#85 - The Decision Part 3

What this episode covers

* Truman met often with Byrnes in the first few months of his Presidency. * But there are almost no records or notes of what they discussed. * And that was apparently Byrnes’ preference. * He was known as being paranoid about leaks. * a very devious politician * Truman referred to him as his “conniving” secretary of state * Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who liked Byrnes and found him personally charming, nevertheless had no illusions about him: “He was an operator. He was a kind of prior Lyndon Johnson.” * Throughout this period Byrnes spoke with the authority of—and personally represented—the president of the United States on all atomic bomb-related matters in the Interim Committee’s deliberations. * It is also quite clear that by early July 1945 when he was sworn in as secretary of state, Byrnes was firmly in control of U.S. foreign policy. * And as we’ve seen before - while Truman seems to have looked up to Byrnes as a mentor, Byrnes privately didn’t like Truman. * One of Truman’s close friends and advisers, his appointments secretary Matthew Connelly, later said that Byrnes thought Truman was "a nonentity, with no abilities to speak of, no knowledge of how to conduct foreign policy, or much else for that matter.” * Matthew Connelly later described Byrnes without reservation as “a very Machiavellian character,” adding that “I never trusted him.” * Similarly, Robert G. Nixon—who served as White House correspondent for the International News Service at the time—would later remark that “Byrnes looked down on Truman. He had a superior attitude.… He, in a sense, despised Truman … he looked upon Truman as an accident of history and not a very good accident at that.” * According to Clark Clifford, Admiral Leahy, who initially was favorably disposed towards Byrnes, came to regard him as a “horse’s ass.” * Bernard Baruch, the financier who presented Truman’s first nuclear arms control proposal at the United Nations in 1946, regarded his friend Byrnes as “power-crazy—that he wants to decide everything himself.…” * Averell Harriman recalled that after Potsdam, “I was through with Jimmy Byrnes … I didn’t want to have anything more to do with him.” * Almost immediately after taking office, Truman demonstrated his great trust in Byrnes by informing him of his intention to appoint him secretary of state sometime that summer—as, of course, he did. It should be kept in mind that the position of secretary of state carried far more weight in 1945 than it does today. * At the time, before the post of national security adviser was established, it was the premier Cabinet office. * Under then-existing law—with no vice president in office once Truman succeeded Roosevelt—the secretary of state was next in line of succession. * If anything happened to Truman, Byrnes would become president. * And of course, everyone knew that Byrnes *should* have been President. * He was going to be FDR’s Veep in the 1944 election - up until the very last moment, when Truman was picked instead. * Byrnes also appears to be a logical candidate for the adviser who convinced Truman to postpone meeting Stalin until the atomic bomb had been tested—one of the truly fundamental strategic decisions of the spring and summer. * Although our information is even more sketchy in this area, we have seen that his mandate—and his alone—included both atomic and diplomatic issues. * Moreover, all the other top advisers directly involved in diplomacy were pressing for an early meeting with Stalin, Thus, either Truman made the decision against their advice on his own or some other highly placed adviser concerned with the atomic bomb convinced him the new weapon would be critical in his approach to Stalin. * So everything points to Byrnes as the man who made the decision to bomb Japan. * Not to win the war - but as a message to Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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