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Hello, everyone, and welcome to the CyberWires Research Saturday. I'm Dave Bittner, and this is our weekly conversation with researchers and analysts tracking down the threats and vulnerabilities, solving some of the hard problems and protecting ourselves in a rapidly evolving cyberspace. Thanks for joining us. we were able to identify a really sophisticated attack, malware campaign, and that evaded the client's entire security stack. But we found it really, really interesting because of some of the creative techniques it used, some of the ways it bypassed security mechanisms and was able to really expand its victim footprint. So we decided to dig deep, do the analysis, and publish on it. That's Brian Hussey, Senior Vice President of Howl or Sell Threat Services at Sideris. The research we're discussing today is titled Bad Ads, Worst Binaries.
Well, the research is a really effective story here. The storytelling itself is noteworthy. And you all begin the report with a first-time developer who's trying to install Claude Code. Why was it important to frame the story around that person? Well, that's just it. One of the things I think that made the story really interesting was its effectiveness of how it used SEO. I think any advertising firm would be very proud of the fact that this was able to get on front page for Google and other search engines. And really what that means is it took advantage of AI, which is the rage right now. You've got all of these people that I realized suddenly, hey, I can go build things. I'm not a coder, but I can go make an app. I can go do things and create things that was never possible before and use AI in a way to make them more effective. That's what we're all doing.
So you've got this legion of people that are looking up Anthropic, looking up Cloud, looking up ChatGPT, anything like that. And when the first page, and in some cases the first link, is to download a site that mimics Anthropic. It's important to say Anthropic is not compromised. This was a fake install site, but it mimicked Anthropic very, very well. So you've got all of these people that are launching towards AI, wanting to build something they've never built before, and are met with this page. And they don't know. They may not have the threat background that a lot of folks do. They may not have all the security mechanisms that some of the corporates do.
So we feel like the victim footprint is really, really large, taking advantage of the AI world that we're in today. And so that's part of the reason we wanted to kind of frame it like that. Say, could be a teacher, could be a small business person, and they're trying to leverage AI to improve their business or do something they haven't done before, and they're being taken advantage of. Well, let's walk through it together. You know, let's imagine that I'm one of those folks you described who's curious about this, what all the hype is around AI and CloudCode in particular. So I do a Google search or any of the search engines for CloudCode install. What happens next? Well, so right up at the top of your page, you've got the link that looks correct. You click on it. And from there, the whole attachment starts to run. After you click on that link, you get the legitimate looking site. You go to the download.
And there's an original ClickFix lure, which is really, really popular. In fact, I think even on your show a few weeks ago, you had a deep dive into that. So they tricked the user into pasting something in the Windows Run dialog command line that launches the MSHTA. From there, I think the attack gets really interesting because it downloads this polyglot file. What polyglot means is it can be two things, two legitimate things at once. So this polyglot file is an MP3. It's a music file. It's legitimate. It plays music. It looks legitimate to the user. And more importantly,
it looks legitimate to the Windows operating system. So this is, even though it has that malicious script embedded in it. So that malicious script runs, that launches directly into a new PowerShell loader, and that disables AMSI. So AMSI is the Microsoft anti-malware capability. And from this point on, this runs completely in memory. It is a, nothing touches a hard drive. It's all decrypted. It does a very good job of hiding from traditional defenses. But again, it bypasses the Windows AMSI, the anti-malware capability. And then it creates, it accesses everything on the computer.
creates an interesting, and I thought this was interesting as well, because it really disables the ability to use traditional threat intelligence, atomic IOCs, like hashes, domains, IPs, because it reaches out to a unique URL based on the computer's hostname and the username. A very large script, 17 megabytes. It's a massive script. Yeah, let me interrupt you there, because as you say, that is big. Why would attackers intentionally make such a large file? It would strike me that that would draw attention to itself. Well, in fact, just the opposite. It didn't, in fact, draw attention from any of the anti-malware capabilities, but what it did, it made it very challenging to deconstruct. So if you want to figure out if this is truly bad...
we send this massive file off to our reverse engineers. Not a lot of companies have full-time reverse engineers and security researchers to tear through this kind of stuff. They might seem to do a sandbox and then we completely defeat the sandbox and we get nothing from it. So our reverse engineers had to get through layers and layers of obfuscation, of encryption, because it was just, it hid in itself over and over again until we were finally able to tear through it all and understand what it did and how it did it. And that's how we really got the full concept of the attack.
Well, at the risk of getting a little bit in the weeds here, one of the things that you highlight in the research is that the attackers intentionally launched the 32-bit version of PowerShell instead of the 64-bit version, which is more common these days. Again, why did they make that choice? So, I mean, I think really just some of the older technologies, they don't have all of the same protections and all the same detections maybe that the modern one did. So it was backwards compatible with previous usages and it just ran very effectively. So I think that was just the fact that they knew it was going to run. I think it's probably why they made the choice.
You make the point that the final payload is loaded entirely into memory. Help us understand the advantage there. So yeah, so most tools, whether they be file-based or they be your EDR, or even if you're running a forensic investigation afterwards, is pretty reliant on something in the actual hard drive, something being saved to a temp file or something in the file being saved somewhere on the computer. In this case, nothing was saved. It all ran in memory and it was encrypted in memory. So, you know, there still are in-memory scanners that...
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You know, none of these techniques individually seem to be brand new. What makes this campaign stand out? Is it the clever way that they're strung together? Yeah, I think that's really, for me, that's really what it was. It's the fact that attackers seem to really anticipate the defenses. But you have any kind of file-based AV being bypassed by the polyglot MP3 file. You've got the AMC script scanning, right? The Microsoft's ability, anti-malware capability directly in the operating system. And that's being bypassed by patching in memory and twisting that flag so that it looks like there's no script there. It uses behavioral techniques with PowerShell to do a good job of evading any kind of EDR telemetry. The sandbox, any kind of analysis that would follow.
Again, very, very hard because of the size of 17 megabytes. The atomic ILCs, again, that's pretty much useless with every URL being unique to every individual computer. So I think just all of that working in concert with itself and the fact that even with a victim that had all of the defenses you would expect to identify this kind of attack creates zero alerts. So I mean, really, I think the evasion and the scope of the attack I think was really interesting. How do you rate this in terms of technical sophistication contrasted against just plain old good social engineering? I think the social engineering element is a part of this as well. Again, with the SEO poisoning in the anthropic install page. But I think when you combine the sophistication of the attack with the social engineering, that's really what sets it apart. Don't get me wrong. Any kind of phishing or vishing where you get somebody to click on something and you trick them into doing that is still a major concern right now.
But a lot of the times, you would expect that to be found by something in your security stack. The fact that this uses both that social engineering lure and then combines that with the capabilities that are going to be found by your technical security stack, I think that really kind of sets it apart. Let's talk about who they seem to be after here and what they seem to be after as well. Any indications there? So yeah, they're targeting it. It's an info stealer. At the end of the day, that's after that launching of techniques that we talked about. They launched an info stealer that steals all the credentials. So the users, all their passwords, access to their bank accounts, say crypto accounts, their corporate logins. So all of the hidden passwords, what they access, and now that the user's got it can go in and we'll have access to all those different accounts. So I mean, that's their target. It's more of a commodity style info stealer. So they're looking to...
They're looking to monetize this. They're looking to take money. There was not a direct attribution. We know that this went back to Russian IP space. We were not able to tie it to a known threat actor group. But the assumption is that it was a Russian cyber criminal group that was launching this attack and looking to, again, monetize it. So what are your recommendations for defenders to best protect themselves here?
Well, I think, you know, it's a good question. I think it starts with the human side. That's if we don't fall for the click fix lure in the beginning and we don't, you know, the user is kind of a bit more educated and realizes it's not necessarily required to run a command in normal install pages. That's a good start. And that starts from that kind of can stop it from the beginning. I think there's a number of other elements there that if you're assuming you have a SOC, you have, you know, if you're corporate, you have people that can do some hunting for you. There's a few key things to look for. Like MSHTA should not be making outbound connections, HTTPS connections. That's there's almost no.
legitimate time when that would happen. So that's something to look for. Again, you talked about the 32-bit PowerShell. It shouldn't be spawned from a common registered scheduled task. It's just unusual. It should be looked for. So there's a lot of the DNS queries to the C2 domain out in Russia. That's something that you might want to block as well proactively. So all these are items that can be hunted for by a threat hunting team. And you can put in some in your EDR, hopefully be able to block that ahead of time.
What about for the employees themselves? I think it's understandable that people would be curious about these AI tools. Is there an educational component here as well to make sure that they're sourcing them from the proper places or know how to handle them responsibly? Yeah, absolutely. I think that's kind of the key point, right? Just a continued education, continued phishing simulations. Look in the URL where you're downloading from. If it's supposed to be anthropic.com, and they can be really clever with this, right? I mean, sometimes even using Cyrillic languages for the A that looks just like an A in the English language. So it's really hard sometimes to spot the differences, but looking to see if the URL matches. Is this the official URL for where I'm supposed to be going? So doing everything they can to know that they're going the right way. And then even...
Even then, especially with AI, one of the things we see, especially with our hunting team, one of the services we provide is identifying who's logging in in a client environment. Who's logging into AI locations? What are their different tools? What are they uploading? What are they downloading? And you should really have a corporate AI where you're paying for a subscription and you have that guarded off. So your customer or your employees may be uploading. Company-specific information is protected and not out in the public. So that's a real dangerous sign as well. So having something I think that is the go-to, like this is the one you're allowed to install.
And having that be the only one that users can install is a good protection, especially when it comes to this kind of AI-based attack. Yeah, I mean, it strikes me that to think that these tools are anything but irresistible to certain users is maybe a bit naive. Our thanks to Brian Hussey from Sideris for joining us. The research is titled Bad Ads, Worst Binaries. Fake Claude Code Installer Drops Info Stealer. We'll have a link in the show notes.
And that's Research Saturday brought to you by N2K CyberWire. We'd love to know what you think of this podcast. Your feedback ensures we deliver the insights that keep you a step ahead in the rapidly changing world of cybersecurity. If you like our show, please share a rating and review in your favorite podcast app. Please also fill out the survey in the show notes or send an email to cyberwire at n2k.com. This episode was produced by Liz Stokes. We're mixed by Elliot Peltzman and Trey Hester. Our executive producer is Jennifer Iben. Peter Kilby is our publisher, and I'm Dave Bittner. Thanks for listening. We'll see you back here next time.
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