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Start listening today at P-O-D-C-A-S-T-L-I-B-R-A-R-Y. Dot-O-R-G. Section 10. Suppose that you read me the first words of Lucius' speech.
Hmm, you know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest. And I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover, for lovers repent enough. Now shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words? Yes.
Everyone is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ. I think that I understand you, but will you explain yourself? When anyone speaks of iron and silver is not the same thing present in the minds of all. Certainly, but when anyone speaks of justice and goodness, we part company and are adults with one another, and with ourselves, precisely, and in some things we agree, but not in others.
That is true. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power, clearly in the uncertain class? Then the retorition ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many are, as of that in which they do not err. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.
Yes, and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and must not make a mistake about the class to which they ought to be referred. Certainly. Now, do which class does love belong to the debatable or to the undisputed class? Do the debatable clearly, for if not do you think that love would allow you to say, as you did, that he is an evil, both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good?
Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech, for having been in an ecstasy I cannot well remember? Yes, indeed, that you did, and no mistake. Then I perceive that the nymphs of Akilos and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better retoritions than Lucius the son of Kepulos, alas how inferior to them he is.
But perhaps I am mistaken, and Lucius, at the commencement of his lover's speech, did insist on our supposing love to be something or other, which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again. If you please, but you will not find what you want. Read that I may have his exact words.
You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest, and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown when their love is over. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought, for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood, through the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended, am I not right, sweet fydros? Yes, indeed Socrates he does begin at the end.
And as to the other topics, are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance, but he wrote off boldly just what came into his head.
But I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition. You have too good an opinion of me, if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition. At any rate you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and her head and feet. There should be a middle, beginning and end, adapted to one another, and to the whole.
Certainly, can this be said of the discourse of Lucius? See whether you can find any more connection in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Frigion. What is there remarkable in the epitaph? It is as follows.
I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas, so long as water flows and tall trees grow, so long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding, I shall declare to pass us by that Midas sleeps below. Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference. You are making fun of that erasure of ours. Well, I will say no more about your friend's speech, lest I should give a fence to you, although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid.
But I will proceed to the other speech, which as I think is also suggestive to students of rhetoric. In what way? The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike. The one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted, and right manfully, you should rather say madly, and madness was the argument of them, for as I said, love is a madness.
Yes, and of madness there were true kinds, one produced by human infirmity. The other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention. True, the divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them. The first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros.
In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true, though partly Ergring, myth, which was also a hymn in honour of love, who is your lord, and also mine fighter us, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain. I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you. Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise. What do you mean?
I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful, yet in these chance-fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one. What are they? First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea. As in our definition of love, which, whether true or false, certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions, and so make his meaning clear.
What is the other principle Socrates? The second principle is that of division into species, according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might, just as our two discourses alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason. And then, as the body which from being one becomes double, and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name. After this manner, the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side, and did not exist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled.
And the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name but divine, which the speaker held before us, and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits. Most true. I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization. They help me to speak and to think.
And if I find any man who is able to see a one and many in nature, him I follow, and walk in his footsteps as if he were a god. And those who have this art I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians. But God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your to Lucius' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which racemicus and others teach and practice.
Skillful speakers they are, and in part their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them, and to bring gifts to them. Yes, they are royal men, but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly in my opinion, dialecticians. Still we are in the dark of pout rhetoric. What do you mean?
The remains of it, if there be anything remaining which can be brought under the rules of art, must be a fine thing. And at any rate is not to be despised by you and me. But how much is left? There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric.
Yes, thank you for reminding me. There is the exhortium showing how the speech should begin if I remember rightly. That is what you mean, the niceties of the art. Yes, then follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses, thirdly, hoofs, fourthly, probabilities are to come.
The great Byzantium wordmaker also speaks if I am not mistaken of confirmation and further confirmation. You mean the excellence theodorus? Yes, and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I ought also to mention the illustrious Parion, a Venice who first invented insinuations and indirect praises, and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the memory.
But shall I, to come forgetfulness, consign, tisias and gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth? And who by force of argument make the little appear great, and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity? I remember Prodigus laughing when I told him of this. He said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.
Well done, Prodigus! Then there is hippie-us, the Elen stranger, who probably agrees with him. Yes, and there is also Polus, who has treasuries of diplasiology and knomology and iconology, and who teaches in them the names of which Lycomneus made him a present. They were to give a polish.
Had not Prodigus something the same sort? Yes, rules of correct diction and many other fine presets. For the sorrows of a poor old man, or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant. He can put a whole company of people into a passion, and out of one again, by his mighty magic, and his first rated inventing or disposing of any sort of Calumne on any grounds or none.
All of them agree in asserting that a speech should end in a recapitulation, though they do not all agree to use the same word. You mean that there should be a summing up of the arguments in order to remind the hearers of them? I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric. Have you anything to add?
Not much, nothing very important. End of section 10.