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Can census cure Somalia’s 4.5 virus? episode artwork

Aug 8, 2026 5 min

Can census cure Somalia’s 4.5 virus?

from Somali Waa kuma Podcast Hosted by MI

MI’s 5 Minutes of Fame | Week 30, 2026 This week’s message is addressed principally to Somalis in Australia. I encourage every Somali household to complete the 2026 Census accurately, include every person living there and pay particular attention to the question about language used at home. Accurately recording Somali will help establish the number and distribution of Somali speakers and provide evidence for interpreting, translation, education, healthcare and other essential services. Full participation will reveal the community’s actual size, geographical distribution and social needs. It will also help governments allocate services and resources more equitably. Census help fair allocation of resources and makes society visible Australia will conduct its national census on 11 August 2026. Everyone in the country that night, including visitors and temporary residents, must be counted. The information collected will influence the planning of schools, hospitals, roads, housing and aged-care services. It will also inform electoral boundaries and the distribution of billions of dollars in public funding. Australia conducted its first national census in 1911, although population counts began much earlier. Its history was not always inclusive. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were fully included in official census totals only in 1971, following the 1967 referendum. This history illustrates a fundamental truth. A census is not merely a statistical exercise. It determines who becomes visible to the state, who receives public services and who is adequately represented. The broader message concerns the census as an indispensable institution of the modern state. A government cannot serve a population it does not understand. Where reliable evidence is absent, political influence soon invents its own arithmetic. Somalia’s demographic vacuum Somalia has attempted to govern for decades without knowing precisely how many people live within its borders, where they live or what services they require. The 1975 census produced only limited results. Another census was conducted in 1985 and 1986, but its findings were never publicly released. The collapse of the central government in 1991 subsequently destroyed much of Somalia’s administrative and statistical capacity. In 2014, Somali authorities and the United Nations Population Fund published the Population Estimation Survey for Somalia. It was the most extensive household survey conducted in decades, but it remained an estimation survey rather than a complete national census. An earlier episode reveals the political sensitivity surrounding Somali population figures. In 2005 and 2006, the United Nations Development Programme conducted a settlement survey. According to UNFPA Somalia, Somali administrations disputed the results because they believed their populations had been underestimated. In Somalia, population figures influence territorial claims, political representation, public appointments and development funding. Political groups therefore have a strong incentive to exaggerate their numbers. Demographic uncertainty has consequently become a source of political power. The 4.5 formula was never based on a census The 4.5 power-sharing formula was institutionalised during the 2000 Arta peace process in Djibouti. It allocated equal political shares to four clan families: Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digil-Mirifle, also known as Rahanweyn. Numerous minority communities were collectively assigned half the share received by each of the four. The arrangement was introduced as a pragmatic response to civil war. It helped competing factions form a transitional political structure when Somalia urgently needed compromise. The fundamental failure was allowing a temporary peace mechanism to become a durable system of government. The formula was never derived from a national census. No credible demographic evidence established that the four selected clan families were equal in population. Nor did evidence demonstrate that all minority communities combined amounted to half the population of one so-called major clan. As Minority Rights Group International observes, Somalia has no reliable national data showing the population’s clan composition. The formula reflects political influence, military power and bargaining strength rather than verified population numbers. The fiction of the largest clan Hawiye and Darod are among Somalia’s most politically powerful clan families. Figures associated with both have long claimed that their clan constitutes the country’s largest population. Neither assertion has been empirically established. Without a credible national census, Somalia cannot determine whether Hawiye, Darod or another community is numerically larger. The country instead relies on estimates, genealogical calculations and politically expedient claims repeated until they acquire the appearance of fact. Powerful groups can count distant relatives, populations across national borders and residents of entire territories as their own. Smaller communities, including agricultural, coastal, occupational-minority and displaced populations, often remain statistically invisible or are politically represented by stronger groups. The absence of a census therefore produces more than uncertainty. It enables clan mythology to masquerade as demographic reality. From citizens to clan allocations The 4.5 formula did not cause the Somali state’s collapse. The government disintegrated in 1991, nine years before the formula was institutionalised nationally. However, 4.5 has perpetuated a political culture that obstructs the development of accountable institutions. Parliamentary seats, ministries and senior appointments are treated as clan allocations. Candidates rely on elders and political brokers rather than individual voters. Public officials consequently owe their advancement to networks of patronage instead of public confidence. Competence becomes subordinate to clan entitlement. Qualified candidates may be excluded because an office has been assigned elsewhere, while unsuitable candidates are appointed because powerful actors regard the position as their clan’s share. Research in the Journal of Somali Studies concludes that the formula perpetuates clan divisions and impedes Somalia’s transition towards citizen-based democracy. Its allocation of a collective half-share to minority communities also institutionalises political inequality. This is not democratic representation. It is an elite agreement for dividing the state. Somalia must count its people A census will not immediately eliminate corruption, insecurity or clan rivalry. It is nevertheless essential for representative government and rational national planning. A credible census would identify where people live and document their needs in education, healthcare, employment, housing, water and transport. It would support fairer public funding, credible electoral constituencies and more accurate development policies. Most importantly, it would weaken the ability of political groups to manufacture population figures. The Somali National Bureau of Statistics should lead the process with federal, local and international technical support. Its methods must be transparent, personal information protected and results independently verified. Special arrangements will be required for nomadic communities, displaced families and residents of insecure areas, but these difficulties cannot justify perpetual demographic ignorance. Australia counts its population because evidence is indispensable to effective government. Somalia must do the same if it wishes to replace clan allocation with citizenship, accountability and democratic representation. As former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon observed, “To be counted is to become visible.” Benedict Anderson offered a necessary caution in Imagined Communities: “The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one, and only one, extr… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit somalia.substack.com

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