My name is Julie Smith, and I am the director of the new Transatlantic Security Program, and I'm joined here with our adjunct senior fellow, Jim Townsend. Hi there. Hello. We just recently relaunched or rebranded my program here at the Center for New American Security to focus on transatlantic security issues, and there's a couple of reasons why we did that.
I think, first and foremost, we feel at CNIS that there's a lot of work to be done these days on Europe and Russia. A lot of challenges. Europe's facing an array of internal and external challenges, whether you look at things like Russian aggression or counterterrorism challenges, some weak economies across the European continent, Brexit. The list goes on and on.
Migration is still a challenge, and then we have lots of common transatlantic challenges that we both face and struggle with, and so we feel like that agenda is going to be really rich. And on Russia, there's endless amounts of work to do on the path forward. How do we engage the Russians, but also push back on aggression in their neighborhood and elsewhere? And we also, I think, Jim and I both feel strongly that the liberal order needs a little bit of support at the moment.
We have Russia very actively undermining or working to undermine the rules-based order, the entire system that we put in place 70 years ago. And so the institution and Jim and I and all of us feel like it couldn't be more important to be working on transatlantic security, and we're going to do that with Rachel Rizzo, who has joined us in the program and worked with us for a couple of years now, and Jackie Ramos, who was the chief of staff in OSD policy at the Pentagon, who's going to be joining us as an adjunct as well, and we're putting together a team to really take on all sorts of questions moving forward. And I couldn't be happier to have Jim Townsend, my former boss, as a partner in crime, and we've got work to do. We really do, Julie, and it's been my dream to work with you again, the way we did in the Pentagon, and having Rachel and Jackie with us.
It's a great team for a very important time, and I think with the French elections behind it, so much attention was on whether Macron would win. He did, and so there's a lot of people this morning who were going, that was close, and they're going back to their normal lives, and I think that's a mistake, because this is just one hurdle of many ahead. That's right. This came along very well, so did the Dutch elections.
Austrian elections. Yes, exactly. Austria's coming up. We've got Germany coming up.
But even so, I think these elections have been closed because there are these underlying problems that we've got to get at. And when I say we, I mean the transatlantic community. We've got problems in our own country. The European nations do with the European experiment, if you will, and with other problems that Julie just talked about.
And so as I look ahead at what this new program can do, I think we've got to help tackle some of these problems so we don't lurch from election to election, keeping our fingers crossed that the right candidate is elected, because one of these days, that's not going to happen. And so let's see what we can do to help the community to deal with these problems that are causing our elections to be these close-run things. And we're going to use a couple of different methods or mediums to deal with all of the challenges that the transatlantic partners face right now. We're going to continue on with our tradition of conducting tabletop exercises.
We ran one on Nordic Baltic security in 2015. And last year, in 2016, we did one on the GI-UK gap, the space of water in the North Atlantic that falls between Greenland, Iceland, and the U.K., which is heating up as another interesting area for the transatlantic partners to look at. And we hope and plan to do another one probably early next year in 2017, so watch this space. We'll continue doing podcasts.
And we're also thinking about putting out a daily dish, The Dish, which you'll be able to subscribe to to get the latest breaking news on the transatlantic relationship, so watch our news about that. That'll be up on our website and forthcoming. And in terms of our substantive agenda, I mean, Jim and I just want to take a few minutes today to actually talk about the month of May, because there's so much going on this month from a transatlantic perspective. So over to you, Jim.
You want to outline some of the meetings that are coming up that we will be tracking and providing some insight on in the weeks ahead? I sure will, and I'm sure I'll leave a bunch out, because there is so much going on. The first one, I think, is the meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. He's coming into town.
This is the first time that he's been to Washington since 2013. And not because he didn't want to come, but after the Russians went into Crimea, whether it was at NATO or whether it was here in Washington, it was not going to be business as usual. We weren't going to see these Russians until something was done in terms of their presence in Ukraine. And so for the past couple of years, there has not been much more than some phone calls.
And that's been about it between the United States and Russia. New administration, the Trump administration is taking another pack, and they are going to see Lavrov. Tillerson will see Lavrov. Tillerson was in Moscow as well, as you know, and he saw Putin there, and then, of course, Lavrov.
So over the past few weeks, there has been some face-to-face, but now we're going to see it live and in person here in Washington. And so what will they talk about? Something interesting to kind of throw some spice into this as well. Erdogan, the Turkish president and strong man, will be here as well.
He's going to be here in a week or so. And so when you talk to Lavrov and you talk about Syria, you'll be talking to Erdogan about Syria as well, all at about the same time. Both those meetings will have things put out in the public about what they talk about when they met. And so this is going to be a bit of a train wreck, I think, in terms of very sensitive issues coming together with these two personalities, Lavrov and Erdogan, coming into Washington and talking to an administration that's still trying to find its feet.
I'm not sure there is a Syria policy. I'm not sure what they're going to talk to Erdogan about when he says you have to do something about arming the Kurds, you're arming and training terrorists that are coming into Turkey. Meanwhile, the administration is following the Obama strategy, going after Mosul, going after Raqqa, using the YPG, using the Kurds. And so I'm not sure what the response is going to be from the new administration.
I'm not sure they found their feet yet. So for this May, just for the first couple of weeks of May, just with Lavrov and Erdogan, there is a lot to watch for. And I'm going to throw one more thing into the next, Julie. And that is, there is another visit happening next week.
And that is the Swedish minister of defense is coming. Now, he's picked a bad time to come because certainly all the oxygen will be taken down the room by the Lavrov and Erdogan visit. But it's important, the Swedish minister's visit, because it gets to what CNAS has been reporting about in terms of not just the GI-UK gap, but what's happening in the Baltics, in the Baltic Sea, the Nordic Baltic area. This is the minister's first visit here.
And so this is going to be important, too. I don't think we can lose sight of that as we look at this longer strategic game up there with the Russians up in the north. All right. It's going to be busy.
That's a long list. There's a lot of engagements. So we'll be here tracking those, writing on those engagements, doing some podcasts on them, and providing some insight on what you can expect in those meetings, and then what came out of them. I guess the last thing we wanted to do today is just mention a couple of us from CNAS just got back from Europe.
We spent a few days in Oslo and Brussels to talk about the tabletop exercise that we ran on the North Atlantic. But we were also there just to kind of, I don't know, check in and see what the mood music was like on the other side of the Atlantic in advance of President Trump going to the NATO summit. It's not an official summit, by the way. We're not supposed to be calling it a NATO summit.
It is just a NATO meeting or informal meeting where the president will be there for a pretty short period of time. Summit's usually run about two days, and this is going to be just at dinner with a couple of bilateral meetings on the margins and the family photo that they all take that has a stay together. But we wanted to see kind of what people were thinking in advance of Trump's visit. And we heard some interesting things.
One of the points that came across pretty clearly in both of the visits that we were on was the fact that it's clear that the administration either deliberately or inadvertently has some preference for strategic ambiguity, one might call it, keeping everybody on their toes because they're a little bit unpredictable. Whether or not that's deliberate or not remains to be seen. But the reality is that our adversaries are on their toes because they're not exactly sure what to expect from the Trump administration. There are those that would argue that that's a good thing because it might make our adversaries think twice before they do something rash.
But what we found on our trip was that it's actually having a pretty adverse effect on our friends and allies in Europe. They feel very uncertain about what to expect from this administration. They don't know what the administration expects of them, what ideas they're going to bring to this NATO meeting on May 25th, and where the administration wants to take the transatlantic relationship going forward. So we heard a lot of comments about that.
We also talked a lot about the NATO meeting on the 25th. There's only two subjects at the meeting. The allies are going to focus on burden sharing, which means are the allies spending the targeted 2% of GDP on defense, as Trump wants them all to do? And do they have a plan to get there sooner rather than later?
And the other topic is counterterrorism. So we heard two things on this. One, on the burden sharing side of the equation, I think the allies feel like they're in a pretty good place. They have a case to make.
They've been increasing their defense spending slowly but surely ever since Putin went into Crimea. With Trump in office, they're going to move a little faster, some of them. And I think they believe that it's ultimately going to be fine on that front, that they can reassure the president, make him convinced that NATO matters and all the rest. What we heard less confidence on was the counterterrorism piece, where it appears that while the administration has put forward the idea of counterterrorism, neither the Europeans nor the Americans have actually put forward any concrete policy proposals in that regard.
And there's a risk, unless they frantically come up with some grand plan in the next couple of weeks, that they won't have much to show for it. Now, it depends on how you define counterterrorism, because of course the alliance has been doing counterterrorism since 9-11. It was deeply engaged in the mission in Afghanistan with 60,000 plus troops on the ground. It's done all sorts of other counterterrorism work around the world.
But if you're just talking about, say, the war in Syria and the counter-ISIL coalition, NATO doesn't have a formal role. And so I guess one question is, will we give NATO a formal role in that counter-ISIL campaign, or will we continue to just welcome the European countries that are already contributing and have it put together in an ad hoc fashion and call it a day? So on the counterterrorism fraud, lots of uncertainty, wondering when the U.S. is going to come forward with ideas, which hasn't happened yet.
And on the burden-sharing side, some confidence that it's going to be okay. So great trip, fascinating, good fun. Well, that sounds great. And we held down the fort while you were gone, and we repelled all invaders who wanted to come and take over the program.
But you mentioned what we call the family photo. And I think what was, for me, what is really the deliverable for this summit coming up is that family photo. I mean, can you imagine a family photo with both Donald Trump and Macron in there? I mean, both of them symbolizing great electoral movements in both of our countries, having just recently happened.
And now there they are, standing with their peers, standing with the section for a family photo. And I will tell you all, if you're not familiar with the family photo, not a lot of people collect those. The family photo was taken. It gives the staff an ability to rest while they're all standing up on the rise of getting a photo taken.
But this photo is going to be a collection item, because this photo is going to come across as symbolizing unity, as symbolizing moving past some rhetoric and some questioning that have been done on both sides of the Atlantic, and taking us into a new era. So I'm going to keep that picture of the family photo if I can get my hands on one. We'll see what we can do, Jim. We'll call ahead.
We can get copy for you. That's good. All right. And with that, that concludes this round of the podcast, and we'll be back soon with some updates on Europe and Russia.
See you soon.