The High Court Report

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport | Case No. 24-781 | Decided: 4/29/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: New Jersey's Attorney General (Platkin) demanded a pro-life nonprofit's donor records despite receiving zero public complaints. The Court unanimously ruled the subpoena inflicted a present First Amendment injury, opening the federal courthouse door immediately.Question Presented: Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas demanding donor identities before state courts enforce those subpoenas.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing; Supreme Court reversed unanimously.Holding: First Choice established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights sufficient for Article III standing.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion.Majority Reasoning: (1) Government demands for donor information inevitably deter First Amendment associational rights — an injury beginning when the demand arrives and persisting as long as it remains outstanding; (2) The subpoena's "non-self-executing" nature carried no constitutional significance — the "sword of Damocles" chilled association regardless of enforcement status; (3) Confidentiality promises, narrowed demands, and prospective protective orders cannot cure the First Amendment injury a donor-information subpoena inflicts.Separate Opinions: None. The Court ruled unanimously without concurrences or dissents.Implications: Every nonprofit, charity, and advocacy organization now holds clear authority to challenge government demands for donor records in federal court immediately under Section 1983 — without exhausting state remedies first. The ruling forecloses the "preclusion trap" that would permanently bar federal review after a state-court loss. Attorneys general nationwide must now account for immediate federal scrutiny before issuing investigatory subpoenas targeting donor rolls. The Court left the merits question open — whether this particular subpoena violated the First Amendment — sending that fight back to the lower courts on remand.The Fine Print:First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."42 U.S.C. §1983: Authorizes suits against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal constitutional rights — enacted by Congress specifically to guarantee a federal forum when state officials violate constitutional protections.Primary Cases:NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958): Government demands for private membership rolls burden First Amendment associational rights; the "vital relationship" between privacy in association and freedom to associate requires the "closest scrutiny" of compelled disclosure.Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021): State demands for charitable donor information "chill" protected associational rights even when the government promises confidentiality; such demands must overcome heightened First Amendment scrutiny.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (First Choice Women's Resource): Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (New Jersey): Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N.J.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:32] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:50] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:55] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:19:27] Petitioner Round Robin Questions[00:24:43] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement[00:25:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions[00:35:30] Amicus Curiae Round Robin Questions[00:38:09] Respondent Opening Statement[00:40:30] Respondent Free for All Questions[01:08:31] Respondent Round Robin Questions[01:20:41] Petitioner Rebuttal

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport | Case No. 24-781 | Decided: 4/29/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: New Jersey's Attorney General (Platkin) demanded a pro-life nonprofit's donor records despite receiving zero public complaints. The Court unanimously ruled the subpoena inflicted a present First Amendment injury, opening the federal courthouse door immediately.Question Presented: Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas demanding donor identities before state courts enforce those subpoenas.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing; Supreme Court reversed unanimously.Holding: First Choice established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights sufficient for Article III standing.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion.Majority Reasoning: (1) Government demands for donor information inevitably deter First Amendment associational rights — an injury beginning when the demand arrives and persisting as long as it remains outstanding; (2) The subpoena's "non-self-executing" nature carried no constitutional significance — the "sword of Damocles" chilled association regardless of enforcement status; (3) Confidentiality promises, narrowed demands, and prospective protective orders cannot cure the First Amendment injury a donor-information subpoena inflicts.Separate Opinions: None. The Court ruled unanimously without concurrences or dissents.Implications: Every nonprofit, charity, and advocacy organization now holds clear authority to challenge government demands for donor records in federal court immediately under Section 1983 — without exhausting state remedies first. The ruling forecloses the "preclusion trap" that would permanently bar federal review after a state-court loss. Attorneys general nationwide must now account for immediate federal scrutiny before issuing investigatory subpoenas targeting donor rolls. The Court left the merits question open — whether this particular subpoena violated the First Amendment — sending that fight back to the lower courts on remand.The Fine Print:First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."42 U.S.C. §1983: Authorizes suits against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal constitutional rights — enacted by Congress specifically to guarantee a federal forum when state officials violate constitutional protections.Primary Cases:NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958): Government demands for private membership rolls burden First Amendment associational rights; the "vital relationship" between privacy in association and freedom to associate requires the "closest scrutiny" of compelled disclosure.Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021): State demands for charitable donor information "chill" protected associational rights even when the government promises confidentiality; such demands must overcome heightened First Amendment scrutiny.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (First Choice Women's Resource): Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (New Jersey): Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N.J.

Louisiana v. Callais and Robinson v. Callais | Case Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 | Oral Argument: 10/15/25 | Decided: April 29, 2026 | Docket Link: Here and Here Overview: On 4/29/26, the Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's second majority-Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, overhauled the 40-year-old Gingles framework for vote-dilution claims, and reinterpreted Section 2 to demand a strong inference of intentional discrimination.Question Presented: Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required Louisiana to create a second majority-minority congressional district, justifying race-based redistricting under strict scrutiny.Posture: Three-judge district court struck down SB8; direct appeal to Supreme Court affirmed 6-3.Holding: Because the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq., did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State’s use of race in creating SB8, and that map is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.Result: Affirmed and Remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New YorkFor Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, LouisianaFor Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, MissouriFor United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of JusticeTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:00] Argument Begins[00:01:09] Appellant Press Robinson Opening Statement[00:03:32] Appellant Press Robinson Free for All Questions[00:26:15] Appellant Press Robinson Sequential Questions[00:47:32] Appellant Louisiana Opening Statement[00:49:02] Appellant Louisiana Free for All Questions[00:57:59] Appellant Louisiana Sequential Questions[01:20:21] Callais Appellees Opening Statement[01:21:47] Callais Appellees Free for All Questions[01:31:11] Callais Appellees Sequential Questions[01:40:35] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement[01:41:42] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions[01:51:08] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions[02:25:32] Appellant Press Robinson Rebuttal

Louisiana v. Callais and Robinson v. Callais | Case Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 | Decided April 29, 2026 | Docket Link: Here and HereOverview: The Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's second majority-Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, overhauled the 40-year-old Gingles framework for vote-dilution claims, and reinterpreted Section 2 to demand a strong inference of intentional discrimination.Question Presented: Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required Louisiana to create a second majority-minority congressional district, justifying race-based redistricting under strict scrutiny.Posture: Three-judge district court struck down SB8; direct appeal to Supreme Court affirmed 6-3.Holding: Because the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq., did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State’s use of race in creating SB8, and that map is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.Result: Affirmed and Remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 2's "less opportunity" language entitles minority voters only to whatever chance any voter receives under the State's permissible nonracial criteria — nothing more; (2) The Fifteenth Amendment bars only intentional discrimination, so Section 2 imposes liability only upon a strong inference of intentional discrimination; (3) Updated Gingles preconditions now require plaintiffs' maps to match all State objectives including partisan goals, polarization evidence to control for party affiliation, and totality analysis to focus on present-day intentional discrimination.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Joined the majority in full but argued Section 2 should never apply to redistricting. The statutory terms reach only ballot-access rules, making the Court's 40-year application to districting a "disastrous misadventure."Justice Kagan (dissenting): Argued the majority converted Section 2 from the effects test Congress adopted in 1982 back into the intent test Congress rejected, calling the new framework "Bolden redux" and predicting severe reductions in minority representation nationwide.Implications: State legislatures now possess a powerful defense against Section 2 challenges: any map defended on partisan grounds enjoys strong immunity wherever race and party preference correlate. Vote-dilution plaintiffs now carry far heavier burdens — producing alternative maps matching every State objective, controlling polarization evidence for partisanship, and proving present-day intentional discrimination. Existing majority-minority districts now stand at legislative discretion. Thomas's concurrence signals two Justices want to eliminate Section 2 redistricting claims entirely, keeping that question alive. Lower courts must now determine what evidence satisfies the new "strong inference" standard.The Fine Print:Section 2(b), Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §10301(b): "A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."Fifteenth Amendment, Section 1: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."Primary Cases:Thornburg v. Gingles (1986): Established the three-precondition framework for Section 2 vote-dilution claims — requiring a sufficiently large and compact minority group, politically cohesive minority voting, and majority bloc voting that usually defeats minority-preferred candidates.Allen v. Milligan (2023): Reaffirmed Gingles and upheld Alabama's obligation to create a second majority-Black congressional district under Section 2, rejecting Alabama's proposed "race-neutral benchmark" test.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New YorkFor Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, LouisianaFor Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, MissouriFor United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Decided April 22, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether federal law preempts state tort claims against military contractors for unauthorized conduct violating military instructions.Overview: Supreme Court narrows military contractor immunity, ruling contractors face state tort liability when they violate rather than follow government orders during wartime operations.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for contractor based on federal preemption.Holding: The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in finding Winston Hencely’s state-law tort claims preempted where the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized Fluor Corporation’s challenged conduct.Voting Breakdown: 6-3 decision vacated Fourth Circuit judgment. Justice Thomas authored majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson.Majority Reasoning: (1) Neither Constitution nor federal statute expressly preempts tort suits against contractors who violate military instructions; (2) Boyle doctrine protects contractors only when they conform to government specifications, not when they breach obligations; (3) Federal preemption requires actual conflict with federal law, not judicial speculation about federal interests.Separate Opinions:Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Roberts and Kavanaugh): Constitution's war powers exclusively assign military authority to federal government; state regulation of combat zone security arrangements violates structural separation of powers and encroaches on federal military domain.Opinion: HereImplications: Military contractors lose blanket wartime immunity and face state tort liability when violating military instructions. Military families gain clearer accountability paths through state courts. Contractors must strengthen compliance with military supervision requirements to avoid potential liability. Decision reinforces targeted conflict preemption over broad field preemption doctrine.The Fine Print:Federal Tort Claims Act § 2680(j): Preserves government immunity for "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2: Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute "the supreme Law of the Land" requiring state law to yield when conflicting with federal directivesPrimary Cases:Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988): Federal preemption protects military contractors only when they conform to government specifications and follow precise government directionsYearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940): Contractors receive constitutional immunity only when sued precisely for accomplishing what Federal Government requested under valid authorityOral Advocates:For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Decided April 22, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether federal law preempts state tort claims against military contractors for unauthorized conduct violating military instructions.Overview: Supreme Court narrows military contractor immunity, ruling contractors face state tort liability when they violate rather than follow government orders during wartime operations.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for contractor based on federal preemption.Holding: The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in finding Winston Hencely’s state-law tort claims preempted where the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized Fluor Corporation’s challenged conduct.Voting Breakdown: 6-3 decision vacated Fourth Circuit judgment. Justice Thomas authored majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson.Majority Reasoning: (1) Neither Constitution nor federal statute expressly preempts tort suits against contractors who violate military instructions; (2) Boyle doctrine protects contractors only when they conform to government specifications, not when they breach obligations; (3) Federal preemption requires actual conflict with federal law, not judicial speculation about federal interests.Separate Opinions:Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Roberts and Kavanaugh): Constitution's war powers exclusively assign military authority to federal government; state regulation of combat zone security arrangements violates structural separation of powers and encroaches on federal military domain.Opinion: HereImplications: Military contractors lose blanket wartime immunity and face state tort liability when violating military instructions. Military families gain clearer accountability paths through state courts. Contractors must strengthen compliance with military supervision requirements to avoid potential liability. Decision reinforces targeted conflict preemption over broad field preemption doctrine.The Fine Print:Federal Tort Claims Act § 2680(j): Preserves government immunity for "any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2: Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute "the supreme Law of the Land" requiring state law to yield when conflicting with federal directivesPrimary Cases:Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988): Federal preemption protects military contractors only when they conform to government specifications and follow precise government directionsYearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940): Contractors receive constitutional immunity only when sued precisely for accomplishing what Federal Government requested under valid authorityOral Advocates:For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLPAmicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of JusticeRespondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLPQuestion Presented: Whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves patented uses from its label actively induces patent infringement through investor press releases and website statements that do not mention, encourage, or instruct the patented useOverview: Generic drugmaker Hikma followed federal skinny-label law but called its product "generic Vascepa" and touted Vascepa's total sales. Brand manufacturer Amarin claims those statements actively induced doctors to prescribe the generic for a patented cardiovascular use worth over $900 million annually.Posture: District court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 2026.Main Arguments:• Hikma (Petitioner): (1) "Actively" induces requires affirmative steps encouraging infringement — none of Hikma's statements mention or instruct the patented use; (2) Amarin's theory of liability imputes inferences physicians might draw, not active steps Hikma took; (3) The Federal Circuit's decision effectively nullifies the section viii skinny-label pathway Congress created to speed generic competition• Amarin (Respondent): (1) Hikma advertised its generic for "Hypertriglyceridemia" — a category encompassing the patented cardiovascular use — going beyond compliant labeling; (2) Press releases calling the product "generic Vascepa" and touting $919 million to $1.1 billion in total Vascepa sales plausibly encouraged prescribers to use the generic for all of Vascepa's indications; (3) Seven other generic manufacturers selling identical skinny-label products avoided suit by accurately limiting their marketing — proving that compliant speech and section viii coexistImplications: Hikma victory establishes that skinny-label compliance shields generic manufacturers from inducement liability for accurate commercial descriptions, protecting the section viii pathway that delivers billions in consumer drug savings annually. Amarin victory confirms that post-label marketing conduct — even investor communications — can cross the line into active patent infringement inducement, preserving incentives for brand manufacturers to invest hundreds of millions in discovering new therapeutic uses. The Court's answer defines the legal boundary between ordinary commerce and unlawful inducement for the entire pharmaceutical industry.The Fine Print:• 35 U.S.C. § 271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer"• 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii): Permits a generic manufacturer to file a statement seeking approval only for uses not covered by the brand manufacturer's listed method-of-use patents, allowing the generic to carry a "skinny label" that carves out still-patented usesPrimary Cases:• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Inducement liability requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement" — mere knowledge that a product may reach infringing uses does not suffice; liability demands "statements or actions directed to promoting infringement"• Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S (2012): Congress designed the section viii skinny-label mechanism to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones," expediting generic competition as soon as patents allowTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:41] Oral Advocates[00:01:58] Argument Begins[00:02:06] Hikma Opening Statement[00:04:13] Hikma Free for All Questions[00:12:50] Hikma Round Robin Questions[00:13:17] United States Opening Statement[00:14:29] United States Free for All Questions[00:24:44] United States Round Robin Questions[00:30:09] Amarin Opening Statement[00:32:34] Amarin Free for All Questions[00:58:56] Amarin Round Robin Questions[00:59:06] Hikma Rebuttal

Mullin v. Doe | 25-1083 | Docket Link: HereConsolidated with Trump v. Miot 25-1084 | Docket Link: HereArgument Date: 4/29/2026Oral Advocates:Petitioners (United States): D. John Sauer, United States’ Solicitor GeneralRespondents (Doe): Ahilan T. Arulanantham of UCLA School of LawRespondents (Miot): Geoffrey M. Pipoly of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLPQuestion Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)'s judicial review bar precludes APA challenges to the Secretary's termination of Syria's Temporary Protected Status designation, and if reviewable, whether the termination violated the APA.Overview: Emergency stay application challenges Secretary Mullin's termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6,132 Syrian nationals. Central questions: whether courts may review TPS termination decisions at all, and whether the Secretary followed required consultation and country-conditions procedures.Posture: S.D.N.Y. postponed Syria's TPS termination; Second Circuit denied stay; government now seeks Supreme Court intervention.Main Arguments:Government (Applicant): (1) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all APA challenges to TPS terminations; (2) Secretary validly consulted agencies and invoked national interest; (3) Courts cannot brand a new administration's policy priorities as pretextSyrian TPS Holders (Respondents): (1) Judicial review bar covers country-conditions determinations only, not procedural violations; (2) Secretary never genuinely consulted agencies and invoked an extra-statutory factor; (3) Concrete harms to 6,132 Syrians facing deportation to an active war zone favor denialImplications:(A) Government victory:The judicial review bar broadly strips courts of authority to review all TPS termination decisionsClear path for DHS Secretary to implement terminations across all thirteen countries — potentially stripping hundreds of thousands of TPS holders of legal status with no judicial recourse.TPS becomes a pure presidential foreign-policy tool.(B) TPS holders victory:Courts retain authority to enforce TPS's procedural requirements;The Secretary must genuinely consult agencies and review actual country conditions;6,132 Syrians retain lawful status while the Second Circuit completes full appellate review.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection."8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A): "[A]fter consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government," the Secretary "shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation . . . continue to be met."Primary Cases:McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (1991): A comparable immigration statute's reference to "a determination" described a single act — the denial of an individual application — and did not bar general collateral challenges to unconstitutional agency practices and policies; the central precedent for the TPS holders' jurisdictional argument.Noem v. NTPSA, 145 S. Ct. 2728 (2025) (NTPSA I) & 146 S. Ct. 23 (2025) (NTPSA II): Supreme Court stayed two district court orders blocking Venezuela's TPS termination without written explanation; the government argues these orders "inform" the equitable analysis here and reflect prior acceptance of its likelihood-of-success argument.Timestamps:[00:01:50] Oral Advocates[00:02:08] Argument Begins[00:02:17] United States Opening Statement[00:04:14] United States Free for All Questions[00:37:20] United States Round Robin Questions[00:46:13] Doe Opening Statement[00:48:56] Doe Free for All Questions[01:06:24] Doe Round Robin Questions[01:26:28] Miot Opening Statement[01:28:06] Miot Free for All Questions[01:43:40] Miot Round Robin Questions[01:45:22] United States Rebuttal

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates: Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLPRespondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLPAmicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of JusticeQuestion Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.The Fine Print:Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."Primary Cases:Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:31] Oral Advocates[00:01:52] Argument Begins[00:01:59] Cisco Opening Statement[00:04:17] Cisco Free for All Questions[00:21:49] Cisco Round Robin Questions[00:38:55] United States Opening Statement[00:40:05] United States Free for All Questions[00:50:27] United States Round Robin Questions[01:19:39] Doe Opening Statement[01:22:12] Doe Free for All Questions[01:50:47] Doe Round Robin Questions[01:55:52] Cisco Rebuttal

Chatrie v. United States | Case No. 25-112 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:Petitioner (Chatrie): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner & BlockRespondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin of the Department of JusticeQuestion Presented: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant — compelling Google to search the location data of all users to identify devices near a crime scene — violated the Fourth Amendment.Overview: Police ordered Google to scan hundreds of millions of users' private location records to catch a bank robber, without naming any suspect. The Court now decides whether geofence warrants survive the Fourth Amendment's ban on general searches.Posture: Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed denial of suppression in a single-sentence per curiam opinion.Main Arguments:Chatrie (Petitioner): (1) Location History data constitutes Chatrie's property, making government access a trespass; (2) The warrant operated as an unconstitutional general warrant by compelling Google to search all users without individualized probable cause; (3) Each warrant step independently failed particularity and probable cause requirementsGovernment (Respondent): (1) Chatrie voluntarily opted into Location History, triggering the third-party doctrine and forfeiting any privacy claim in two hours of public movements; (2) Chatrie's property theory was forfeited below and lacks any foundation in American law; (3) The magistrate-issued warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and the good-faith exception independently bars suppressionImplications: A Chatrie victory likely ends geofence warrants as currently used — law enforcement would need to identify specific accounts before any search, fundamentally limiting their ability to identify unknown suspects through third-party tech platforms. It could also extend Fourth Amendment property protection to cloud-stored data broadly. A government victory grants constitutional clearance for geofence warrants and reaffirms the third-party doctrine against digital location data, exposing every opted-in user's movements to law enforcement access whenever a crime occurs nearby — including near places of worship, political gatherings, or medical facilities.The Fine Print:Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act): Requires a warrant for the government to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications stored for 180 days or fewer — a provision Chatrie argues supports a broader Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for location data.Primary Cases:Carpenter v. United States (2018): The Court held that seven or more days of cell-site location information triggers Fourth Amendment protection, declining to apply the third-party doctrine where data reveals the intimate patterns of daily life — Chatrie's central precedentSmith v. Maryland (1979): Established the third-party doctrine — a person who voluntarily shares information with a third party "assumes the risk" of disclosure to law enforcement and forfeits Fourth Amendment protection — the government's bedrock authorityTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:21] Oral Advocates[00:01:29] Argument Begins[00:01:37] Chatrie Opening Statement[00:02:55] Chatrie Free for All Questions[00:26:57] Chatrie Round Robin Questions[00:58:35] United States Opening Statement[01:01:05] United States Free for All Questions[01:28:53] United States Round Robin Questions[01:56:42] Chatrie Rebuttal

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & MurphyRespondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller PostmanAmicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of JusticeQuestion Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.Main Arguments:• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.The Fine Print:7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."Primary Cases:Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.Timestamps:[Sorry, come back later for timestamps!]

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here | Decided: 4/22/26Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.Holding: Because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal of the case to federal court outside the statute’s 30-day deadline was untimely.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion. No Justice authored a separate opinion.Result: Affirmed. Nessel wins.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Statutory exceptions throughout removal law demonstrate Congress rejected general equitable tolling; (2) Mandatory language requires strict deadline enforcement; (3) Efficiency concerns counsel against case-by-case deadline extensions through judicial discretion.Implications: Companies lose flexibility to move cases to federal court after missing statutory deadlines. State courts retain jurisdiction over environmental and regulatory disputes even when federal issues arise later. Forum selection becomes permanent within thirty days of service regardless of extraordinary circumstances.Main Arguments:• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstancesThe Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"Primary Cases:• United States v. Brockamp (1997): Explicit statutory exceptions strongly indicate Congress rejected additional implied exceptions through judicial interpretation• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express onesOral Advocates:For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here | Decided: 4/22/26Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.Holding: Because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal of the case to federal court outside the statute’s 30-day deadline was untimely.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion. No Justice authored a separate opinion.Result: Affirmed. Nessel wins.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Statutory exceptions throughout removal law demonstrate Congress rejected general equitable tolling; (2) Mandatory language requires strict deadline enforcement; (3) Efficiency concerns counsel against case-by-case deadline extensions through judicial discretion.Implications: Companies lose flexibility to move cases to federal court after missing statutory deadlines. State courts retain jurisdiction over environmental and regulatory disputes even when federal issues arise later. Forum selection becomes permanent within thirty days of service regardless of extraordinary circumstances.Main Arguments:• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstancesThe Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"Primary Cases:• United States v. Brockamp (1997): Explicit statutory exceptions strongly indicate Congress rejected additional implied exceptions through judicial interpretation• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express onesOral Advocates:For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Mullin v. Doe | 25-1083 | Docket Link: HereConsolidated with Trump v. Miot 25-1084 | Docket Link: HereArgument Date: 4/29/2026Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)'s judicial review bar precludes APA challenges to the Secretary's termination of Syria's Temporary Protected Status designation, and if reviewable, whether the termination violated the APA.Overview: Emergency stay application challenges Secretary Mullin's termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6,132 Syrian nationals. Central questions: whether courts may review TPS termination decisions at all, and whether the Secretary followed required consultation and country-conditions procedures.Posture: S.D.N.Y. postponed Syria's TPS termination; Second Circuit denied stay; government now seeks Supreme Court intervention.Main Arguments:Government (Applicant): (1) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all APA challenges to TPS terminations; (2) Secretary validly consulted agencies and invoked national interest; (3) Courts cannot brand a new administration's policy priorities as pretextSyrian TPS Holders (Respondents): (1) Judicial review bar covers country-conditions determinations only, not procedural violations; (2) Secretary never genuinely consulted agencies and invoked an extra-statutory factor; (3) Concrete harms to 6,132 Syrians facing deportation to an active war zone favor denialImplications:(A) Government victory:The judicial review bar broadly strips courts of authority to review all TPS termination decisionsClear path for DHS Secretary to implement terminations across all thirteen countries — potentially stripping hundreds of thousands of TPS holders of legal status with no judicial recourse.TPS becomes a pure presidential foreign-policy tool.(B) TPS holders victory:Courts retain authority to enforce TPS's procedural requirements;The Secretary must genuinely consult agencies and review actual country conditions;6,132 Syrians retain lawful status while the Second Circuit completes full appellate review.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection."8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A): "[A]fter consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government," the Secretary "shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation . . . continue to be met."Primary Cases:McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (1991): A comparable immigration statute's reference to "a determination" described a single act — the denial of an individual application — and did not bar general collateral challenges to unconstitutional agency practices and policies; the central precedent for the TPS holders' jurisdictional argument.Noem v. NTPSA, 145 S. Ct. 2728 (2025) (NTPSA I) & 146 S. Ct. 23 (2025) (NTPSA II): Supreme Court stayed two district court orders blocking Venezuela's TPS termination without written explanation; the government argues these orders "inform" the equitable analysis here and reflect prior acceptance of its likelihood-of-success argument.

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Case No. 24-813 | Decided: April 17, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a state environmental lawsuit challenging a WWII military contractor's crude oil production "relates to" its federal avgas refining contract under the federal officer removal statute.Overview: Louisiana parishes sued Chevron over World War II oil production damage. Chevron invoked the federal officer removal statute, arguing its wartime crude oil production closely related to its military contract to refine aviation gasoline for the U.S. military.Posture: District Court and Fifth Circuit both denied removal; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Holding: Chevron plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal aviation gas refining duties and therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal officer removal statute.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by six Justices. Justice Jackson authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito did not participate in the case.Result: Vacated and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) "Relating to" under the federal officer removal statute requires a close — not tenuous, remote, or peripheral — connection between challenged conduct and federal duties; no explicit contractual directive needed; (2) Chevron's crude oil production closely related to its federal avgas refining — wartime drilling practices directly enabled military fuel output; (3) The P.A.W.'s role allocating crude oil among refineries as an intermediary did not sever the production-refining relationship.Separate Opinions:Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment): Agreed Chevron satisfies the removal requirements but argued the 2011 "or relating to" amendment preserved the prior causal-nexus test rather than replacing it with a looser indirect-relationship standard; Chevron satisfies both tests.Implications: Military contractors and other companies that performed federal government work during wartime now carry stronger arguments to move state environmental and other lawsuits into federal court. The ruling clarifies that a close relationship between challenged conduct and federal duties suffices — no explicit contractual directive required. Jackson's concurrence signals future courts may apply a stricter causal-nexus test when facts run thinner. Louisiana parishes pursuing decades-old coastal damage claims against other wartime oil companies face the same federal-forum question across 41 remaining lawsuits.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1): "[A] civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to . . . [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office."Louisiana Coastal Resources Management Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49:214.34(C)(2): "Individual specific uses legally commenced or established prior to the effective date of the coastal use permit program."Primary Cases:Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992): "Relating to" encompasses indirect connections; state advertising rules related to airline rates even where consumer decisions intervened as intermediaries in the causal chain.Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon (1990): A law "relates to" something even when lawmakers never specifically designed it to affect that subject; explicit direction unnecessary to establish a cognizable relationship.

Bondi v. Lau (formerly named Bondi v. Lau) | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of JusticeRespondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLPQuestion Presented: Whether the government, to remove a lawful permanent resident as inadmissible after paroling him into the United States, must prove it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the disqualifying offense at the time of reentry.Overview: A green-card holder returns from a brief trip abroad facing only unproven criminal charges. The government paroles him in, waits for his conviction, then invokes the inadmissibility track. The Supreme Court now decides whether that sequence respects the INA's plain text.Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Government (Petitioner): (1) Courts lack jurisdiction to review discretionary parole decisions; (2) The INA requires proof of the offense at the removal hearing, not at the border; (3) Requiring border officers to weigh clear-and-convincing evidence before paroling LPRs would nullify decades of lawful practiceLau (Respondent): (1) The INA's plain text requires the government to establish the statutory exception at the time of reentry; (2) Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether DHS held authority to parole at all; (3) The government retains ample deportation authority under § 1227 and faces no operational hardshipImplications (90 words max): A government victory preserves DHS's ability to parole returning green-card holders facing criminal charges, use later convictions to justify the parole decision, and invoke the inadmissibility track — where the noncitizen bears the burden of proof. A Lau victory forces the government onto the deportation track for any LPR admitted without sufficient border-time evidence, shifting the burden of proof to the government. Millions of permanent residents who travel abroad while facing pending charges would gain a clearer procedural protection against the inadmissibility framework.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien — … (v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title…"8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A): "The Secretary of Homeland Security may … in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily … only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien…"Primary Cases:Wilkinson v. Garland (2024): Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a noncitizen met the statutory eligibility requirements for a discretionary immigration decision — even where the ultimate exercise of discretion sits beyond judicial reviewVartelas v. Holder (2012): A lawful permanent resident who committed a crime involving moral turpitude before a 1996 statutory change could not retroactively lose the right to travel abroad and return; the Court acknowledged in dicta that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) appears to require conviction or admission of the offenseTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:22] Oral Advocates[00:01:33] Argument Begins[00:01:38] United States Opening Statement[00:03:42] United States Free for All Questions[00:26:57] United States Round Robin Questions[00:51:52] Lau Opening Statement[00:54:15] Lau Free for All Questions[01:22:24] Lau Round Robin Questions[01:25:46] United States Rebuttal

FCC v. AT&T, Inc., consolidated with Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and HereOral Advocates:Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLPRespondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of JusticeQuestion Presented: Whether the Communications Act violates the Seventh Amendment and Article III by authorizing the FCC to order payment of monetary penalties for failing to safeguard customer data, without guaranteeing carriers a jury trial.Overview: A Missouri sheriff exploited AT&T's and Verizon's location-data programs to track hundreds of people without consent. The FCC ordered AT&T to pay $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million — through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in suits at common law.Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second and D.C. Circuits upheld Verizon's and Sprint's. Supreme Court consolidated and granted cert January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:• AT&T and Verizon: (1) FCC forfeiture proceedings constitute "Suits at common law" demanding a jury before any final liability order enters; (2) The back-end Section 504 jury option fails — no carrier received a jury trial in 47 years under this scheme; (3) The scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury-trial rights on defying a final federal order and risking operating licenses.• FCC and United States: (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — a carrier may lawfully do nothing after receiving one; (2) The Seventh Amendment right attaches at the collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial under Section 504(a); (3) The Court's 1915 ruling in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad already upheld this exact model, and founding-era practice confirms its validity.Implications: An AT&T and Verizon victory strips the FCC of its primary enforcement tool, potentially leaving privacy, robocall, and data-security rules unenforced — and destabilizing similar penalty structures across at least five other federal agencies. An FCC and United States victory confirms that agencies may enter nine-figure penalty judgments through in-house proceedings, with regulated businesses' only realistic path running through courts that apply deferential review — not juries.The Fine Print:• U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."• 47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States...Provided, That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."Primary Cases:• SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment applies when a federal agency seeks civil penalties through in-house proceedings that parallel common-law suits; Congress cannot remove such claims from jury adjudication by assigning them to an administrative tribunal.• Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue non-binding monetary awards — enforceable in subsequent civil suits with jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:23] Oral Advocates[00:01:33] Argument Begins[00:01:44] AT&T Opening Statement[00:03:37] AT&T Free for All Questions[00:28:25] AT&T Round Robin Questions[00:55:12] FCC Opening Statement[00:56:56] FCC Free for All Questions[01:20:27] FCC Round Robin Questions[01:22:12] AT&T Rebuttal

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLPRespondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLPQuestion Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which blocks federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments — can apply when the state-court decision remains subject to further appeal in state court.Overview: A Maryland woman who signed a consent order to secure her release from involuntary psychiatric commitment challenges a federal doctrine that slammed the federal courthouse door before her state-court appeal concluded — dividing the federal circuits.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rooker-Feldman; expressly split from majority of circuits.Main Arguments:• T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending to non-final judgments; (3) Preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without a jurisdictional bar• UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-part test contains no finality requirement; (2) District courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments regardless of pending review; (3) T.M.'s rule would produce gamesmanship, parallel duplicative litigation, and profound federalism harmImplications: A T.M. victory gives any state-court loser who raises a constitutional claim an open path to federal district court while state appeals remain pending — broadening federal access but triggering parallel proceedings across two court systems. A UMD victory preserves the rule that state-court losers must exhaust state remedies before federal district courts intervene, reinforcing comity but potentially denying urgent federal relief before the state appellate process concludes. Either outcome reshapes how hundreds of thousands of civil litigants navigate federal courthouse access every year.The Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."Primary Cases:• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claim supports their position.• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack power to reverse or modify state-court judgments — one of only two cases where the Supreme Court ever applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss a federal suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the doctrine's namesake.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:15] Oral Advocates[00:01:27] Argument Begins[00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement[00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions[00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions[00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement[00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions[00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions[00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLPRespondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of JusticeQuestion Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.Overview: Federal securities enforcement showdown asks whether the SEC must prove actual investor money losses before courts order fraudsters to surrender profits — reshaping a $6.1 billion annual enforcement tool.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Second Circuit requires it; Supreme Court granted cert January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Sripetch (Petitioner): (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's definition of disgorgement, which requires restoring funds to actual victims; (3) Allowing victimless disgorgement creates incoherent statutory anomalies and lets the SEC circumvent procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.SEC (Respondent): (1) Disgorgement strips wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains rather than compensating victims — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 disgorgement provisions, signaling no pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) The statutory phrase "unjust enrichment" carries a common-law meaning that never required monetary loss.Implications: Sripetch victory forces the SEC to document specific investor money losses before courts order disgorgement — shrinking the SEC's multibillion-dollar enforcement arsenal and potentially shielding cleverly structured fraud schemes from profit-stripping orders. SEC victory preserves the agency's ability to disgorge profits from any securities violation regardless of whether identifiable investors lost money, keeping market manipulation unprofitable even when individual victims remain unharmed on paper. Lower courts, practitioners, and compliance officers across the securities industry await the Court's answer.The Fine Print:15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."Primary Cases:Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held that SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must "be awarded for victims" — the foundational ruling both sides now dispute.SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit held that disgorgement requires proof of investor pecuniary harm, creating the circuit split that prompted the Supreme Court's cert grant.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:07] Oral Advocates[00:01:17] Argument Begins[00:01:26] Sripetch Opening Statement[00:03:33] Sripetch Free for All Questions[00:25:18] Sripetch Round Robin Questions[00:41:42] SEC Opening Statement[00:44:17] SEC Free for All Questions[01:08:35] SEC Round Robin Questions[01:08:48] Sripetch Rebuttal

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves patented uses from its label actively induces patent infringement through investor press releases and website statements that do not mention, encourage, or instruct the patented useOverview: Generic drugmaker Hikma followed federal skinny-label law but called its product "generic Vascepa" and touted Vascepa's total sales. Brand manufacturer Amarin claims those statements actively induced doctors to prescribe the generic for a patented cardiovascular use worth over $900 million annually.Posture: District court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 2026.Main Arguments:• Hikma (Petitioner): (1) "Actively" induces requires affirmative steps encouraging infringement — none of Hikma's statements mention or instruct the patented use; (2) Amarin's theory of liability imputes inferences physicians might draw, not active steps Hikma took; (3) The Federal Circuit's decision effectively nullifies the section viii skinny-label pathway Congress created to speed generic competition• Amarin (Respondent): (1) Hikma advertised its generic for "Hypertriglyceridemia" — a category encompassing the patented cardiovascular use — going beyond compliant labeling; (2) Press releases calling the product "generic Vascepa" and touting $919 million to $1.1 billion in total Vascepa sales plausibly encouraged prescribers to use the generic for all of Vascepa's indications; (3) Seven other generic manufacturers selling identical skinny-label products avoided suit by accurately limiting their marketing — proving that compliant speech and section viii coexistImplications: Hikma victory establishes that skinny-label compliance shields generic manufacturers from inducement liability for accurate commercial descriptions, protecting the section viii pathway that delivers billions in consumer drug savings annually. Amarin victory confirms that post-label marketing conduct — even investor communications — can cross the line into active patent infringement inducement, preserving incentives for brand manufacturers to invest hundreds of millions in discovering new therapeutic uses. The Court's answer defines the legal boundary between ordinary commerce and unlawful inducement for the entire pharmaceutical industry.The Fine Print:• 35 U.S.C. § 271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer"• 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii): Permits a generic manufacturer to file a statement seeking approval only for uses not covered by the brand manufacturer's listed method-of-use patents, allowing the generic to carry a "skinny label" that carves out still-patented usesPrimary Cases:• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Inducement liability requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement" — mere knowledge that a product may reach infringing uses does not suffice; liability demands "statements or actions directed to promoting infringement"• Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S (2012): Congress designed the section viii skinny-label mechanism to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones," expediting generic competition as soon as patents allow

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.The Fine Print:Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."Primary Cases:Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.Main Arguments:• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.The Fine Print:7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."Primary Cases:Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.

Chatrie v. United States | Case No. 25-112 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant — compelling Google to search the location data of all users to identify devices near a crime scene — violated the Fourth Amendment.Overview: Police ordered Google to scan hundreds of millions of users' private location records to catch a bank robber, without naming any suspect. The Court now decides whether geofence warrants survive the Fourth Amendment's ban on general searches.Posture: Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed denial of suppression in a single-sentence per curiam opinion.Main Arguments:Chatrie (Petitioner): (1) Location History data constitutes Chatrie's property, making government access a trespass; (2) The warrant operated as an unconstitutional general warrant by compelling Google to search all users without individualized probable cause; (3) Each warrant step independently failed particularity and probable cause requirementsGovernment (Respondent): (1) Chatrie voluntarily opted into Location History, triggering the third-party doctrine and forfeiting any privacy claim in two hours of public movements; (2) Chatrie's property theory was forfeited below and lacks any foundation in American law; (3) The magistrate-issued warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and the good-faith exception independently bars suppressionImplications: A Chatrie victory likely ends geofence warrants as currently used — law enforcement would need to identify specific accounts before any search, fundamentally limiting their ability to identify unknown suspects through third-party tech platforms. It could also extend Fourth Amendment property protection to cloud-stored data broadly. A government victory grants constitutional clearance for geofence warrants and reaffirms the third-party doctrine against digital location data, exposing every opted-in user's movements to law enforcement access whenever a crime occurs nearby — including near places of worship, political gatherings, or medical facilities.The Fine Print:Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act): Requires a warrant for the government to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications stored for 180 days or fewer — a provision Chatrie argues supports a broader Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for location data.Primary Cases:Carpenter v. United States (2018): The Court held that seven or more days of cell-site location information triggers Fourth Amendment protection, declining to apply the third-party doctrine where data reveals the intimate patterns of daily life — Chatrie's central precedentSmith v. Maryland (1979): Established the third-party doctrine — a person who voluntarily shares information with a third party "assumes the risk" of disclosure to law enforcement and forfeits Fourth Amendment protection — the government's bedrock authority

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which blocks federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments — can apply when the state-court decision remains subject to further appeal in state court.Overview: A Maryland woman who signed a consent order to secure her release from involuntary psychiatric commitment challenges a federal doctrine that slammed the federal courthouse door before her state-court appeal concluded — dividing the federal circuits.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rooker-Feldman; expressly split from majority of circuits.Main Arguments:• T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending to non-final judgments; (3) Preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without a jurisdictional bar• UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-part test contains no finality requirement; (2) District courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments regardless of pending review; (3) T.M.'s rule would produce gamesmanship, parallel duplicative litigation, and profound federalism harmImplications: A T.M. victory gives any state-court loser who raises a constitutional claim an open path to federal district court while state appeals remain pending — broadening federal access but triggering parallel proceedings across two court systems. A UMD victory preserves the rule that state-court losers must exhaust state remedies before federal district courts intervene, reinforcing comity but potentially denying urgent federal relief before the state appellate process concludes. Either outcome reshapes how hundreds of thousands of civil litigants navigate federal courthouse access every year.The Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."Primary Cases:• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claim supports their position.• Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack power to reverse or modify state-court judgments — one of only two cases where the Supreme Court ever applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss a federal suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the doctrine's namesake.

Bondi v. Lau (formerly named Bondi v. Lau) | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the government, to remove a lawful permanent resident as inadmissible after paroling him into the United States, must prove it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the disqualifying offense at the time of reentry.Overview: A green-card holder returns from a brief trip abroad facing only unproven criminal charges. The government paroles him in, waits for his conviction, then invokes the inadmissibility track. The Supreme Court now decides whether that sequence respects the INA's plain text.Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Government (Petitioner): (1) Courts lack jurisdiction to review discretionary parole decisions; (2) The INA requires proof of the offense at the removal hearing, not at the border; (3) Requiring border officers to weigh clear-and-convincing evidence before paroling LPRs would nullify decades of lawful practiceLau (Respondent): (1) The INA's plain text requires the government to establish the statutory exception at the time of reentry; (2) Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether DHS held authority to parole at all; (3) The government retains ample deportation authority under § 1227 and faces no operational hardshipImplications (90 words max): A government victory preserves DHS's ability to parole returning green-card holders facing criminal charges, use later convictions to justify the parole decision, and invoke the inadmissibility track — where the noncitizen bears the burden of proof. A Lau victory forces the government onto the deportation track for any LPR admitted without sufficient border-time evidence, shifting the burden of proof to the government. Millions of permanent residents who travel abroad while facing pending charges would gain a clearer procedural protection against the inadmissibility framework.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien — … (v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title…"8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A): "The Secretary of Homeland Security may … in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily … only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien…"Primary Cases:Wilkinson v. Garland (2024): Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a noncitizen met the statutory eligibility requirements for a discretionary immigration decision — even where the ultimate exercise of discretion sits beyond judicial reviewVartelas v. Holder (2012): A lawful permanent resident who committed a crime involving moral turpitude before a 1996 statutory change could not retroactively lose the right to travel abroad and return; the Court acknowledged in dicta that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) appears to require conviction or admission of the offense

FCC v. AT&T, Inc., consolidated with Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Communications Act violates the Seventh Amendment and Article III by authorizing the FCC to order payment of monetary penalties for failing to safeguard customer data, without guaranteeing carriers a jury trial.Overview: A Missouri sheriff exploited AT&T's and Verizon's location-data programs to track hundreds of people without consent. The FCC ordered AT&T to pay $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million — through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in suits at common law.Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second and D.C. Circuits upheld Verizon's and Sprint's. Supreme Court consolidated and granted cert January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:• AT&T and Verizon: (1) FCC forfeiture proceedings constitute "Suits at common law" demanding a jury before any final liability order enters; (2) The back-end Section 504 jury option fails — no carrier received a jury trial in 47 years under this scheme; (3) The scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury-trial rights on defying a final federal order and risking operating licenses.• FCC and United States: (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — a carrier may lawfully do nothing after receiving one; (2) The Seventh Amendment right attaches at the collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial under Section 504(a); (3) The Court's 1915 ruling in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad already upheld this exact model, and founding-era practice confirms its validity.Implications: An AT&T and Verizon victory strips the FCC of its primary enforcement tool, potentially leaving privacy, robocall, and data-security rules unenforced — and destabilizing similar penalty structures across at least five other federal agencies. An FCC and United States victory confirms that agencies may enter nine-figure penalty judgments through in-house proceedings, with regulated businesses' only realistic path running through courts that apply deferential review — not juries.The Fine Print:• U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."• 47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States...Provided, That any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."Primary Cases:• SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment applies when a federal agency seeks civil penalties through in-house proceedings that parallel common-law suits; Congress cannot remove such claims from jury adjudication by assigning them to an administrative tribunal.• Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue non-binding monetary awards — enforceable in subsequent civil suits with jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.Overview: Federal securities enforcement showdown asks whether the SEC must prove actual investor money losses before courts order fraudsters to surrender profits — reshaping a $6.1 billion annual enforcement tool.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Second Circuit requires it; Supreme Court granted cert January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Sripetch (Petitioner): (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's definition of disgorgement, which requires restoring funds to actual victims; (3) Allowing victimless disgorgement creates incoherent statutory anomalies and lets the SEC circumvent procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.SEC (Respondent): (1) Disgorgement strips wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains rather than compensating victims — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 disgorgement provisions, signaling no pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) The statutory phrase "unjust enrichment" carries a common-law meaning that never required monetary loss.Implications: Sripetch victory forces the SEC to document specific investor money losses before courts order disgorgement — shrinking the SEC's multibillion-dollar enforcement arsenal and potentially shielding cleverly structured fraud schemes from profit-stripping orders. SEC victory preserves the agency's ability to disgorge profits from any securities violation regardless of whether identifiable investors lost money, keeping market manipulation unprofitable even when individual victims remain unharmed on paper. Lower courts, practitioners, and compliance officers across the securities industry await the Court's answer.The Fine Print:15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."Primary Cases:Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held that SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must "be awarded for victims" — the foundational ruling both sides now dispute.SEC v. Govil, 86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit held that disgorgement requires proof of investor pecuniary harm, creating the circuit split that prompted the Supreme Court's cert grant.

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Argued: 10/7/25 | Decided: 3/31/26 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.Implications:Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Chiles): James A. CampbellUnited States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of JusticeRespondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor GeneralThe Fine Print:Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."Primary Cases:National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:00:50] Argument Begins[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Argued: 10/7/25 | Decided: 3/31/26 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.Implications: Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard. Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline. States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open. The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques. Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Chiles): James A. CampbellUnited States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of JusticeRespondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor GeneralThe Fine Print:Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."Primary Cases:National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 4/1/26Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (United States): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor General;Respondent (Barbara): Cecilia Wong, American Civil Liberties UnionMain Arguments:Government: (1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law;(2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship;(3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.Families: (1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule;(2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction;(3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.Implications:Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations.Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.The Fine Print:Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."Primary Cases:United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship.Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.Timestamps:00:01:11: United States Opening Statement00:03:14: United States Free for All Questions00:27:47: United States Round Robin Questions01:09:57: Barbara Opening Statement01:12:46: Barbara Free for All Questions01:41:51: Barbara Round Robin Questions02:06:10: United States Rebuttal

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/31/26Overview: Death row inmate Terry Pitchford argues prosecutor Doug Evans deliberately excluded Black jurors in his 2006 capital murder trial and that no court ever fairly examined that claim because Mississippi's courts called it forfeited.Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips BlackRespondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor GeneralUnited States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeMain Arguments:Pitchford: (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right;(2) Mississippi wrongly blocked comparative juror analysis on appeal, contradicting Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008);(3) Batson violations constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal.Mississippi: (1) Mississippi courts applied a lawful, long-standing rule requiring defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own post-conviction filings admitted he failed to preserve the Batson record, and his trial attorney swore under oath she never raised those arguments; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question — not the underlying Batson merits or the form of habeas relief.Implications:A Pitchford victory sends the case back to Mississippi courts for the first Batson Step Three examination in nineteen years — testing whether Evans's race-neutral explanations for striking four Black jurors amounted to pretext.A Mississippi victory leaves Pitchford on death row and establishes that AEDPA deference shields state forfeiture rulings even when trial courts themselves foreclosed the underlying challenge — chilling Batson enforcement at Step Three nationwide.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (AEDPA): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."Primary Cases:Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials of Curtis Flowers before the Court reversed.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:07] Oral Advocates[00:01:21] Argument Begins[00:01:29] Pitchford Opening Statement[00:03:49] Pitchford Free for All Questions[00:28:09] Pitchford Round Robin Questions[00:54:35] Cain Opening Statement[00:56:46] Cain Free for All Questions[01:15:43] Cain Round Robin Questions[01:34:48] United States Opening Statement[01:35:51] United States Free for All Questions[01:45:22] United States Round Robin Questions[01:48:42] Pitchford Rebuttal

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/26Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.Main Arguments:Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of courtBalazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsedImplications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.The Fine Print:FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"Primary Cases:Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basisCortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration awardTimestamps:[00:01:25] Argument Begins[00:01:32] Jules Opening Statement[00:03:03] Jules Free for All Questions[00:26:40] Jules Round Robin Questions[00:32:42] Balazs Opening Statement[00:34:05] Balazs Free for All Questions[00:51:56] Balazs Round Robin Questions[00:52:08] Jules Rebuttal

Abouammo v. United States | Case No. 25-5146 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/36Question Presented: Whether venue lies in a district where no offense conduct occurred, so long as the statute's intent element contemplates effects that could occur there.Overview: Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice in his Seattle home during an FBI interview, then emailed it to San Francisco agents. The Court now decides whether prosecutors can try document falsification where the targeted investigation sits, not where the defendant acted.Posture: Ninth Circuit upheld Northern District of California venue; Supreme Court granted certiorari December 2025.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley AustinRespondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.Main Arguments:Abouammo: (1) Venue tracks the offense's essential conduct elements — falsification occurred entirely in Seattle;(2) Intent elements cannot anchor venue because mental state does not constitute conduct;(3) The Founders embedded the vicinage right twice in the Constitution specifically to reject effects-based prosecutionUnited States: (1) The Constitution permits venue where a crime's effects are intentionally directed and felt, not just where the defendant stood;(2) Section 1519 defines an inchoate offense — like conspiracy — and the targeted investigation's location forms part of the crime's commission;(3) Even under Abouammo's own theory, emailing the fake PDF to San Francisco created a duplicate falsified record there, independently satisfying venueImplications: Abouammo victory anchors venue to a person's physical location, giving protection against distant prosecution. On the other hand, it hamstrings prosecutors from bringing digital obstruction crimes that reflects today's technology realities. Government victory allows prosecution in the district of any targeted investigation, giving federal prosecutors broad forum-selection power for any obstruction-related offense nationwide.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 1519: "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."U.S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."Primary Cases:United States v. Cabrales (1998): Venue tracks the location of the specific prohibited conduct — not collateral circumstances; money laundering in Florida could not face trial in Missouri simply because the underlying drug proceeds originated there.Ford v. United States (1927): Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it warrant prosecuting the defendant as if present at the effect — the foundational intent-and-effects venue principle.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:12] Argument Begins[00:01:21] Abouammo Opening Statement[00:03:30] Abouammo Free for All Questions[00:26:27] Abouammo Round Robin Questions[00:33:40] United States Opening Statement[00:35:54] United States Free for All Questions[01:04:34] United States Round Robin Questions[01:13:58] Abouammo Rebuttal

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Argument: 11/3/25 | Decided: 3/25/26 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.Result: Reversed and remanded.Link to Opinion: Here.Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.Separate Opinions:Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.Implications: Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations. Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences. Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases. Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."Primary Cases:Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Overview[00:00:37] Argument Begins[00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement[00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions[00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions[00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Argument: 11/3/25 | Decided: 3/25/26 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.Result: Reversed and remanded.Link to Opinion: Here.Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.Separate Opinions:Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.Implications: Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations. Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences. Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases. Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."Primary Cases:Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Overview and Holding[00:00:52] Subscribe and Contact[00:01:14] Rico's Background and Supervised Release[00:02:07] Absconding and New Crimes[00:03:33] Lower Courts and Circuit Split[00:04:33] Supreme Court Question[00:05:07] Majority Textual Reasoning[00:07:03] Government Arguments Rejected[00:08:22] Decision and Remand[00:08:38] Alito's Dissent Explained[00:11:15] Practical Impact Nationwide[00:13:01] Wrap Up and Outro

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Date Decided: 3/25/26Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.The Fine Print:17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."Primary Cases:Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.Timestamps:[00:00] Oral Argument Introduction[01:28] Oral Argument Begins[01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement[03:37] Petitioner Free for All Questions[19:25] Petitioner Round Robin Questions[41:21] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement[42:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions[51:39] Amicus Curaie Round Robin Questions[01:01:23] Respondent Opening Statement[01:03:44] Respondent Free for All Questions[01:31:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions[01:39:19] Petitioner Rebuttal

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Date Decided: 3/25/26Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.The Fine Print:17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."Primary Cases:Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/25/26Question Presented: Whether last-mile delivery drivers who never cross state lines qualify as transportation workers "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.Overview: Flowers Foods required its Colorado bread delivery driver, Angelo Brock, to arbitrate wage disputes. Brock never crossed a state line. The Court must decide whether the 1925 FAA's transportation worker exemption covers last-mile drivers.Posture: D. Colo. denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; four-circuit split prompted cert grant.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones DayFor Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta WesslerMain Arguments:Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 covers only workers who directly and actively move goods across state or international borders;(2) historical 1925 labor schemes excluded purely local intrastate workers;(3) the Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test turns simple arbitration threshold questions into costly mini-trialsAngelo Brock (Respondent): (1) century of Supreme Court precedent defined last-mile workers finishing an interstate goods journey as "engaged in interstate commerce";(2) seamen and railroad employees in 1925 included last-mile workers who never crossed a border;(3) Flowers argued its last-mile drivers qualify as interstate workers under the Motor Carrier Act — and won — directly contradicting its position hereImplications: A Flowers win strips court access from last-mile drivers at FedEx, UPS, Amazon Logistics, and the U.S. Postal Service — forcing employment disputes into private arbitration and shielding company labor practices from judicial review. A Brock win preserves court access for workers serving more than 170 million delivery addresses and anchors a century of interstate commerce precedent in the modern gig economy.The Fine Print:9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"Primary Cases:Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): Transportation workers must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders to qualify for the FAA Section 1 exemptionBissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024): Transportation workers need not work for a transportation industry company to qualify for Section 1, but must actively engage in transporting goods across bordersTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:02] Argument Begins[00:01:08] Flowers Food Opening Statement[00:03:21] Flowers Food Free for All Questions[00:27:30] Flowers Food Round Robin Questions[00:32:08] Brock Opening Statement[00:34:35] Brock Free for All Questions[01:05:32] Brock Round Robin Questions[01:14:23] Flowers Food Rebuttal

Noem v. Al Otro Lado | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/24/26Question Presented: Whether noncitizens stopped on Mexican soil "arrive in the United States" triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing requirements.Overview: Border control challenge determines whether immigration officers can block asylum seekers at ports of entry before statutory protections attach, or whether federal law requires processing anyone who presents themselves at the border.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; fifteen judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeRespondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and ProtectionMain Arguments:Government (Petitioner): (1) Plain meaning of "arrives in" requires physical territorial entry—Greeks outside Troy's walls did not "arrive in" Troy; (2) Section 1225's inspection, detention, and removal procedures require U.S. presence—officers cannot inspect people standing in Mexico; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality and Sale precedent confirm statutes apply only within U.S. territory.Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in the United States" encompasses presentation at ports of entry to avoid rendering phrase redundant with "physically present"; (2) Congress enacted provisions to implement non-refoulement treaty obligations prohibiting return of refugees to persecution; (3) Government regulations for decades defined "arriving alien" as someone "attempting to come" into the United States at ports of entry.Implications: Government victory preserves Executive Branch authority to manage border surges through metering, allowing officers to control entry timing at ports during capacity constraints. Asylum seeker victory requires immediate inspection and processing for anyone reaching ports of entry regardless of resources, potentially forcing facility entry to comply with statutory mandates.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States...may apply for asylum"8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (a)(3): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States...shall be deemed...an applicant for admission" who "shall be inspected by immigration officers"Primary Cases:Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Presumption against extraterritoriality bars applying immigration statutes to refugees interdicted at sea before reaching U.S. territory; statutes apply only within United States.DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020): Arriving aliens physically on U.S. soil remain treated as stopped at the boundary line without having effected entry; arrival and admission constitute distinct legal statuses.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:23] Argument Begins[00:01:29] United States Opening Statement[00:02:40] United States Free for All Questions[00:27:04] United States Round Robin Questions[00:40:34] Al Otro Lado Opening Statement[00:42:52] Al Otro Lado Free for All Questions[01:10:56] Al Otro Lado Round Robin Questions[01:18:32] United States Rebuttal

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/24/26Overview: Fifth Circuit's mechanical judicial estoppel rule bars claims entirely when bankruptcy filers fail to timely disclose lawsuits, creating circuit split over whether courts must consider all circumstances or presume bad faith from potential motive alone.Question Presented: Whether courts can bar a person's lawsuit if that person filed for bankruptcy and forgot to tell the bankruptcy court about the lawsuit?Posture: Under rigid estoppel rule, district court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's lawsuit.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Keathley): Gregory G. Garre of Latham and WatkinsUnited States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur): Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeRespondent (Buddy Ayers Construction): William M. Jay of Goodwin ProctorMain Arguments:Petitioner Keathley:(1) Courts must examine all circumstances, not presume bad intent automatically(2) Estoppel punishes deliberate manipulation, not honest mistakes or simple confusion(3) Rule rewards wrongdoers, harms innocent debtors, contradicts bankruptcy's fresh-start promiseRespondent Ayers Construction:(1) Estoppel requires objective inconsistency, not proof of subjective bad intent(2) Mistake exception covers only objective errors, not every non-malicious explanation(3) Seventeen-factor test creates unworkable trials, eliminates deterrence, guts disclosure requirementsUnited States (supporting Keathley):(1) Equity requires holistic assessment including bankruptcy-specific factors, not mechanical presumptions(2) Bankruptcy courts' firsthand findings deserve weight when assessing debtor intent(3) Fifth Circuit's restricted inquiry ignores relevant evidence, contradicts equitable principlesImplications:Keathley victory: courts examine full circumstances before blocking lawsuits. Ayers victory: automatic blocking regardless of honest mistakes or creditor harm.The Fine Print:11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i): "The debtor shall file a schedule of assets and liabilities"Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a): "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed"Primary Cases:New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Estoppel targets deliberate manipulation, not inadvertence or honest mistakesHolland v. Florida (2010): Equity demands flexible judgments, not rigid mechanical rulesTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:18] Argument Begins[00:01:26] Keathley Opening Statement[00:03:33] Keathley Free for All Questions[00:18:46] Keathley Round Robin Questions[00:33:09] United States Opening Statement[00:34:28] United States Free for All Questions[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions[00:47:24] Buddy Ayers Opening Statement[00:49:27] Buddy Ayers Free for All Questions[01:09:04] Buddy Ayers Round Robin Questions[01:09:13] Keathley Rebuttal

Watson v. Republican National Committee (RNC) | Case No. 24-1260 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/23/26Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Mississippi): Scott Stewart, Mississippi’s Solicitor GeneralRespondent (RNC): Paul D. Clement of Clement and MurphyUnited States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor GeneralMain Arguments:Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.The Fine Print:2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final talliesPrimary Cases:Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:02] Argument Begins[00:01:13] Watson Opening Statement[00:03:10] Watson Free for All Questions[00:27:07] Watson Round Robin Questions[00:56:51] RNC Opening Statement[00:59:02] RNC Free for All Questions[01:17:29] RNC Round Robin Questions[01:51:58] United States Opening Statement[01:52:57] United States Free for All Questions[02:02:11] United States Round Robin Questions[02:05:17] Watson Rebuttal

Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermon Suit over Section 1983 | Argument Date: 12/3/25 | Date Decided: 3/20/26In Olivier versus City of Brandon, Mississippi, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a person previously convicted under a law can still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement. Justice Kagan wrote for the full Court. No concurrences. No dissents.Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented:Can someone who already received a criminal conviction under a law still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement — or does a 1994 Supreme Court precedent called Heck versus Humphrey permanently close that door?Does Heck versus Humphrey block a federal civil rights lawsuit even when the person suing never had the ability to challenge their conviction through the normal imprisonment-challenge process — called habeas corpus — in the first place?Holding: 9-0. A person who previously received a criminal conviction under a law can still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement. Rationale: Olivier sought future relief — not to undo his conviction.Heck targets backward-looking attacks on convictions, not forward-looking injunctions.Wooley versus Maynard already resolved this question in 1977.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No concurrences. No dissents.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Olivier): Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, TX. For United States (as Amicus Curiae) in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice. For Respondents (City of Brandon): G. Todd Butler, Flowood, MS argued for Respondents.

Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 4/1/26Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.Main Arguments: Government: (1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law; (2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship; (3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.Families: (1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule; (2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction; (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.Implications: Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations. Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.The Fine Print: Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."Primary Cases: United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship. Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/31/26Overview: Death row inmate Terry Pitchford argues prosecutor Doug Evans deliberately excluded Black jurors in his 2006 capital murder trial and that no court ever fairly examined that claim because Mississippi's courts called it forfeited.Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Main Arguments:Pitchford: (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right;(2) Mississippi wrongly blocked comparative juror analysis on appeal, contradicting Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008);(3) Batson violations constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal.Mississippi: (1) Mississippi courts applied a lawful, long-standing rule requiring defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own post-conviction filings admitted he failed to preserve the Batson record, and his trial attorney swore under oath she never raised those arguments; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question — not the underlying Batson merits or the form of habeas relief.Implications:A Pitchford victory sends the case back to Mississippi courts for the first Batson Step Three examination in nineteen years — testing whether Evans's race-neutral explanations for striking four Black jurors amounted to pretext.A Mississippi victory leaves Pitchford on death row and establishes that AEDPA deference shields state forfeiture rulings even when trial courts themselves foreclosed the underlying challenge — chilling Batson enforcement at Step Three nationwide.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (AEDPA): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."Primary Cases:Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials of Curtis Flowers before the Court reversed.

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/26Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.Main Arguments:Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of courtBalazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsedImplications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.The Fine Print:FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"Primary Cases:Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basisCortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award

Abouammo v. United States | Case No. 25-5146 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/36Question Presented: Whether venue lies in a district where no offense conduct occurred, so long as the statute's intent element contemplates effects that could occur there.Overview: Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice in his Seattle home during an FBI interview, then emailed it to San Francisco agents. The Court now decides whether prosecutors can try document falsification where the targeted investigation sits, not where the defendant acted.Posture: Ninth Circuit upheld Northern District of California venue; Supreme Court granted certiorari December 2025.Main Arguments:Abouammo: (1) Venue tracks the offense's essential conduct elements — falsification occurred entirely in Seattle; (2) Intent elements cannot anchor venue because mental state does not constitute conduct; (3) The Founders embedded the vicinage right twice in the Constitution specifically to reject effects-based prosecutionUnited States: (1) The Constitution permits venue where a crime's effects are intentionally directed and felt, not just where the defendant stood; (2) Section 1519 defines an inchoate offense — like conspiracy — and the targeted investigation's location forms part of the crime's commission; (3) Even under Abouammo's own theory, emailing the fake PDF to San Francisco created a duplicate falsified record there, independently satisfying venueImplications: Abouammo victory anchors venue to a person's physical location, giving protection against distant prosecution. On the other hand, it hamstrings prosecutors from bringing digital obstruction crimes that reflects today's technology realities. Government victory allows prosecution in the district of any targeted investigation, giving federal prosecutors broad forum-selection power for any obstruction-related offense nationwide.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 1519: "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."U.S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."Primary Cases:United States v. Cabrales (1998): Venue tracks the location of the specific prohibited conduct — not collateral circumstances; money laundering in Florida could not face trial in Missouri simply because the underlying drug proceeds originated there.Ford v. United States (1927): Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it warrant prosecuting the defendant as if present at the effect — the foundational intent-and-effects venue principle.

Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/25/26Question Presented: Whether last-mile delivery drivers who never cross state lines qualify as transportation workers "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.Overview: Flowers Foods required its Colorado bread delivery driver, Angelo Brock, to arbitrate wage disputes. Brock never crossed a state line. The Court must decide whether the 1925 FAA's transportation worker exemption covers last-mile drivers.Posture: D. Colo. denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; four-circuit split prompted cert grant.Main Arguments:Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 covers only workers who directly and actively move goods across state or international borders;(2) historical 1925 labor schemes excluded purely local intrastate workers;(3) the Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test turns simple arbitration threshold questions into costly mini-trialsAngelo Brock (Respondent): (1) century of Supreme Court precedent defined last-mile workers finishing an interstate goods journey as "engaged in interstate commerce";(2) seamen and railroad employees in 1925 included last-mile workers who never crossed a border;(3) Flowers argued its last-mile drivers qualify as interstate workers under the Motor Carrier Act — and won — directly contradicting its position hereImplications: A Flowers win strips court access from last-mile drivers at FedEx, UPS, Amazon Logistics, and the U.S. Postal Service — forcing employment disputes into private arbitration and shielding company labor practices from judicial review. A Brock win preserves court access for workers serving more than 170 million delivery addresses and anchors a century of interstate commerce precedent in the modern gig economy.The Fine Print:9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"Primary Cases:Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): Transportation workers must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders to qualify for the FAA Section 1 exemptionBissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024): Transportation workers need not work for a transportation industry company to qualify for Section 1, but must actively engage in transporting goods across borders

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/24/26 Overview: Fifth Circuit's mechanical judicial estoppel rule bars claims entirely when bankruptcy filers fail to timely disclose lawsuits, creating circuit split over whether courts must consider all circumstances or presume bad faith from potential motive alone.Question Presented: Whether courts can bar a person's lawsuit if that person filed for bankruptcy and forgot to tell the bankruptcy court about the lawsuit?Posture: Under rigid estoppel rule, district court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's lawsuit.Main Arguments:Petitioner Keathley:(1) Courts must examine all circumstances, not presume bad intent automatically(2) Estoppel punishes deliberate manipulation, not honest mistakes or simple confusion(3) Rule rewards wrongdoers, harms innocent debtors, contradicts bankruptcy's fresh-start promiseRespondent Ayers Construction:(1) Estoppel requires objective inconsistency, not proof of subjective bad intent(2) Mistake exception covers only objective errors, not every non-malicious explanation(3) Seventeen-factor test creates unworkable trials, eliminates deterrence, guts disclosure requirementsUnited States (supporting Keathley):(1) Equity requires holistic assessment including bankruptcy-specific factors, not mechanical presumptions(2) Bankruptcy courts' firsthand findings deserve weight when assessing debtor intent(3) Fifth Circuit's restricted inquiry ignores relevant evidence, contradicts equitable principlesImplications:Keathley victory: courts examine full circumstances before blocking lawsuits. Ayers victory: automatic blocking regardless of honest mistakes or creditor harm.The Fine Print:11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i): "The debtor shall file a schedule of assets and liabilities"Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a): "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed"Primary Cases:New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Estoppel targets deliberate manipulation, not inadvertence or honest mistakesHolland v. Florida (2010): Equity demands flexible judgments, not rigid mechanical rules

Noem v. Al Otro Lado | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/24/26Question Presented: Whether noncitizens stopped on Mexican soil "arrive in the United States" triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing requirements.Overview: Border control challenge determines whether immigration officers can block asylum seekers at ports of entry before statutory protections attach, or whether federal law requires processing anyone who presents themselves at the border.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; fifteen judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.Main Arguments:Government (Petitioner): (1) Plain meaning of "arrives in" requires physical territorial entry—Greeks outside Troy's walls did not "arrive in" Troy; (2) Section 1225's inspection, detention, and removal procedures require U.S. presence—officers cannot inspect people standing in Mexico; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality and Sale precedent confirm statutes apply only within U.S. territory.Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in the United States" encompasses presentation at ports of entry to avoid rendering phrase redundant with "physically present"; (2) Congress enacted provisions to implement non-refoulement treaty obligations prohibiting return of refugees to persecution; (3) Government regulations for decades defined "arriving alien" as someone "attempting to come" into the United States at ports of entry.Implications: Government victory preserves Executive Branch authority to manage border surges through metering, allowing officers to control entry timing at ports during capacity constraints. Asylum seeker victory requires immediate inspection and processing for anyone reaching ports of entry regardless of resources, potentially forcing facility entry to comply with statutory mandates.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States...may apply for asylum"8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (a)(3): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States...shall be deemed...an applicant for admission" who "shall be inspected by immigration officers"Primary Cases:Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Presumption against extraterritoriality bars applying immigration statutes to refugees interdicted at sea before reaching U.S. territory; statutes apply only within United States.DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020): Arriving aliens physically on U.S. soil remain treated as stopped at the boundary line without having effected entry; arrival and admission constitute distinct legal statuses.

Watson v. Republican National Committee | Case No. 24-1260 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/23/26Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.The Fine Print:2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final talliesPrimary Cases:Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.