Debating Damage Limitation, Again (Pt. II in a series)

During our last conversation on U.S. nuclear strategy (about two weeks ago, primarily led by Austin Long and Charlie Glaser who have spent quite a bit of time debating damage limitation), we uncovered a few questions we just didn’t have time to address. We chose three specific questions to discuss on today’s pod, and of course, we uncovered enough interesting material to start planning a Part 3:* Is retention of a damage limitation necessary for U.S. extended deterrence strategy, and if so, how important is it for extended deterrence allies?* How comprehensive or successful does the U.S. need to be for damage limitation to be considered “meaningful”?* How important is damage limitation as a nuclear strategy objective, considering other traditional objectives (restoring deterrence, escalation management, threatening unacceptable damage, etc.)?Before we dive into these questions, however, we tried to address some recent listener feedback: What does damage limitation actually entail from an operational perspective?As we mention several times throughout the discussion, conversations on the hypothetical, though never realized, end results of U.S. nuclear strategy and objectives gets Strangelovian very quickly. We’re talking about end-of-the-world extremities in international politics, with the shared goal of ensuring U.S. strategy is designed to ensure that day never comes. You’ll hear several important themes come up—the relative political stakes of belligerents in a conflict over a third country, like a U.S. ally or partner; the importance of saving lives vs. saving the functioning state; why geography matters, etc. While we’re nuclear folks discussing much grander ideas, you will hopefully see the connections between these wonky nuclear strategy topics and broader U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy. On a lighter note, Charlie reveals the new MIT swag - the CNSP branded “nuclear umbrella” that will now form the core of the new Center’s public diplomacy efforts.Enjoy this podcast, and as always, we appreciate your feedback and questions to further our own study of and reflections on this important set of topics.Stay tuned for Part 3, where we hope to spend some time talking about current and potential adversary reactions to current U.S. nuclear strategy, among other issues.If you missed it, catch part one of this podcast series here.Suggested readings (referenced during the pod):Austin’s chapter, “Damage Limitation in the 21st Century” (p. 66), in the LLNL CGSR volume “Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy.”Charlie’s article in The Washington Quarterly, which he co-authored with Steve Fetter, “Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy.”Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com