12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
from YaleCourses Hosted by YaleCourses
Game Theory (ECON 159)Uploaded 20-11-08We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature.00:00 - Chapter 1. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Definition30:50 - Chapter 2. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Hawk vs. Dove50:00 - Chapter 3. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Discussion55:39 - Chapter 4. Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Identification and TestabilityComplete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.eduThis course was recorded in Fall 2007.
Embed this episode
No transcript yet.