8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization

Game Theory (ECON 159)We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling's location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, "mixed strategies." Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game.00:00 - Chapter 1. Candidate - Voter Model14:22 - Chapter 2. Location and Segregation: Why Outcomes Are Not Necessarily Preferences46:01 - Chapter 3. Location and Segregation: Examples52:10 - Chapter 4. Location and Segregation: Policy Implications57:51 - Chapter 5. Location and Segregation: Central vs. Individual Randomization01:00:51 - Chapter 6. Pure vs. Mixed Strategies: Rock, Paper, ScissorsComplete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.eduThis course was recorded in Fall 2007. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices