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Drones Podcast Series: Drones and the MTCR episode artwork

Jul 26, 2017 24 min

Drones Podcast Series: Drones and the MTCR

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

In this episode of the Drones Podcast Series, CNAS experts Michael Horowitz, Alexandra Sander, and Paul Scharre discuss the Missile Technology Control Regime.

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Drones Podcast Series: Drones and the MTCR

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I'm Paul Shari, a senior fellow at the Center for American Security. I'm here with Michael Horwitz, associate professor of the University of Pennsylvania and adjunct senior fellow here at CNAS, and Alexandra Sander, research associate with the Technology and National Security Program here at CNAS, and we're here with another episode of our Drone Proliferation podcast. Mike, Alex, nice to be here. Thank you.

Today we want to talk about the missile technology control regime that captures drone exports and proliferation. It's 30 years old and is a major player in shaping how drone proliferation is perceived and what countries are willing to do abroad. Mike, 30 years into this, how are we seeing the MTCR hold up with changing drone technology? I mean, the MTCR, I have a birthday to the MTCR.

It's 30 years old, and I think from the perspective of missile proliferation, the MTCR is thought of as a reasonably effective regime. The MTCR is essentially an export cartel. It's a voluntary group of nation states that have decided to restrict the extent to which they export missile technology above a certain range and payload, as well as production components for those technologies. And I think the challenge in the area of drones is that no one ever thought that we would be here.

When drones were initially included in the MTCR, they were thought of as target drones or maybe first-generation reconnaissance drones where the concern was mounting a weapon of mass destruction on them and flying them into something, essentially a remotely piloted cruise missile. The creators of the MTCR simply didn't anticipate drone platforms like the Predator or the Reaper where you can go back. And Alex, what specifically does the MTCR prohibit? What rules does it place on state to our members?

Well, first of all, it's a voluntary agreement, so there's no true enforcement mechanism for the MTCR. The intent of the MTCR is to limit the spread of WMD delivery systems under two different categories. Category 1 items are strong presumption of denial for export, and the specifications for these systems is that they have the capability to deliver a 500-kilogram payload over a distance of 300 kilometers. The Category 2 systems are incomplete technologies that could contribute to the development of a delivery system.

So it's a little bit less certain what's specifically included in Category 2 items, but where it's really relevant to drones is this Category 1 limitation in terms of exports. And has the MTCR been successful in slowing down or stopping exports in these technologies? The MTCR, I think, is certainly limited exports by MTCR members such as the United States. And one of the things that's really interesting is the way that countries attempt to gain the system to create drone exports that are MTCR compliant.

For example, later this year, Israel will be delivering 10 armed Heron TP drones to India, and the export variant of the Heron TP has a payload of 450 kilograms, which is the same 450 kilograms that China claims that the CH4 has, the system that China's been exporting to Jordan, Iraq, Nigeria, et cetera. And this isn't surprising, but I think it reflects the way that countries are attempting to argue that they are complying with the MTCR while still exporting armed drones, which then raises the question of whether that 500-kilogram limit on Category 1 systems is still meaningful when it comes to drones. Can you walk us through why that limit? Why 500 kilograms, 200 kilometers?

What's significant about that when the MTCR was originally created? When the MTCR was originally created, most of the countries that were members were European countries along with the United States, and they were thinking about the use of weapons of mass destruction in Europe. And the notion was that 300 kilometers was a range that was meaningful for thinking about the security environment in Europe especially, but also elsewhere at that time. And that 500 kilograms was about what you would need to mount a weapon of mass destruction on a missile, to put a warhead with a weapon of mass destruction on a missile.

And so that's where the Category 1 limit was set. And that Category 1 limit made some sense for missiles at that time and probably made some sense for the target drones of the day at that time in thinking about loading them with a weapon of mass destruction. I think the problem now is that 500 kilograms in particular isn't a meaningful capability breakpoint for thinking about drone capabilities. What differentiates the capability of drones in the contemporary period has to do with questions of ISR integration and their ability to operate over the horizon, as well as the precision of their munitions.

It's less the payload per se. But I just want to disagree with you here, Mike. If the focus of the MTCR is really preventing the proliferation systems that are WMD-capable delivery vehicles, doesn't that payload threshold still matter, right? And sure, maybe it doesn't apply to think about drones in another context, but that wasn't the purpose of the MTCR in the first place.

Sure, but fighter aircraft and commercial airlines also can go more than 300 kilometers and carry a payload more than 500 kilograms, but we're not arguing that they should be under the MTCR. It's essentially an accident of history that target drones, it's not an accident of history, it's a technological development trajectory that target drones became essentially uninhabited aircraft. And the drones of today are much more akin to fighters or commercial aircraft or those types of systems rather than missiles. Regulating them essentially as if their primary purpose is a missile.

I think this is what the technology is about. So this is a really interesting challenge. We have this technology that originally looked like kind of like a cruise missile and now it's evolved to look more like an aircraft. And particularly as we look further down the price, we see things like possibly unmanned aircraft, large unmanned aircraft being used in a commercial setting for things like maybe cargo delivery or optionally piloted systems or applique kits.

How do we adapt the MTCR, our friend of mine, to think about these things that are technically captured today under the MTCR but are really much more like manned aircraft? That's a really tough question. If you adapt the MTCR to be more applicable to drones, are you by default weakening its ability to regulate the proliferation of WMD delivery systems? If you're focusing more on broader operational cases in which drones are used, then does that sort of miss the point of regulating missiles and, well, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that aren't intended to be recoverable?

That's sort of the main distinction that we've been getting at in terms of is the MTCR successful? It's been successful in limiting the spread of these delivery systems because there aren't other operational cases necessarily for missiles, maybe beyond space launch vehicles. But again, that's not something that's designed to be recoverable, whereas the drones, it's much more broad. Why is it that we limit proliferation of missiles and not large commercial aircraft or flight aircraft that also, as you pointed out, might can similarly be used as other vehicles?

At the time, I think it's that missiles were uninhabited and one way not recoverable. And the thought was that if you were going to, the equivalent essentially of including a fighter in the MTCR would be worrying about somebody loading the cockpit with a WMD warhead or something and flying it into something. And I think that was thought of as a less realistic sort of thing or a pilot with a sort of nuclear-tipped missile like flying your aircraft into something as opposed to launching the missile. And so I think that's one of the reasons why they weren't part of the agreement.

They also weren't part of the agreement because the engineering challenges were different. I think one of the reasons why the MTCR is generally thought of as successful from a missile proliferation perspective is that designing the rocket engines and producing the gyroscopes necessary for accurate long-range missile systems is harder than I think people had initially anticipated in the immediate post-World War II period. So an export agreement like the MTCR with a strong presumption of denial can be meaningful. For something like aircraft, where just about anybody could build something that could go more than 300 kilometers and have a payload of more than 500 kilograms, the notion of an export agreement wouldn't be meaningful because everyone could just build it themselves.

So it's going to be simply just regulating what is regulatable versus what is really maybe even most significant. Right. It's like the nuclear suppliers group works in theory because the materials regulated by the nuclear suppliers group are sort of relatively rare, relatively difficult to acquire. So through working together, countries can prevent proliferation beyond the group.

That only works, though, if those countries have something that's controllable. Well, and on top of these regulations of missiles and WMD delivery systems, you also have norms of nuclear nonproliferation. So if you're worried about a drone dropping a nuke, is it necessary to regulate the proliferation of the drone or, you know, you're already regulating the proliferation of nuclear weapons? So there's a sense of redundancy there.

And I think the concern is that the status quo risks undermining the MTCR's effective, relatively effective efforts at preventing missile proliferation, that you end up with potential issue linkage between UAVs and missiles, where, you know, suppose you start, suppose MTCR members started exporting Category 1 drones more regularly without some kind of agreement between MTCR members. You know, then does that undermine the norm against, you know, applying the strong presumption of denial to missiles, thus making countries more likely to sell longer-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. And so the challenge is trying to figure a way to sort of square the circle. Well, that's a good question.

Can the MTCR be adopted without breaking it? What historical cases tell us here? Are there examples? What should we anticipate?

My reading of the history of arms control would suggest that it's more likely the MTCR will break, but this is a relatively unique situation in some ways, where the development of a technology has so far outpaced what that technology looked like at the point of the initial agreement. But you certainly could alter, one could imagine a world in which the MTCR would see there altered to change the limits for what a Category 1 system looked like for UAVs, where UAVs were dropped out of the MTCR, or potentially if there was an agreement that for Category 1 UAVs there's not a strong presumption of denial, there's some other phrase that's a little lower than a strong presumption of denial. All of those would be theoretical possibilities. I wonder if one of the challenges here is that as the technology's evolved and drones look more like aircraft, that the MTCR is focusing to some extent on the wrong thing, that it's focusing on whether or not there's a human in the aircraft or in the vehicle, but it's looking towards things that could be more optionally piloted vehicles.

That's not really the key distinction. And I wonder if a distinction about recoverability is more significant. The difference between a missile that just launched and doesn't come back versus an aircraft, whether there's a human in it or not, might be a cleaner distinction that actually holds up longer over time as the technology evolves. If that's the case, then what would necessarily be the end game for that?

Are you still focusing on limiting drone proliferation as a WMD delivery system or just limiting drone proliferation for the sake of drone proliferation? I think that's a great question is what are the aims here, right? Certainly if missile technology itself and ballistic missile technology is still difficult to get access to and develop and there's value in constraining that, and if I'm keeping the MTCR in that respect, maybe one focus would be to really narrow the MTCR on those things and accept what might be inevitable when it comes to drones, but at least protect missiles as something that can be prohibited and regulated. Sure.

At least my read on some of the major concerns about drone proliferation and the impact that it might have beyond this conversation about the MTCR is whether or not it lowers the threshold for conflict. So if you're thinking about that concern and then relating it back to these non-proliferation measures, does the MTCR achieve that by limiting drone proliferation or can it? Right. If you're worried about lowering the threshold for the use of force and you think about the ways that most countries then a drone that can go 200 kilometers with a payload of 350 kilograms might be just as likely for your average country to reduce the threshold to use of force argument.

That 250 system is probably just as likely to reduce the threshold to the use of force as a 300-500 system. Well, the interesting thing, of course, is that the MTCR doesn't actually distinguish between armed and non-arm systems, which from that perspective of thinking about strikes matters, of course, quite a bit. Right. And on top of that, neither Israel nor China, two of our top three progrators outing in the United States aren't members to the MTCR.

They claim to follow the MTCR, but they're not formal members. And it's an interesting example of the power that their drone exports, that the payload on their drone exports are 450 kilograms, allowing them to save face, essentially, from an international norms perspective, even though they're not technically members, as Alexander said and is absolutely right about. What are they paying? Anything more than lip service to that norm international actions?

Think about the way that this has played out in missiles. I mean, UAVs aren't the only place we've seen this. If you think about the British export of Storm Shadow to Saudi Arabia, they're less often in the missile arena than in the drone arena. We've seen a little bit of uncertainty for systems that were right at the margins of a Category 1 system and where countries have produced export variants that are magically just below the thresholds falls under the threshold and if there's a certain threshold that you come underneath it, then that's allowed.

But it's a little bit different. When I look at the Chinese CH4, well, it looks an awful lot like a Reaper and the U.S. classifies a Reaper as a Category 1 system that China's saying is their CH4 is not and there's someone on them abroad. And so I wonder how there's just a double standard in terms of compliance.

I'm not sure it's a double standard in terms of compliance. I think it points out the weakness of the standard as far as delineating capabilities. And one can even believe that a CH4 has a payload of 450 kilograms, but if in theory it's delivering, putting aside the high-star integration piece, if in theory the platform can deliver a very similar capability to the Reaper, I think it calls into question whether, in this case, whether 500 kilograms is a substantively meaningful distinction or thinking about the capabilities of drones. Right now, it still is probably for missiles.

So acknowledging some of these concerns, what are the options that states have going forward in terms of how they work together unilaterally to adapt the MTCR and their own actions to this changing environment? I think based on the conversation we've just had, it's either a question of changing those Category 1 specifications, potentially adding new signatories to the MTCR, or completely diverging the discussion about drones from the MTCR and creating a new system, whether that's something voluntary as the MTCR is, maybe stemming from future conversations around the joint declaration that came out last fall, or simply long-term promulgation of new norms of use. I think there's a variety of paths that we can take. The creation of a new arms control regime focused on drone exports, essentially MTCR just for drones, I think in the current international political climate would be very difficult to negotiate.

A minor repair as such to the MTCR might be more likely to happen or more achievable. But it would take a country taking the lead and going down that road and deciding that they wanted to at least absorb some international political costs probably in the short term to advance a reform proposal, and then how to hold the line then if other countries come in, countries such as Russia or China, that want to use any alterations to standards for drones to legitimize more significant missile exports. One of the more interesting things we've also seen in the international space when it comes to policy is this linkage of the MTCR to intentions for use. And...

principles of use for the country that you might be exporting the drone to. And I think that's this first attempt to get around the distinction between the use case of a missile, which is obvious, and the use case of a drone, which is not. So, at least in the near term, we'll probably continue down that path. And in terms of the mechanics of evolving the MTCR to this new environment, there's an interesting example I could play here, right, where changing the MTCR requires consensus among all of the state parties, but on the other hand, the regime itself is non-legal binding, and it actually doesn't even prohibit states from these transfers.

It simply requires a strong presumption of denial, a little vague exactly what that means. I mean, we've seen cases where countries have been able to overcome that presumption of denial and transfer abroad, right? True. If you look at CIPRI's arms trade database and track sales of drones back to 2007 when you saw the first export of an arms system from the United States to the UK, you're really not seeing many transfers of the really complex weapons-capable drones until China comes on the scene.

And they've completed most of the arms drones transfers since I think their first agreement in 2009. The United States transfer to the UK is still the only arms transfer that hasn't come from China so far. We have a couple more coming down the pipeline, but Alexander's absolutely right. Nearly all arms drone exports have been Chinese systems.

Is there a world where countries just simply start overcoming that strong presumption of denial more and more? Is it seeing more category one transfers? And what does that start to look like? Does that threaten all the parts of the regime?

Or does that simply allow the proliferation, the prohibition on large drones to kind of die natural deaths as technology evolves? You can overcome the strong presumption of denial on, quote, rare occasion according to the MTCR. So what does rare occasion mean? The challenge is that if you overcome, if you define rare occasion one way for drones, then it might be harder to make the argument against doing the same thing for missiles.

You really need to then be clear about what it is about drones that means that you can more easily overcome the strong presumption of denial but you still want to hold the line on missiles. And I think that's going to be a challenging international diplomatic discussion to have, but one that is worth having if the MTCR member states decide that preventing the export of drones should still be a key role for the MTCR. So looking forward, both in terms of technology and the politics of how the MTCR responds, I'm going to ask each for a prediction, but it's a long ways out, so we want to kind of catch it for a while. Will the MTCR still be around 30 years from today?

I don't think so. If the future of the MTCR is to limit drone proliferation, I think the number of alterations required to do that effectively will make it a completely different agreement. Things I plan to have 30 years from now. A flying car, Rosie the healthcare robot, and all sorts of other things that will make our lives presumably very different than our lives today.

In that way, it's hard to imagine a 30-year continuation of the status quo with regard to the relationship between drones and the MTCR. I can easily imagine the MTCR is still around and kicking when it comes to missile technology, but my suspicion would be that something will give before the next 30 years hits when it comes to the way that a drone exports work with regards to the MTCR. Well, great. Well, thank you, Mike and Alex, for your thoughts on the future of MTCR, and we'll see how things evolve.

Thank you. Thanks a lot. Thank you. Thank you.

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