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Jun 27, 2006

2. The Praxeological Case for an Ultimate End

from Foundations of Libertarian Ethics Hosted by Roderick T. Long

Claims of ultimate ends, like happiness or well-being, are impossible, says Hobbes. In this life, the fact that you are still acting shows that you have not achieved any ultimate end. Does action really express dissatisfaction? You can act to keep something happening, rather than to try to change things. An ultimate end is not praxeologically impossible. Is it required? Yes. There has to be some final end. There is a minimum threshold of things worth striving for. Above that level, you are happy. Once there, higher levels can make you happier. We are committed to having some overarching goals – but not impossible ones, nor ones too easy. The second of ten lectures from the Foundations of Libertarian Ethics seminar with Roderick T. Long.

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Claims of ultimate ends, like happiness or well-being, are impossible, says Hobbes. In this life, the fact that you are still acting shows that you have not achieved any ultimate end. Does action really express dissatisfaction? You can act to keep something happening, rather than to try to change things.

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2. The Praxeological Case for an Ultimate End

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