60. Jonathan Schaffer | Metaphysics, Epistemology

Is reality fundamentally built from many parts, or does everything ultimately depend on the whole through a layered structure of grounding and explanation?My links: https://linktr.ee/frictionphilosophy.1. GuestJonathan Schaffer is an American philosopher specializing in metaphysics and also working in epistemology, mind, and language.2. Interview SummaryJonathan Schaffer discusses how metaphysical theorizing about “what’s fundamental” should be guided—at least in part—by our best, most unified physical theories. In the opening, he motivates a broadly monistic picture on which the cosmos as a whole is a prime candidate for fundamentality, since it is the system most directly characterized by the fundamental dynamical laws, while many other descriptions are only approximate. He also pushes back on the worry that this “privileges physics” in a question-begging way: the thought is that we can consult the most powerful, unifying scientific posits without already assuming that either parts or wholes must be fundamental, and then let that scientific picture constrain metaphysical hypotheses.A large portion of the interview then turns to grounding: how to treat it methodologically, what its role is in metaphysical explanation, and how to adjudicate disputes about its status. Schaffer recommends a kind of methodological primitivism—grounding can be used fruitfully even if no reductive analysis is in hand—and he frames an influential debate (e.g., with Jessica Wilson) around two key axes: (i) whether grounding is a single, substantially unified relation or merely a label for a heterogeneous bundle, and (ii) whether we should take grounding as primitive and define “fundamental” as ungrounded, or instead take fundamentality as primitive and then try to reconstruct grounding. He argues that starting with grounding helps preserve the ordering structure among nonfundamental levels (e.g., chemical vs. biological), which is obscured if we only draw a fundamental/nonfundamental cut.In the later sections, Schaffer broadens the methodological theme by looking at context-sensitivity in philosophical discourse—especially in epistemology (and by extension, causation). He treats “shifty” knowledge attributions as a real phenomenon to be explained, and sketches a contextualist/relevant-alternatives style framework on which knowledge is not merely a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition, but can depend on a contextually supplied question or set of relevant alternatives; he suggests parallel structure for causal talk (e.g., contrastive or alternative-sensitive causation). He closes with a reflective account of why metaphysics is worth doing: the puzzles feel gripping and occasionally yield fleeting moments of insight, but even more often the value lies in the wonder and reward of engaging seriously with deep questions at all.3. Interview Chapters00:00 - Introduction00:32 - Cosmos as fundamental02:20 - Fundamental laws04:26 - Why privilege physics?07:42 - Grounding relation as primitive10:11 - Primitives as a theoretical cost11:32 - Communicating primitives17:21 - Concept development20:52 - Jessica Wilson’s view29:30 - Losing structure with fundamental-first account31:54 - Is the dispute substantive?36:29 - Skepticism about metaphysics41:26 - John Heil’s criticism46:15 - Ground between the gaps47:57 - Mind and brain50:24 - Further gaps?54:24 - Epistemic contextualism59:57 - How relevant are common intuitions?1:04:02 - Problems with common usage1:07:33 - “Causation” as context-sensitive1:12:52 - View not metaphysical?1:15:56 - Value of philosophy1:18:02 - Conclusion This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fric.substack.com/subscribe