#83 - The Decision Part 1

What this episode covers

* On 15 August 1945, about a week after the bombing of Nagasaki, Truman tasked the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey to conduct a study on the effectiveness of the aerial attacks on Japan, both conventional and atomic. * Did they have an effect on the Japanese surrender? * The Survey team included hundreds of American officers, civilians and enlisted men, based in Japan. * They interviewed 700 Jap military, government and industrial officials. * And had access to hundreds of Japanese wartime documents. * Less than a year later they published their conclusion - that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without it, without a Soviet declaration of war, and without an American invasion. * “It cannot be said that the atomic bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of surrender. The decision to surrender, influenced in part by knowledge of the low state of popular morale, had been taken at least as early as 26 June at a meeting of the Supreme War Guidance Council in the presence of the Emperor." * It goes on to say that there wasn’t a unanimous agreement amongst the military, especially the War Minister, and the Army and Naval Chiefs of Staff. * They wanted to fight on. * But that’s why the Emperor was brought into the discussions to accept the Potsdam terms. * According to the report: * “So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel." * The report says the only thing the atomic bombings achieved was that they sped up the process. * The War Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff were looking for a way to surrender without losing face. * And the nuclear attacks gave them that. * Because the military were able to conclude that there was no way of defending the home islands against further atomic attacks. * So they could surrender without losing face. * But the report strongly suggests the Japanese would have surrendered anyway and probably pretty quickly after the Emperor got involved. * They had been trying to get the Soviets to intercede with the United States. * The Soviets, as we know, kept stalling until the Potsdam Declaration on 25 July. * Then they declared war on 9 August. * The made the decision to surrender on August 10 and they publicly accepted the Potsdam terms on August 15. * But in the 73 years that have passed since Hiroshima, poll after poll has shown that most Americans think that the bombings were totally justified—and, moreover, that they had saved a very significant number of lives which might otherwise have been lost in an invasion. * 56% of Americans according to a poll in 2015. * Which is down from 85% in 1945. * But it’s a lot considering that the Strategic Bombing Survey concluded as early as 1946 that it wasn’t necessary to get Japan to surrender. * And considering senior American military leaders from Admiral Leahy to MacArthur, Eisenhower and Woodrow Wilson all said they didn’t think the bombing was necessary. * So if it wasn’t necessary, why did it happen? * WHAT’S UP WITH THAT? * In 1990, J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission wrote: * The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it. * But does this mean dropping the bombs was wrong? * Not necessarily. * We obviously can’t put ourselves in the shoes of American leaders in 1945. * But I think there are two questions we CAN ask. * 1. Did American military and government leaders in 1945 think they had to use, or should use, th Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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