This is Neil Irwin, the director of external relations here at the Center for New American Security. And we are here with our brand new two-day old, I believe, senior fellow in our Asia Pacific Security Program, Dan Kleinman. Great to have you both at CNAS and here to talk to us in particular about North Korea. Thanks Neil, I'm delighted to be here and excited for my inaugural podcast.
So today it came out that North Korea appears to have had a small weaponized nuclear warhead that can go on a ballistic missile. Am I explaining that about right and if so, why other than the obvious is that so terrifying. So their reports underify that the US government, the intel community, has assessed that North Korea could put a small nuclear warhead on a missile. The Japanese recently made a similar assessment, so that's a collaboration.
Why this matters? North Korea wants to credibly threaten having a clear capability that could be credibly used against the United States. They need a long range missile, which they've three-cent tested, demonstrated they have. They need to have a warhead that can fit on a rocket, which is what appears to be essentially the case now.
And lastly, they need the ability to have that warhead ran or the atmosphere when it comes down and not disintegrate. So there's really three steps. And why this matters? They have two other three complete.
But last time they did a missile test, the reentry didn't go so well. It seemed like they were from video footage that were had disintegrated or reentry vehicle, but they're now two out of three steps toward having that capability. So it's very much a significant development. So what is the upshot then of them having a nuclear deterrent?
From their perspective, it grants them regime survival. At the end of the day, Kim Jong-un is all that one person himself. And when he goes about at night, he worries about the United States taking action to depose him. If he can credibly threaten a nuclear attack against a US city in the continental United States, that makes him more securely.
He thinks that there's less likely that the US would someday decide to take him out. He probably worries about the face of Saddam Hussein or a market off. He thinks this is insurance policy. Well, I'm glad he's getting a flack.
So what can we do to keep them from taking that third step? So there's not a lot the US can do to prevent North Korea from taking the third step short of the print of military action. At the end of the day, North Korea has a very robust and recent months testing pattern. And it's a matter of time.
If they continue to test, ultimately they'll be able to figure out the reentry. What the United States can do, though, is strengthen our conventional deterrents. So work with our allies and partners, enhance our missile defenses, and essentially prepare for the day when North Korea might have this capability. At the same time, the United States can continue to try to tighten the screws on North Korea through sanctions.
And the UN sanctions that were just passed, it's certainly an important development, but whether it is actually executed or not remains a key question. So let me ask the question that may be naive, but that I'm fairly certain is running through the president's hand. Every day, North Korea's position seems to get stronger, and ours gets weaker, and that dynamic does not appear to be changing anytime soon. If we're ever going to do military action, is this the right time to do it?
The North Korea problem has bedeviled multiple administrations starting with President Clinton. There's no good solution. Military action is fraught. North Korea has a very large number of artillery next to Seoul.
Any kind of military conflict would involve civilian casualties on a scale that we've not seen in a generation. At the same time, North Korea has missiles, they hit Japan, or bases there as well as civilian. So leaving aside the entire nuclear long-range missile piece, there's already the possibility of cataclysmic civilian casualties. So military actions are not very much a last resort, and you have to balance the cost of that versus trying to prevent North Korea from ultimately fielding a nuclear capability.
There's still time, at least, for a pressure strategy, which is what we see the US government currently doing through sanctions. And at the end of the day, there's also time for prepare for a stronger deterrent, and that involves enhancing certainly our conventional capabilities in the region, working with our allies and partners as well. If North Korea does ultimately field a deterrent, a nuclear deterrent capability that can hit the United States, that's particularly important to strengthen that conventional piece. It may actually become more confident in its provocations because it feels that the US is more limited.
So to me, it's crucial to get ahead of that potential dynamic and really strengthen our conventional capabilities today. So I guess two last questions. First, then, are you somewhat confident that we'd be able to contain even an unambiguously nuclear-armed Korea? North Korea, I should say.
It's an outcome nobody wants. It's an outcome that's not fordained today. But the United States, at the end of the day, with our allies, has former resources, former capabilities in North Korea, and while Kim Jong-un make it off of a rationality, he does care about regime survival. And that does provide the basis for a deterrent.
It's not a situation anyone wants, but it is a situation that the United States could sustain, knowing that he would never use the weapon because that would be the end of his regime. Yes, the challenge, in my perspective, he might be emboldened to have conventional provocations that he would have failed the United States, couldn't even use conventional force. And that's why I think it's so imperative today to focus on some of the conventional challenges that North Korea poses, as well as, of course, suggest a nuclear threat. All right, well, unfortunately, we're going to have a lot more times to talk about this.
So Dan, great to have you on board. Thanks so much.