#84 - The Decision Part 2

What this episode covers

* By June 18 events had progressed to the point where Admiral Leahy was able to note privately in his personal diary: * It is my opinion that at the present time a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for America’s defense against any future trans-Pacific aggression. * This is two months before Hiroshima. * But also on June 18, when Grew spoke to Truman about brokering peace with the Japanese, The President shut him down. * He said he wanted to hold off until the Potsdam meeting. * Which, as we know, he was putting off to coincide with the Trinity test. * About 5000 American troops died between May and August. (page 22) * A total of 24,000 casualties during that period. * The Battle of Okinawa 1 April until 22 June, 1945. * If saving American lives was the objective, why not talk peace with the Japanese during this period? * Unfortunately we don’t know much about what Truman was thinking during these months. * Contemporaneous documents concerning Truman’s attitude at this time are scarce. * We have far fewer hard facts illuminating his calculations than we have concerning the thinking of Marshall, Stimson, and Grew. * Truman did give a public speech in June where he said his main priority was minimizing the loss of American lives. * And yet the invasion was set for November 1, 1945. * Which everyone knew was going to be a bloodbath. * Admiral Leahy said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. * Which suggests at least some people were worried about the optics. * McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, claims that at the June 18 meeting, he strongly advocated to Truman that they should spell out terms of surrender to the Japanese, assuring them that they could keep the Emperor, * The President said that is just what I have been thinking about. “Why don’t you draft something and take it to Jimmy Byrnes.” * Byrnes, as we know, was acting as a special advisor to Truman and was soon to become the Sec of State. * He also thought HE should be the President. * And he disliked Truman. * When McCloy took his proposal to Byrnes, it was shot down because Byrnes thought it would be considered a weakness on America's part to conclude the war without a total surrender. * So twice on June 18, Truman told people that he agreed with the idea of offering the Japs a deal. * But then Byrnes said no. * And it never happened. * Like the official Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946, the internal War Department report concluded the atomic bomb had not been needed to end the war. * Its assessment of the impact of the Soviet declaration of war paralleled that of American historian Ernest May: It was a “disastrous event which the Japanese leaders regarded as utter catastrophe and which they had energetically sought to prevent at any cost.…” * Had the atomic bomb not been available or not been used, the study concluded, it is “almost a certainty that the Japanese would have capitulated upon the entry of Russia into the war.…” * The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies. * The entry of Russia into the war would almost certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable. * And, as we know, American leaders had been trying to get the Soviets to engage with the Japanese since a few days after Pearl Harbour. * General George C. Marshall, June 18, 1945: "An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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