Cauldron Of Terror Gaza, Hamas, Israel, and the World - 500 Days in Gaza Chapter Two Podcast Three

Welcome to an excerpt of Cauldron Of Terror Gaza, Hamas, Israel, and the World, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Pen and Sword. This is presented by Kensington Security Consulting, which brings education to national security. This is the third excerpt from chapter two, and it focuses on the ideology, history, men, and women of Hamas.   Hamas Comes to Power   Hamas’s first leadership generation appeared in the 1980s. Its creator was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Charismatic, quadriplegic, and driven, he led Hamas until the IDF assassinated him. He broke his neck as a young boy and used a wheelchair for the rest of his life. Always studious, he studied English at Cairo University and later became a popular teacher in Gaza. He supported the war against Israel and was intermittently imprisoned for nearly 10 years in Israeli detention prisons.   Yassin brought Hamas from obscurity to prominence after splitting from Arafat in 1994, when the Nobel Prize-winning leader of the PLO accepted a two-state solution. Yassin demanded that all Israeli land be surrendered to Palestinians and ordered a wave of suicide bombings. In response, Israel decided to eliminate him. In March 2004, a drone spotted him being carried to prayer in his wheelchair and targeted him with an invisible laser. Helicopters launched three Hellfire missiles, one of which hit him directly, killing him and nine others. Many Palestinians idolized him, while Israeli authorities wondered whether they had created a martyr who would inspire future generations of Palestinians.   In the 1990s, while Yassin was in prison, his deputies managed Hamas’s operations. Rantisi, Khaled Mashaal, and Mousa Abu Marzouk led the political wing of Hamas in Gaza, while its military wing was spread across the West Bank. In the early 1990s, Iran and Syria began supporting Hamas as it moved its military and political committees to Damascus. During this period, Hamas focused on building and strengthening its political influence. The assassination of Hamas leaders in 2004 created a power vacuum that was quickly filled. These targeted killings may have unintentionally strengthened Hamas by energizing the group’s militant side. Israel now faced a fully militarized Hamas alongside a more adaptable Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Hamas’s increased prominence attracted financial and military support from Muslim countries that saw it as the stronger competitor in the Muslim fight against Israel, further boosting grassroots support for Hamas.   Hamas gained political power in 2006 by winning more seats than Fatah and competing secular parties in a Palestinian election. Few expected Hamas to achieve such a major victory. This marked a turning point for Hamas, as it was the first time the organization succeeded in a large-scale election. The following year, it took control of Gaza from Fatah, ending the PLO’s long-standing dominance over the Palestinian electorate. Hamas declared that it had not abandoned its goal of destroying Israel. However, Hamas’s political language was often inconsistent, sometimes sounding conciliatory toward Israel and other times sounding resolutely aggressive. Israel transferred the land to them in 2006, along with modern greenhouses, barns, storage facilities for vegetables and orchards, and extensive irrigation systems. Then, Gazans destroyed them.               Hamas established a one-party regime in the Gaza Strip, while Fatah governed the West Bank. By the summer of 2007, Hamas controlled most of Gaza, whereas Fatah had formed a separate government in the West Bank. In the 1990s, Yassir Arafat called Hamas a ‘bunch of ants.’ It seemed that Fatah would indefinitely maintain its monopoly on political control over the Palestinians. A generation later, few in the PLO shared that arrogance. The power of the Palestinians was now divided indefinitely.   Does Hamas Have Wings?   As Hamas gained political legitimacy in 2006, observers sought to understand its ambitions, capabilities, leadership, and structure. Significant differences existed between Hamas’s and Fatah’s ruling styles. By 2007 and 2008, Fatah’s governance had become more technocratic. One observer, Jonathan Brown, opined that responses to Israeli aggression primarily drove Hamas’s rule. In his view, Hamas cannot be defined by a single term; it is a multifaceted entity encompassing social, political, military, and educational dimensions.   The structure of Hamas raises a question: Is it a unified political and military entity, or is it composed of several allied organizations or factions? Hamas consists of three main components: a vast network of social organizations, including schools and hospitals, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; a political division that engages in extensive fundraising; and an armed militia wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which orchestrates suicide bombings.                Yassin claimed that Hamas was a single enterprise. He said its ‘wings,’ including its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, were fully integrated with the social and political elements. ‘We cannot separate the wing from the body. If we do so, the body will not be able to fly. Hamas is one body.” He saw these elements as reinforcing the central goal of destroying Israel. Rantisi explained, ‘Hamas’s political wing determines overall policy for the movement.’                Long after Yassin’s death, Hamas remains unified, and its funds and activities are interconnected. It continues to utilize its charities to finance terrorism operations. Mosques and charities incite, recruit, and provide logistical and operational support for terrorists, and they are places where suicide bombs are made. Hamas and Fatah use schools, orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues to socialize even the youngest children to aspire to die as martyrs.   Hamas and Terrorism   Hamas continues to use terror to weaken the resolve of Israelis. Terror remains a key part of a broader strategy focused on diminishing Israeli national morale. Ongoing and unpredictable attacks on civilians are intended to make life in Israel unbearable. This tactic was apparent during the wave of assaults in the Second Intifada, which started in 2000 and lasted four years.   From underground, Hamas’s ghost army periodically emerged from a tunnel network to infiltrate Israel, kill indiscriminately, and then quickly retreat underground for cover. Hamas targeted various busy civilian locations, including buses and light rail stops, nightclubs, restaurants, markets, universities, and even a hotel hosting a Passover Seder. They aimed to undermine Israeli morale and devastate the economy by shifting resources from productive sectors to defense. The intifadas have hurt many parts of the Israeli economy by draining and reallocating resources, and the attacks have led to concessions.               In December 1992, the al-Qassam Brigade killed six Israeli soldiers, prompting the Rabin government to exile suspected terrorists and their supporters. However, Rabin also withdrew some Israelis from Gaza and Jericho, actions that came before the Oslo Accords. Hamas leaders cited Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 as evidence that terrorism was effective and would continue. Hamas has regarded, and still regards, terrorism as a valuable tactic. The belief that Israel feared Hamas probably helped Hamas’s election victory in 2006, one year after the Second Intifada ended.               Kidnapping for prisoner exchanges has compelled Israel to negotiate the release of imprisoned Palestinian operatives. The most notable exchange was the Gilad Shalit deal, in which Israel released 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for one Israeli soldier. An imprisoned female terrorist recommended that Palestinians take another Shalit.’ On October 7, 2023, Hamas took over 200.               Hamas also kills Israelis to demonstrate to the world that it is highly operational and that its fighters are eager to attack the Israeli enemy. This murderous enthusiasm attracts funding from Muslim nations. Hamas does not rely solely on sympathy to secure foreign support. It kills Israeli citizens, which earns it respect among those hostile to Israel’s existence. Iran provides Hamas with material and financial backing. Along with Qatar, Turkey shelters some of Hamas’s top leaders and helps fund the organization’s activities. Terrorism shows the world, especially Hamas’s Islamic benefactors, that it is strong, well-organized, armed, and eager to kill.               Ironically, another reason for using terrorism is the self-inflicted destruction and impoverishment of social infrastructure that it causes. During the First Intifada, Israel demolished the homes of individuals linked to Palestinian terrorism. Media outlets sympathetic to the Palestinians labeled these retaliatory strikes as war crimes through collective punishment. By placing munitions depots and bomb-making facilities near schools or beneath hospitals, Hamas provoked retaliatory or preemptive military strikes. Israel targets these sites and others, which attracts funding from international organizations and various Western countries to rebuild the facilities (see Chapter 8). Some of the funds intended for reconstruction and development are used as planned. Meanwhile, other money is diverted to terrorist operational planning, with much of the revenue ending up in the bank accounts of Hamas leaders living in luxury in Qatar.               The funds are allocated to charities under Hamas’s control. In turn, those who receive aid are expected to support Hamas. An Israeli defense official said, ‘In the territories, there are no free lunches . . . Those who receive help from the Islamic associations pay with support for Hamas. Palestinians who benefit from Hamas charities are expected to allow operatives to use their homes as safehouses, harbor fugitives, and permit Hamas to store weapons on their property.               Some of this money also goes to imprisoned Hamas and Fatah operatives as part of the ‘pay-to-slay’ agreement. Hamas and the PLO pay millions of dollars each month to terrorists and their families, including those captured after the October 2023 murder. The motivations for terrorism – political success, affirmation of Hamas’s importance, and fundraising – prompted Hamas to launch terror campaigns that went far beyond sporadic, uncoordinated bombings and killings. Each campaign lasted several years and became known as an intifada, or uprising. These campaigns took place in Gaza and the West Bank and involved both Hamas and Fatah.   This concludes the third reading from Chapter Two of "Cauldron of Terror Gaza, Hamas, Israel, and the World," by Mark Silinsky, published by Pen and Sword. If you found it useful, please consider subscribing and buying a copy. The book is available online or at major bookstores worldwide. This reading does not represent the official position of any agency or individual within the United States government. On behalf of Kensington Security Consulting, thank you for listening.