86. Don Loeb | Metaethics

Do moral truths exist independently of our attitudes, and if they don’t, why should moral reasoning and disagreement still seem so substantive?My links: https://linktr.ee/frictionphilosophy.1. GuestDon Loeb is professor of philosophy at the University of Vermont, and his work has focused primarily on metaethical issues, including moral language, methodology, debating moral realism, and more.2. Interview SummaryThe interview starts by getting clear on what ‘moral realism’ amounts to: the host sketches it as (roughly) cognitivism + stance-independence + truth (and maybe an epistemic component), and Don Loeb pushes on what should count as definitional—especially whether “we know some moral facts” belongs in the definition rather than being a common realist commitment. From there, they use the “now what?” problem for error theory as a bridge to practice: even if metaethical theories differ, Loeb suggests that normative ethical deliberation can often proceed without much changing, because moral talk can serve familiar social and practical functions regardless of deep metaphysical disagreement. He illustrates this with an analogy: two people can participate in the same ritual (like saying grace) while privately attaching different theological interpretations to what they’re “doing,” and the shared activity still works for its purposes.Building on that, Loeb defends the idea that an anti-realist can engage in ordinary moral discussion “just like anybody else,” while declining the realist’s ontological commitments—so the real action, for many everyday and philosophical purposes, is in the normative attitudes, deliberations, and patterns of responsiveness people share. The interview then digs into how we should understand reasons—especially the contrast between instrumental reasons and reasons that might apply even when you don’t antecedently have the relevant goal. That debate leads into side-discussion of broader views in contemporary ethics (including moral particularism-style disputes), with the participants noting that some influential ways of writing about reasons can feel much clearer in conversation than on the page.A major theme of the second half is pressure-testing realism with “companion in guilt” style worries. One focal example is “gastronomic realism”: if the usual motivations for moral realism also seem to support objective facts about what foods are really good, that starts to look implausible—so the challenge is to say why moral value is importantly different. Loeb suggests there may be differences (including differences in how moral vs. gastronomic value show up in ordinary experience), even while emphasizing how the setup is meant to make the similarity feel uncomfortably close. They also discuss the “moral experience” argument for realism—roughly, the thought that moral experience presents morality as a realm of fact, and that we should accept that unless we have strong counterevidence—where Loeb is skeptical of both the experiential presumption and the inference to realism, comparing the structure to familiar arguments from religious experience and insisting that what’s needed is evidence, not just reports that “it seems that way to me (and my friends).”3. Interview Chapters00:00 - Introduction00:40 - Moral realism04:39 - Anti-realism and anti-factualism08:18 - Concern for non-factualism11:19 - Normative vs. metaethical attitudes12:25 - Is moral realism intelligible?24:34 - Reasons for belief26:20 - Gastronomic realism29:09 - Moral realism inert?31:07 - Moral naturalism34:32 - Non-naturalist realism37:13 - Reasons38:51 - Jonathan Dancy and reasons41:16 - Asymmetry with gastronomic realism43:03 - Moral experience50:00 - Philosophical and common use57:37 - Best explanation59:39 - Burden of proof1:02:14 - Evidence and theory selection1:05:04 - Strong seemings?1:06:56 - Descartes and studying philosophy1:10:16 - Moral disagreement1:11:55 - Eric Sampson and responses to disagreement1:18:24 - Realist response1:21:11 - Michael Huemer and phenomenal conservatism1:23:59 - Moorean shifts1:29:04 - Argument from moral experience1:30:50 - What is a good argument?1:32:17 - Companions in guilt1:37:41 - Epistemic reasons1:40:31 - Aesthetic value and value generally1:44:09 - Relativism and toleration1:45:24 - Other problems for realism1:47:29 - Moral facts vs. preferences1:55:02 - Folk usage2:03:19 - Value of philosophy2:05:57 - Conclusion This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fric.substack.com/subscribe