There's a kind of silence that follows a ransomware attack. You throw kids dry, your chest gets a little heavy, and everything around you goes silent. Especially when you see texts like this flash across your screen. All of your files are currently encrypted. If you try to ignore us, we've downloaded your data and already published it.
You don't know who's on the other side of that ransomware note, or just how much damage they may cause if you don't pay up. The most fearsome enemy is the one you can't see. That silence pulsating fear can be deafening as it creeps across hospitals trying to treat patients or business owners, trying to make payroll or teachers, running a class full of kids. The time is almost over. We need your decision.
If we don't receive any reply to this message, we begin publishing your data. Conte is here to prevent any further damages. For years, there was a group that called themselves Conte, and they wreaked havoc across the internet. Conte is here to prevent any further damages. Hackers operate behind a curtain, known mostly by the destruction they leave behind.
We rarely hear or see them. They want to remain covered up in the shadows, under the guise of codes and keystrokes. But what happens when that curtain gets yanked? And suddenly their deepest, darkest secrets are exposed for the whole world to see. Not just their threats against us, but their arguments, their insecurities and fears.
These are true stories from the dark side of the internet. I'm Jack Resider. This is Darknet Diaries. This episode is sponsored by ThreatLocker. The weird part about modern cyber attacks is how normally they look.
The attacker logs in from Chrome, uses PowerShell, runs a remote admin tool your IT team already trusts. There's no custom malware, no dramatic movie hacker moment, just normal tools used in a wrong way. That's part of why ThreatLocker exists. ThreatLocker helps organizations control what software can run, what it can do, and how systems communicate. If attackers get credentials or land on a machine, they'll have a much harder time moving through the environment.
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This episode is sponsored by my friends over at Mays. GitHub saw nearly a billion commits last year. This year, with AI agents writing code, they're on pace for 14 billion. Code is shipping faster than ever. And its vulnerabilities are piling up just as quickly.
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And when something's exploitable, you find the fix and send it straight to the right developer or your coding agent. Check out mays.mayshq.com.net. That's Mays spelled M-A-Z-E. mayshq.com.net.net. When I think about the lifespan of a Russian cyber gang, there's an image that comes to mind.
It's that Russian nesting doll, those wooden dolls, that stack together. They stack inside each other. They start small and then they get bigger and bigger and bigger. Russian hackers operate in the same way. One tiny group starts it.
They're at the center. And then they develop more and more layers around them. They get bigger and more influential and can rack up millions of dollars and leave a trail of destruction. These Russian cyber criminals seem to be untouchable by the Western authorities. The FBI and Europool can't go into Russia to arrest them.
But they can issue arrest warrants for them in case they trip up or fly somewhere outside of Russia. They might get arrested. But you might think that when the cyber criminal gets arrested, it's all over, right? Well, not exactly. Like those nesting dolls.
When a cyber gang forms an outer shell, it forms into something else. Sometimes something even more sinister. And it keeps happening over and over until they're splintering cells, each one learning from the other, each one working together. And that's how I think about Conti, one of the most successful ransomware gangs in history. But before I get into Conti, let's back up a bit and take a look at where they came from.
Before there were other ransomware groups, there was the dire gang and there was Trickbot. An essential person in both of those was a Russian crime boss who went by the name Bentley. Bentley was an entrepreneur at heart and found creative ways to launder his cyber crime profits in order to securely access profits from cyber crime, this Bentley character created side hustles to launder his cyber crime profits. It's a hard problem at hackers have to figure out all the time. How do you return ransomware payments, stolen credit card data, or crypto?
And it's something you can buy without leaving a paper trail. It's where the business of illegal hacking means the real world. And Bentley's big idea was to use his proceeds from the dire ransomware gang to create a film production company. I guess his idea was that if you can make a film with dirty money and then that film makes actual money, then that money is clean. The window was so much money that they needed some vehicle through which to wash the money.
That's Jeff White. He's a good friend of the show. He's a journalist out of London. And he's been reporting on some of the world's most prolific hackers from the US to North Korea to Russia. And he hosts a new BBC podcast on Contee called The Conte Files.
Jeff says Bentley's film production company was called the 25th Floor of Film Company, housed in a skyscraper in Moscow. Now, this wasn't just an idea of Bentley's. They wouldn't make actual films. Obviously, they have to make some films, because if you have a phone company, it's actually do some of the work that the front company is supposed to be doing. So they thought, well, what film should we make?
They worked on some movies and television shows in Russia and surrounding countries. And they also produced action films with A-List American starts. Like there was this movie called Exposed, starring Keanu Reeves, which was made by them. Nobody's talking. I'm going, he's dead.
He's dead. He's dead. But somebody knows something. And Bentley knew all the ins and outs of the cyber crime underworld. And he had a film production company.
And this made him start to think. And he literally decided they would make a film about a group of Russian computer hackers, which was going to be called Botnet. And this film they were going to make, when I spoke to the screenwriter, guy called David Kaplan, who was recruited in Hollywood. Some Russian guys came up to him at the party and suggested he might like to write this film. And then when he starts researching it, he went over to Russia to meet the film company, not realizing that the very building the film company was based in was also the same building where the hackers were working on this malware.
And they described the plot to him. And they said, well, there's going to be this guy in charge. There's going to be this big bald guy. And there's going to be this smart number two guy. And then there's going to be a glamorous woman.
And all of these people were actually real characters, real people in the dire gang. Bentley, the guy who went on to become stern, who went on to run Contee, was going to be one of the characters in the film. And apparently they had a plan that they were going to come across to Hollywood and actually shot this around and try and get some funding for it. So it's just, I can never get over this. In order to launch the profits from cyber crime, we created a film company.
And then we're going to use the film company to make a film about the same sort of crime that we're using to make the profits to launch it through the film company. It's just, it's genius in a way, evil genius. A critical rule in the background around is don't dox yourself. It's really rule number one. If you're doing cyber crime, you've got to use fake names, fake addresses, burner emails, burner phones.
You can't trust anyone you're working with. Because if they know who you are and they get compromised, now suddenly you'll compromise too. The best operators in the world are the ones you've never heard of. Silence is their shield. People in this world who can't resist telling their stories are often the first to get caught.
So it's wildly surprising that Bentley and even the people around him in the dire gang were thinking about making essentially a documentary about the ransomware gang. But in the end, Bentley never reached his dreams of making his big break with this movie, Bartlett. Those dreams came crashing down at the end of 2015. Now, tragic end to the 25th film company, Anandique the Diagon. They actually got raided by the Russian authorities.
We don't know why, clearly they fell foul with the Russian authorities somehow. Off the back of that, out of the ashes of that, emerges a new group. Now that group, initially called Trickbotz, starts to morph as they use ransomware. And the ransomware is strange that they use, because different types of ransomware. The ransomware they use was called Conte.
So eventually, the dire gang becomes Trickbotz, and eventually Trickbotz known as Conte, and from then on, they're just known as the Conte gang, because they're using Conte ransomware to infect victims. And now you're starting to see these Russian nesting dots stacking up. One on top of each other, layers upon layers in the group. And within all these variations of hacking games, leaders like Bentley learned how to recruit other members of this growing empire. It's astonishingly astute and driven, an organized group of people.
And as you say, recruiting was a key part of it. You know, they were able to recruit people through Russian job seekers sites. They were obviously being cagey about what the operation was. They would say to join the fast-moving startup. And one of those early hires was a Latvian computer programmer who went by the name Max.
Now, when I first heard that there's a computer programmer in the Conte gang named Max, the first thought I had was, of course, there he is. Max is a very popular classic hacker handle. This guy's probably watched too many hacker movies, and he probably wears hoodies and has his computer that's like LEDs inside the case and stuff. But actually, this Max is opposite of what I pictured. Max is chatty, middle-aged, and a woman from Latvia.
A mom even. Her actual name is Alavita. She spoke with a journalist, and the BBC translated her responses. A long time ago, I graduated from Latvian State University. Max grew up in the 1980s in Soviet Union.
And managed to pick up coding work in Russia. Max has a degree in applied mathematics and wanted more than anything to become a computer programmer. She got married, had kids, and moved all the way to the tiny country in South America. There, I continued to work with Russians, but it was all uncertain. From one project to the next, I wanted most ability and didn't want to work alone just to my client and I.
So she's looking for a job, computer programming is what she always wanted to do. And she comes across a talent bootcamp for coders. I attended this free-day webinar. Your CV kind of goes into circulation, and the potential employer can come across it and even reach out with some kind of invitation. Max sends her resume, and someone responds to see if she wants to join their company.
She didn't ask a lot of questions about who this company was, and she didn't get a lot of information, because Max thought that's just how it goes in the land of coders. As part of the job application, she was asked to take a test. So I said that I would take this test. It was quite complicated, but I solved everything and sent them a link so they could see the results. And the week after, they write back to me, okay, you've passed the test.
When can you start? And I'm like, if you want, write today. She gets the job and starts getting to know her coworkers. Everyone is remote. Now remember, Max is living in South America, so it feels a bit isolating.
There's some water cooler talk over Jabra Messenger, but something feels off. None of her coworkers are using their actual names. Instead, they're using strange nicknames, like Professor or Snow White or Adelina. Simple random nicknames. And then there was one other thing.
No one on the team wanted to do a video chat with her. I asked if we wanted to Skype, but they said that they were just chatting. I like good jokes. That's why I wrote Ironically the Mail. Ah, maybe you're the kind of hackers you hear so much about.
He answered me. No, we are not hackers. But soon enough, she learns the truth. Her boss gives her link to a page that had some wording on it. She's told to use what was on the site as a template for other sites.
And that's all she knows. The page loads. She sees the gears turning, turning, Max stares on her screen. The scrolling text comes across it, and it starts to come into focus. There was text.
Your computer is infected. Blah, blah, blah. So pay money. It's a template for a ransomware note. This was the first time Max realized she's not just a computer programmer for some tech company.
She's a programmer for a cyber criminal enterprise. We're at the center. We're at the center. We put pizza all together from the rubble of the 25th floor film company. This is the moment where Max goes from being an innocent computer programmer to knowingly being part of an international cyber crime syndicate, which has to be some decision, right?
Like when you realize you're infecting the world with ransomware, do you say, oh, no, that's against my ethics. What, do you just shrug your shoulders and say, you know what, for the pay, why not? At that point, she decides to stick with it. And actually at that point, she's living very far away from her, she was living actually in Sewanarm in South America. I think she felt like she was way far away from any risks.
Maybe there, she felt she was just working. By this point, she realized she was working for once in my gang. But I think she felt quite insulated. I also felt that her role was fairly junior within this. It's a classic thing where I think she justified it to herself of, well, you know, I'm not really doing any hacking.
I'm just doing some coding for them. Over the years, Max became a bigger and bigger part of the ransomware operations. While her focus is web design and web development, investigators said that because of her language skills, she was able to help write ransomware notes. Now, Max wasn't massively great operational security because she ends up hosting some of the Conti-wants-where code apparently on her own website in her own name, Alavita is her name. And it also done some YouTube videos at the time.
So it was also identifiable from those. It could be that her security was rubbish, or it could be that she didn't realize how it was. She was, this was the early stages of the Conti-wants-where group forming. And they had already began infecting systems and getting paid when somebody wanted the decryption key, which of course was starting to draw attention of the US authorities. They began investigating who's behind Conti, which led them to Max and soon they discovered her real name was Alavita.
And they found that she was living in South America. They found out that she actually overstayed her visa while in South America. And so the US authorities worked with the local authorities there to find her and get them to fly her home to Russia because she overstayed her visa. But they purposely put her on a flight to Miami to make her connection to Russia. And when she landed in Miami, she was arrested by US authorities.
This was the first person to go down in the Conti group. They were charging her with her involvement with Trickbot and Conti. At this point, Trickbot was working closely with the Conti ransomware gang. And soon they would merge together. Conti was going to acquire Trickbot.
And Conti ransomware was becoming sort of a service where you could be an affiliate of theirs. You could use the Conti ransomware to infect a network somewhere. And then once infected, the Conti team would then take it from there negotiating payments, handing over the encryption keys, et cetera. And then the affiliate would get a cut of it. A few months after Max's arrest, hackers using the Conti ransomware launched a devastating attack that put Conti on the map of the world's stage.
In the early days of the pandemic, someone burrowed their way deep into Ireland's hospital network. The initial intrusion happened when a hospital employee opened a phishing email containing a malicious Microsoft Excel attachment. They clicked it, they opened it, they got infected. That was patient zero. Attackers got in and opened up a backdoor so they could stay in.
And then they began making that infection spread. Dozens of infected machines became hundreds. One infected hospital became two, which quickly spread to 10, thousands of machines were infected and the infection kept spreading across clinics and offices. And more hospitals, thousands of machines were hit with this ransomware. In total, over 70,000 computers were infected at 4,000 locations.
And over 40 hospitals were infected within the Ireland's hospital network. And it just sat there, quiet, waiting for the right moment to lock up all the computers. Sometimes, like in its being a burglar, you break into a house, it's dark. You've no idea the layout of the house. And so you just have to kind of keep opening doors.
And you hope that the door you open isn't the one into the bedroom where the people in the house are there with the gun. There is a long process of scoping it out. And of course, at any moment, you might get caught in your access might be revealed. And after weeks of lurking in the network shadows, the hackers struck. Ireland's health service describing this as a significant ransomware attack.
People asking how an attack like this could have happened in the first place. There's no doubt it is a vicious and a callous act and will be condemned everywhere by decent people. It was total pandemonium. Ireland's health care system was hit with the most devastating ransomware attack they had ever seen by a Russian-based cyber crime gang called Conti. Every hospital in the Irish network felt Conti's attack.
To keep track of patient appointments and records, clinicians just had to use pen and paper in like the old days. The attack disrupted COVID and blood work tests. All this as Ireland was in its third wave of the COVID pandemic. It's long as lockdown yet. This is the middle of a pandemic.
And as you say, people in Ireland, they speak their minds, they are Irish and they absolutely hated this. Why would people attack our health service? And particularly during the middle of a pandemic. Maternity wards and pediatric units were thrown into chaos. This is basically an entire country's hospital system being held to ransom in one go, absolutely stunning.
It was unlike anything that they, well actually we've ever seen before. The information systems behind all these hospitals went into a tailspin, a total scramble. Health services, classically, do not prioritize IT security because they've got lots of other things to prioritize. I think they don't think that they're gonna be a target for hackers, they haven't been historically. And those patients ended up paying a big price.
One person who Jeff actually talked to, who lived in Dublin, went through a particularly awful cancer treatment, a brain cancer treatment. But when the cyber attack happened, she was getting ready for a highly targeted cancer treatment involving lasers, abbing the cancer in these precise spots. But with computers down, the doctors had to cancel her appointment. So she had to wait even longer to get her cancer radiated. Stories like these began to flood through Ireland's hospitals.
It was pure chaos. And of course, the Conti group was messaging the hospital saying, there's one thing that can make this stop, money. Just about every hospital in a network got around somewhere and saying, we have ransomware in your data. If you wanna contact us and negotiate, here is the way you do it. Hackers demanded $20 million to bring back up the hospital's computers.
To make matters worse, the Conti gang said they had stolen over 700 gigabytes of data, like a patient and payroll records. They were saying, if you want us to delete it, you have to pay. Now imagine you're the one in the Ireland Health Department that has to make the call on what to do next. You came into work and you found every screen in the building displaying the same ransomware message. Everyone's files are encrypted, all the computers are down.
Your backups are gone. People's lives are literally on the line and at the bottom of countdown and a price. Ireland's response? No, we are not gonna pay around some, forget it. The executives for the Irish Health Service kept in contact with Conti gang now.
I think they were negotiating the price down, but I also think they were just trying to buy some time so that they don't publish the data yet. There was some back and forth between the two of them while the Ireland Health System tried desperately to get their systems back up and running all on their own. They're desperate to work out, how can we decrypt this data without paying the ransom? How can we get hospitals back on their feet? Which are the most important hospitals?
And you're gonna make some hard decisions there, Jack. Is children's health more important than all the persons health? Do you prioritize cancer? Do you prioritize some other diseases? These are the kind of decisions they're having to make.
They're literally life or death decisions where you're trying to apply the help first. There was a calculation apparently made at the rate they were able to decrypt the data, how long it would have taken to decrypt all of it without the ransom way key, the decryption key. And it was in the years, one or two years, on Scramble at all. So you're facing these problems month after month, potentially year after year. So the hackers kept going.
And of course, at this point, frankly, you may as well, you scramble all the data, you're kind of in for penny in for pound, or in for several tens of millions in this case. There was a period of several weeks where all of this was going on, the data was scrambled, hospitals were really struggling. The hospitals were getting by, you know, the health professionals, they can get back some test results, there's a fraction of what they get, and they can continue treating with some people. But after weeks, the hacker had a surprising change of heart out of nowhere. Without having paid the ransom, they gave the decryption key over to Ireland, and seemingly just left the hospital alone after that.
It's still a mystery as to why, but there are some running theories. One theory is that there's a Russian embassy in Ireland, and it condemned the attack, even agreeing to support Ireland as it recovered. So the hackers handed over the decryption key, so hospitals could recover, but their attacks continued against other places in Ireland. They infected school districts, city governments and businesses. Their demands were always the same.
Pay up to decryption computers, or else we released your data on the dark web. Just in case if you try to ignore us, we've downloaded your data and already to publish it if you do not respond. So it'll be better for both sites if you contact us as soon as possible. One of their targets in 2021 was this jewelry company called Graf. It's in the UK and known as the jeweler of the stars.
Its clients include Donald Trump, Oprah Winfrey and David Beckham, but the client list is never revealed publicly by Graf. It's actually super secret. They are extremely tight-lipped about who their clients are. But in 2021, Conte broke into the jewelry store digitally and stole a list of all of Graf's clients. This, of course, made Graf panic, and they were extremely upset.
The names and phone numbers of all their high-end customers has been stolen, and in the hands of some cyber criminals, forget about the computers being encrypted, the stolen data was more of a problem now. Conte wasn't messing around. When Graf didn't pay right away, they wanted to show them they were serious. So they took a chunk of this customer data and released it. 70,000 Graf documents hit the dark web.
The solution to ransomware was pretty easy. Backup your data. Because if it's scrambled, you can swipe the computer, reinstall the data from backup, and jog on and not pay the ransom. Of course, the ransomware gangs saw that, saw its the threat to their business, which it was, and invented the idea of, what, it called double dip ransomware. Double dip ransomware.
Essentially, a cyber attack with two steps. Steel-sensitive corporate data before encrypting it. It gives the hackers more leverage. Can't even demand that the jeweler pay tens of millions of dollars to the encrypted systems, and to prevent more information from getting out on the dark web. So, so, to scrambling the data, we will steal a chunk of the data, and then scramble the data.
And if the victim refuses to pay, because they've got backups of the data, we can say, ha ha, if you don't pay, we will leak the sensitive data. It's exactly what happened to Graf. So with Conte, it wasn't the full leak. It would have been, you know, a few hundred pages, maybe, of data, but in there would have been the data of very high profile clients. And my guess is that Conte scanned the information and thought, oh, look, some famous people here, we'll stick this online, as a sort of threat to the Graf group, and say, look, if you don't pay the ransom, there's going to be more of this.
But Conte didn't look really carefully through the data they were leaking. Because actually too much data for the Conte gang to analyze effectively. In the end, Graf did pay up. They paid seven and a half million dollars in Bitcoin. They didn't want the rest of their clientless getting out, and they felt like this was the price.
They have to pay to keep their customers' records secret. But how much can you even trust this Conte group to be good on their word when they say, they'll actually delete it? It must have been so maddening for Graf. Conte's successful jewelry heist may have been rushed, even sloppy. We all make mistakes when rushing.
And Conte is no difference. Within the initial breach of customer data leaked on the dark web, Conte unwittingly shared details of purchases of high profile members of society. And one of those was the Saudi royal family. That's right, Conte darks, the Saudi royal family. And that did not go down well, it seems among the Saudi royal family.
There are people around the world who, you want to offend them, people really, really don't, and the Saudis are probably very much elastic category. After the UK's Daily Mail reported on his heist, the Conte gang must have been contacted by someone or threatened or something serious happened because Conte published an apology, something you never see from cyber criminals. We found that our sample data was not properly reviewed before being uploaded to the blog. Conte guarantees that any information pertaining to the members of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar families will be deleted without any exposure and review. Our team apologizes to his royal highness, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and any other members of the royal family, whose names were mentioned in the publication for any inconvenience.
Conte said it removed the documents from graph that it initially leaked online and claimed none of the stolen data was sold on auctions or offered as samples or revealed any other capacity to any third party. Conte guarantees to implement a more rigid data review process for any future operations. Wow, that's really unusual that they retracted their leak. My head starts to go to, okay, somebody had enough wealth and influence to be able to say, okay, let's find out who these people were and go and personally threaten them. Yes, yes, there was an expert we interviewed for the podcast, intelligence experts.
His assessment of this was that the kinds of wealth you're talking about and the kinds of people involved in those leaks, you're talking about the top strata of the world's richest and most powerful people. They have a cadre of people around them who look after security and look after their interests. Those people are very good at their jobs and will make it absolutely clear to a gang like Conte. You have done this, there are going to be consequences for you, we have ways of finding you and if we find you, you're in a lot of trouble and potentially a lot of danger. So there would have been an intimidation of Conte to say, take this data down or else you're not playing here with low players, you're playing with serious people.
Now, as I say, we do not know, we're not privy to those emails because they would have been sent received by the security teams behind these powerful people. But as I say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We know that's the continuation of apology and we know within the internal conversations within Conte that they absolutely freaked out when this happened and were very worried. In fact, one of the quotes in the Conte gang was they'll find you and you're gone. So we know that Conte worried internally, we know that publicly they were apologizing.
If you join the dots, it does really look like somebody got to Conte and said, take it down or else. Wow, that's really surprising to me. I imagine these ransomware groups to be always getting threats from people, right? I'm just like, I will find you and I will take your children or dog or something. And they just like watching the world burn.
So it's just a surprise to see them be threatened in such a way, be scared in some way that the issue in apology and redact their leak. They must have been really spooked. And they were on such a role too. In 2021 alone, they collected over $180 million from their ransomware operations. But I guess Conte was getting their first taste of flying too close to the sun.
We're gonna take a quick ad break here, but stay with us because when we come back, these nesting dolls are gonna come apart in the most dramatic way possible. This episode is sponsored by Doppel. Protecting yourself from attackers used to be as simple as deleting dodgy-looking emails. But with AI, the attack surface has outgrown the defense that legacy vendors provide. Doppel was founded in 2022 to give companies back control.
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Doppel, outpacing what's next in social engineering. Learn more at doppel.com. That's spelled D-O-P-E-L, doppel.com. Imagine this, two Russian hackers are having a conversation. One of them is planning a major attack against, I don't know, hospital, let's say, and the other is in disguise, posing as a Russian hacker.
And he's really trying to thwart that attack. The conversations are happening over at Dark Web Forum or on Jabber or Raka Chat. And sure, conversations with a Russian hacker might start lights like talking about fishing or visiting St. Petersburg's art museums, but then they'll take a turn, shifting to actual criminal secrets. Just imagine, if you could get a hacker to be vulnerable when their guard is down, what kind of intel could you get about targets or methodologies for attack?
Could you turn them away from cybercrime? We find fascinating things on the Dark Web. We engage with the bad guys. We get inside of not only their systems but inside their heads. This is Alex Holden.
He's a Ukrainian cybersecurity researcher, now living in the US and he runs a company called Hold Security Based in Milwaukee. Years ago, him and his team of analysts began infiltrating members of Trickbot, which would go on to get acquired by Conte. Alex and his team talked with Trickbot members, pretending to be Black Hat hackers trying to gain their trust. They weren't buying or selling anything because that is illegal, but they were on a top secret mission to make connections. And that's what Alex does with ransomware games.
Nations, state threat actors were hacktivist movements. It would be surprised that the bad guys on the Dark Web, one of them need to talk to somebody, they need a friend. And we create this friend environment for them to start spilling their deepest and darkest secrets. So they're getting some of Trickbot's deepest and darkest secrets through its members. They even applied for jobs at Trickbot and tried to move up the chain and they developed relationships with their members so they're more and maybe even turned them good.
And we also meddled with some of their perception, opinions, even building paranoia for some of them saying that one person is coming for you. After a while of chumming it up with Trickbot, Alex caught up being a break. So one guy part of Trickbot decided to give his girlfriend as a present access to Trickbot. So this is not the top presence of guys, give their girlfriend, but he gave access so she can go shopping. So he showed how to find credit cards, how to take virtual machines, stuff like that.
And through a folly virus, because we had visibility into her communication and said she did not believe in encryption or the past reason she gave us all of it. So that was one of the main friend-bent at the two points for a while. But over time, we started looking at this and say, okay, here's access to a chopper server because this girl was given an account and the password was one to three, four, five, six. And that's what the admin gave her. But his password just had to pay at the end of the month, three, four, five, six.
Alex's team whittled their way into Trickbot's infrastructure, scraping chat logs and eventually cloning the network. And while continuing to make connections with some of the big players in the Trickbot, Eshon. You know, build friendship with some of the people, including Stern. Ah, yes, Stern. Remember I told you about the guy Bentley before?
He was the one who ran the Diya Ransomware Gang and then he started the 25th floor film company and then he started the Trickbot Ransomware Gang, which morphed into the Conti Ransomware Gang? Well, when it morphed into Conti, he morphed from Bentley to Stern. But at the time we didn't know who the Stern guy was, we only knew that he was one of the nesting dolls at the center of Conti. At some point Stern wants to build his own crypto mining platform and there was a conversation like 30, 40 pages of conversation about that. But this is the idea of persuade from the cyber crime to a social angle.
Trying to limit Stern's damage. There are a lot of moving parts here. A lot of sleepless nights where Alex and his team was glued to chat logs, reading chat forums. They watched Trickbot starting in 2019 and continued as Trickbot got acquired by Conti two years later. His team obtained hundreds of thousands of messages.
They curated the data, they read through it, and published summaries of the data. What they saw was a criminal enterprise, a lot more organized than any of them even imagined. Probably But was run by Stern as a company. It was not run as a game. And I'm very used to corporate America.
That's the look of it right now. But the company that they run, they had different departments, they had physical offices. They had lunches, they talked to each other. They were sympathetic to employees like our vehicle got in trouble. Alavita is the Trickbot member I told you earlier, who was arrested.
She went by Max, remember? They even said that they are allocating $25 billion in the first eight months of 2021 to improve their infrastructure. Not that the company can afford that much of expansion. They did. So it was budgeting, it was your accounting, it was everything.
Alex's team also got insight into attacks that were still in the planning stages, attacks against schools, city governments and hospitals. Here's one country member named Target writing about going after health care. We got on a video call with them. They offered 18 Bitcoin. Their turnover is 30 million.
Let them pay millions. Tomorrow we'll make a move that'll make the whole leadership go, please, please, don't do it. They got used a little chance and messages over there. 18 Bitcoin. Tomorrow the whole office will rob them.
Let them die. Despite this being criminal activity, there are still certain rules that criminal hackers have. Ask enough people in the ransomware underground and you'll hear that there are certain targets that are just off limits, like hospitals. After the Russian hacking group, Lockbit, targeted a children's hospital in Canada in 2023, it publicly apologized and turned over the decryption key. It didn't know it was a hospital.
In the Conti chat logs, you can see internal disagreements about the ethics of going after health care. For example, one county member asks the county boss, Stern, if he signed off on encrypting the hospital's data and Stern responds with, I usually don't approve encryptions. If you didn't approve it, I will hand the decryptor to that clinic. We agreed not to touch the medical sector, remember? This county member who's pushing back against going after hospitals messages Stern, complaining about their coworkers, someone who goes by the same dollar.
Let's get dollar out of the game. He's a total idiot. Back then, he screwed me over, claiming he had an agreement with you to mess with the hospital. And now he targeted the hospital again. That's disrespectful.
I told him twice that we don't touch the medical sector. At this point, Conti's members and affiliates were in the hundreds. And as I grew, it became more challenging to control hacking operations. So it's not surprising to get these internal reps about who to attack. And to make matters worse, Conti was without leadership.
The boss, Stern, drifted away from the child logs. He was just not present very much anymore. My theory is that when you start a new and upcoming cyber crime group, it's exciting. It's fun. But then when things start turning into just handling customer support issues all day long, leaders often lose interest.
One of his deputies, someone who went by the name Mingo, got growingly frustrated about this. You constantly give me the impression that you don't care. You need to be online more often. And in some situations, be a bit tougher for disciplinary purposes. And then by January 2022, researcher Alex Holden says, Stern left Conti without a trace.
The child logs just show Conti falling into chaos after that. Listen, Stern has gone missing. No, he's not missing. He'll show up soon. Everyone's looking for him.
With the boss gone, people started getting worried if anyone was going to get paid. Members weren't quite panicking yet, but it felt like the ground was becoming unstable within Conti. And then to everyone's surprise, a full blown war erupted. It was unprovoked. But this is what Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed on Ukraine.
As the sun came up this morning, a missile striking an industrial park in Western Ukraine. A helicopter resolved on an airport outside of Kiev, close, intense fighting. And there are civilian casualties. And little did we know that Russia invading Ukraine was going to send a shockwave through Conti. Many of the members were glued to the news.
I hope that Kiev will be ours by evening. But not everyone in Conti was rooting for Russia. Many of Conti members were from Ukraine. The war split a lot of families, because some families were living in both Ukraine and Russia and suddenly they were at war with each other. The war completely split the Conti pack, with some of its operators really unhappy about this invasion.
Friends, brothers, are there any Ukrainians besides me, madness, supporting me, brothers? I mean, I'm just thinking about how can you be thickest thieves with someone and go rob the world of millions of dollars doing cyber crime together and then suddenly go to war with the very people in your own group? Members were torn about what to do. Talking to you directly, you're post-appointful for the members of our team. Emotions and tensions started flaring up in the group chats.
Half the Conti gang were saying, Kiv by dawn. And the other half were saying, Sava Ukraine. And eventually, Conti as an organization took a stand, releasing a statement for the world to see. The Conti team is officially announcing full support of the Russian government. If anybody decides to organize a cyber attack or any war activities against Russia, we are going to use all our possible resources to strike back at the critical infrastructures of an enemy.
When that message showed up on computer screens across the world, there was someone who took this note very seriously. He was an IT specialist from Ukraine, and this message consumed him with anger. I cannot truth anything, but I can fight with a keyboard and mouse. In an interview at the time, he told CNN he was prepared to cut deep into Conti where it hurt. We had someone voice his responses.
It's my country. If the Ukrainian government provides me weapons, okay, I'll go fight. But I'm better at typing. The Ukrainian IT specialist had a plan. He wanted to do a data breach on the Conti ransomware gang itself.
He thought if he could get into their internal communications, download all their chat logs, see what their network consists of, look at their member information, he could expose them in a very devastating way. He started working with Alex Holden and others to try to obtain the Conti chat logs. He was grabbing the chat logs while other members of the team were reading through them and providing summaries. These messages were private in the Conti network. They were never meant to be released, but he was determined to expose them to ruin Conti.
He came to Alex and told him what his plan was. He talked to me ahead of time. We talked about Conti-budders properly and it turned out that the way it did. I had no control over it. I did tell him that he needs to think about it, but from legal perspective, it was not our data.
From more perspective, I'm also from Ukraine and I completely understand him and his actions. You have to understand that in the first days of the Russian invasion into Ukraine, Conti stated that they fully support the cause of Putin. My friend as a Ukrainian citizen, Ukrainian national, felt that this is his way not to pick up a weapon and defend his homeland, but something to do bigger against the aggression from the Russians.
The Ukrainian analysts had infiltrated Conti deep enough and gathered enough in cremating data that he thought it was time to start leaking the data. He created a Twitter account called at Conti Leaks, which is very ironic to breach and expose a company who is in the very business of breaching and exposing companies. Here's what the first tweet said. Greetings. Here is a friendly heads up that the Conti gang has just lost all their shit.
Please know this is true. Now there's been speculation from researchers and journalists that the leaker may have been a disgruntled former Conti member. The truth is we aren't exactly sure who the leaker is. But Alex Holden says he knows. He says the Conti leaker is a computer specialist who at the time of the leaks was a consultant for his company and continues to live in Ukraine today.
Regardless of who he is, he released the Holy Grail for cyber security analysts, researchers and journalists who were studying this gang. The contents of the first dump contain the chat communications current as of today and going to the past of the Conti ransomware gang. We promise it is very interesting. There are more dumps coming. Stay tuned.
Thank you for your support. I'm glory to Ukraine. Over several data dumps, there were tens of thousands of internal messages released. There were conversations about planning attacks, names of members, pictures of members, and details about the organization's structure of Conti, which was surprisingly hiding in plain sight. But there were also nuggets that were meant to strike deep into Conti where it hurt.
Like the cryptocurrency accounts used to steal millions of dollars in ransomware payments. There were discussions about going after journalists reporting on the poisoning of the Russian opposition leader, Alex Holden, says before the logs were released, there was information excluded for safety reasons. But he says nothing was altered. My goal in the cemetery was to help victims and help victims as effectively as possible. So he did what he did and he changed the world.
Which changed the world one victim at the time. He did something like that. Because in this situation, Conti was a victim of a database. So this whole thing is like flipped on its ear. I don't think we've ever seen a teacher preach like this before where the hackers got hacked.
I don't think it was the right thing to do. The Conti shattered in many different groups and the members became part of many other ransomware groups that start multiplying the crime and losing visibility actually increased number of victims. Alex Holden says even though he wouldn't have publicly released the logs, the disclosure changed the Conti gang in profound ways. How many triplet and Conti operatives have been unmasked since? How many of them were indicted?
How many of them are on wanted lists for us from one first perspective? I remember when these leaks came out. It was quite a moment if you were on Twitter at the time. We all got our popcorn out and was just watching this cyber gang unravel in real time. The nesting dolls just kept opening one after another and we had no idea how many would just keep opening.
It was just wild to see one open after another. People were being exposed left and right. There were pictures of the Conti gang going around. Soon there were memes about the members. Like surprisingly, there was a half dozen women who were members of the Conti gang.
And so you'd see posts like these are the women of the Conti ransom working and lots of photos were shown of just them driving in cars eating lunches, passports photos of them. Many of them were looking like they were part of the world of luxury. It felt like the lid of this shadowy dark underworld just blew off in an instant. It was such a rare glimpse into one of the most successful ransomware groups of all time. Twitter was having a field day.
This wasn't your typical white paper right up on some ransomware group. This had drama. This had intrigue. This had dirt and scandals. It even posted a meme which said, info sec.
We know drama. Just reading through the chat logs. You see all kinds of in fighting. You can tell it's something catastrophic is going to happen soon. A lot of us were just sitting back in our chairs like, wow, season one of this show is amazing.
Investigate a reporter Jeff White grabbed a front row seat. When this came out, I think there was all this stuff about cyber attacks around Ukraine, trying to keep a burst of all of that. Then these Conti leaks come out. It's 70,000 messages. It was an absolute nightmare.
They're all in Washington. They're in the civilic characters. They're in hackers' lungs. You got to try and start translating them. And then immediately afterwards, you get the second huge dump information.
It's even more messages. You read 47,000 of these messages? Yes, yes. Amazing. The thing about the leaks is it's thousands of messages.
They're all in Russian. They're all in the civilic characters. Obviously, you're thinking a lot of the listeners will be thinking, well, we're sticking to one of these all of these all of these all of these all of these all of these all of the lm's. Let the AI do the work. lm's do not deal well with civilic alphabet.
So there's loads of mistranslations. So one of the things they keep talking about in the leaks is the Cubels. Who's got the Cubels? Like Snuka or Poole? Or you know, and I can understand this.
I know that if you take the Russian translation of Bitcoin, it's a bit queen. The end of the end, because it's in a little bit like a V, so the translation engine's translate is Bitov, which in Russian is Cubel. Bitov Cubel. And so when I was talking about the Cubels, it means that you're talking about Bitcoin. So immediately you start to kind of understand there's a code almost in the translations.
The only thing I kept talking about was the Toad. As in like the reptile, like, well, why is the Toad slow? And I've got problems with the Toad. And I can understand why I kept talking about the Toad. And it turns out this was the software they were using to communicate was Java, which in Russian is Haber.
Haber translates as Toad. So they keep talking about the Toad and you realise they're talking about the Java thing being slow. So with these messages, you have to go through them by eye, I think, one by one, because only then you get the hang of what is actually being discussed. Okay, so after the leaks came out and we start to see the inner workings of how this Conti Ransomer Gang is operating, do they skitter? Do they run away?
Do they hide? Shut up, shut up. What happens to them? So in terms of what happened next to Conti, we know that the gang apparently disbanded and we know that there was talking in the chats of, well, it's coming to an end, just go off and rest for a little while will regroup. People who track these things are pretty sure that various affiliates from Conti just came affiliates from other gangs.
There's some suggestion that Conti members set up other ransomware groups, crossovers with code and so on. So the thing splinters and it fractures, but there's this amazing moment where they decide someone somewhere within Conti decides they're going to go for one last big takedown and they're just going to do an absolute showstopper and that's when they decide they're going to hit an entire country. They're going to hit the government at Costa Rica. Late today we learned that Costa Rica has declared a state of emergency after a ransomware attack. Sounds very similar.
It was very 35 for us over many government organizations where compromised by that campaign. We didn't know what to do. Exposed citizens personal information. So it's not clear how they're going to resolve all this. Yeah, Costa Rica declared their out war with Conti.
How about that? Nobody was expecting this as the next step from Conti, especially if they just got exposed. About two dozen different government organizations were targeted and many sectors came to a streaking halt. This was a big deal for Costa Rica. The first thing that was hit was Costa Rica's treasury.
One of the big ramifications that was importing and exporting of goods and all that's run digitally. That just collapsed and they had to go back to pen and paper. But Costa Rica was not ready for that. A large chunk of the country's money just got cut off because imports just grinded to a halt. There were also disruptions with paying salaries and pensions for government workers.
In the end, the solution that came up with was anybody who got a pension lost month gets another pension this month. Just pay people again and I hope you sorted out later. So they didn't manage to get around that. There was also political consequences. This attack happened right in between a change of presidential administrations and it fed into the whole campaign against the existing government.
Like, of course they're incompetent. They couldn't stop this cyber attack. It's fed into this sense of a country that was kind of on the edge. As the government started looking at this and refused to pay Contee, Contee upped the ante and attacked more parts of the government, more government departments. I think the Science and Technology Department got attacked.
And in the end there was various local government websites that got taken down. As I said, you got this pylon effect where other gangs and other cyber criminals started to get involved. And the Contee government was in the end fighting fires and they were probably in the dozens of attacks. Some much bigger, you know, like the treasury and so on, so much more in terms of local government institutions. But it really was a pandemonium.
It happened at this time for transferring government when Costa Rica was particularly vulnerable. The incoming president treated this like it was a national emergency and like a wildfire. The vulnerabilities spread across government organizations. Some systems were infected through phishing emails while for others malware was just put right on them and right from the internet and something became clear. Maybe this wasn't just Contee.
As the attack went on, other cyber crime groups, other ransomware groups emerged and also started attacking Costa Rica. So it was kind of a pylon. So Contee were there definitely, but the effects of the Contee gang got amplified as the attack unfolded over weeks in Costa Rica. Yeah, I don't know if it matters or not, but we don't know if it was the Contee ransomware gang that actually picked their targets or if it was their affiliates that picked the targets or a mix of both. I mean, Contee has so many affiliates by this point.
And those affiliates would have caused all of that access to the encryption software, the ransomware software. And so even if the central core contee group dissolved, it's nice to me as possible, certainly technically that somebody could have retained that encryption software. And if there were affiliates and could have getting it into a network and infecting a network, there's no reason why they couldn't have used the Contee sort of ransomware without the core contee gang being aware of it, approving it or even still being in existence. This could have been an entirely single affiliate led job. I think from my technical understanding, that's not so impossible.
Another possibility, Jeff says, that this was a former member of Contee that was just flexing their muscles saying, Hey, I came from Contee and I did the Costa Rica attack. Imagine what else I can do. And we know for sure that Costa Rica got hit by Contee ransomware, but that was the last incident we ever saw of the Contee ransomware because after that a rest started happening. Certain low level members of Contee and Trippont weren't getting nabbed. Contee seemed to be done.
Too much had been exposed. The war tore the members apart and stern their leader was still missing from daily operations. But the affiliates that were helping spread the Contee ransomware, many of them, they were probably just joined other groups. There were loads of other gangs recruiting. If you say look, I was with the Contee gang, I managed to get a couple of high profile targets.
You know, can I work with your ransomware as an affiliate? You like to get a job elsewhere? In terms of the core Contee gang, we don't know what happened with them. The suspicion is they went on and formed other groups. The fact is many other Contee members who appeared in the logs, we don't know who they really were or what happened to them.
It's because a lot of them used fake names that were based in Russia. So it's just really hard to trace. But one high ranking person within Contee, we do know it's stern, the trickbot commander who was in charge when Contee absorbed the trickbot. The German police and international prosecutors identified stern as Vitaly Kovalev at Russian National in his late 30s. The European Union, UK and the US all sanctioned him, linking him back to trickbot and Contee, a multinational response that essentially tries to freeze him off from the global economy.
He's going to have a hard time using any service that changes his money into dollars or euros. He likely can't travel to any country that has an extradition treaty with the US. Vitaly allegedly racked in more than $300 million in ransomware payments. Not just his own personal cut of the proceeds, but given how long he's been at it, Jeff White says it's possible that he might be a cybercrime billionaire, which would be the first person to become a billionaire from cybercrime. Vitaly isn't someone that you would look at and say, oh yeah, that's a successful cybercrime boss right there.
If you look him up on nine, you can see his face and he doesn't look suspicious. He doesn't have a hood or coverings. He's smiling, looking serious, like the kind of person that if he was lost on the street, he would stop and ask for directions and say hello. You don't look at pictures of Kovalev and think, you know, internet scanning is the number one. Now, I don't know how many other people you've investigated Jack who you would think that about, but he really just doesn't seem the type, which is odd for me to be saying is an investigation of journalists.
Normally I can see you doing this, but Kovalev is somehow not. Of course, the big problem with the telecoffload is if indeed he is stern and did run the Conti Gang is what to do with all that money. Because you'll know, I mean, again, you've done so isn't this, you know, Bitcoin, if you've made money in Bitcoin, you've got a big problem in that it's traceable. You know, the big problem I suspect now for members of the Conti Gang is where to launder that money. And actually what we turned up as part of the podcast was a sort of whole slew of kind of Middle East based, often Dubai based cryptocurrency type operations that people were saying were linked to or seemed to have links to people like the Conti Gang and something that's just behind that.
Interesting, these around the Ukraine war, there was kind of a bit of an exodus of Russians towards Dubai and towards Middle East. Conti's rises both astonishing and tragic. It became the apex predator in the cyber crime world. Its tactics evolved and that turned into a cash cow. And it became so big that it spawned a network of affiliates who went rogue and put targets on its back.
Conti became so big and famous and scary until it became too large to last. A victim of its own success. Thank you so much to my guests, Alex Holden and Jeff White. Jeff actually has a multi-part podcast called the Conti Files by Cyberhack, which was in so much more detail about this Conti Store. He interviewed some really interesting people and it's worth listening to that.
Hey, I just released a whole new podcast. It's called Low and it is out and available for everyone to go listen to right now for free. Just search your favorite podcast player for Low or go to ThisIsLow.com to find it. This is a story that is so long and twisted that I felt deserved its own podcast and stands on its own as something truly special. At least I think so.
And the feedback I've gotten so far is that it is mind blowing. It'll make you think differently about your life. And a lot of people say it should absolutely be a movie. I've never put so much effort into a story before. It took like seven years for me to get this out.
And go listen to Low now. Thank you. This episode was created by me, Sir Loying, Jack Reesider. The Ping Repeater himself, Sean Powers, who wrote and produced this one. Our editor is a Ransom Werewolf, Tristan Ledger, mixing done by proximity sound in our intro music is by the mysterious breakmaster cylinder.
My Ransomware negotiator quit on me last week. She said the job had too many demands. This is Darknet Diaries.