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Start listening today at P-O-D-C-A-S-T-L-I-B-R-A-R-Y.org. Looking for something meaningful to listen to? Visit podcastlibrary.org. A growing home for timeless audiobooks, classic radio dramas, educational talks, history, philosophy, and thousands of hours of spoken word audio, all free to stream.
Whether you want to relax, learn something new, or rediscover voices from the past, Podcast Library makes it easy to find something worth hearing. Start listening today at P-O-D-C-A-S-T-L-I-B-R-A-R-Y.org. Book 6, Part 1. And thus, Locken, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.
I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened. I suppose not, I said, and yet I believe that we might have had a better view. Both of them, if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject, and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust, must consider. And what is the next question?
He asked. Surely, I said, the one which falls next in order, inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you, which of the two classes should be the rulers of our state? And how can we rightly answer that question? Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our state, let them be our guardians.
Very good. Neither, I said, can there be any question, that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes? There can be no question of that. And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable, as with the painter's eye, to look at the absolute truth, and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world, to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them?
Are not such persons, I ask, simply blind? Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition. And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular virtue, also know the very truth of each thing? There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities.
They must always have the first place, unless they fall in some other respect. Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellencies. By all means, in the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the state.
What do you mean? Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature, not bearing from generation and corruption. Agreed? And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being.
There is no part, whether greater or less, or more or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce, as we said before, of the lover and the man with ambition. True. And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess? What quality?
Truthfulness. They will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth. Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them. Maybe, my friend, is not the word, say, rather, must be affirmed, for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.
Right? He said. And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth? How can there be?
Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood? Never. The true lover of learning, then, must, from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth? Assuredly.
But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker than others. They will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel. True. He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul and will hardly feel bodily pleasure, I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.
That is most certain. Such a one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous, for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending have no place in his character. Very true. Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.
What is that? There should be no secret corner of illiberality. Nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things, both divine and human. Most true, he replied.
Then how can he who has a magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existent think much of human life? He cannot. Or can such a one account death fearful? No, indeed.
Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy. Certainly not. Or again, can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean or a boaster or a coward, can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings? Impossible.
Then you will soon observe whether man is just and gentle or rude and unsociable. These are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical. True. There is another point which should be remarked.
What point? Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning, for no one will love that which gives him pain and in which after much toil he makes little progress. Certainly not. And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?
That is certain. Laboring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation. Yes. Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophical natures.
We must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory. Certainly. And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion. Undoubtedly.
And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind which move spontaneously towards the true being of everything. Certainly.
Well, and do not all these qualities which we have been enumerating go together and are they not in a manner necessary to a soul which is to have a full and perfect participation of being? They are absolutely necessary, he replied. And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory and is quick to learn noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred? The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.
And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education and to these only you will entrust the state. Here, Ieomitus interposed and said, To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply, but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers. They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions. These little accumulate and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be have turned upside down and as unskillful players of drops are at last shut up by their more skillful adversaries and have no peace to move.
So they too find themselves shut up at last, for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are counters and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of argument he seems as a fact that the votarians of philosophy when they carry on the study not only in youth as a part of education but as the pursuit of their mature years most of them become strange monsters not to say utter rogues and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol. Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?
I cannot tell, he replied but I should like to know what is your opinion? Hear my answer I am of opinion that they are quite right. Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them? You ask a question, I said to which a reply can only be given in a parable.
Yes, Socrates and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose? I perceive, I said that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion but now hear the parable and then you will be still more amused that the meagerness of my imagination for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own states is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it and therefore if I am to plead their cause I must have recourse to fiction and put together a figure made up of many things like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarreling with one another about the steering.
Everyone is of opinion that he has a right to steer though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned and will further assert that it cannot be taught and they are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says the contrary. They throng about the captain begging and praying him to commit the helm to them and if at any time they do not prevail but others are preferred to them they kill the others or throw them overboard and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores thus eating and drinking they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected to them. He who is the partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion they compliment with the name of sailor pilot able sea man and abuse the other sort of man whom they call a good for nothing but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and wind and whatever else belongs to his art if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship and that he must and will be the steerer whether other people like or not the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers how will the true pilot be regarded will he not be called by them a preacher a stargazer a good for nothing of course said Iamitus then you will hardly need I said to hear the interpretation of the figure which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the state for you understand it already certainly then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honor in their cities explain it to him and try to convince him that their having honor would be far more extraordinary I will say to him that in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world he is right but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them and not to themselves the pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him this is not the order of nature neither are the wise to go to the doors of the rich and the ingenious author of this saying told a lie but the truth is that when a man is ill whether he be rich or poor to the physician he must go and he who wants to be governed to him who is able to govern the ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors and the true helmsman to those who are called by them good for nothings and stargazers precisely so he said for these reasons and among men like these philosophy the noblest pursuit of all is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction not that the greatest and most lasting injuries done to her by her opponents but by her own professing followers the same of whom you suppose accuse her to say that the greatest number of them are errant roves and the best are useless in which opinion I agreed yes and the reason why the good are useless has now been explained true end of book six part one