[19-1155] Garland v. Dai

Garland v. Dai Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2021.Decided on Jun 1, 2021. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Respondent: Ming Dai. Advocates: Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent in No. 19-1156 (Alcaraz-Enriquez)) David J. Zimmer (for the Respondent in No. 19-1155 (Dai)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility. This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156. Question Can a court of appeals presume that an immigrant’s testimony is credible and true if an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals did not specifically find that he was not credible? Conclusion A court of appeals cannot presume that an immigrant’s testimony is true or credible simply based on an absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that a court reviewing a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) accept “administrative findings” of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Coupled with the established principle that a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” additional judge-made procedural requirements on agencies, this requirement means that so long as the record contains “contrary evidence” that a reasonable factfinder could find sufficient, a reviewing court may not overturn the agency’s factual determination. Although another provision of the INA does describe a presumption of credibility on appeal, it notes that outside the appeal, there is no such presumption of credibility. However, a court’s review of decisions by the BIA is not an appeal in this context. The only “appeal” is from the immigration judge (IJ) to the BIA. Subsequent judicial review is not an appeal but a “petition for review”; as such, there is no presumption of credibility at that stage of review.