Contriving Imaginary Gaps in Nuclear Deterrence
from Aarva Hosted by Jay Tilden
Could the hunt for imaginary gaps in nuclear deterrence invite the very aggression it fears? Writing on 29 May 2026, Jay Tilden examines the recurring American habit of announcing "deterrence gaps" to justify new weapons programs. While these warnings often secure funding, the piece suggests they do more harm than good by signaling specific vulnerabilities to adversaries. The real danger isn't a lack of theater-range missiles, but the public insistence that a president's hands are tied by rigid doctrine. The piece tracks how the stories told in Washington might actually be shaping the strategic calculations made in Moscow and Beijing. An examination of the deterrence gap in U.S. nuclear strategy, specifically the perceived deficit in low-yield theater weapons relative to Russia and China. Tracing the history of such strategic anxieties, the author argues that publicizing these vulnerabilities risks signaling weakness to adversaries. It evaluates the tension between the principle of proportionality and the strategic value of unpredictability in nuclear decision-making. Read at source: War on the Rocks For more features and details, visit aarva.app
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