Approaching Parked Motor Vehicles

In this archive episode, Dennis explains approaching parked motor vehicles and the laws around this subject. Recorded on 08/07/2017. State v . Butler 1994 - http://www.leagle.com/decision/1994371278NJSuper93_1362/STATE%20v.%20BUTLER Under both the United States and New Jersey constitutions, a police officer has the authority to detain individuals without a warrant, on less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 502-504, 517 A.2d 859. And, in order to pass constitutional muster, the stop must be predicated upon specific and articulable suspicion that a person has been or is about to engage in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 504, 517 A.2d 859. The Court in Davis noted: A police officer charged with the duty of crime prevention and detection of the public safety must deal with a rich diversity of street encounters with citizens. In a given situation, even though a citizen's behavior does not reach the level of highly suspicious activities, the officer's experience may indicate that some investigation is in order. Depending on the circumstances, street interrogation may be most reasonable and proper. [Id. at 503, 517 A.2d 859]. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that under a narrowly defined and controlled set of circumstances, investigatory stops and detentions are constitutionally permissible even though based on less than probable cause. In State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 561, 461 A.2d 1155, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008, 104 S.Ct. 526, 78 L.Ed.2d 709 (1983), the Court explained: Our reading of Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), convinces us that for certain detentions — those that do not entail significant intrusions upon individual privacy or freedom, are productive of reliable evidence, and can be effectuated without abuse, coercion or intimidation — no probable cause in the traditional sense is necessary in order to obtain the authorization of a judicial officer[.] We conclude that, under a narrowly defined set of circumstances, such detentions can be constitutionally permissible. Davis, 394 U.S. at 727-28, 89 S.Ct. at 1398, 22 L.Ed.2d at 681. Strictly limiting the circumstances under which such detentions take place insures that the restrictions upon individual privacy and freedom interests are minimized so that a showing of need upon less than traditional probable cause can be tolerated. See United States v. Place, supra, [462] U.S. [696] at [703], 103 S.Ct. [2637] at 2642 [77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)] (minimally intrusive detention can be supported on less than probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1983) (permitting police to conduct stop and frisk upon less than probable cause); Michigan v. Long, [463] U.S. [1032], 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (permitting police to conduct protective search for weapons in passenger compartment of car upon less than probable cause); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (permitting search upon probable cause determined by administrative standards). In evaluating whether an officer has acted reasonably under the circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909. In other words, the test for reasonable suspicion is whether [b]ased upon the whole picture the detaining officer [had] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678, 542 A.2d 912 (1988) (quoting Cortez,...