit split" regarding two specific provisions of the FAAAA:The Preemption Rule: Does a state-law "negligent hiring" claim "relate to a service" of a broker in a way that Congress intended to prohibit to ensure a uniform national market?The Safety Exception: Even if the claim is generally prohibited, does it fall under the "safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles," which Congress explicitly carved out and preserved for the states?Highlights from Oral ArgumentDefining "Safety Regulation": Paul Clement, representing Montgomery, argued that personal injury lawsuits have historically been the primary way states regulate safety. However, several conservative justices, including Justice Clarence Thomas, questioned whether a lawsuit against a middleman who never touches a truck truly counts as regulation "with respect to motor vehicles."The "Patchwork" Concern: Counsel for the broker, Theodore Boutrous, argued that allowing these suits would create a "patchwork" of 50 different state standards for how brokers must screen carriers, "bollixing up" interstate commerce and driving up insurance costs for the entire supply chain.Practicality and Common Sense: Justice Brett Kavanaugh focused on the practical burden on small brokers, asking how they are supposed to verify complex safety data or driver English proficiency without being forced to only hire large, expensive carriers, potentially crushing small business competition.The Intrastate Anomaly: Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh pointed out a potential "logical flip" in the statute: the law clearly bars these suits for intrastate (in-state) travel. They questioned why Congress would prohibit states from regulating safety within their own borders but allow them to do so for interstate (cross-border) trips.The Solicitor General's View: The Department of Justice participated in the argument, siding largely with the brokers. The government argued that while states can regulate trucks and drivers directly, extending that authority to the "matchmaking" service of a broker stretches the safety exception too far.

Case Summary:On March 3, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Hunter v. United States, a case that examines the limits of plea agreements and whether a defendant can truly waive their right to appeal a sentence that may be unconstitutional.The case involves Munson P. Hunter III, who pleaded guilty to wire fraud. As part of his plea, he signed a standard "appellate waiver," giving up his right to challenge his sentence. However, at sentencing, the judge imposed a condition requiring Hunter to take any mental health medications prescribed by his doctors—a requirement Hunter argues violates his Fifth Amendment liberty interests. Crucially, after imposing the sentence, the judge explicitly told Hunter, "You have a right to appeal," and the government prosecutor did not object to that statement.Core Legal IssuesThe justices are deciding two major points that affect nearly 95% of federal criminal cases settled by pleas:The Scope of Waivers: Are the only exceptions to an appeal waiver claims of "ineffective assistance of counsel" or a "sentence exceeding the statutory maximum," or are there broader exceptions for "miscarriages of justice" or unconstitutional sentencing conditions?The "Waiver of the Waiver": Does a judge’s oral statement at sentencing—telling a defendant they have a right to appeal—override a previously signed written waiver, especially if the government remains silent?Highlights from Oral ArgumentSkepticism Toward the Government: Several justices, including Justice Elena Kagan and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, appeared troubled by the government’s "hard line" position. They questioned whether a waiver should really block a defendant from appealing a sentence if, for example, a judge was explicitly racist or imposed a "shocking" and unconstitutional condition.The Contract Law Debate: Hunter’s counsel, Lisa Blatt, argued that plea deals are essentially contracts and should be subject to traditional contract defenses like "unconscionability" or "public policy." However, Justice Samuel Alito and others expressed concern that importing complex contract doctrines into criminal law might make plea deals too unpredictable.Coercion and Power Imbalance: Justice Jackson highlighted the inherent power imbalance in plea negotiations, questioning whether a defendant can "voluntarily" waive a right to challenge a sentence that hasn't even been determined yet.The "Silent Prosecutor" Problem: Much of the bench focused on the fact that the prosecutor did not correct the judge when Hunter was told he could appeal. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh explored whether the government "forfeited" its right to enforce the waiver by failing to speak up in the courtroom.

Case Summary:On March 2, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Hemani, a pivotal Second Amendment case determining whether the government can permanently disarm "unlawful users" of controlled substances, specifically marijuana.The case involves Ali Danial Hemani, a Texas man who was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) after FBI agents found a Glock pistol and marijuana in his home. Hemani, who admitted to using marijuana roughly every other day but was not intoxicated at the time of the search, challenged the law as an unconstitutional violation of his right to bear arms.Core Legal IssuesThe justices are grappling with whether a categorical ban on gun ownership for drug users is consistent with the "history and tradition" of American firearm regulation. Under the standard set in Bruen, the government must prove that this modern restriction is analogous to historical laws from the founding era.The United States argues that the ban is similar to historical "habitual drunkard" laws, which allowed for the disarmament of individuals deemed a danger to themselves or others. Hemani’s defense, however, contends that those historical laws only regulated the use or carry of firearms while actually intoxicated, rather than stripping away the fundamental right to possess a weapon in the home for self-defense based on occasional or regular drug use.Highlights from Oral ArgumentJustice Gorsuch’s Breakfast Hypo: Justice Neil Gorsuch expressed skepticism toward the government’s "habitual user" standard, pointing out that many of the Founding Fathers, including John Adams, consumed alcohol daily (such as hard cider with breakfast) without being considered "dangerous" or subject to disarmament.The Ambien Problem: Justice Amy Coney Barrett pressed the government on the breadth of the statute, noting that under the current law, someone who takes a spouse’s Ambien or a single unprescribed Adderall could technically be labeled an "unlawful user" and face a 15-year felony sentence for owning a gun.Vagueness Concerns: Several justices questioned the lack of a clear definition for "unlawful user." They noted that the statute does not specify how frequently one must use a substance or how recently the use must have occurred to trigger the loss of a constitutional right.Individualized Dangerousness: Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Brett Kavanaugh explored whether the Second Amendment requires an "individualized determination" of danger—similar to the domestic violence restrictions upheld in Rahimi—rather than a blanket ban based on the mere status of being a drug user.

Case Summary:On February 25, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Pung v. Isabella County, a case that examines the constitutional limits of "home equity theft" and could fundamentally change how local governments handle tax foreclosures.The dispute began over a relatively minor tax bill of approximately $2,242 on a Michigan property. Despite a tax tribunal previously ruling that the owner was entitled to an exemption, Isabella County foreclosed on the home, sold it at auction for $76,000, and initially attempted to keep the entire amount. While lower courts ordered the county to return the "surplus" (the auction price minus the debt), the family argued they were still cheated because the home’s fair market value was roughly $194,400.Core Legal IssuesThe justices are considering two primary constitutional questions:The Fifth Amendment (Takings Clause): Does "just compensation" mean the government only owes the former owner the surplus cash from a forced auction, or must it pay the full fair market value of the property?The Eighth Amendment (Excessive Fines Clause): Is the loss of over $100,000 in home equity to satisfy a $2,200 debt—an amount 50 times the original bill—a "grossly disproportionate" fine that is unconstitutional?Highlights from Oral ArgumentFocus on Fairness: Several justices expressed significant discomfort with the facts of the case, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett likening the relentless tax assessor to Inspector Javert from Les Misérables, noting it was "even worse" because the family likely didn't even owe the tax.The Auction vs. Market Value: Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Chief Justice John Roberts pushed back on the idea of a "fair market value" requirement. They questioned whether an auction, by its very nature as a forced sale, shouldn't be the standard measure of value, asking if a "fairly conducted" auction is all the Constitution requires.The "Infinite Windfall" Problem: Counsel for the county warned that requiring fair market value would "effectively eliminate" foreclosure as a tool for debt collection, as governments would be forced to pay out hundreds of millions of dollars in equity they didn't actually collect at auction.Property as a "Bundle of Sticks": Justice Neil Gorsuch emphasized that when the state takes a house, it takes the entire "bundle of property rights." He suggested that the state should be responsible for the full value of what it takes, not just what it manages to sell it for under pressure.What Happens NextA decision is expected by June 2026. This ruling will clarify whether the 2023 landmark case Tyler v. Hennepin County (which stopped states from keeping all auction profits) goes a step further to require that states ensure homeowners receive the full, un-depressed value of their life's savings.

Case Summary:On February 24, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, a case that could determine the fate of the controversial Line 5 pipeline through a technical dispute over court deadlines.The litigation began in 2019 when Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel sued in state court to shut down a segment of the Enbridge pipeline running beneath the Straits of Mackinac, citing environmental risks. Nearly 30 months into the state court proceedings, Enbridge attempted to "remove" the case to federal court—far beyond the standard 30-day statutory deadline for such moves.Core Legal IssuesThe central question before the Court is whether the 30-day deadline for removing a case from state to federal court (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)) is a rigid, mandatory rule or if district courts have the "equitable" authority to extend it in exceptional circumstances.Enbridge argues that the deadline functions like a statute of limitations and should be subject to "equitable tolling," allowing a judge to excuse a late filing if the federal interests are significant enough. Michigan contends that the deadline is a firm procedural requirement designed to prevent "forum shopping" and that allowing exceptions would cause unpredictable delays in state-level litigation.Highlights from Oral ArgumentThe Forum Stakes: Several justices noted that the choice of court is pivotal; federal courts are generally viewed as more sympathetic to Enbridge’s arguments regarding federal safety preemption, while state courts are seen as more likely to favor Michigan's environmental protection claims.Justice Sotomayor’s Skepticism: Justice Sonia Sotomayor pointed out that unlike a statute of limitations where a late filing might end a case entirely, a late removal just means the case stays in state court. She questioned if Enbridge was truly "losing" any rights, or simply losing its preferred venue.International Implications: Justice Samuel Alito expressed concern over the potential for "severe" diplomatic fallout with Canada if a state court were to order the pipeline shut down, suggesting this broader context might justify federal court oversight.The "Clear Command" Debate: The argument heavily featured the "clear statement rule." Michigan’s Solicitor General argued that Congress’s inclusion of specific, narrow exceptions in the statute proves that it did not intend for judges to create their own "equitable" loopholes.What Happens NextThe Supreme Court is expected to rule by June 2026. If Enbridge wins, the case will likely move back to federal court, where the pipeline is more likely to remain operational. If Michigan wins, the case will proceed in state court, bringing the Attorney General one step closer to her goal of decommissioning the Line 5 segment.

Case Summary: Gemini saidOn February 23, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación CIMEX, S.A., a landmark case determining whether Cuban state-owned entities can be sued in American courts for "trafficking" in property seized during the 1960 revolution.The case stems from the confiscation of an oil refinery and over 100 service stations belonging to Exxon’s predecessor, Standard Oil. Exxon is seeking tens of millions of dollars in damages under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which targets anyone who economically exploits property stolen by the Castro regime.Core Legal IssuesThe central question for the justices is whether the Helms-Burton Act automatically strips foreign state-owned companies of their sovereign immunity, or if plaintiffs must still prove a specific exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).Exxon argues that by creating a private right of action against "any person" (including foreign agencies), Congress clearly intended to abrogate their immunity. Conversely, the Cuban conglomerate CIMEX contends that because Congress did not explicitly amend the FSIA when passing the Helms-Burton Act, the standard baseline of sovereign immunity must still apply unless a specific "commercial activity" or "expropriation" exception is met.Highlights from Oral ArgumentSkepticism Toward Exxon: Several justices expressed doubt that the Helms-Burton Act was intended to bypass the FSIA entirely. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson and Justice Brett Kavanaugh raised concerns that allowing such lawsuits to proceed without a clear FSIA exception would empower private companies to "punish" foreign governments in ways usually reserved for the Executive Branch.The "Clear Statement" Rule: Much of the debate focused on whether the language in the Helms-Burton Act is specific enough to meet the "clear-statement rule" required for Congress to waive sovereign immunity.Presidential Deference: Justice Neil Gorsuch pointed to the fact that the law allows the President to suspend these lawsuits for national security reasons. He questioned whether this executive "veto" power suggests that Congress anticipated sovereign immunity conflicts and provided the President—rather than the courts—with the final say on which cases should proceed.Fairness and Reciprocity: Counsel for Exxon argued that if Cuban state companies are granted immunity, it would create an "implausible" scenario where a foreign government-owned business is better protected from liability than a private company or even a domestic tribal government.What Happens NextThe Court’s decision, expected by June 2026, will clarify the jurisdictional rules for suing foreign state-owned enterprises. If the Court rules in favor of Exxon, it could open the floodgates for billions of dollars in claims against Cuban, and potentially other foreign, state instrumentalities.

Case Summary:On February 23, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral arguments in Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., a case that centers on the interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act and the liability of U.S. companies for using property confiscated by the Cuban government.The legal battle began when Havana Docks Corporation, which held a 99-year lease (a usufructuary concession) to operate the Havana cruise pier until 2004, sued several cruise lines for "trafficking" in their stolen property by using those same docks between 2016 and 2019.Core Legal IssuesThe primary question before the Court is whether a plaintiff can maintain a claim under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act if their original legal interest in the property would have expired naturally before the alleged "trafficking" occurred. Royal Caribbean argues that because Havana Docks' concession was set to end in 2004, the cruise line's activities a decade later did not technically interfere with any existing property rights.In contrast, Havana Docks contends that the statute was designed to punish any economic exploitation of property that was once wrongfully seized from U.S. nationals, regardless of the original lease's expiration date.Highlights from Oral ArgumentJudicial Skepticism: Several justices expressed concern over the "infinite" nature of liability if Havana Docks' interpretation were adopted, questioning whether a temporary lease should grant a permanent right to sue for damages decades later.The "But-For" Argument: Counsel for the cruise lines emphasized that even without the Cuban Revolution, Havana Docks would have had no right to the piers in 2016, making the current claim for hundreds of millions of dollars appear disproportionate.Statutory Purpose: Some discussion focused on whether Congress intended the Act to be a remedial measure for lost property or a punitive tool meant to deter all foreign investment in Cuba.Executive Branch Input: The Solicitor General argued that while the Act is broad, it must be anchored in traditional property law principles to avoid creating "extravagant" liability for U.S. businesses.What Happens NextThe Supreme Court is expected to issue a formal written opinion by the end of its term in June 2026. This ruling will serve as a massive precedent for dozens of other pending "certified claim" lawsuits involving confiscated Cuban hotels, refineries, and agricultural land.

Case Summary:Trump, President of the U.S. v. Cook arises from President Donald Trump’s attempt in August 2025 to remove Lisa Cook, a Senate-confirmed member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors serving a 14‑year term, on the ground that she allegedly committed mortgage fraud before joining the Board by designating two different properties as her primary residence on separate loan applications. After the removal letter issued, Cook challenged the action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” removal protection limits the President to removing a governor only for misconduct or failures in office and that alleged, disputed pre‑appointment mortgage irregularities do not qualify as valid cause. She also contended that, because her statutory, fixed‑term position created a protected property interest, the President violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by removing her without adequate advance notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The district court, treating her request for a temporary restraining order as a motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoined the President from removing Cook, finding that she was substantially likely to succeed on her statutory “for cause” and due process claims and that the equitable factors favored interim relief. The D.C. Circuit, by a 2–1 vote, declined to stay that injunction, leaving Cook in her position while the litigation proceeded and setting the stage for the President’s emergency application and subsequent review in the Supreme Court. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the Court should stay (pause) the lower court’s preliminary injunction that currently prevents President Donald Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook while her challenge to the legality of that removal proceeds. In deciding whether to grant that stay, the Court must assess both the president’s statutory and constitutional authority to remove a for‑cause‑protected Fed governor on the basis of alleged pre‑appointment misconduct and the scope of judicial power to review and temporarily block such a presidential removal.

Case Summary:M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund is a case about whether an employer is obligated to contribute to a multiemployer pension fund under a collective bargaining agreement and related plan documents, and whether the fund’s trustees correctly interpreted those documents when claiming contributions were owed, but a precise sentence‑format rule or holding cannot be given here because the necessary case details cannot be accessed at the moment.

Case Summary:Wolford v. Lopez is a Second Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s law that makes it a crime for licensed handgun carriers to bring a firearm onto private property open to the public without the owner’s express permission, with the plaintiffs arguing this default ban unconstitutionally burdens public carry while the State defends it as consistent with historical regulations and property owners’ right to exclude, and the Supreme Court has not yet issued a decision in the case.

Case Summary:Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. arises from an August 9, 2018 collision in Philadelphia, where Cedric Galette, riding as a passenger in a stopped vehicle driven by Julie McCrey, was injured when a New Jersey Transit bus struck their car. Galette sued McCrey and New Jersey Transit in Pennsylvania state court for negligence, and New Jersey Transit moved to dismiss, arguing it is an “arm of the State of New Jersey” entitled to interstate sovereign immunity from being sued in Pennsylvania; after the trial court and intermediate appellate court rejected that immunity claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and held that New Jersey Transit is an instrumentality of New Jersey and thus immune from Galette’s suit. The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court is whether New Jersey Transit qualifies as an “arm of the State of New Jersey” entitled to sovereign immunity that bars it from being sued for damages in another state’s courts (here, Pennsylvania), and more broadly what test courts should use to decide when a bi‑state or cross‑border transit agency is treated as a state for sovereign‑immunity purposes.

Case Summary: West Virginia v. B. P. J. arises from a challenge by Becky Pepper‑Jackson, a transgender girl in West Virginia, to the state’s “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which bars transgender girls and women from competing on girls’ and women’s school sports teams. As an 11‑ to 15‑year‑old middle‑ and high‑school runner who has taken puberty blockers and publicly lived as a girl for years, she sued the state education authorities and West Virginia after the law threatened to exclude her from her school’s girls’ cross‑country and track‑and‑field teams, alleging that enforcing the statute against her violates Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause by denying her any meaningful opportunity to participate in girls’ sports on the same terms as other girls. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether West Virginia’s “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which categorically bars transgender girls from playing on girls’ school sports teams, violates Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to a transgender girl who has been treated consistent with her gender identity and seeks to compete on her school’s girls’ cross‑country and track teams.

Case Summary; Little v. Hecox arises from Idaho’s 2020 “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” (HB 500), which bars transgender girls and women, and any student designated male at birth, from competing on female sports teams at public schools and public colleges, and includes a sex‑verification process that can require invasive exams if an athlete’s sex is disputed. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wanted to compete on the women’s cross‑country team, together with a cisgender high‑school girl concerned about being subjected to sex verification, sued Idaho officials including Governor Brad Little, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by excluding her from women’s sports based solely on her sex assigned at birth and transgender status; a district court enjoined the law, the Ninth Circuit upheld that injunction, and Idaho then sought Supreme Court review. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a state law that limits participation in girls’ and women’s sports to “biological females” (as defined by the statute) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the background of that merits question, the Court is also being asked whether the case has become moot because Lindsay Hecox has left competition and sought to dismiss her claims, and, if so, what should happen to the Ninth Circuit’s decision that upheld the injunction against Idaho’s law.

Case Summary:Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish grows out of a set of Louisiana coastal‑damage suits in which Plaquemines Parish and other local governments allege that Chevron and other oil and gas companies’ decades of exploration and production activities in the coastal zone, such as dredging canals, drilling, and failing to comply with Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act permitting scheme, eroded wetlands and harmed waterways, and seek money damages and restoration costs. Chevron, a vertically integrated company that both produced crude oil in Louisiana and refined aviation gasoline for the federal government during World War II under federal contracts, removed the parish suits from state court to federal court under the federal‑officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that its challenged production activities were “connected or associated with” its federally directed wartime refining work, but the district courts and the Fifth Circuit held that the complaints targeted only crude‑oil production and related permitting practices not directed by federal contracts and therefore ordered the cases remanded to state court. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether Chevron can rely on the federal‑officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), to remove these Louisiana coastal‑damage suits to federal court based on its World War II–era federal refining contracts, even though the parish complaints on their face challenge only state‑law coastal‑zone production activities and permitting noncompliance, not the federally directed refining work.

Case Summary: Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment arises from a suit by Sony and other record labels alleging that Cox’s internet customers used its service to download and share pirated music, after Cox received millions of infringement notices identifying specific subscriber accounts. In the Eastern District of Virginia, Sony proceeded on theories of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, presenting evidence that Cox knew particular subscribers were repeatedly infringing yet chose not to terminate their service and operated an intentionally lax “repeat infringer” policy that disqualified it from the DMCA safe harbor. A jury found Cox liable for willful contributory and vicarious infringement of 10,017 works and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages, and the Fourth Circuit later upheld contributory liability while rejecting vicarious liability and vacating the damages award. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a defendant can be held liable for contributory copyright infringement based on a jury instruction that allowed liability if Cox “knew or should have known” of its subscribers’ infringing activity, or whether contributory infringement instead requires proof that the defendant actually knew of specific acts of infringement (or was willfully blind to them)

Case Summary:Urias-Orellana v. Bondi involves Douglas Humberto Urias‑Orellana, his wife, and their child, Salvadoran nationals who entered the United States without authorization in 2021 and conceded removability but applied for asylum and Convention Against Torture protection based on escalating threats and one physical assault tied to gang extortion in El Salvador. An immigration judge found Urias‑Orellana credible but concluded that the threats and single non‑hospitalizing assault, combined with his ability to relocate within El Salvador for periods without incident, did not amount to “past persecution” or a well‑founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the First Circuit, treating the persecution determination as a factual question subject to deferential substantial‑evidence review, upheld the BIA’s decision.​​ The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not amount to “persecution,” treating that determination as a factual finding reviewable only for substantial evidence, or instead must review that ultimate persecution determination de novo as a legal or mixed question of law and fact.

Case Summary:First Choice Women’s Resource Centers v. Platkin arises from a 2023 administrative subpoena issued by New Jersey Attorney General Matthew Platkin to First Choice, a Christian, pro‑life nonprofit that operates pregnancy centers and provides counseling, information about abortion, and abortion‑pill‑reversal services. The subpoena, issued under New Jersey consumer‑protection and charitable‑solicitation laws, demands the names of nearly 5,000 donors along with more than a decade of internal records, including solicitation materials, advertising, personnel information, complaint files, and documents substantiating medical and cost claims on First Choice’s websites, all based on alleged deceptive practices but without citing specific complaints; First Choice responded by suing in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the subpoena and the threat of enforcement chill its and its donors’ First Amendment rights, while the State has pursued enforcement in New Jersey courts. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a state attorney general’s broad administrative subpoena to a nonprofit advocacy organization seeking years of internal documents and thousands of donor identities based on alleged deceptive practices violates the First Amendment by impermissibly burdening and chilling the organization’s and its supporters’ rights to free speech and expressive association, and if so, what constitutional standard governs such subpoenas

Case Summary:Olivier v. City of Brandon arises from Gabriel Olivier’s street‑preaching near a concert at the Brandon, Mississippi amphitheater, where he used signs and a loudspeaker to evangelize on sidewalks and grassy areas just outside the venue. After the city adopted an ordinance confining all “protests” to a remote designated zone in the park, the police chief ordered Olivier to move there; when he returned to the higher‑traffic area so concertgoers could actually hear him, officers arrested and charged him under the ordinance, he pled no contest and paid a fine, and he later filed a § 1983 suit seeking damages and an injunction on the ground that the ordinance and its enforcement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a person who has been convicted under a local ordinance may still bring a federal civil‑rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against that ordinance, or whether such a suit is barred by the Court’s precedent in Heck v. Humphrey because success would necessarily imply that the prior conviction is invalid.

Case Summary:Trump, President of the United States v. Slaughter arises from President Donald Trump’s March 2025 decision to fire Federal Trade Commission Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter before the end of her fixed term, even though the FTC Act provides that commissioners may be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Trump notified Slaughter by email that keeping her on the Commission would be inconsistent with his Administration’s priorities and did not claim any statutory “for cause” ground, prompting Slaughter to sue in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on the theory that her removal violated both the FTC Act and the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, after which the district court ordered her reinstatement and the government sought emergency stays in the D.C. Circuit and then the Supreme Court. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the President may remove a sitting Federal Trade Commission commissioner at will based solely on policy disagreement or whether the FTC Act’s “for cause” removal protection, as interpreted in Humphrey’s Executor, constitutionally limits the President to removing commissioners only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.

Case Summary:Case Summary: NRSC v. FEC (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission) arises from a 2022 lawsuit in which the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, then‑Senator J.D. Vance, and then‑Representative Steve Chabot challenged federal limits on how much national party committees can spend in coordinated expenditures with their own candidates under 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d). They filed in the Southern District of Ohio under FECA’s special review provision, which required the district court to certify the constitutional questions directly to the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc; that court upheld the coordinated‑expenditure limits against facial and as‑applied First Amendment challenges, after which the plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court agreed to review whether those coordinated party‑expenditure caps violate the free‑speech and association rights of political parties and candidates. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Election Campaign Act’s coordinated‑expenditure limits for national political party committees—52 U.S.C. § 30116(d)’s caps on how much a national party can spend in coordination with its own candidates violate the First Amendment rights to free speech and association of parties and candidates, either on their face or as applied to the plaintiffs

Case Summary:FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund involves a group of closed‑end investment funds, including FS Credit Opportunities Corp., that adopted “control‑share” provisions (mirroring Maryland’s Control Share Acquisition Act) to restrict the voting rights of any shareholder whose holdings would reach or exceed 10% of a fund’s voting power, which the funds said would protect long‑term investors from short‑term activist takeovers. Activist investor Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. acquired large positions in several of these funds and then sued in the Southern District of New York, arguing that the control‑share provisions violated section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act, which requires each share of stock to have equal voting rights, and seeking rescission of those provisions under section 47(b); the district court granted summary judgment to Saba and ordered rescission, and the Second Circuit affirmed, prompting the funds to petition the Supreme Court on whether section 47(b) creates an implied private right of action. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 itself provides an implied private right of action that allows private plaintiffs like Saba to sue to rescind contracts or provisions (here, the control‑share voting restrictions) alleged to violate the Act.

Case Summary: Hamm v. Smith involves Alabama death-row prisoner Joseph Clifton Smith, who was convicted of capital murder for killing Durk Van Dam during a 1998 robbery and sentenced to death. Over the years, Smith received five full-scale IQ scores ranging from roughly 72 to 78 (with measurement error meaning his IQ could be as low as about 69), and he sought state postconviction and then federal habeas relief arguing that, under Atkins v. Virginia, his intellectual disability makes him categorically ineligible for execution. After state courts rejected his claim without an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court held a hearing, found he met Alabama’s criteria for intellectual disability, and vacated his death sentence, a ruling the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Eleventh Circuit used the correct legal standard under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) when it granted habeas relief by deferring to the federal district court’s factfinding, rather than to the Alabama courts’ rejection of Smith’s Atkins intellectual‑disability claim. In particular, the case asks how federal courts should apply AEDPA’s deference provisions when state courts have denied an Atkins claim without an evidentiary hearing but a federal court later holds a hearing and finds the prisoner intellectually disabled

Case Summary:Hencely v. Fluor Corp. arises from a 2016 suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, where an Afghan national, Ahmad Nayeb, employed by a subcontractor of Fluor Corporation, detonated an explosive vest using materials from his job, killing several people and seriously injuring U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely. Fluor was working under a Department of Defense logistics contract that required it to hire and supervise local Afghan workers as part of the “Afghan First” program, and Hencely sued Fluor in federal court under South Carolina tort law (negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, negligent retention, and related claims), alleging the company failed to properly vet and supervise Nayeb, which allowed him to move unsupervised around the base and carry out the attack, as well as a contract-based claim arguing he was a third‑party beneficiary of Fluor’s contract with the military. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a federal contractor like Fluor can invoke federal-law defenses, principally the “combatant activities” exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act and related federal‑preemption doctrines, to bar state‑law tort suits by U.S. service members injured by the contractor’s alleged negligence in performing a combat‑zone military contract. In particular, the case asks whether Hencely’s South Carolina negligence and contract claims are preempted or displaced because Fluor was carrying out a Department of Defense logistics contract in an active war zone, such that allowing the suit to proceed would impermissibly second‑guess or interfere with the federal government’s combat and force‑protection activities.

Case Summary:Rico v. United States involves Isabel Rico, who was sentenced in 2010 to 84 months in prison and four years of supervised release for a federal drug offense, then began serving her supervised release in 2017. In 2018, she absconded, stopping all contact with her probation officer, while 37 months of supervised release remained. After she was arrested in January 2023 and charged with new violations, the district court, applying the judge‑made “fugitive tolling” doctrine, treated her supervised release term as having been paused during the years she was a fugitive and thus still running, revoked her release, and resentenced her to 16 months in prison followed by a new two‑year term of supervised release, a result the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether federal courts may apply a judge‑made “fugitive tolling” doctrine to pause (toll) a defendant’s term of supervised release while the defendant is a fugitive, even though 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) specifies when supervised release is tolled and does not mention fugitive status.

Case Summary:Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton arises from a 2015 adversary proceeding in the Vista-Pro Automotive bankruptcy, where Vista-Pro (a Tennessee auto-parts manufacturer) sued Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, in the Tennessee bankruptcy court to recover approximately $49,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista‑Pro served the summons and complaint by first‑class mail addressed only to “Coney Island Auto Parts Unltd., Inc.” at its Brooklyn business address, without naming or directing service to any officer or registered agent, Coney Island never appeared, and the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment in May 2015, which Vista‑Pro’s Chapter 7 trustee, Jeanne Burton, then spent years trying to enforce, sending a demand letter to Coney Island’s CEO, serving subpoenas, registering the judgment in New York, and ultimately freezing about $97,000 in Coney Island’s bank account, before Coney Island moved in 2021 under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a party can seek relief from a void federal judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) at any time, or whether such a motion is subject to a time limitm such as Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement or equitable doctrines like laches, when the defect is lack of personal jurisdiction based on improper service of process.

Case Summary:Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist arises from a products‑liability suit brought by Grant and Sarah Palmquist on behalf of their son E.P., alleging that his physical and mental decline and diagnosis of heavy‑metal poisoning were caused by consuming Hain’s Earth’s Best organic baby foods purchased from Whole Foods. The Palmquists originally sued Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, Hain removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, the district court dismissed non‑diverse Whole Foods as improperly joined, denied remand, and then granted judgment as a matter of law in Hain’s favor at trial, but the Fifth Circuit later vacated that judgment and ordered the case remanded to state court after concluding Whole Foods had been properly joined and complete diversity was lacking. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a federal court of appeals may vacate a final merits judgment and order a case sent back to state court when it concludes, after that judgment, that complete diversity was lacking because a non‑diverse defendant (here, Whole Foods) was in fact properly joined and should not have been dismissed as “improperly joined” at the removal stage.

Case Summary:Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump involves two family-owned educational toy companies, Learning Resources and hand2mind, which import most of their products from China and other countries. They claimed that new emergency tariffs ordered by President Donald Trump would dramatically raise their costs and harm their businesses. In April 2025 they sued the President and several federal officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose broad import tariffs in response to a declared national emergency, that tariff authority belongs to Congress under Article I, and that the executive orders imposing the tariffs therefore exceeded statutory limits and violated separation‑of‑powers principles. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose broad, across‑the‑board import tariffs as an emergency measure, or whether such tariff‑imposing power is reserved to Congress under Article I so that the President’s emergency tariff orders exceeded both the statute and constitutional separation‑of‑powers limits.

Case Summary:Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections involves Damon Landor, a Rastafarian incarcerated in Louisiana whose religious beliefs require him to wear his hair in dreadlocks. After Landor showed prison officials a Fifth Circuit decision stating that forcibly cutting a Rastafarian prisoner’s hair violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), officers allegedly threw the opinion in the trash, strapped him down, and shaved his head bald, leading Landor, after his release, to sue the DOC secretary, the warden, and involved guards for money damages under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a former prisoner can recover money damages in a lawsuit based on violations of his religious rights under RLUIPA, specifically, whether prison officials can be sued for damages (in their official or individual capacities) for forcibly cutting his dreadlocks in violation of that statute and related constitutional protections.

Case Summary: GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal arises from a class action filed by former and current civil immigration detainees at GEO’s Aurora, Colorado detention facility, alleging that GEO ran two unlawful labor schemes inside the center. First, they claim GEO’s “Sanitation Policy” forced detainees, under threat of punishment such as solitary confinement or loss of privileges, to clean common areas of the housing units for no pay; second, they allege GEO’s “Voluntary Work Program” paid detainees only $1 per day for other facility jobs, unjustly enriching GEO in violation of Colorado law and constituting forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) permits civil class actions by immigration detainees against a private prison contractor like GEO for alleged forced labor in a federal detention facility, and specifically whether such claims are preempted or otherwise barred by federal immigration and detention statutes and regulations governing federal contractors.

Case Summary:Fernandez v. United States arises from Joe Fernandez’s federal convictions in the Southern District of New York for participating in a murder‑for‑hire scheme, based largely on testimony from a cooperating witness, Darge, after which the court imposed two consecutive life sentences while his co‑defendants received much shorter terms ranging from two to thirty years. Years later, Fernandez moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that doubts about Darge’s credibility, the large sentencing disparity between him and his co‑defendants, harsh prison conditions during the COVID‑19 pandemic, and his post‑sentence rehabilitation together created “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction; the district court agreed and ordered his release, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to the reliability of the evidence and to sentencing fairness must be pursued through habeas or other collateral review rather than through compassionate release. The isssue before the Supreme Court was whether, and to what extent, a federal court ruling on a compassionate‑release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) may treat alleged trial errors (like doubts about a key witness’s credibility) and large sentencing disparities as part of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction, or whether those kinds of arguments are categorically off‑limits and must be brought only through habeas or other collateral review.

Case Summary:Rutherford v. United States arises from Daniel Rutherford’s federal convictions for two Hobbs Act robberies and two associated firearm counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), for which the district court imposed a total prison term of about 42½ years, including a “stacked” 32‑year mandatory minimum on the firearm counts (7 years for the first, 25 years for the second) plus 125 months on the robbery counts. After the First Step Act later eliminated this kind of stacking for defendants sentenced after its enactment, so that Rutherford would now face a 14‑year rather than 32‑year mandatory minimum on the same firearm conduct, he repeatedly moved in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for compassionate release based on the large disparity between his sentence and those imposed under current law, but the district court and the Third Circuit denied relief, holding under circuit precedent that non‑retroactive changes made by the First Step Act could not constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether, in ruling on a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may treat the large sentencing disparity created by a non‑retroactive change in federal law, specifically the First Step Act’s elimination of “stacked” § 924(c) mandatory minimums, as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that can justify reducing a defendant’s sentence.

Case Summary: The Case involves Harold R. Berk, a Florida resident who was visiting Delaware when he fell, severely injured his left ankle and foot, and then sought treatment at a local emergency room and rehabilitation facility. Berk alleges that Dr. Wilson C. Choy, Beebe Medical Center, and Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital provided negligent medical care that worsened his injuries by delaying necessary surgery, causing extreme pain, and complicating his recovery, and he filed a diversity medical‑malpractice action in federal district court without attaching the expert “affidavit of merit” required by Delaware’s health‑care negligence statute. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a federal court sitting in a diversity medical‑malpractice case must enforce Delaware’s state “affidavit of merit” requirement, which obliges plaintiffs to file an expert certificate at the outset of suit, or whether that requirement conflicts with and is displaced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing pleadings and expert disclosures.

Case Summary:The Case arises from a Texas murder trial in which the judge ordered defendant David Asa Villarreal not to discuss his ongoing testimony with his lawyers during a 24‑hour overnight recess between direct and cross‑examination, and again during a later seven‑minute break in cross. Villarreal, the only defense witness and central to a self‑defense theory, was thus unable to confer with counsel about his testimony at a critical stage of trial; after he was convicted and sentenced to sixty years, the state appellate courts upheld the conviction and concluded that the no‑conferral order did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it barred only discussion of his testimony, not other topics. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial judge violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant from consulting with defense counsel about the substance of his ongoing testimony during an overnight recess and a subsequent short recess between direct and cross‑examination.