Welcome back to the new thing. I'm David Barr and the thing is always my good friend Alex, how are you? I like how after that. He's just disc, Greg, good at me.
I do. How are you? I'm feeling better for my COVID. Yeah, I'm happy to hear it.
I was also happy to read on Twitter that I'll be dying within the next two to three years and I've never even had COVID. So it's nice to let you work. Do you not ask, COVID? No, no, yeah.
Oh, wow. Good for you. Yeah. My good friend Greg, Greg, just fine.
It's good to be here. Good to see you guys. Another guy just three episodes. Yeah.
Maybe Eric Adler will be happy about that. Eric and his wife. No, no, it's not like that. It's just that.
No, no. How's all we take that? No, it's just my boys. Right.
So Alex, I'm really excited about today's show. I'm mega-s excited. No, I mean, it's not every day that we get to talk about the soul of one of our co-hosts. I mean, we all know that Greg is one of the nicest, most noble, honest, upset.
I'm on it. And that's just a day in Europe. It still reminds you of it too, every day. And so today we're going to get to talk about his little portion of Aristotle's ethics.
That's true. Greatness of soul. Greg's old man. Greg's old man.
So this is all about that. It makes no difference whether we examine the characteristics of the person's of greatness, of soul is greatness of soul. That's the clear etymological link. Yeah.
So this is, that's good. Would you guys say that this is one of the more popular parts of the ethics? I think so. I mean, at least in certain circles, that doesn't give you all for everybody, right?
And I think that you can read it and you have two reactions. So one is, I fall terribly short of this. And the other is, oh, I have flashes of greatness and soul. You have lightning vaults or something to work toward.
That's so funny. I confess, I just taught it this evening with a mutual friend of ours, David, Dustin Pion. He's teaching at Mercer College right now. So they've got this continuing education program and he asked me the guests lecture, but I didn't really lecture about this.
And I don't know if this is a bad foot to start off on, but you know, when I read about the great soul man, I can't help but I think he's a jerk. I don't think he's like, I'm not sure. Like, I sounds a terrible person to be around. You know, it's been time with this guy.
He's too good for us. You know, it seems like a, I don't know. I was sort of off by him. He's even greater than the great soul man.
That's right. That's right. Yeah. No, I think, again, we'll maybe we can be above me.
Sort of give us an office of this of these passages. I think it's hard to imagine how some of these great soul men is definitely a top note at bottom. Anyway, how do we get on this? Killies.
Oh, yeah. He's not Patrick, please. I'm not. He's definitely not.
Well, a little great soul man. Volume three. It's well. Anyway, I, it's hard to imagine that such a person exists.
I know in Charles and circles people trade this letter from Strauss to somebody about Churchill. Yeah. I actually have that. He says, I know from my experience how incomprehensible and foreign to me is, was aerosols constant and greatness of soul originally, and that I now, not only theoretically, but rather also practically, approve it.
A human being like Churchill proves that the possibility of greatness of soul today exists precisely as it did in the fifth century. B.C. Oh, whoa. I man, thank you for reading that.
I thought that he pulled his punches a little bit more. Where does he say that? I thought he would say something like these are closest approximation of this fabled. No, he's he's, I mean, this is a strong term.
This is a letter to learn of it in 1946. So, this is just at the end of World War II, right? Like, obviously reacting to sort of, but he, and years later when Churchill died, he gave a eulogy where he, I think, reiterated the sentiment sort of. In class, wasn't it at Exteniparaneous, the remarks about, yeah.
So yeah, so on the one hand, he got my sort of this guy might be a jerk, but on the other hand, I think the reason why he's so popular, the great soul man, whether there is an indication that it might also be a woman or that a woman might be able to have this class as well. On the one hand, you have the chair unbelievable. Well, I'll let's see. It's a, it's a, how does he say his honor or what is the, the word in Greek for man?
Yeah, on air. Great soul. It's just masculine, Megalas, Megalas, so whatever, right? So it's a masculine guy.
But he does, there's this discussion of Thedas and I think that there's the implications there that you might have had, something like this as well. Maybe Alex will talk about that. So on the one hand, you have this, I was just to go back out. There's this, my impression is that this guy's a bit of a jerk, but on the other hand, I think the reason this is one more popular parts of the book as you were mentioning is because it applies to Churchill or to Lincoln or to Washington or to, you know, great statesmen.
I think that's who we tend to sort of attribute this virtue to. And much like a great, old man, Greg, will not mention himself and so it applies to Greg McBrayer. Obviously, obviously, because it's a good reminder. You guys don't stay well, though.
I'm hungry for money. This is an audio podcast. You guys don't see that. The great soul man is known for having beautiful, useless objects, right?
And so you can see in the background of Greg, there's some paintings and some chalices and some busts and gills and beautiful, but not useless, but certainly not used as also his wife is in the background, isn't she? No, no, no. I thought you were saying that you're going to see the volume of Xenophon Solenica. That's true.
That is beautiful. Also useless. So it's really quick. Can we, can somebody give an overview?
Where does this fall in the core support ethics? Like where? The middle, the beginning, and then what two arguments is it? Sorry, what two concepts is it nestled between?
And then just a quick overview because we're talking about the great soul man as if everybody's familiar with definition by Aristotle. Well, I can, I'll take a stab at it. So the very beginning of the ethics, Aristotle's. I think you're rough, but we need to talk about what translation we're using.
You know, we can talk about what translation we're using. That's important. I'm using a manuscript that's newly been digitized by the University of Oxford. I'm using 16th century manuscript.
That's what I'm using. What are you using Alex? The translation by Susan D Collins. Mm.
And. Or Chicago Press. And Bobby B. Sorry, well, I just, I was trying to go for the equity angle.
But you know, you could be. Yeah. Or into you. Okay.
So how does this fit into this, this work is all? Yeah, how's it stand? It's great. Tell me how it's sandwiched.
Yeah. Well, I mean, I'll skip to the chase, right? The book opens with discussion of happiness. And sort of what's the best way of life?
There's some discussion about various possibilities. The life of money making life, honor, a couple of others. He says he's not going to discuss them all. There's some questions about the actual life and happiness.
He divides intellectual and moral pursuits. But then at the end of book two, book two, chapter seven, he just, we decide that the life is the best life is the vote to virtue. And so he listened book two, chapter seven, a number of virtues, depending on how you count could be 11 or 12. And then he goes through 11 virtues when he's began to take up the virtues and book three events of cowardice.
That's beginning in book three, chapter six. He does, he treats cowardice over the course of three chapters. Then he moves on to moderation. And there's, he goes through, as I mentioned, nine other virtues.
So the first one is courage. The fifth one that we're treating tonight is called megalosucia, or greatness of soul, or magnanimity. And then there's another potential peak of justice, which is the final one he goes through. So it seems to be something of, it starts out strong, descends, there's an ascent, another decline in another sense.
So it seems like if I were to, all of their own, but it seems to me that courage, greatness of soul and justice are the three principal or most important ones that he deals with. So we're in the midst of him examining the moral virtues. And this is one of the possible peaks of moral virtue. Let me add to that, that when he, when he sets out the highest peaks of moral virtue, greatness of soul and justice are really, and maybe in some tension.
So, detention, absolutely. And I think, for instance, when you look at, so when you look at the great soul, man, you can think of it as a hero or aristocrat, or the sort of, or do you have like chivalrous virtue, would be a later manifestation of this. And I think it's, it's helpful to think, look at this new lens of Hobbes, and here I'm just creeping off of a strawsus book on Hobbes, but one way to think about modern liberalism, and the world in which we live in, is that it favors the peak of justice, a peak of virtue that is justice, and that is more egalitarian over and against the peak of virtue that is greatest of soul or kind of aristocratic or heroic virtue. Right.
And in that sense, I think that helps to clarify why the great soul man might to us seem kind of ridiculous or strange and foreign or not aristocratic. Well, can you do it? We're not really egalitarian, and we don't like how we're justice people. Right.
And this is where, this is where I think one of the things Strauss's letters touching on in 46, he already written the Hobbes. This is a risk of credit type is still there. Yeah, he thought it was like a foreign thing and originally like, unrelatable and incomprehensible. And then he sees Churchill, he's like, no, I get it.
This is still a type of possibility. But is it still a type in 2022? I mean, Churchill was the product of an older age when maybe there was still less aristocratic undercurrents in Great Britain. It's possible you embody it, or I get it.
I know, I know. Really quick. Greg, can you take a stab since this is just a mere description of yourself? Can I give it a what is Aristotle's definition?
I know there's something who wants to it. Right. Sure, sure. So it seems to be concerned this great, this man who is a great soul man seems to be concerned above all with honor.
I'll have to clarify that in just a moment. But he seems to be really concerned with honor. He's he doesn't like to be prey. There's paradoxically there for he doesn't like to be praised except sort of great phrases by great people.
He's sort of he really holds onto grudges. He doesn't like being insulted. He doesn't really seem to care very much about money. He doesn't admire or wonder at things.
He doesn't speak a lot about himself or others. He has a deep voice, maybe more like Alex Dree rather than Greg DeG He also have a public he has a public facing or sorry a public spiritedness about him. You don't catch the great old man hunched over as a copy editor. Right.
We see this type more in political things. Well, yes, yes. Well, we'll talk about this at the end. There's a second possible great sold man type.
But the first type, yeah, I mean, you're right. I mean, you do seem in the political arena, but it seems like he mostly stays out of politics unless something big is happening in politics. This makes me laugh every time. You get the guy just sitting around waiting for big things happening.
Like, just waiting like, oh, oh, oh, 9-11, not big enough. Not big enough. He just constantly waiting for something big. And this maybe I'm just leaning in a little too much to where I think so.
He's a very serious guy. And therefore he can come off as a little bit laughable because he is so, so serious and demands only really serious occasion. Let me give you a couple of things. You already talked about Churchill, right?
I mean, like how he longed for the opportunity for something big to display his virtue. And you see this in his own kind of his early life. He recognized this kind of stuff was kind of silly. He didn't get fun.
But what he really wanted was a grand opportunity to show himself. And so on the one hand, he wants to be completely independent. And on the other hand, he needs this opportunity to display his excellence. Or even Lincoln, I mean, by his own autobiographical account, right?
Like he jumps back into politics because of the Kansas brass guy. So it's like some big event thrust him back into politics. You know, we thought he was out, but it brought him back in. But what I don't understand with those two, with those two examples in particular, I thought the great old man, Coriolanus sometimes had to see aspects of the good old man.
They're supposed to because of their, their, their, their breeding and their, you know, they don't necessarily have to be wealthy, but they tend to be wealthy. They're supposed to disdain common opinion. But in the examples of Lincoln and Trish, especially Churchill, the written record they left behind shows that there is a concern for their reputation. Also with Washington, I was just reading a former guest on the show.
There was no longer do I forgot even that it was Robert Faulkner. Robert Faulkner talks a lot about Washington in this regard. And he has some interesting... I got the great example.
Yeah. I'm just going to read this for page 28 in his book, The Case for Greatness. He says, consider Washington again. As a young soldier, he was, quote, two desires of acquiring all the honor and quote, complain to Britain's agent for Indian affairs, even as President Jefferson recalled.
When Washington's temper broke its bonds, he was most tremendous in his wrath. Still the eruption over Washington restored the bonds. And he goes on to say that apparently he would be just most upset and he cared most about what the... Right, so here it is.
He felt attacks on the press, quote, more than any person I ever met with. So apparently very sensitive to. So this is the kind of guy getting angry at tweets. Yeah, well there's this great story we joke about.
Sometimes you were called... You may know the Stu Greg where Washington is at the dinner party and then some David Barr type comes up. He thinks their friends would watch and slops him on the back. He's like, hey, d*** sucker.
And Washington just gets this cold stare. The guy slowly removes his arm. I hope he... Yeah.
The tweets... I was asking these students, these are all these students were returning students. They were all mature adults. And I said, can we give examples of a great soul man after we've gone through some of these descriptions?
And they said Trump. And I thought he does share some of the characteristics, namely really taking offense and insult, I think. And probably some other examples do, but there were some other ways in which I didn't think that quite worked. But they were also...
Everything is... And his house is beautifully gold and useless. Yeah. But the problem is he does, I mean, he is concerned with money, which is the great soul man that Gordon Aerosol is not something he's concerned with.
So there's at least one striking difference. For sure. But anyway, there were other examples. I sort of apparently Dustin said that when he teaches this, by his recount, his students typically report to him that Kim Kardashian, that someone they say is great soul, that's struck me as somewhat preposterous.
But when he said this to the students, they're like, no, but her husband is like a great soul man. So I don't know if you think Kanye is great soul or not, but... Really? Yeah, I'm really...
He seems to really not like the insults. I mean... Yeah. So is Aerosol the...
What's great about Kim Kardashian, I'm not taking another soul. Yeah, that one didn't make any sense to me, but they also mentioned a number of boxers. That seems correct to me because there's a certain amount of... I think the boxing type is sort of this...
If you need a sort of popular representation of it, or maybe it's great soul on a small scale, which maybe that sounds kind of ditry, but this person who goes into the arena all by himself, and you can't imagine a sort of humble boxer. It just doesn't make sense, right? No, they have this... Obviously, it's obviously the greatest.
I'm the greatest. I'm the greatest of all time. I'm the most honest. And so there's this self-like disbelief for this, maybe you're just trying to convince yourself, but you're the greatest that there is.
And I think one of the problems that we try to understand it is due to the influence of Christianity, I think we probably get confused because this sometimes gets aligned with... with pride. And for us, humility is virtue. And for Aristotle, humility is a kind of vice because it's a kind of deception or lying about your actual worth.
One last thing about the great soul man is basically the first thing Aristotle says, actually, so I want to make sure we say it. He then, the great soul man, I'm sorry, he then who deems himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them, is held to be great soul. So it's this alignment between thinking you're awesome and actually being awesome. Can I pick up on the comment you made about?
Yeah, hold on. Can I ask a quick question? Yeah. Thinking you're awesome and being awesome.
Well, thinking you're awesome being held to be awesome, be fair. And being held to be awesome, but then you're being held to be awesome. These honors are bestowed unto you by other people. It seems like there's a rank ordering of human-type soul types.
The philosopher still has the great soul man. The way the philosopher's soul is greater than the great soul man. Is Aristotle doing something where he's trying to set the great soul man in opposition to the philosopher? Or is he collapsing the...
Sorry, maybe cut that out, Jake. No, no, no, no. No, no, no, no, no, no, no. Eric, I mean, Greg, sorry, I confused you because you're all great soul.
But let me pick up on the humility thing. I think Greg should pick up on the philosopher thing with the... Sure. But just on this question about humility, Aristotle actually says that to be worthy of great things, but deem yourself worthy of less than your worth, is a vice of smallness of soul.
We would call that humility. And we actually expect heroes to deny that they're great. We expect great people to say, oh, I'm just not much. I'm shocked.
But really for Aristotle, that's a vice. Now, I think the interesting point here is that the converse is not the case, right? While somebody who thinks they're worthy of greater things than he is worthy might be vague. He's not the case in all situations, right?
And in fact, there might be somebody who deems that and he is actually close to the virtue. So it turns out that the real defect is humility. That's not the real virtue of a hero. So that's another place where I think Christianity has had a real effect on how we could appreciate this.
No, close, because pride is a sin. And so, the megalosucia would almost be sinful for Christians, I think. Absolutely. You know, I had to go on.
Go on. Well, just before we turn to the flosser part, I just want to say, I think Aristotle is critical of this type. And the simplest level is that this person believes that his soul is bigger than human soul. Right?
There's a kind of way in which you think you're unproportional. You think you're, I don't know any better way to relate that. But you have an outsized understanding of how great you are. Right?
Like Achilles really is just a man in the end. And he is mortal and he dies and he regrets it, according to the honesty. So there's this way in which your self-understanding is exaggerated, overblown, and misguided. Your self-understanding is wrong.
Like they're all kinds of ways, like you think you're bigger than you are. You think you're free from the honor of the people and you're entirely self-sufficient, independent, but you're entirely dependent upon the praise and honor of others to feel like Achilles really wants, I mean, it's the dishonor that bothers him so much. Yeah, it's strange, because Aristotle emphasizes early on that the great soul man has kind of self-awareness or self-knowledge of his greatness, right? Yeah, he's aware.
But, but it's strange. It's not self, it is a, I think it's actually a good way to get to the philosopher question, but there's a kind of self-knowledge, but it's only as regards to honor. It's not in any deep or pervasive sense, right? Another version of the problem you mentioned is that, so the great soul man is worthy, only accepts things that he's actually worthy of, but, you know, if the city doesn't have that much going on, he'll accept something a little subpar and go with it.
And on the one hand, that looks like, initially that looks like a real problem for the great soul man, like he's accepting second best. But then there's this other part, which is honor is the greatest of the external goods. The great soul man doesn't like to be done a benefaction. So it seems like the great soul man needs to accept something beneath him, so that he doesn't feel obligated, otherwise it's too equal a transaction.
So, I mean, there's a number of ways to approach this confusion, but one is he has to accept the honor for people that he basically has contempt for, that's like the Coriolanus problem, right? The other is that he says he does support honors, but he needs to accept honors beneath him, otherwise it'll be too equal and then he and the people will be on a par, right? So I think there's a deep sort of awareness of his greatness and then a kind of self-delusion. And when you start to tease this out, I think you start to realize that if you're going to be actually great souls, the self-awareness or the self-knowledge aspect needs to be pushed also in the direction of analyzing this kind of confused concern with the honor.
But help me out here, sorry. One question. Okay. So Achilles is a jerk.
He probably wants to have been a time, and he seems kind of hard to be around. And the other examples he gives of other people, as if he's sort of seems insufferable. Churchill seems to have been a pleasant company. He doesn't seem, I mean, so when Charles says this is the guy, he doesn't seem to have been, I mean, they're all kinds of great stories about him, but was he sort of easily slided?
Was I guess Washington by that account, the guy put his hands back, that does sound like he was easily slided, but you don't get that sense out of Lincoln. Lincoln seems much more democratic. Yeah, I mean, or at least the way that Churchill writes his history is the Great Wars. He's like, Churchill doesn't seem all my detractors.
It's all good. And he doesn't seem like external good. He seems to enjoy another thing. Achilles throws his life away in this way.
It doesn't seem like anything Churchill would have done. Or even Lincoln? I don't know. On the Lincoln, there's a great quote again in Faulkner's analysis on page 17 of the case of Granny's He says, Abraham Lincoln once hoped that he understood, quote, the inside of a gentleman.
However, deficient he might be in the quote, unquote, outside polish. So he somehow, I think, understood the interior but lacks this sort of exterior. Greg, I was reviewing the ethics. I haven't studied it in many years, but so this is a genuine question.
I have to read your Alex. Is the great old man? I noticed that there is no from Aristotle, educative portion of this virtue. The other virtues, like courage, he's like, oh, you want to know our courage?
Go out and throw a spear. All right. And like, so he's kind of giving you guides on how to recalibrate one cell, calibrate one cell properly to achieve the other virtues. This greatness of soul is purely descriptive.
There's no prescriptive element. And I was wondering, hey, if I'm remembering this correctly, is the correct observation to be if you make anything of it. Because it sounds right to me. Then you wonder where this great soul man come from.
You wonder why Aristotle doesn't wish to issue any corrective to like, yeah. I don't know if this helps, but as you think about the different alternatives for happiness in book one, you think through what it would mean to be devoted to moral virtue. It seems like there's some virtue itself is not single in people's minds. And so they have different understand what virtue is.
So if you're more inclined to identify virtue with the noble or beautiful, maybe that manifests in courage in a certain way. And maybe this honor loving type, maybe the great soul man is sort of the culmination of the honor loving type. And so there are these different types within the category of people who are attracted by virtue. And I think I'm mentioning the education of Cyrus and this regard because it seems like these, Zenith and I think, thanks that some of these people are honor lovers by nature.
They're sort of in them by nature. But I also, as I was walking over here thinking this through, it was in my mind tonight. I was actually thinking through, is this, is the reason the great soul man is one of the possible pieces of virtue? Is it because he's the one who's thought through most seriously what the life devoted to moral virtue would like such that he issues even his own happiness?
Like he wants to throw away his soul. I mean, it sounds like there's nothing, what's good in his life? Where in the text do you see that he is giving over to introspection? Okay, that would be shifting gears.
I'll switch to the introspection. But what I guess what I mean is like, he's, I don't mean to say that he's reflected on the character version and sort of thought his way to this. What I mean is sort of, there's this, like he's so attracted to virtue that he sustains people who have these second interciary attachments to it. Like I wanted to have no benefits whatsoever to me except then of course he does want the honors.
But the introspection, there's this turn, this is in chapter three, the chapter of course. He says, 1125, the great soul man has also not given to admiration since nothing is great to him. And Collins and Bartlett note that that word admiration can also be wonder. And so, what do I, why am I mentioning this obscure word?
What he seems to be saying here, Aristotle is that this great soul man is not given introspection. He does not wonder about the world. He doesn't think about these things. Like he's completely unfilissable.
There's this sort of, I think you were just making the claim that he had five will. Yeah, sorry. So, so I think on the one hand, this guy, there's something about wonder that recognizes your own deficiency and smallness. And so this guy, I don't, nothing surprises me.
Nothing's wonderful or nothing inspires wonder. But on the other hand, I think there are a couple of cell indications here that there's this other type, and he mentions irony, for example. And so there's this suspicion that one has that Aristotle is talking about Socrates or the philosophers also being great-sold. And this is confirmed not here.
And I think in the Nicrukian ethics philosophy is there and it bubbles up to the surface sometime and goes back down. And in some of his other writings, Aristotle is a little more openly pro philosophy here. I think he's pro-Gentlemen, pro-Moral virtue, it relates to this is a little controversial. But in the posterior analytics, he actually makes much more clear that there are these two types of great-sold men.
I'll just read this passage from posterior analytics. This is from book two of the posterior analytics. I may illustrate this earlier, which is was not what I thought that book was about. I was extremely disappointed first time I read it.
Me too. Aristotle says, I may illustrate my meaning as follows. If we were inquiring what the essential nature of pride greatness of soul is, we should examine instances of great-sold men to know of what they see and see what is such they have in common. For example, if Alcibiades was great-sold or Achilles and Ajax were great-sold, we should find un-inquiring what they all had in common.
And that was intolerance of insult, none of them like being insulted. It was this, which drove Alcibiades to war, Alcibiades' wrath, and Ajax to suicide. That's one genre of great-sold men. On the other hand, we next examine other cases, Lysander, for example, or Socrates.
And then if these have in common indifference alike to good and ill-forgian, I take these two results and acquire what common elements have equanimity amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonor. If they have none, there will be two genera of greatness of soul. So there might be two manifestations of it. And here, and we've done several episodes on the ethics at this point.
I've stressed many times that I think up until book six, for the beginning of book seven, Aristotle is treating this in Greek from a sub-philosophic point of view. And so here, I think in his account of greatness of soul, he's suppressing the philosophical term. But it's still there as a possibility. No, I think that's right.
You question about that line of arguing you laid out about wonder. On that basis, some people have come to the bar and say, well, yeah, he can't be a philosopher. He must be wise. And it's just like, no, you've completely been a philosopher.
But this is one of the issues is he seems to have all the virtues. Is he the perfect king of the end of book three of the politics? No, that's too much of a political office. He's some sort of strange figure.
Can I go back to something? David, you mentioned that point. I think this is such a good point about it. It doesn't seem like something you can educate yourself.
And one way I think to make sense of that is to point out that he calls greatness of soul an ornament or crown of the virtues. Right. So it's somehow it's like you're working on the other virtues. You get them, you've got to develop them and then you get really big and juicy and plump and strong and they're throbbing and they all kind of throw together.
And then you've got this large pulsating protuberance of virtue and then like this little crown emerges on and that's great. And so there's a way in purple crown. Yeah, it's like a purple crown with a pretty good trip. I don't think guys are talking about an area.
No, but I think it's an interesting point because it seems and then he later says that the vices like smallness of soul, right, don't actually have harm. Like when somebody demands less honor than they deserve, it's not really something that harms them really in a concrete way or the city. And likewise, if somebody demands too much in their vein, like you kind of can just shrug it off. So it's a strangely of virtue doesn't really seem to have to do with action per se, except maybe in the selection of actions you take like you really want the greatest ones.
And so I mean, I start wondering, is this even like really a virtue? Like what actually is this? It strangely is like this weird emanation or something from the other virtues as they throb and pulsate like a hot but they, but, but, you know, I think you can't habituate yourself. I mean, I agree with you.
I don't think you can't habituate yourself precisely because it's like a strange perception of the other virtues or some strange help me out though. Here's my problem with he says you're right. He says is the crown of the virtues or it's like a born into the shoes, but I'm going to go through them. You tell me.
Okay. So it's so he's got all the other ones in this one's the crown because he's got them all courage. Is the grace old man courageous. That's a great word.
We could spend time in this on this. Right. Is he moderate? He doesn't strike.
Let's just say yes, no, maybe. Yeah, it doesn't strike for any of them. That's kind of like one. Okay.
So I'll just say I'll just go through them quickly. I'll give my quick answer which I have to courage maybe, but I actually think there's some tension with his courage and what encourages us to describe earlier. Which is not courage at all. It's like fear.
It's like there's no fear. Yeah, he's like fear is beneath me. Right. Moderation.
Okay, maybe. But maybe only the other difference not of a kind of cultivation of the virtue of moderation. Is he liberal with money? No, he doesn't care about money.
Right. So. Magnificent. I mean, is he friendly?
We read Aristotle's army since I think of like a guy with a feather bower. So that's definitely not the great soldier. I mean, so great. Do you think that Aristotle includes this here as a because these types do crop up in that?
Yes. Sometimes we're prone to praise them or admire them. It's a kind of a warning, but he's trying to make us aware. Not to fall for it or what's he doing in the section?
I guess I'm being too hard. I think I'm maybe it's my mood today, but I'm sort of finding this guy in an impressive and I think that you guys would be ending up by saying how popular this great soul man is. And so I do think it's something very attractive about the idea of great soul. It's just not clear to me that the text bears that sympathy for this out.
That's why I thought I'll do it. I know that's unfair question, but what do you know? I don't know. I mean, I think you're right.
Just to tell us that there are these types. I think I meant what I said. I'll circle back to what I said. It's called months ago.
The attachment to virtue might manifest in more than one way. Am I more interested in equality? Okay. Maybe I think justice is the most important virtue.
Am I more interested in nobility or self sacrifice? Maybe I'm more interested in courage. Am I more interested in sort of honor? Maybe that manifests itself.
And by the way, these types can look similar. I think that Achilles could look like he's courageous and that's what it's all about. But if it's magnificence or if it's great enough souls, excuse me, it's magnanimity that maybe it's not courage. No, I think I'm apologizing.
Yeah. If it is a kind of warning, but it's air cells that pains to make us aware of this human type who may not be as good or greatest he or she seems, then why is he placing it right here before? I guess I'm just confused about its place. Let me try to defend it a little bit against this.
Yeah, please. I'm sorry. As a result of like modern liberalism, we're like not ready to look at it. But there is a sense in which you might strive for this or that virtue and try to acquire them.
And you might have a good confident sense of what you're capable of. You don't want to expand your energy and whatever all of these are less or activities and you're looking for a real crisis in the way that Lincoln, you know, as Greg brought up, waited for the Kansas National Act. And he says, now, now I need to step in. This is something worthy of me and a kind of self-restraint.
And I think when you look at it that way, there is, I think there are some laughable or comic elements. I don't want to reject that on hand because I agree with Greg on all of those points. But I think there is a way in which somebody who has taken more virtue seriously would want a real crisis. Now, there might be some confusions and problems that arise about it.
But also what a great person to have. Like, I mean, who like a Lincoln who could actually do something there and could accomplish something there. So, I mean, it might be confused and more virtue is a fraught situation, right? Like people have conflicting sentiments when they go into moral situations and they want to prove their excellence.
But still, you do have to admit that somebody who does actually possess these virtues and is worthy of a great crisis. Should they come up, come against one and perform accordingly, you would look on them with a kind of greatness. Now, when you take that sentiment to its extreme, I do, like as Aristotle does on the theoretical level, I do think you come up with some comic elements. But in its more diluted form in the Lincoln or a Churchill where there's a great example of Lincoln when they were doing that, Lincoln movie with Daniel Day-Lewis, and they released audio of his voice, which was historically accurate.
Apparently Lincoln had a more high voice and was a little squeaky. People got angry with it. Like, this isn't what Lincoln, you know, sounds like he's supposed to have like a noble deep voice. Oh, it's going on seven years ago.
Our forefather said, what on this continent? We're going to the whole world. Yeah, yeah. We're going to make a stop like Mickey Mouse.
We'll fight them on the pages. We'll fight them on the show. Churchill, it's a lot of hilarious things. I'm a bit tired of the line.
But yeah, it's, you know, so we have these expectations, they're real expectations that I think Aristotle's bringing up. Nevertheless, I do think you have to, as theoretically, as much as you might critique them theoretically refine certain aspects of a comic, you do have to admit that when somebody does have this virtue, it is deserving of a great crisis, right? You would be surprised. Sure.
The one curiosity about this, and this is, I mean, think about this, right? Justice seems to be connected to the political community in an obvious way. Like the just human being wants to benefit the political community. The great, old man benefits the political community if an opportunity rises.
But not really to benefit the city, right? I mean, mostly because the benefit of the city is what will allow him to shine. Does that make sense? Like, doing my duty versus like, all right, now there's a time where I can go show that I'm the man.
I mean, you do need things to be messed up. Yeah. Yeah. Right.
In that respect, I interpret the great, old man as a potential danger to having the city. Sure. It's great when they crop up and they're, you're able to kind of use them or they use themselves with themselves in motion to good effect. Right.
But they can cause a lot of trouble to. Sorry. No, no, no. So I mean, I was thinking about this great with your thesis about Cyrus.
Yeah. Yeah. I was like, if you were great sold, but there wasn't a crisis, the crisis might just be your disappearance. Like, okay, there wasn't a crisis.
But if I disappear, I'll just wait. It's going to help. Right. So your thesis being right that Cyrus prepared for the collapse of Persian is absolutely right.
That might be one way in which a great sold man. This is kind of petty and small, but there is something tacitly small. I think about the great sold man. Well, I mean, I was thinking about Cyrus a lot in this, right?
He doesn't, he doesn't like to have good things done for him. He's not interested in external things, right? He's a sort of benefit others, but has a shame to receive a benefit of action. Even the wondering at nothing at the very end, when Cyrus establishes himself as emperor, Zenefen says he took pains to make sure that he appeared not to wonder anything.
And that even though it's underneath him, he made sure that they not appear to wonder anything. So there is this element of grace. So there's no, you know what else is absent? Should I notice?
Maybe I'm wrong? No, I like that habituation thing was huge, by the way. This really is a, there's no mention of the great sold man and the propagation of the family. So, I mean, he says he has, he has only useless, beautiful things, like no toilets.
No, no, no desire to pass his way of life. Yeah, and so no family. I mean, you know, that's how the politics helps with Cyrus. Yeah.
Yeah. So we should talk now, I think we should. Well, even Coriolanus, right? Doesn't want to happen.
You're talking about family down, but even Coriolanus doesn't have family up either. And I wonder what that is. He's got that weird thing with his mom, right? Right.
Right. Right. Well, we all the, I do wonder what kind of a step you could put on a great sold man run amok then, because the familial ties don't bind the things of the city bind only to a certain extent, but he's disdainful of him. The city should not raise a line club, but if it does, it should submit to its ways.
Is that from Alex B? No, that's where we're starting for Alex. But can we, I think we talked with that is about. Yeah, that's what I thought.
So, but maybe one, I think Greg wanted to talk about this. Maybe now we could transition to the question of the gods, because I think a lot of these impossibilities point to a kind of inhumane or a superhuman desire in the great sold man and maybe the medical suit gross isn't even a human being. I mean, the two examples Aristotle uses are a God and a city. So, I mean, these are, so this is within the chapter of the others obviously uses human examples of the exterior analytics.
So, the implication, this is at 1124 B15, hence theatus to not speak of the manufacturing she had done for Zeus, nor did the Laconian speak of those they had done for the Athenians, but only those they had been done. So, in this sentence, is it he just recognizing that Zeus is a great sold man? That's why she didn't speak of the benefits of the fact that she had done to him. No, she's so she recognizes that he'll find it insulting if she points out that she benefited him.
Yeah, I mean, he's just said that they like to talk about that I don't remember whatever benefaction they may have done. They've done, but not that was the end up. So, that is nose better than to bring this up around Zeus. Yeah, of course, she does as far as letting Colin's point out on the footnote, but right, right, right.
And then the same thing with Athens. You're literally like magic. Yeah, so this gets to my Cyrus point too. I don't know if you want to go this way, but I don't know if this is what you meant when you bring this up.
But this great sold human being, what kind of a person thinks life their life is is you can just throw it away, that their life is meaningless. There's got to be an implicit belief that your soul is bigger than your life. Right. So this is the type that thinks it's sort of a demigod or something like this that they're deifying themselves.
I don't know if that's quite right, but I mean, the word for soul in Greek and also new life life. Yeah, well, they're yeah, but I think they're greater than life. Like the mere life is nothing to them. So they're sort of superhuman.
Or they think them. Yeah, they think that they are want to be long. They long to be superhuman. It's so weird.
We were texting about this before the show. It's really hard to conjure up this kind of person. Every example, real world example that we are problematic. But the courageous person seems to be more aware of his mortality than the great sold man.
Right? No. No, I think so. He's more of the fear is there.
Yeah, he's more afraid. And therefore he's more in touch with it. I don't know. Like, what is the great?
Maybe the question is, what is the great sold man thing when he throws his life ways? Like, you're being a great opportunity to die, you know, and like throw yourself. It makes me wonder it was Lincoln like, was Lincoln upset that he got shot by some goddamn actor? He read the very short, like one paragraph speech he gives as he's leaving Springfield to go become inaugurated president.
He says, I'll butcher the quote, it's 11 o'clock at night on these coasts. He says something like I leave now, knowing not whether I will return with a task before me, greater than that which faced Washington. So he's very aware, I think, even before he's inaugurated that this will cost him his life. So I do think there's a willingness to throw away his life for a big cause.
Yeah. Yeah. I mean, if you see the opportunity and you go on the front, you just go into it. Like, no, this is not the privilege side.
Like Churchill talks about his young life. That was a great sold when he was young. He talked about how exhilarating it is to be shot at. Yeah.
Well, I wonder how much of that is. Yeah. His earlier time, I've read all those games since South Africa. Right.
I wonder how much of that is myth-making on. But I mean, if it's true, it sort of represents like, I wanted to, I just wanted to, I mean, he said the great trail is being shot at unsuccessfully. That's the most pleasant feeling or something like this. So he doesn't die.
Yeah. I remember it's in my early life. He talks about the first time he wrote a bullet whizz about it. Yeah.
Yeah. I mean, I imagine for somebody like that, he's that enterprising. There's just a foreign sort of relationship to threats, right? Yeah.
Yeah. We didn't have a run or show tonight. Did we get through with stuff? We want to get through.
We did a great job. Do we sufficiently capture the difference or opposition between old man and the philosopher? No, no, no. What if the philosopher is a different type of great sold man, Alex?
Because he seems to have the philosopher seems to have the insight that is unavailable to the great sold man. He doesn't. He's in different. He's in different.
Yeah. He's in different. He's in different. He's in different.
He's needs are taken care of. We can assume or he wouldn't have time to philosophize. Right. You can't really teach philosophy in a certain right.
And I wonder to what extent Aristotle maybe has in mind the end of the symposium, right? Where Alcibi gives a sort of confession of humiliation at the hands of Socrates. He says his hubris was to not give into his beauty. He even said Socrates laughs at him as they're like naked, right?
Which is very nice thing to do. But then you kind of move forward and then this puts Alcibi into a lot of confusion. I don't know what to do. And then he starts talking about his experiences in war with Socrates.
And one of the crucial moments is that the generals want to give Alcibiates that are a stay at the prize for excellence. And Alcibi says, no, no, no, no. Socrates saved me. He deserves it.
The generals look at Alcibi as Socrates. Like, can we just give it to you? Fsifies? And Socrates says, yeah, just give it to Alcibiates.
So there's a way in which he's way more divorced from the honors. And Alcibiates ultimately recognizes Socrates superiority specifically in his resistance to small, lower beauties. Right? That's what he says is, you know, I think this isn't necessarily correct as an analysis of Socrates.
But he says Socrates is full of all this great virtue. And he's so beautiful and noble on the interior, even though he's so ugly and ridiculous on the outside. I'm the only one who really saw it. Why?
Because he laughed at my nakedness. Right? That's the, that's my beauty. And I think he says, is there's a kind of greatness and he construes it or reads it morally, which tells you a lot of Alcibiates.
Well, what is Socrates actually up to? He seems to have it kind of in different studies. Right. But so he's not a different respect to benefactions.
Like the great, old man, the morally great, old man doesn't want to have great deeds. Doesn't want to have good deeds done for him. So actually, he doesn't seem to have that problem. But he's perfectly happy to have Crido frontom some cash or other people do nice things for him.
So I mean, that doesn't seem to capture him well. Do you think he remembers it? No. Maybe he just forgets.