"«Boundaries», Part 1: a key missing concept from utility theory" by Andrew Critch

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8oMF8Lv5jiGaQSFvo/boundaries-part-1-a-key-missing-concept-from-utility-theory Crossposted from the AI Alignment Forum. May contain more technical jargon than usual. This is Part 1 of my «Boundaries» Sequence on LessWrong. Summary: «Boundaries» are a missing concept from the axioms of game theory and bargaining theory, which might help pin-down certain features of multi-agent rationality (this post), and have broader implications for effective altruism discourse and x-risk (future posts). 1. Boundaries (of living systems)  Epistemic status: me describing what I mean. With the exception of some relatively recent and isolated pockets of research on embedded agency (e.g., Orseau & Ring, 2012; Garrabrant & Demsky, 2018), most attempts at formal descriptions of living rational agents — especially utility-theoretic descriptions — are missing the idea that living systems require and maintain boundaries. When I say boundary, I don't just mean an arbitrary constraint or social norm.  I mean something that could also be called a membrane in a generalized sense, i.e., a layer of stuff-of-some-kind that physically or cognitively separates a living system from its environment, that 'carves reality at the joints' in a way that isn't an entirely subjective judgement of the living system itself.  Here are some examples that I hope will convey my meaning: