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Oct 21, 2020 42 min

Code Red Podcast with Lt. General H.R. McMaster

from CODE RED Hosted by Secure America Now

On this edition of the Code Red Podcast, host Allen Roth speaks with retired Lt. General and Former National Security Advisor to President Trump, H.R. McMaster. In this exciting interview, Allen and Gen. McMaster discuss his new book, 'Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World', and the many foreign threats facing our nation today. From Communist China to Iran, this wide-ranging interview touches on all of today's top national security issues, so you do not want to miss it!

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Code Red Podcast with Lt. General H.R. McMaster

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And what's important for us is that China is not only repressing its own people in a brutal and sophisticated way with this perfection of an Orwellian technological surveillance state, technological enable surveillance state, not only with a campaign of cultural genocide in Xinjiang, where overly people are in concentration camps. And Xi Jinping said recently, I'm going to build some additions onto those concentration camps. And then said, and then said, it's good. This is good for the people. They really like being reeducated. It's worth noting that weaker birth rates are down about 60% since this campaign against them.

So this is a concern, especially as now that repression is extended into Hong Kong with the national security law. But what should be troubling to all of us, to the whole free world, is that China is promoting this authoritarian mercantile system at our expense. And it's doing so through a very sophisticated campaign, a campaign that I describe in the book as co-option, coercion, and concealment. You're listening to Code Red with Secure America Now, the largest national security grassroots army. With us today, Lieutenant General Retired H.R. McMaster. H.R. McMaster has is...

has a distinguished 34-year career with the United States military in many capacities, but he also ended his career as national security advisor for President Donald Trump. And since his retirement, he's kept himself busy by writing what I consider to be an extraordinarily important book called Battleground, subtitled The Fight to Defend the Free World. And first of all, I want to thank you for... spending some time with us. I would like to talk about some of the big themes in your book and maybe get a little more specific because your book does get quite specific. My offhand review of this book is simple. You do a brilliant job in blending your personal experiences, your in-depth knowledge of history, both American history and international history, and your experiences, I'll use the term battlefields of the world, and you're sharing that information with us. My first question is a very Big Ten question.

Who do you hope reads this book and why did you write it? Well, thank you so much. Maybe in a predictable manner, after retiring from the Army in 34 years, I made a mission statement for myself. And what I wanted to do was contribute to a deeper and more full understanding of the most crucial challenges to our future, to peace and our security and our prosperity. And so that was what drove the book. I hope that all Americans read it, not just for book sales, but because I think it's going to take the American people to demand a better foreign policy. I mean, we have this great gift of living in a democracy in which we all have a say in how we're going. And that carries over to our foreign policy as well. And as I describe in the book,

really lack of strategic competence that underpins our foreign policy, at least since the end of the Cold War. You have criticisms and some praise for Democrat and Republican presidents in your book. And you, one of the terms that is used that you call a cultural or a narcissistic attitude that many of our presidents as well as our foreign policy establishment have towards countries that we deal with on the world stage. What do you mean by, I think it was Hans Morgenthau who came up with the term of narcissistic arrogance. Can you describe what that is? Because it does pop up several times in the book.

Well, thank you, Alan. It really is our tendency to define the world only in relation to us. And that's why, obviously, because it's self-referential, but it doesn't acknowledge this approach, doesn't acknowledge the agency, the influence, the authorship over the future that others have. And therefore, our strategies and our policies tend toward wishful thinking and optimism bias. And they don't recognize that foreign policy and especially competitions in war are interactive. And so what I argue for in the book is strategic empathy.

strategic empathy to try to view the most crucial challenges to our future, to our security, to our prosperity, from the perspective of the other, and to pay particular attention to the emotions and ideology and aspiration that drive against the other. Because we oftentimes, because this narcissistic approach to foreign policy, we tend to believe that either that our decisions, whether these are decisions to act or to disengage, are decisive to achieving favorable outcomes, when in fact, the future course of events depends not just on what we do, but on what especially rivals and adversaries and enemies choose to do. We have, and it's interesting, in poll after poll, when you ask the American people which is the greatest threat, foreign policy threat to America, China tops the list. And the virus, I'm sure, has helped that, but it was true even before the virus struck.

And you see China as a real threat to the United States. And can you describe why you think that? And what do you see as should be our response to that threat? Thank you. In the book, what I try to do is I try to tell the story of how the past produced the present as the first way of projecting into the future. And in connection with the Chinese Communist Party, strategic narcissism resulted in an assumption, an assumption that China, having been welcomed into the international order, would play by the rules and as it prospered, would liberalize its economy and ultimately liberalize its form of governance. Now, it's quite clear, and it has been for some time, that the opposite is the case.

And China will not become what Bob Zellig hopes it would become, a responsible stakeholder in the international system. So what China is driven by, what I describe in the book, are the emotion of fear, primarily fear of losing its exclusive grip on power, the Chinese Communist Party leadership, and also aspiration. Aspiration for China to return to national greatness, to take, in Xi Jinping's words, center stage in the world. And what's important for us is that China is not only repressing its own people in a brutal and sophisticated way with this perfection of an Orwellian... technological surveillance state, technological enable surveillance state, not only with a campaign of cultural genocide in Xinjiang, where overly people are in concentration camps. And Xi Jinping said recently, I'm going to build some additions onto those concentration camps. And then said, it's good. This is good for the people. They really like being reeducated. It's worth noting that Weaver birth rates are down about 60% since this campaign against them.

So this is a concern, especially as now that repression is extended into Hong Kong with the national security law. But what should be troubling to all of us, to the whole free world, is that China is promoting this authoritarian mercantilist system at our expense. And it's doing so through a very sophisticated campaign, a campaign that I describe in the book as co-option, coercion, and concealment. And within that campaign are several strategies at work that cut against our interests and our future security and our prosperity. This includes military-civil fusion, where China is extracting as much sensitive and disruptive technologies as it can.

and applying them through its so-called private companies, which have to act as an arm of the party and its national champions, its state-owned enterprises, to the People's Liberation Army, such as the People's Liberation Army, which includes their Navy and Air Force as well, could overmatch us in future conflict. And in the meantime, can intimidate us and push us out of the Indo-Pacific region and challenge us eventually globally. The other strategy is called Made in China 2025. And this is the effort for China to dominate advanced manufacturing and for the United States really to be relegated to maybe providing them with some raw materials, but China would dominate the future global economy. would dominate it from a manufacturing perspective, as I mentioned, but also would dominate global supply and logistics chains, as well as communications networks. And then finally, the third of these strategies is one belt, one road, where they are creating servile relationships by indebting countries, mainly corrupted countries who are willing to take some payoffs to make these really bad deals. And then oftentimes trading debt for equity so they can take over critical infrastructure.

or just creating, again, this relationship that forces those countries to support China's foreign policy. And so if China succeeds, I mean, it's quite clear, Alan, that the world will be less free, less prosperous, and less safe. Do you believe that American policymakers understand the problems and the challenges that you just presented? Yes, Alan, I think this was the biggest achievement of the Trump administration. I was proud to be part of this assessment. I had the opportunity to convene what's called the Principal's Committee of the National Security Council quite early, very soon after I came into the White House as National Security Advisor quite unexpectedly toward the end of February. This, I think, was in early March. And we put into place a new type of meeting for the National Security Council and for the Principal's Committee, which was called a framing session, a principal small group framing session. We would just frame complex challenges and apply design thinking to these challenges. And in this meeting, I read a few passages from previous...

policies on China and just made the observation that we're about to enact the largest shift in US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, a shift in policy that was long overdue. And I think that shift in approach from, and these labels I know are only of limited utility, but of cooperation and engagement toward China to an approach of competing, recognizing that we had to compete to advance and protect our interests that were under assault by the Chinese Communist Party was an immensely significant shift. And it's a shift now, I think, Alan, that has a very high degree of bipartisan support as well. One of the ways that China, and you just mentioned it, one of the ways that China gathers this information, technological information, is by sending thousands of students to the United States.

also set up something called the Confucian Institute, or Confucius Institutes. And the Trump administration took some action on those institutes. Can you just give us an overview of how, I think you're the one who quotes General Kellogg on his assessment on how much the billions of dollars that China has actually, let's say, stolen or borrowed from us through on the technology side and how dangerous that is to our country. Right, right. This is the former head of the National Security Agency. He said, you know, it's the greatest transfer of wealth in human history. And so to maintain this or to gain this technological advantage over us, China is engaged in a sustained campaign of industrial espionage. That includes, as you mentioned, infiltrating People's Liberation Army scientists, for example, into U.S. government-funded research programs, oftentimes at universities or other research facilities.

And there's a systematic program, Alan, where they come and get as much technology as they can, and they go back to a debriefing center that aims not only to understand this technology and to extract it from our research efforts, but then to apply it, to apply it either to getting a dominant position in the emerging data-based global economy or to gain a preponderant advantage militarily. So that's one element of the campaign of industrial espionage. Another is a sustained effort at cyber-enabled. espionage. And this is carried out by a hacking entity called APT 10. And in December of 2018, this is good reading, actually, the Department of Justice, along with 12 other countries, released a number of indictments and sanctions and now sanctions against

against APT-10. It was a very well-integrated multinational effort. And so that's another aspect of this campaign of industrial espionage. Another aspect is inviting U.S. companies in, luring them into China with the promise of profits based on access to the Chinese market, and then requiring those companies to transfer their know-how and their sensitive technologies and intellectual property. This is very short-sighted by the companies who've done it, because oftentimes what happens is China extracts that technology, replicates it in a Chinese company.

produces those goods at an artificially low price because of the subsidies from the party and the state-directed economy, and then drives that company out of business from a global perspective. I mean, this is why there used to be, I think, the numbers 32 solar panel manufacturers in the United States, and there are only two left, Alan, because of that. You can say the same with high-density batteries and many other technologies. Drug companies. Drug companies, right? Pharmaceuticals, about 80% of our pharmaceuticals have an element of the supply chain that runs through China. So this requires a concerted effort.

Alan, defensive measures on our part, but also doubling down on our efforts to maintain our differential advantages. You also mentioned the Confucius Institutes. which are a particularly pernicious form of advancing an orthodoxy, an orthodoxy that is sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party and is disparaging to Western democracies. There's also an organization called the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, whose job it is to keep tabs on Chinese students and to make sure that they don't have the temerity to utter a critical word about the Chinese Communist Party. And so I think at a minimum, what universities have to do...

is they have to put in place some due diligence to screen those who are doing research in their facilities. US companies have to do the same thing. We don't want to turn universities into the FBI, right? Let the FBI do what the FBI does. But there has to be some degree of due diligence. And then also, what universities can definitely do is they can say that they will not tolerate the intimidation of their own students. So Chinese students who come to the United States should be able to enjoy the academic freedoms that are essential to higher education in this country. So there's a lot to do, Alan. The main theme in the book is to re-enter.

arenas of competition that we vacated based on strategic narcissism and the flawed assumptions associated with it. You talk about, in the book, that the United States should not sit on the sidelines when there are human rights violations, abuses taking place overseas. China, once again, tops the list of a country that's trying to re-educate millions and millions of people, and I use that term in quotation marks. Hong Kong, not only dampening down, but destruction of a democratic society. What is it that the United States should be doing that it isn't doing?

in terms of protesting and trying to get China in this case, but there are other countries that are doing the same, to in fact... stand up for American values of freedom was bringing religion, freedom of speech, et cetera. Right. Well, the Trump administration has done quite a bit in recent months and the last year and a half, I think, in terms of sanctioning companies, Chinese companies who had a hand in constructing and monitoring and running these concentration camps in Xinjiang, for example. I think recognizing that Hong Kong has lost its special status and then imposing the economic costs on China is wholly appropriate as well.

I think that it's very important now for us not to be complicit across the private sector in strengthening the Chinese Communist Party and advancing its strategies, which are designed to really to challenge us and ultimately deny us the future that we want for our children in our free and open societies and our grandchildren. And so that means financing China's military buildup. I mean, it's really unconscionable that Chinese companies are listed on U.S. exchanges and then the U.S. investors are funding really the development of the People's Liberation Army.

Chinese companies, as you know, when they listen on U.S. exchanges, don't have to meet the transparency standards. They just refuse to do so. They're supposed to. So I think just enforcing standards such that we treat China like any other country or any other human rights violator, right? And so these sanctions are very important. But I'd like to see some other measures taken. Alan, I think there should be an international agreement among our free and open societies, our democratic societies, that we will abide, our companies will abide by local laws.

But they will not abide by local laws if they violate the UN Declaration on Human Rights, for example. And then our companies can say, listen, we should pass a US law. There's a law being drafted called the Strategic Act on the Hill right now, which I hope has this provision in it. I think it does, which will require US companies to not violate our values, essentially. But that should be a multinational agreement. Oftentimes, US companies will say, well, if I give up.

market share in China, a German company or a Japanese company, those take my market share. I think we have to now recognize that the free world has to impose costs on China or the Chinese Communist Party for its behavior. The other measure might sound kind of counterintuitive, Alan, but I think that Chinese employees of US companies who are subjected to the coercive power of the Chinese Communist Party, right? Think about companies that hold sensitive data or developing new technologies. I think that we ought to grant them visas to come work in the United States and just encourage, you know, on-shoring of more of these sensitive development of technologies, for example.

or helping them get out of the country. I recall in the book, I write about when George H.W. Bush was confronted with the Tiananmen Square massacre. He said to all Chinese students in the United States, hey, if you want a green card, you can have it. 58,000 took him up on it. And just like other previous waves of immigrants who were escaping oppression, they became our most productive citizens, many of our most productive citizens, the most successful entrepreneurs and scientists and doctors. And so I just think a policy like that, and I think the UK's example on offering visas for Hong Kong.

resonance. I mean, I think that was also a very positive measure. But overall, Alan, the title of the chapter on what to do about China is called turning weakness into strength. We ought to take a look. What is the Chinese Communist Party? What do they think is a weakness for them, a vulnerability for them? Well, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, rule of law. I mean, what if the Chinese people actually had an idea that maybe they want to have a say in how they're governed, right? So all the things that the Chinese Communist Party views as weakness, that's our comparative advantage. Now, we have issues in all these areas in our own society these days, right? So I argue for a bit of introspection.

to strengthen the pillars of our democratic society and free market economic system, as well as those of like-minded countries. One of the points that you just made in this interview, which you make in the book, is the tendency on the part of our policymakers to look at the world only through our ideological eyes. And when the Obama administration went into this JCPOA, this... deal with Iran, the nuclear deal. You quote Ben Rhodes as saying, if we permit them, if we usher them into the international community, it will temper their radicalism. They will become good citizens of the international community. Well, that hasn't happened, as we all know. Can you give your assessment of the Iran nuclear deal?

Right. Well, I would call it a political disaster masquerading as a diplomatic triumph for the reason you just stated. This is an extreme example of strategic narcissism. And what I write about Iran and Battlegrounds is our tendency to overlook the very nature of the regime now, to expect them to change like the Grinch right before Christmas. Their hearts would get two sides bigger. They would stop their four-year-old proxy war against us. That's not going to happen. And then also we divorce the latest decision on Iran.

from this record of this four-decade-long proxy war. And what I describe in the book is really our approach toward Iran since 1979 has been a policy of conciliation with them. Every time there's a shift in the government, a shift in certain things, we think, okay, now's the time when if we welcome Iran, they'll change their behavior. They're not going to do it, Alan. There was a competition for a time in Iran, as you know, between the revolutionaries and the Republicans, right, or the hardliners and the reformers. Hey, the revolutionaries won. They won. And sometimes they put forward a shop window, you know, whether it's Hattini or Rouhani or Zarif.

But behind that is the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard School. All the JCPOA did is probably give them cover to continue their programs in a clandestine manner while allowing them to reap tremendous economic benefits, a huge payoff up front, but then relaxation of sanctions from which they profited handsomely in just that one year. And where did they apply those profits? Back to the proxy war to intensify against the great Satan, the United States, the little Satan, Israel, and the Arab monarchies. And what they had succeeded in doing in this period of time.

is establishing this land bridge really to the Mediterranean with the design of putting a proxy army on the border of Israel. So the JCPOA empowered Iran across the Middle East and allowed them to pursue their hegemonic designs. The Trump administration policy of... reimposing sanctions on Iran, then eventually getting out of the JCPOA. That's the right approach now, is to force the regime to make a choice, right? You can be a responsible nation. You can then reap the benefits, but you can't reap the benefits of being a responsible nation when you're essentially a state sponsor of terrorism who is perpetuating a sectarian civil war across the Middle East that is keeping not only the Arab world perpetually weak and threatening Israel, but is keeping these jihadist terrorist organizations on life support also, right? Because they can portray themselves as patrons and protectors of Sunni Muslim communities who fear complete evisceration at the hands of Iran's proxies.

You talk about the need for the United States to rebuild its alliances. with like-minded countries, free world. Can you explain what steps you would like to see what this administration or future administration take to rebuild these alliances? Right. Well, I think we, first of all, have to make clear our resolve to remain engaged, to remain engaged in the key areas of the world that have, I think, resulted in the prevention of great power conflict for over 75 years now. And I'm concerned about now as we emerge from the triple crisis of COVID-19.

the recession associated with it, and then the civil unrest that was sparked by George Floyd's murder, the divisions in our society, the vitriolic partisanship that we see. I fear that we're going to become so introspective, Alan, that we disengage from the world. And it really is America's engagement in Europe and across the Pacific region that gets more out of our allies, that builds their confidence in our alliance structures and in our advancing and protecting our interests vis-a-vis two revisions powers on the Eurasian landmass, China and Russia, for example. I think it's also very important for us to remain engaged in the Middle East. Because when we don't, countries in the region, they hedge. They hedge against a U.S. withdrawal. And they tend to accommodate Russia, for example. So I think that I'm not arguing for a massive amount of troops and military efforts. But we have to sustain our commitment to NATO. We should sustain our commitment on the Korean Peninsula and to Japan and with our naval efforts across the Pacific region. Because it is those efforts that result in deterrence by denial, convincing our potential enemies that they can't accomplish their objectives through the use of force or other forms of intimidation. What I describe in the book is.

Russian new generation warfare, for example. But also, I think it is right. It is right to demand more from our allies at the same time, more burden share. I think, in particular, Germany has to step up and has been lagging behind in terms of our collective defense capabilities, as well as giving Russia coercive power over its economy with this Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, for example. So we can demand more if we remain committed. And then I think it's also very important for us to recognize the broad competition with China. And we all have to act together on China. China will play us off against each other.

If we oppose some costs on China economically, they'll just go to the EU, the European Union to make up for it, or to Japan. If those three economies, the European Union plus the UK and Japan and the US work together, it's going to be very difficult for China to advance its interests. And for example, its effort to establish the standards for data and for the emerging data economy. You talk about in the book this... need and you just expressed it and you explained why it's important to have a close working relationship with our allies. Before the lockdown, I had an opportunity to meet with one of Boris Johnson, the UK Prime Minister's closest advisors.

And I found it kind of incredible, and this wasn't January of this year, I found it incredible what needed to be said to try to get the British not to get into bed with Huawei, the Chinese firm, basically not to turn over, give the opportunity for this Chinese firm to have a lot of say over the internet in the UK. To me, it was kind of mind-boggling, something that to me, again, I'm just a layman. To me, it just seemed crazy that you would turn over to an enemy of the UK, an enemy of the free world, this power.

Are you at times also amazed of how some obvious policy prescriptions are not taken by our allies and ourselves? Right, Alan, I think it's avarice, right? I mean, a lot of people have made a lot of money in China, and China is very good at co-opting elites, right? China's influence strategy, really going back to the 90s at least, was co-op elites in the West and dominate the narrative. Now they're becoming actually even more sophisticated and starting to take some pages out of Russia's book on influence. But the first study that really pulled the curtain back...

on how China was engaged in this kind of sustained influence campaigns in the West to cultivate witting and especially unwitting agents so they could advance their interests was done in Australia by an investigative journalist named John Garneau. It's a brilliant study. We did one here at the Hoover Institution at Stanford as well that is excellent as well. Some real China experts who were very disappointed because they were hopeful for China. This is the great author of The Beautiful Country in the Middle Kingdom. John Popper, for example, was on that team.

And it's really eye-opening because you see how the Chinese Communist Party has targeted us sector by sector, academia, think tanks, federal government, businesses, and local governments as well. But I think now China's overplayed its hand. I mean, you see public opinion shifting. Since that time in January, when you were in the UK, the UK has banned Huawei. I mean, the simple question I think to ask Alan is, do you really expect the Chinese Communist Party to treat your citizens better than they treat their own people? And if the answer to that is, of course not.

then there's no way you should give them your communications infrastructure and access to all your sensitive data. I would like you just to briefly talk to me about, it's slightly off topics that we've been talking about, our relationship with Pakistan, which you addressed in the book. And frankly, it's a subject that is almost never publicly discussed, except when it is crisis. And you make a point that the United States was on a course to punish economically Pakistan to get them to change their ways. And then America...

dropped that policy. And you say in the book, I wish they had waited. Pakistan has been at the center of so many problems that we have had to deal with in the Middle East. What is it about Pakistan? And there was also a recent report about how Pakistan is prepared to provide nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. I mean, we're dealing with a potentially dangerous country and certainly one that has human rights violations. I mean, a whole bunch of things.

Why is Pakistan not dealt with it by American policy? Well, this is, again, the case of strategic narcissism, Alan. We think that it must be our fault, right? Maybe we're just not treating that well enough, Alan. So we blame ourselves. One aspect of strategic narcissism that is particularly frustrating is that we actually blame ourselves for the most egregious actions of our adversaries. And so it is sort of our tendency. I mean, the Shia Adeshwara have nothing on us. We're very good at self-flagellation, Alan. And so we fail to consider the nature of...

of the Pakistani regime, which is dominated by the Pakistani army, which is dominated by a culture that sees, first of all, an Indian behind every tree and defines every aspect of its foreign policy by its competition within India. Because that's the Pakistani army's reason for existence, anyway, and justification for existence. But the party that the army has used in Pakistan has used terrorist organizations as an arm of their foreign policy since 1947. And in so doing has created a Frankenstein's monster there that could and has parts of it turned against them. And so the inter-service intelligence, the intelligence arm of the Pakistani army is not going to give this up. As you mentioned.

Pakistan is dangerous for a number of reasons. It perpetuates this jihadist terrorist ecosystem in a very inaccessible, difficult to get to a region. And in this ecosystem, these various groups from Lashkar-e-Taiba to Tariki Taliban Pakistan, which is hostile to the Pakistani state, Al-Qaeda-related groups, the Haqqadi network. the Taliban, these groups all share people and resources. They have access to a lucrative organized crime enterprise that involves all forms of illicit trafficking, mainly opium, but also semi-precious gems and timber even. And so they have resources, they have a safe haven support base, and they already want to kill our children, these people, right? So it is a very dangerous place. Now add on to it that this is a country with nuclear weapons. And you can see the danger potentially of these jihadist terrorists getting access to the most destructive weapons on earth. So I think that...

It is in Pakistan's interest for us to have a tough approach to them. I mean, I mentioned it in the book that when I spoke with my counterparts, I would just paint the picture of their future. I said, your future is North Korea. You know, you'd be a pariah state with a single state sponsored China. How does that look to you? That can't look good to you. And so I think that that approach is important, but we keep falling back into the trap. I want to see this so many times where the Pakistani officers in the military, they're so charming. You know, they speak the Queen's English. They serve great scotch, right? And so you think, wow, they're just like us. And what they do is they convince you.

You're going to be the one. You're going to be the one that's going to convince me to change my behavior. And so they play to our egos, right? And then we think, oh, well, they really have just been misunderstood. It has been our fault based on the Pressler Amendment and the breakoff of relations and so forth. So they have this whole narrative. And it's almost like when you speak with a senior Pakistani official, you hit the play button, you get the same story of history. And we just have to stop being so gullible. This is serial gullibility of the highest order.

Well, General McMaster, again, I want to thank you for sharing your very informative insights into the challenges that the United States of America faces and how to deal with them. Urge everyone to buy and read Battlegrounds by General McMaster. I also want to thank you for the service that you've done for this country, for our country. And you are a historian by nature, I believe. I mean, like I said, your dereliction of duty book on the Vietnam War, I think is a must read as well. And now you're offering your insights to educators. And I agree with you. I think that every American should read this book. We will, as we promote.

this interview, we will, of course, have links so that people will be encouraged to make a purchase of the book, read the book. I also want to say that General McMaster is hosting at Hoover a series of interviews called Battlefront. And you can see him there. Go to the Hoover Institute. I'm sure there's a way of signing up for these interviews with world leaders, with people who will help us be in educated populations.

And so I wish you all the best. I hope you stay well with the rest of the country. And once again, thanks for sitting through this interview. Thank you for the privilege of being with you. Take care. Bye-bye. Thanks for listening to the Code Red Podcast. Be sure to click subscribe to stay up to date and be the first to hear about our future podcast. You can also find and subscribe to the Code Red Podcast on Podbean, Spotify, Google Play, and YouTube.

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