[17-8995] Mont v. United States

Mont v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2019.Decided on Jun 3, 2019. Petitioner: Jason J. Mont.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Vanessa F. Malone (for the petitioner) Jenny Ellickson (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017. While on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont’s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont’s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions. Mont challenged the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction. Question Is the term of supervised release for one offense paused by imprisonment for another offense? Conclusion Pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction tolls (pauses) a supervised-release term under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling calculation retrospectively, after learning whether the time will be credited. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 5-4 majority opinion affirming the lower court. Section 3624(e) provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” In interpreting this provision, the Court looked first to the dictionary definition of “imprisoned,” finding that definition to include pretrial detention. Then the Court noted the expansive phrase “in connection with,” giving rise to a sufficient nexus between the pretrial detention and the conviction because the pretrial detention is credited toward the sentence for that same conviction. Although under this interpretation, Section 3624(e) would require courts to retrospectively assess whether a period of pretrial detention tolls a term of supervised release, the Court determined that this retroactive crediting would not cause undue uncertainty for defendants like Mont. Finally, the Court found that “statutory context” supported this interpretation as well, given that supervised release is intended to facilitate a prisoner’s transition back into the community and a period in prison does not serve this purpose. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent argued that the plain text of the statute cannot authorize tolling when the defendant is in pretrial detention and a conviction is merely a possible future event. The present tense used in the statute precludes the majority’s interpretation. Moreover, the purpose of pretrial confinement is to ensure the defendant shows up for trial, not to punish the defendant for a crime.