145. Marc Moffett | The Indispensability of Intuitions

What are intuitions, and are they indispensable to our knowledge?My links: https://linktr.ee/frictionphilosophy.1. GuestMarc Moffett is associate professor at the University of Texas at El Paso, and his work has focused on epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics.Check out his book with Cambridge Elements, "The Indispensability of Intuitions"!https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/indispensability-of-intuitions/6F7C18793C39B08507716DD934E4C6A2https://a.co/d/0bsB4MX12. Book SummaryMarc A. Moffett’s The Indispensability of Intuitions argues that rational intuitions are not mystical or mysterious, but rather a ubiquitous and essential feature of human cognition. Defending a stance called “moderate dogmatism,” Moffett contends that intuitions serve as basic sources of evidence alongside perception and introspection. He posits that rejecting the role of intuitions would undermine our knowledge on a massive scale, rendering them epistemically indispensable for almost all knowledge, whether a priori or a posteriori.A central part of Moffett’s argument involves rejecting the prevalent idea that the epistemic weight of intuitions (and other “seemings”) relies on a specific “presentational phenomenology” or conscious “feel”. Through thought experiments involving “Cartesian zombies,” he demonstrates that phenomenological properties are not what confer epistemic justification. Instead, he introduces the Attitudinal Theory of Presentationality (ATP), which characterizes presentational states by a unique cognitive posture—specifically, an involuntary “apprehending-as-actual” of certain contents. This non-phenomenological approach successfully addresses skepticism, such as Timothy Williamson’s “Absent Intuition Challenge,” by showing that intuitions can rationally guide our doxastic inclinations without requiring a distinct, introspectively obvious phenomenology.Building on this non-phenomenological foundation, Moffett demonstrates the widespread payoff of his theory by linking intuitions directly to concept application. He explains that philosophical thought experiments, such as the famous Gettier cases, rely on these concept-application intuitions to guide our judgments. Furthermore, Moffett expands his scope to argue that acts of explicit inference, as well as the higher-level presentational contents of normal perceptual experiences, fundamentally rely on the application of concepts, and therefore on intuitions. Consequently, intuitions are not just tools for abstract philosophy, but are intimately integrated into nearly all of our everyday cognitive functioning.3. Interview Chapters00:00 - Introduction00:54 - What are intuitions?03:06 - Absent intuition worry06:55 - John Bengson08:22 - Terminological dispute12:20 - Methodological worry14:53 - Moderate dogmatism18:38 - Foundationalism23:10 - Internalism26:39 - Blindsight30:10 - Zombie argument36:52 - Rejoinder43:09 - Non-phenomenal presentational dogmatism45:48 - Upshot47:47 - Another rejoinder51:48 - Indispensability55:46 - Are intuitions needed?59:47 - Intuitions as content-determining1:02:07 - Animal concepts1:06:10 - Inferences1:08:39 - Inference without reckoning1:10:59 - Philosophy without intuitions?1:14:14 - Ethics1:17:29 - Perceptual experience1:23:54 - Value of philosophy1:27:32 - Conclusion This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fric.substack.com/subscribe