EPISODE · Sep 5, 2026 · 1H 8M
3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
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Game Theory (ECON 159)We apply the main idea from last time, iterative deletion of dominated strategies, to analyze an election where candidates can choose their policy positions. We then consider how good is this classic model as a description of the real political process, and how we might build on it to improve it. Toward the end of the class, we introduce a new idea to get us beyond iterative deletion. We think about our beliefs about what the other player is going to do, and then ask what is the best strategy for us to choose given those beliefs?00:00 - Chapter 1. Iterative Deletion of Dominated Strategies: The Median Voter Theorem27:25 - Chapter 2. Iterative Deletion of Dominated Strategies: Problems with The Median Voter Theorem35:07 - Chapter 3. Iterative Deletion of Dominated Strategies: Robustness of The Median Voter Theorem39:11 - Chapter 4. Best ResponseComplete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.eduThis course was recorded in Fall 2007. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
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