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Jul 8, 2017 31 min

Drones Podcast Series: Emerging Norms

from CNAS Podcasts Hosted by Center for a New American Security

Rachel Stohl, a senior associate with Stimson Center's Managing Across Boundaries Initiative, joins CNAS' Paul Scharre and Alexandra Sander to discuss emerging norms for drones as they proliferate.

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Drones Podcast Series: Emerging Norms

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Hi, I'm Paul Sharay from the Center for American Security. Welcome to our latest podcast on drone proliferation. I'm joined today by my colleague, Alexander Sander, from CNAS, and Rachel Stoll from the Stimstone Center. Rachel, Alice, welcome.

Thank you. So today we're going to talk about drones for drones as they're proliferating, standards of behavior for use, and how perceptions about what's acceptable and unacceptable use is evolving internationally. So Rachel wanted to start with you. How do you see these norms or expectations about appropriate behavior evolving as drones are proliferating and various actors are using them?

Sure. Well, I think the issue is that there are lots of frameworks or types of international law that cover the use of drones, just like they cover other kinds of weapons systems. International legal frameworks related to human rights law, humanitarian law, or the law of the law of the wrong conflict. I think that what we've seen with drones is that they're really developing on more of an ad hoc basis based on the use of by the United States.

And so you're seeing sort of a body of norms develop that's not really based on any, necessarily any international standard, but really on the use that the United States is undertaking in theaters around the world, whether they're inside or outside the hot battlefield. How is that a US-use shaping and people's perceptions internationally? Well, I think the issue with the US-use is that a lot of the use has been done in secret. It has not been done very transparently.

And so we don't know, for example, the processes by which drone strikes are being decided, what targets are acceptable. And so we're seeing the USA trust us. We know what we're doing. We have intelligence that's leading us in a certain direction.

And what happens then is other countries say, oh, well, we don't have to be very transparent in our use of this technology. And so you're seeing this norm develop where you're not necessarily following the international legal frameworks that exist because of national security reasons. And so we have to sort of get back to the grounding of what the standards are that are in place that govern the use of this technology. I think the other issue you're seeing, especially with US-use dominating the conversation about norms, is that the context really is counterterrorism operations.

You haven't seen the use expand into other types of conflicts. So you're going to miss a whole range of other use cases for drones as they continue to proliferate if we let that continue to be the guiding behavior. Yeah. And I think the other issue is that we get caught up in drone use or drone export or proliferation equals targeted killings.

Right. And I think that that's not necessarily the equation. I think there are other aspects to drone use and drone exports that are outside of the targeted killing framework. And so again, we get caught up in sort of one aspect and one legal framework and not really looking at the issue across the board.

So one of the dynamics here is that, maybe seven or eight years ago, it was probably in US interest when the US was using drones or other sort of not, to maybe not be very transparent. And now as they're proliferating and others are following the US League maybe in ways that it would not like, that dynamic is changing. How have we seen US policymakers respond over the last several years? Well, I think you've seen US policymakers respond by the sort of bureaucratic level to trying to develop guidelines and principles and policies that sort of frame US export use or export policy, US use policy.

But you're seeing other countries also trying to figure out what the US is doing and develop their own. So France, for example, which doesn't have their own policy is looking to the US. It's come to the US and said, what are you doing? Meeting with Congress, meeting with the administration.

What are you trying to do so they can develop their own policies? You're seeing the impact of the US lack of policy or the lack of transparency and their policy sort of reflecting across other countries as well. You also sort of have an application, I think, of the role of Congress here. Congress has an oversight role.

Congress has a regulatory role. But has very much left this issue to the administration to determine whether it's the bureaucratic process for making decisions about who's on the kill list, who is governing, or who has the responsibility for strikes as the CIA or DOD. You're seeing a lot of application of the role of Congress to oversee drone strikes and their operation and the policies around them. Yeah, and the other response to the transparency question is the new policy requiring the Director of National Intelligence to report on US strikes outside areas of hostilities.

But within that document, you're still only getting a range in terms of how many strikes and a range in terms of the estimated casualties. You're still not getting any information on necessarily where they're occurring or any further breakdown. So I think there's an effort to respond to criticisms on transparency, but we're still figuring it out. And I think that has impacts internationally, because we've seen, for example, the UK was far more open about their use of unmanned systems in strikes in Syria and Iraq.

And now seeing that the US has pulled back a little bit, they're becoming less transparent. So there's sort of a continuum effect here that if the US is less transparent, other countries will also be less transparent down the road. In some ways, it seems a little bit surprising that we haven't yet seen more countries use drones the same way the United States does in terms of extraterritorial strikes against non-circuptions that they're not happy with. We've seen some of that within states own territories, they're using armed drones in that fashion, but not necessarily outside others.

Do you see that coming down the road? And how should the US be thinking about that and how to respond to that, inevitably? I do see that increasing down the road. I think right now, there's hesitancy on what the response might be from other countries if someone is incurring into their territory to conduct an armed drone strike.

I think part of that is due to the lack of US transparency about the legitimacy of counterterrorism strikes. So there's a hesitancy on the international scene about whether or not this is actually a legitimate use in terms of what is the escalation response going to be. So far, if you're operating a surveillance drone and somebody else's territory and gets shot down, that hasn't led to escalation. But if we see more strikes, then I'm not sure what the context will be.

I mean, sovereignty is still a fundamental principle of the international order. And I think most countries are hesitant to betray that concept. And so flying a drone, even for surveillance, across an international border without the permission of the foreign government, still is a provocative initiative. And so I think you do see other countries a little more concerned about breaking that sort of norm.

But I do think that the time is coming when you'll see that at a greater extent as countries are more willing to lower the barriers of entry into conflict to take that extra risk because you're not putting human lives on the line and see what happens. And I think that we're going to have to as an international community deal with that reality, whether it's from states or non-states crossing borders. Yeah, I think this will especially develop for countries who are buying drones in lieu of manned aircraft. They're going to be using them as replacements.

So we should expect them to use them in the same way as seeing them using the manned aircraft. I think the US, to be fair, the US is in a unique position in that we are engaged in conflicts around the world for counterterrorism, operation, et cetera. Although that's expanding in terms of the use. But other countries don't have sort of the footprint that we have, it's not really a footprint, I guess.

But they don't have the footprint that we have around the world. And so there's less opportunity for other countries to use them in ways than the United States. But as you say, I think it's only going to grow as they replace their manned systems with these kinds of. How does that, I mean, how do you proceed, if you start to see states using drones for those kinds of strikes, that might affect legitimacy for US action?

So if we had the French using armed drones in Mali to go after terrorists with the UK using them in Libya to connect to strike or Chinese, and then we were going to go after their collage traffickers, how does that affect perceived legitimacy for US actions positively or negatively? I'm not sure how legitimate the US actions are seen at the moment, to be honest. I mean, I think there are a lot of questions. I don't think there's a forum to bring those up at the moment.

I think that countries are still sort of wary of calling out the US for their use of lethal strikes in areas outside battlefields because there's an understanding that that's helping fight terrorism, which is a norm or a value that they agree with. So there has been hesitancy to sort of question the US legitimacy sort of publicly. But behind closed doors, you do get a lot of, I don't know if this fits with law of international conflict. I don't know if this works with international humanitarian law, discrimination of proportionality, all of those issues that international lawyers like to talk about.

So I do think that there is the likelihood that these conversations are going to have to come to the fore. The US has sort of said, trust us. If you knew what we knew, you would do the same thing. But that sort of justification isn't going to fly if Russia flies a drone into London because there's someone that they see as a particular threat to their sovereignty or national security, and they take out that particular target.

That's going to be seen very suspiciously and have a reaction from the rest of the world. It totally depends on your use case. I mean, if you're talking about French-conducting counterterrorism operations, that's probably not going to negatively impact the legitimacy of US actions. But if you have China using it to target populations outside of their borders, that could be perceived completely differently.

Are there some actions like the French or the UK or going after terrorists also doing similar kinds of drugs rights that actually would normalize from the US actions against terrorists and sort of make it seem more legitimate? Is there a dynamic there that makes sense? I think you could see it have a legitimacy increasing effect. But it's going to depend on what the collateral damage is.

If another country conducts an attack and you are immediately seeing reports of civilian casualties, then there could be a negative impact. I mean, how do you as policymakers respond? If at some point in time any future, say, Russia is conducting drone strikes and a caucus in South Asia and US does not like that, now all of a sudden issues on the other foot, how can you really criticize those actions? Right.

This is where a lack of transparency really undermines us in the future. And the development, I think, of what those international norms should be in terms of use. So without a basic understanding, everyone on the same page, you just have a culture of impunity where you can say, look, this was in our national security interests, this was a counterterrorism objective, whatever your rationale is, and there's not much that the rest of the world can do. And so that's why I think as the use increases and the potential scope of use increases, I think there is going to be a need to figure out what is that baseline, what are we willing to accept as an international community and what is not acceptable?

So I started this project two years ago on drone proliferation into sort of maps and these things out to try to get ahead as in these challenges. And the fascinating thing about working in this area is the technology, the policy, the use of moving so rapidly that in some ways governments that tend to be slow and reactive have been even ahead of a lot of our attempts to kind of respond and do with this. So when we started out, we've very little policy in the US government to try to address these things. And we've seen a number of things happen.

What if it could kind of just walk through the changes that we've seen in terms of government policy, in terms of the export policy and the joint declaration? Sure. So we've seen the US export policy come out. And what that's doing is linking US exports to principles of use, but also reaffirming the application of international law to drone use.

And in terms of exports highlighting the relevancy of the missile technology control regime. But that brings in your point about applying technological standards to an area of development that's changing rapidly. If you look at the MTCR, that's something that came out in the 80s and we're applying it to a technology that really is still in its initial stages in terms of where drones are going to go, where robotics are going to go, what's happening next in autonomy. So it's really just a first step.

I think the joint declaration was the next step, taking that to the international level. It may not have been as explicit as our export policy was in terms of identifying principles for use. But I believe the intent when we promulgated that policy was to use that as a stepping off point for future conversations on the international stage about what drone norms should look like. Yeah, and I would add that in 2014, there was the first rewrite of the US conventional arms transfer policy in 19 years.

And that technically also covers unmanned systems. I think that 2015 export policy sort of elaborated or numerated sort of the extra controls or the extra safeguards for drones. But you can sort of start to see a thought process by the US government on we do need to update our sort of regulations and export approach to these systems. But then also the principles for proper use that are included in the 2015 export policy sort of elaborate that.

And I think that's an interesting development and the joint declaration does as well as this linkage between exports or the nonproliferation aspect of the technology as well as they use. And that's unique. It's new. It's hard for governments to wrap their heads around from a bureaucratic perspective.

But also for how do you implement something that is looking at sort of these international legal frameworks in terms of how something is used and the actual nonproliferation or proliferation issues related to where that technology is spreading. That's a really interesting development. And it'll be, I think, difficult for that to sort of expand internationally. But I think it's an important expansion.

I think one of the major hurdles we're going to face is in the past when you're talking about nonproliferation efforts and dealing with exports. You're usually including in your policy very specific technical specifications. And that's going to be really hard looking at drones, first of all, that vary widely from what a commercial system looks like to what a sophisticated military system looks like. And then also understanding that autonomy is really about software.

So if you're thinking about a drone airframe being enabled by software, which is what gives it its autonomy, how do you translate that into policy points? Well, I think it's always hard to regulate from behind. So the technology is out there. It's adapting.

If you try and sort of, OK, we're going to regulate this, and you draw these very technical specifications around what you're. Then it's very easy to develop something that this is what we see in the MTCR. That goes just a few kilometers less, or carries a few pounds more or less depending on what the regulation is. So I think it's easy to sort of develop the technology around an existing regulation.

That doesn't mean we shouldn't have the regulation. It just means you have to think about what you're going to control and why, to what end. Because there are lots of good uses for this technology. Unmanned systems can be really helpful.

The reason that they're attractive, the reasons are many, whether it's the loitering and the persistence and the ability to sort of not put human lives on the line or to get into areas that are difficult topographically. And there's lots of positive uses, not to mention all the commercial uses that we see for this technology. So I think regulation is good, but to what end? What are you trying to control?

What are you worried about? And so to think about the controls in that way, and not get so hung up on the technical specifications. But is it that you're concerned that they could fall into the hands of non-stagactors and be used to target innocent civilians? Or could they be used to drop some kind of weapon on a large population or small population?

What is it that you're using? And then to develop the regulations of the controls around that. I think that's hard for policymakers, too, because they're very used to developing an export regulation. It's on this specific specification.

And if the system is in it or outside of it, then I'll control it this way. That's not what we're talking about anymore. There's lots of regulations that control on technology, whether it's Teposanar or the MTCR. It's we're worried about how these weapons could potentially be used and who could do that using.

That's what we're interested in. That's where we get in trouble, I think, with just focusing on counterterrorism operations for so long. And that's why Paul and I hosted that war game back in late 2015, exploring what new operational concepts you might see with drones to provide a platform for thinking about policy outside of that counterterrorism box. And I think other countries are actually thinking more outside the counterterrorism box.

I think the US is stuck in that box. But even as we see the expansion into other areas, yes, they have a counterterrorism lens. But I think that's only because that's what's cashing. That's what's needed right now.

But they're not necessarily actually for counterterrorism operations. But you can use this technology in a lot of ways that are really, really helpful to the US military. But we just tend to focus on this counterterrorism lens, which I think is doing it to service to the development of norms and also controls and regulations down the road. So let me turn to Rachel's question back to both of you.

What should we be concerned about and what role does regulation play in responding to those potential concerns? I'm not sure. I mean, part of the problem is that we haven't really seen a new operational concept yet, especially when you think about where the technology is going. Maybe the next thing we're going to see is swarms of micro drones.

I have no idea what that's going to look like in terms of new concepts. But being flexible in our regulations, I think it's going to be key in making space for controlling that type of use. I mean, what's the payload on a micro drone? Is that going to be electronic warfare or something else?

Yeah. And I think if we take it out of the counterterrorism lens, I mean, we can see force protection as not necessarily an counterterrorism context, as important, getting the intel in advance of boots on the ground. It allows you, if you're worried about where you're trying to get to refugees or IDPs, getting that intel and saying this is where we see this group of people, or we can't move these people through this particular past because it's flooded. So I think there are lots of other military, not necessarily lethal, applications.

That would be really useful. I think the problem, and I think most people would be OK with those. And I think we'd be OK with the periphery, even if it's an armed drone in that context, particularly in the force protection context. But I think we think if we need to look at, what are the attributes of this technology that makes them so attractive to not just the US, but to other potential end users, and then think about how could that be used in a way that would undermine sort of the other national interests, or steering interests, or foreign policy objectives?

What is it that we're concerned about? Is it the use to target civilians? Is it the use to engage in conflict that you wouldn't otherwise engage in? What are those areas that we're concerned about?

I think the other issue for me has been, I'm not sure how effective this technology has been for the United States in its counterterrorism operations. We don't have any way to measure the success. We're not sure what the metric is. Have they been used in the way that strategically is accomplishing the goals that we set out for them?

I don't know. And my understanding is there's not been a global look at the effectiveness or the efficiency of this system as compared to other systems. And so in that case, I think we need to take a step back and say, is this technology doing what we need it to do? Or is it just the fad right now, and everybody wants one, because they're cool, and they allow you to do things that you can do otherwise.

But we need to really understand what their potential efficacy and efficiencies are, and then determine whether or not they've been successful. So you mentioned that there are all these other regulations that have still applied also to drones. Is there still a need for, and clearly, the countries that signed a joint declaration was just a is, right, for something unique to, I didn't have a aircraft and why? What's the gap there?

Yeah, I mean, I think the re, well, I think there's a couple things with the joint declaration. I think countries signed on because it was seen as a supportive of President Obama and his legacy on drones. And so I think there was sort of a reciprocal, could you do a favor and sign this and support our efforts? I do think the other piece of that is that we don't, I think the other piece is that we don't know what that joint declaration is or is about.

And so countries sort of signed on, and we're like, oh, I signed on saying I believe in norms for drone use. Yeah, look, I can check that box. I, you know, shown I'm a responsible end user without having to commit to anything and demonstrating, you know, oh, there are standards, and we're all supportive of those. But the countries that didn't sign on, which I think are really important, is what were those that were concerned about the legitimacy that that process was creating for what the United States has done, but also saying, well, now, why do we have to do anymore?

We've signed on to something. We've shown that we care about this. What's the incentive for doing more? So I think the joint declaration is sort of a, it's sort of a red herring in that, you know, people can say, well, I've done something already.

I don't need to do anything more. But it also demonstrates when more is needed. So it's like this weird paradigm that you have there. I think the other thing is there are international legal frameworks, but it's very easy looking at the US context to say, well, if it doesn't apply to the US, then it may not apply to me as well.

And so I can now maybe breach that sovereignty that I wasn't really sure about, right? Maybe take out that potential threat and then get quickly back across the border. I think it's expanding how people are thinking about how they can use drones. So given these political dynamics internationally, where do you see the conversation around the joint declaration going?

Is that a first act towards something else? Or is that an off ramp for energy about international regulation for drones? Well, I think it's a huge question. And it's even more of a question now with the election and the presidency of Donald Trump in that, how is the US going to engage with the rest of the world?

There tends to be, although it changes every day, so I'm not sure. But there tends to be sort of a anti-multilateralism approach. And I think with the joint declaration, you actually have to have the US engaged. I think it undermines the effort if the US isn't on board and isn't trying to work with its partners and allies.

I'm not sure that trying to get the 50 plus countries together to agree initially makes a lot of sense. I think it's going to be really difficult. I think if you get those countries that are actually exporting and using drones now to sit down and say, OK, what are the standards that we can all live with? What can we work with?

And start with the principles for proper use that the United States already has in its policy as a starting point. I'm not saying that's where it ends. But at least not have anything less than the US already has domestically. I think that is a positive step.

I don't know, though, how the US will engage. I don't know if the US will see this as a priority. This was an Obama legacy issue. And it's very likely that the, or possible, I'm not sure it's likely that it's possible that Trump administration will say, yeah, we're not interested.

We have other priorities. Yeah, it's unclear what their policy is going to be respected to drones. The only really measurable step you've seen so far is Trump re-grant authority to the intelligence community to conduct drone strikes. And I think Mike Zinko has put out a couple of numbers on this, measuring the frequency of drone strikes so far under the Trump administration.

And the comparison point there is that he's authorized an average of a strike every day compared to granted over a much longer time period, so a bigger n. Obama's approval of a strike about every 5.4 days. So you are seeing an uptick in the frequency of strikes. But again, it's unclear to me what the policy is behind this and where the Trump administration intends to take the US going forward.

Well, and the other thing I think that we've seen Trump do is expand the areas of active hostilities, getting permission to include new areas. So I do think signs are pointing to a rollback of some of the measures that the Obama administration put in place, particularly at the very end. You've seen sort of questions about releasing data on its civilian casualties and sending executive order to that effect. So I mean, yes, I think there is, we don't really have a complete picture, but all signs are pointing to reversal rollback.

So all of us who were saying we need more controls, or more regulations, or more norm development, now we're saying, wait, we need to hold the line that we had at the end of the Obama administration, which wasn't sufficient. But we certainly don't want to go back further. I think, again, looking at the larger picture and norm development that undermines our efforts to develop global norms. And the US can't go alone on this.

I mean, maybe 10 years ago, the US could go alone, but now the number of actors that control this technology has grown. And there are more people using these in theaters that we never anticipated, and the dangers are too high for the US to say we're out. Yeah, the next couple of years are the sweet spot for us to continue to shape proliferation. And I think time will be up shortly as more people start using drones internationally for the US to continue shaping.

So if you assume, maybe if the state called me that the Trump administration steps back from this leadership role internationally, is there someone else that steps into fill the void? Or who are the key actors that then end up shaping some of these norms and expectations of behavior internationally? I mean, to be honest, I'm not sure that the process would survive without the US. I think the US is the largest exporter and user of the technology.

If you don't have the US on board, there's going to be a Y-bother aspect for the rest of the world, I would think. I mean, you're not going to see China and Russia, who are also in Iran and Israel. They weren't part of the initial joint declaration. They're not going to suddenly step up and say, oh, we need to put controls on this technology in terms of its proliferation and its use.

Would some of the Europeans that have been thus far supportive of the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Italy, would they step up? Probably not. I mean, I think they're working on their own domestic policies. And you have very much an anti-drown tenor in the populations in those countries.

And so I don't think they would want to engage in something that really doesn't help them domestically or help them as a continent. So I question what would happen without the United States? I think it will set the process back for global norm development. Doesn't mean the US has to be the leader.

But I think if you don't have the US at the table and people are saying whatever we do, won't have an impact because the US can undermine either the export policy or the use policy. I think it just won't go anywhere. Yeah. If the US steps away from the table, I think things will just continue to develop in a really ad hoc manner.

And when you see other proliferators of this technology start selling more and more systems on the international market, that's going to change the game. The US use of drones is going to have less weight in terms of shaping norms. You've already seen China in the past couple of years really change the game in terms of arms drone proliferation. The US first sold an arms system to the UK in 2007.

And China, since I want to say starting in 2009, has been the predominant supplier of arms drones to other countries. Yeah, over 90% of international arms drones come from China. Right. So depending on who they sell to and what their intended uses for those drones, that will have a big impact on the development of future norms.

Well, and if you see the US expanding its use in areas outside and inside hot battlefields and you see proliferation increase from the US, there's going to be a, you know, I don't have to follow any rules at attitude from countries that are already less willing to conform to international norms. Well, it would be interesting to see how this plays out. Certainly more drones are coming in, so we'll see how things evolve. Thanks, you.

Thank you both for joining us today. Thanks. Thank you. Thank you.

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