Hi, I'm Paul Sharay, Senior Fellow here at the Center for New American Security, with another edition of our podcast series on drones. Today we're going to talk about drone transparency. What can a Trump administration do to build on Obama administration initiatives to increase transparency about US use of drones? I'm joined by Lucardic, Executive Director of the Network Science Initiative at the National Journal and Fellow at the International Security Program at New America Foundation, and Lauren DeYoung-Schulman, a Senior Fellow here at CNAS.
Thanks, Lucard, for joining me. Thanks for having us. Thank you. Both of you really had worked in the Obama administration in various aspects of drone policy.
I started with what were the initiatives that the Obama administration took to increase transparency over the course of that administration. So I'll let Luc get into the specific initiatives, because he was much more involved in that. But throughout my career at the Department of Defense and the National Security Council, drones, for fairly dominance, even when it was not my portfolio, both in terms of how will we export them and sell them to foreign partners? Are they the sort of magical response to anything on the planet that we need surveillance or a strike on in some way?
They were really the capability that was discussed the most within the NSC and also in public. But at the same time, they were, I think, probably least well understood by Congress, by the general public, as well as by some of our partners, which is why I think a lot of the stuff that Luc worked on was really important. Yeah, so I'll just say at the outset that I approached drones from having the experience in the counterterrorism community, which means I was mostly thinking about them as an enabler of special operations or as platforms for taking strikes against terrorist groups. And I think for that latter point, in the community, it's called direct action against terrorists.
It's helpful to think about where we started at the beginning of Obama administration and where we ended. And at the beginning of the administration, there were pretty widespread news accounts of drone strikes in various places in the world. But no real government acknowledgment of it. And if you read the reports from some of the outside groups that were studying drones' strikes, a perception that they were not particularly precise or accurate in terms of removing their intended target without harming civilians at any significant number.
And that began to change throughout President Obama's first term, most notably by a series of speeches that his senior advisors gave. And this was on both the policy side and the legal side. And I think what you saw in the first term was it desired to try to be more transparent about, one, at least the fact that we were taking these actions. And two, what we believed was the legal and policy framework for doing that and how that was consistent with both domestic law and international law.
Certainly a lot of disagreement about that. But at least the case was made through that. In 2011 was the first time that we had ever acknowledged specific countries where we were taking drone strikes and in a war powers declaration. We acknowledged drone strikes being taken in Yemen and Somalia, which was pretty significant.
But I think that the view and the perception that drone strikes were still causing significant civilian casualties led President Obama to undertake a series of efforts to try to rein in the program and make sure that it was on very firm legal and policy footing that we could explain more broadly. And so this culminated in the 2013 speech he gave at the National Defense University, in which he offered a very strong defense of his record on drones, but also announced a series of reforms to further improve the approach that we took on this. And his second term really is kind of a continuation of the beginning of transparency that he laid down in 2013. And so you have things like in 2014, we began to acknowledge specific strikes in Somalia, which we've never done before, most notably the removal of Godani, who was the head of Al Shabaab in 2015.
There were additional disclosures in that case, very unfortunately, around the death of Warren Weinstein, a US citizen who was killed in direct action by the US government. And we discovered more details about that action than we had about previous actions. Going into 2016 was probably the banner year of President Obama's final year in office. And there were a number of disclosures made that year, particularly around specific strikes being conducted in Yemen and Libya.
There were aggregate statistics that were released, which was probably one of the bigger things that the administration did, which was to say, this is the US government's assessment of the number of strikes and the number of combatants and noncombatants killed from 2009 to 2015 across all theaters. They released the Presidential Policy Guidance on Direct Action, so sort of the main framework that the president had proved for taking these actions. And then there was a notable document that was released in kind of the waning days of the Obama administration that didn't get a kind of attention, but it was actually a really fascinating document, which is a comprehensive legal and policy framework for all of our counterterrorism actions. And it laid out in pretty painstaking detail the series of legal and policy conclusions that were reached and that formed the framework for thinking about direct action in that administration.
So if I want to talk a little bit about what's going on in parallel to this, to all the policy discussion that we've just laid out, because at the same time as first the Bush administration and the Obama administration were developing their drone policy that evolved, we had a really fascinating dynamic in terms of how the American people were thinking about transparency and accountability in the use of force. In the sense that since 2001, there has been no congressional debates or new congressional authorization for use of force for any of the actions that have taken place worldwide since September 11th. The AOMF has covered basically Iraq, Afghanistan, a lot of the CT war with various sort of congressional kids at favor, whether they favored it, the fact that they continue to fund it. But there was not a debate in the sense that our founders might have thought of it when giving the Congress the ability to declare war.
So the American people aren't used to thinking about should the US government be really transparent, or should they be really accountable for a lot of their use of force activities. And that becomes even more fascinating when you think about this is fairly new, or at least not so new, it's much larger for the CIA to be undertaking some of these activities beyond the traditional Department of Defense. So while I think that there are a lot of activists very rightly pointed out that transparency and accountability were really important facets to strengthen the fraudulent policy, the American people haven't necessarily been clamoring for us. And in a lot of ways, that's because they are used to a dynamic where the administration has a lot of power and the ability to execute war.
So why does transparency matter? Well, I think there's a few reasons. But I think the biggest thing is that it's absolutely important for both the domestic constituency as well as the country where we're taking these actions to understand, for a domestic audience, for a US audience, on what basis the government believes it out to carry out force on behalf of its people. And in a country that is where the strikes are actually taking place, it's important for the populations around where the strikes are taking place to understand why the action has been taken, and to be able to judge for themselves whether those actions are discriminate and precise, and whether they're in keeping with what they would expect of the elected officials in their own country.
So at most, basically, what I think is that. I think that's exactly right. I would add that it was part of really the bargain that I feel that was struck by giving Congress the ability to declare a war and the president, the ability to be the commander in chief, to be able to have some sort of basically public negotiation about what it means to use violence on behalf of the American people, and what sort of risks are being mitigated, and what sort of risks are being increased by the very nature of armed conflict overseas, whether it be by the CIA or the Department of Defense. And one of the things I find interesting about transparency in the case of the drones issue is that because they're unmanned, you are sort of minimizing the debate about risk to US assets and personnel.
And that's actually really helpful in so many ways. But you're not, as a result, perhaps addressing as much about the risk of what else happens. Is there a greater risk to US interests? Is there a risk to the local population?
Is there a risk to US relationships that are received? Some of the risk debates that might naturally happen around a traditional US military conflict or DOD is engaging in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere don't necessarily happen in the same way when you're talking about drones because it's such a different set of players. And that's, in some ways, neither good nor bad. A lot of the debate is actually increased, I think, in use of drones, like they're more transparent inside governments, but they're less transparent outside of government in a lot of ways, I think, really matter to the American people, whether they quite realize it or not.
Can I add one thing to this? I think another important thing to consider is that transparency allows you a means to evaluate the actions against what has been established as sort of the rules of the campaign. And in the case of drone strikes that we're talking about, I think, in this context, which in government, the term was outside areas of active hostilities. That's the same places like Yemen and Somalia, where the United States is not in a full-scale state of war.
The important thing, I think, for the Obama administration was to say that in these places where we don't have, we're not in a full-scale war, we ought to be bound by certain higher-level principles. And the principles that were articulated in that administration and President Obama's guidance on this was that lethal action will only be taken when there is a continuing imminent threat to US persons, a pretty high standard, right? That it will only be taken when there is no option for capture or not a feasible option for capture, so you can debate what goes into feasibility. But that the first preference should be for capture.
And that before you take a strike, the relevant commander can assess within your certainty that civilians will not be harmed. So they're not terribly complex set of principles. I mean, there's only a couple of them, but they are very high standards. And I think it was important to be able to assess whether we were actually meeting that bar because of some of the limitations on transparency.
And I'm sure we'll get into those soon. It is hard to assess whether the United States government, from an outside perspective, not having the perspective that we've had of being inside government, to fully assess that the government was meeting those standards. So you know, you each talked about the kind of reality of what the US government's doing, and at least very early on, to the perception about what was happening. So as the Obama administration sort of took these measures to increase transparency, have we seen the perception shift?
How is this sort of perception about the world as to what the United States is doing changed as a result? So take that into place. One, having been in the Obama White House from 2013 to 2016, so sort of three of his final four years in office, the focus at that time and sort of the incoming, I guess, that we're receiving, the comments that we're receiving from the press, the meetings that we had with human rights groups and the such, there was a strong acknowledgement that the transparency was helpful, that it was helpful to be able to articulate these standards, and that the administration was making steady steps toward greater transparency. But I think where we really fell down, where the shortcomings remain and where the criticism really focused, at least for the end, was that the United States government has never gotten around to, or has never been able to fully explain each of its strikes taken over the course, so in other words, to take it a different way.
The US government has only disclosed bits and pieces of the specific strikes that were taken. So from 2014 onward, there's a strike by strike account of the strikes that took place in Somalia. That's really helpful to be able to assess in that context what it looked like. 2016 on where there's that same kind of accounting in Yemen.
Anything before 2014, and anything beyond the disclosures that have already taken place, there's no way of assessing it. So you know the US government has released that there were hundreds of strikes taken from 2009 to 2015, but doesn't actually acknowledge where those took place, the specific cases where our assessments of civilian casualties might have differed from those of outside groups, whether media or human rights groups or the such. And even in the aggregate statistics released at the end of the administration, there's in early 2017 that in the waning days of administration they released the numbers from previous year, it's still aggregated across all theaters, and there's no way to be able to really distinguish where those differences might have lied between the US government's accounts and those outside groups. To me, Paul, your question comes back to you, one of the terms that Luke spoke out a moment ago, and I'm not a lawyer, nor is I a CT person, but the continuing imminent threats to the American people.
To me, it's really would be very helpful in the future to give the American people a better understanding of what that actually means. And which I don't mean what is that technical legal definition, but to go back to the drone strikes taken by the United States over this very long time period, what to give them a better sense of what was the specific threats, how was it mitigated, and what were the sort of knock on effects that may have happened either within that community or within that terrorist network. Not to say that those strikes weren't worth it, maybe in many cases, probably 90% of the cases they were, but to me, transparency and accountability have to be linked ultimately to the American people and having a good sense of what kind of risks and costs are being taken in their name. Not that they will necessarily decide to change their mind about it, but at the end of the day, they're sort of the ones who will be kind of held to the accounting of how did this work in practice over these last two decades.
And I think maybe not necessarily immediately, but over the long term, they really merit having a more broader public debate about that. That's really a broader intelligence community issue, where the intelligence community, I think, believes that we should rely on them to keep the secrets of the United States and they should be the trusted arbiters of analysis. And we absolutely do have to trust them for that. But over the long term, I think it'd be much more useful to have a more transparent conversation with the American people about here's what we really meant by the al-kind of threat.
Here's what the true Russian threat to US forces is in the Baltics, because the extent that we keep that secret, whether or not we're intending to, it becomes, there's a perception of we must be doing something wrong behind the curtain, or the ability for people who would oppose us to say that you are doing something wrong without us having the ability to defend ourselves practically. Yeah, let me pick up on a point there. I think there's a couple of things that jumped out of me in this, I'm more to comment here. One is that in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think we found out very early that we could disclose basic details about every strike and every major operation and the sky wouldn't fall.
That you could do that and it would be helpful, at least in explaining where our assessments differed from those other groups. I think that ultimately came to like, I don't want to say quite value, but see the necessity and the use utility in doing so. Yeah, I think I absolutely grew that and still do it for Iraq and Syria operations, and that's continuing the Trump administration, which I think is an important point, I think particularly among military professionals, particularly among the folks who've been on the ground and have to go out into the communities where we've just taken action. Being as transparent as possible is something that they've come to value as a strategic asset, not just an important piece of maintaining the contract with the American people.
So I think that was pretty important. There will, even if we could achieve the level of transparency we've had in Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of being able to account for every strike outside of this year, so places like Yemen and Somalia, we will still inevitably fall short from what the greatest, greatest, I guess proponents of transparency would see. So we're never gonna be able to fully explain how we knew that the target was there, why we took the shot, if there were civilian casualties, to be able to fully explain the specific tactics and procedures that led to that outcome. And so there will always be some gap there, but we're a long ways from being able to debate that it's kind of a high-class problem, as some of my colleagues used to say.
I think to me, what you guys have highlighted is that there's explaining the specifics of the intelligence in this particular case, but then there's this broader issue, Lauren, you mentioned, which is explaining to the American public sort of the process that this works in general, right? And we've outlined kind of what the legal and policy frameworks are, although I'm not sure how much that's really filtered down in any intelligible way to sort of the average public, but I worry that, so the average American citizens view about the intelligence process, their concept is much more to do with 24 and Jack Bauer, which is thinking about what an imminent threat is, right? Or we're thinking about civilian casualties, it's coming from things like the I in the Sky movie, worrying about drone strikes, and I guess I have the sense that those are not necessarily accurate representations of what's happening in practice, right? And I think that's true with a lot of issues related to drones, like actually very few uses of drones that you guys know far better than I are actually related to strikes, most of our related to surveillance and ISR in theaters that have nothing to do with counter-terrorism.
But in some ways that means I think people perceive that counter-tears of strikes are far more prevalent and far more violent than they actually are, but in other ways that means that they're not necessarily thinking through so what does that mean and where are they being executed? I had another thought that in my way. No, I think that understanding is it's a tricky piece, right? Because you want people to understand the nature of targeting and why it's so difficult, but at the same time, you know, obviously you want to get away with the secrets that allow that targeting to take place.
But you're right, I mean, in terms of like continuing in the threat, what does that mean? I mean, certainly you think imminent threat, you think Jack Bauer 24, as you said, when you read Attorney General Holder's comments on this, he defines imminence pretty broad, and there's three different tests, and one of them is kind of the relevant window to act, and you start to look at that and say, well, those have very practical reasons that that is the way that military operations must assess a concept like imminence, but it doesn't sound like kind of the dictionary definition of imminence. And you know, I think as much as it can seem dry, there is still the legal and policy conversation about what these specific terms mean. It's still very important, and because it's a useful kind of, I guess, ruler for other administrations and other legal and policy experts to assess how far we've gone and what are the appropriate rules, and so even though there's hard things that are in terms of translating those to the American people, they're really essential if we ever want the US approach to drone warfare to be the basis for an international standard, and I think we're far from that right now, but certainly that articulation, that wrangling over those terms and being as transparent about as possible is critical to that discussion.
Well, I think that's a great time to kind of pivot to thinking about the example the US has been setting for other countries because we're now seeing other countries getting access to more capable drones, including arm drones. The US has been very reluctant to transfer arm drones abroad, only to France, from the United Kingdom, and approving transfers to Italy, but they haven't gone through yet. But what we've seen in China has not been so reluctant, and in fact, 90% of international arm drone transfers come from China. So how are other countries looking at what the US has been doing and this sort of precedent in the United States has been setting in terms of action and then transparency, and how are we seeing that inform their behaviour?
Let me really call you, you would probably be a better person to talk about some of that. My perception is actually like a lot of arms control and related debates that other countries like to put a lot of pressure on the United States to have extremely high standards to be quite transparent and to be cautious in our use of a lot of the kinds of weapons platforms. At the same time, they may be behind the table, sorry, behind the curtain are appreciative of some of these standards or lack thereof that we set, such that they may be able to take advantage of themselves, or that they may be able to sort of write on our coattails in terms of how we're applying them. I don't have the greatest sense of how arm drones are being necessarily employed or talked about being employed in other countries, but I think that the public debates on drones and the fact that they are, I think, widely perceived as a low cost, low risk, possibly depending on your view, either very low to casual, very high to casuality sort of option, makes this a difficult conversation to have in a kind of community that should be having it.
If I would often think that it would be a lot easier to talk about drones if drones cost a lot more, if they were incredibly expensive, or they were really hard to fly, or they were much more difficult to employ, because then you could think about the actual effects that they were having as opposed to, these are really easy, so we'll go use them in a bunch of different theatres without really thinking about it. Because they're so relatively low cost, and relatively easy to employ, and relatively easy to build, we're not being forced to have those conversations the same way you might about different level, but nuclear weapons, or very high-end tactical aircraft, or anything like that. Yeah, that's a good point. I think there are a couple of things that jump out for me on this.
One, the transparency and accountability piece is really important when we think about other countries, and in particular other countries, that may not already have kind of a baseline of transparency, so in order to have to have the United States tends to treat military operations, not to say we're perfect, but we certainly, far more transparent than say, China, Russia. So it is an important piece for maintaining some accountability with the striking nation's public on whose behalf the forces being used, as well as, as I mentioned, the outside, the host nation where the forces being used, and particularly the local populations around there. I think that one of the important things that, so we have a long ways to go on transparency, and I think that that transparency only further comes, that's an example, and that's basically, because we can get to the ideal. I think having a very solid framework on civilian protection is also really important.
The tricky piece here is that, part of the reason that we're so, we've become very good at preventing civilian casualties is because our technology is very good, and also our professionals who do these operations are just extraordinary. And so, there's a lot of art and science of this, and I do worry sometimes when we talk about civilian protection, that when we're sort of preaching the US way of civilian protection, that's not always an achievable level of discrimination and precision when we're looking at some less developed countries that may have terrorist threats in their borders, and this may be a more discriminate approach than say putting ground troops in, but they still may not be able to reach our levels. But nonetheless, I do think having at least some solid framework and agreement on principles of civilian protection is important. The final piece I'd say here is that, really being clear about our domestic and international legal basis is, I think, really important.
I think the Obama administration did very well in articulating that. I think that the challenges on the domestic legal basis, we're still, as Lauren pointed out, relying on the 2001 authorization for the US military force, which has been further interpreted to not just account for al-Qaeda and its associated forces, so groups like Al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula, but also ISIS, which has had a public split with al-Qaeda, but under the legal analysis, is a kind of a success organization, and so is still covered by the 2001 AUMF. And to the extent that we're not freshing that, and we're not making the congressional authorization appropriate to the current threat we face, I worry that that is maybe not setting the best example for other countries who might use an aging piece of legislation to justify a range of use force. On the international legal basis, part of the disagreements you get into in this space, and particularly when you read US government accounts of the international legal basis versus the criticisms of the Lodge of Balsight groups, is that the US government relies on, and I'm gonna mangle some of this because I'm not aware, but I'll do my best.
The US government relies on the law of war, and particularly the concepts of proportionality and discrimination, but it assumes a war mindset, a war framework, and so everything that we're doing in places like Emmett Somalia is on its face significantly higher than anything that the laws of war require. There are others who say if we're using drones for strikes outside of declared war zones, that we ought to apply the International Human Rights Law, which is a significantly higher standard and requires a far higher exhaustion of possibilities before lethal action is taken, and a far higher standard for being able to target somebody in the first place. And I worry that the continued debate about which of those frameworks is important leaves us a little bit talking past each other at times. I think that's a key point, Luke, is whether you come at this issue from a law of war framework where a criminal law framework has a huge implication for how you then do the gallery's actions, I think it strikes me when I go overseas and talk to audiences, even in your conversations, even with close US allies, is that the discussion that I'm hearing from Washington among people in government or think tanks or the sort of Washington bubble heads like us is, well, the administration laid out sort of its legal and policy framework, and it's lawful and it's conducted in accordance with the international humanitarian law or the laws of war, but overseas, I often see others take a very different perception, and the perception is simply, well, what the US is doing is illegal, and it must be violating international law because that's why they're being secretive about it, and they're not telling us, right?
And there seems to be this linkage between secrecy and the perception of legitimacy or illegality, and it worries me not only because it then affects the perceived legitimacy of US actions, because I also worry then about the precedent that says what other countries might do, if there's a perception that some of the rules don't apply to drones. If I use drones for whatever reason, the laws don't apply, and I can then kind of go outside the bounds of law, which I don't think it's what the US is doing, but that perception could be certainly harmful as others get access to them. Yeah, but something that I have wanted to ask policymakers going back to the Bush administration is if, well, two questions, if you could not be secret about the use of drones, it's not possible from a legal standpoint or just from any other standpoint, would you still employ them in the same way? Or if you couldn't use drones, you had no access to them whatsoever, and you only had other capabilities, what would you do instead?
And I think having those conversations more publicly, and both of which may lead back to using drones for these sorts of missions makes a lot of sense, would give a lot more credibility and credence to how US policy for drone use has worked over the last couple of decades, because you'd have to talk through the, here's what the, it's less the secrecy that matters, and more the efficacy of the platform and the effectiveness of it. I think in many ways our legal authorities have constrained us from having conversations with both our international partners and American people that might be much more useful in terms of how we use force. That's a great question, actually. We could apply to most any government activity if your government asks yourself, well, if I couldn't make the secret, what I still do it, we'll call that the young showman rule.
Remember that in the future. Yeah, and I think that's a great point for going forward. I mean, look, there's a lot of reasons that we got ourselves into a place where we are not able to be as transparent as we could be about drone strikes. And some of those, again, we saw through some hard work that you could get past some of that, and certainly the case of Somalia is a lesser than to be able to go from not talking about drone strikes, to being able to talk about them quite frequently, in order to specific strike-by-strike basis, the same for Yemen.
The challenge on this is that the aspects of the drone program that remain secret are a reason. And one of the frustrations, I think, on this is that, as you try to make the president's ultimately the foremost classification authority, right? But he can't just arbitrarily say, well, this is going to be disclosing this is not, because at any given time, there's a number of other things that he has to think through and the staff has to think through. If I make this category of information public, then all these other categories of information that I'm insisting are classified, one might argue, and if one had good litigators, one might bring those litigators to argue, that those things ought to be made public as well.
And suddenly, you've kind of, friend of mine described this as sort of a large dam, and there are a number of holes, and any given next hole can be the one that brings it down through. I think that's a little bit dramatic, but you get the nice visual for thinking about this. So the work of declassification is this incredibly painful work where you're going through and really drilling down to the root of why it's classified, what other types of things are classified that are similar to this, that if we just close this, one can make a good case of those things ought to be just close. And that doesn't happen because, you know, as we talked about, the intelligence community is so good about keeping things secret or attempting to be good at how you keep things secret.
The idea of making an act of push towards transparency is not something that the military intelligence community are always committed to, and so it requires commitment from the top, it was something that President Obama cared a lot about. I can't imagine unless this administration becomes very focused on transparency, that they will have kind of the patience for the long process of working through declassification. And I think that's unfortunate, because I do think we need to be able to get to a better place on this. Yeah, no, other than willingly giving secret to the Russians, it's not because the administration is very focused on transparency.
That is a good point, right? Because I often wonder, I mean, it's a side point, but I often wonder if some of the things that President Trump has disclosed and others in this administration may have disclosed will come back to bite them down the road with somebody saying, well, you disclose this, we had also released X, Y, and Z information. Yeah, I mean, it's a really valuable point about thinking about, for leucibility, that I would imagine those people don't, you just don't, I don't know where they don't think about it. So I mean, so what are the prospects going forward for greater transparency?
What could be done for other, what are the limits, and what if anything people actually see other administration? So, so the greatness of administration so far in transparency is, it's just an incomplete, right? I mean, the sitcom has continued and again, this sort of outside of our specific drone framework, but announcing their strikes in Iraq and Syria. They've also announced Yemen strikes, although in kind of batches, so they did this series of, I think, 80 strikes in March and April, and they were kind of announced in the last, you know, couple weeks we did this number of strikes.
So it's not that same kind of fidelity of strike by strike, but it's still useful to know that information. The procedure of announcing strike by strike and Somalia appears to still be in place. So it's really early to say, and you know, the civilian casualty numbers for this administration appear to be up, but a lot of that is because, you know, when you look at Iraq and Syria, which kind of get rolled into this discussion, we're in the middle of urban combat in those locations. And then for Yemen, a lot of it comes back to that rate that did not go well in real-school and civilians being killed in the crossfire.
So it's really, really to say, I think, how well this administration is doing non-transparency. I don't think you're gonna see President Trump giving a major legal and policy address on the merits of transparency. I don't think that's kind of disposition-wise where he comes from. But I do think that, you know, the gold standard on this, what we ought to be seeking and where we've still fallen short is to be able to announce every single strike with maybe rare exceptions, every strike that the US government takes.
You don't need to be able to say, in all cases, the specific target or why it was taken, which can get into sources methods, that at minimum where that acknowledged as strike was taken. And this is the military's assessment of combatants and noncombatants killing the operation. So thinking through some of the personalities involved to try to guess at what their calculus may be, so President Trump during his campaign talked a lot about how military secrecy was actually quite important to him and he didn't understand why we're so transparent about both our saber rattling, but also our follow-up to any operation. It's difficult to say whether or not there's a consistent position on his part, but at least in some ways he is less an advocate of transparency and others.
He is, I think, very, a more of an advocate, perhaps, as a transparency. General or Secretary Mattis is, it's interesting, like you can see him when he's talking about civilian casualties from his Secretary of Defense, but he's doing so very much in the manner of a senior military commander, where he's absolutely right that the Department of Defense, the United States military does more than anyone in the world to prevent and limit civilian casualties. But at the same time, the US military understandably does not have to explain itself really further. That's really more of a policy role.
Secretary Mattis has not, in his public discussions, had broader discussion about, like, all right, so I understand that you're seeing more civilian casualties, here's what this means. It's been more of a limited conversation, though it's expanded a bit over time. Pompeo, CIA, just thinking about his prior roles in Congress, he may see the utility of not wanting to give the missions of his agency broader or more significant oversight in Congress. He's got a pretty good deal right now.
I had a friend point out to me the other day that there's not, like, a John McCain of the drone strikes, or at least not very publicly. So, you know, it's very much within his incentives to keep things the way they are. And then lastly, McMaster, and this is a really broad assumption. Some of the mass velocity comes back to the importance of consolidating gains in military campaigns.
So you're not just executing a fire and forget, you're actually connecting a mission and doing the follow-up necessary to make sure that whatever gains you achieve is actually locked in for yourself and local population. And it would seem to me that he would, yes, he would find drone strikes to be something that are not terribly useful in consulting gains unto themselves and that transparency may be a necessary factor in increasing that consolidation of gains. Problem with all of those is that all these guys have a lot more on their plate than this. So, we'll see.
Can I make a one additional point on this? Which is, I think one of the things that was really valuable in the Obama administration was that we spent so much time meeting with outside groups that were tracking civilian casualties and were tracking and monitoring our drone strikes. And that was mostly human rights groups, but also, you know, the Stimson Center did this remarkable task force led by General Abbisey and Rosa Brooks that looked into and evaluated our overall drone strategy. And having been on the government side of those meetings, they were often uncomfortable in that there was very little, we could say, in response to some of the specific cases that they made, but the research that some of these groups do is just really meticulous.
And I think brings a very interesting perspective into how you assess the civilian casualties and the combatant casualties and the overall impact of drone strikes. And I think it was really important to hold those meetings. I don't know how much of that's going on now in the new administration, but it was an important outside check on this. You could imagine a more ideal world where there was a greater ability of the US government to engage in some of the specific strikes that they focus on as problematic and be able to have a dialogue that perhaps produces a greater level of truth as to the true outcome of those actions.
Well, that sounds like we may be transitioning perhaps back to a world where most of the transparency we get about US operations comes from some of these outside groups. Yeah, I think it could be. And again, this is a pretty robust infrastructure. I mean, human rights watch, amnesty, international rights for so-and-says all have pretty robust drone tracking programs in some way.
My organization in New America has a comprehensive strike tracker that the Bureau of Investigative Journalism of the UK has there's long word journals. There's a pretty robust community of groups that are tracking this. But again, it's essentially outside accounts that go. Sometimes you heard the Obama administration frequently refer to wide gaps as the quote between US government assessments and those outside groups.
But there's never a specific kind of litigation of the specific points. And I think it would be ideal to be able to have some greater dialogue on this going forward. Well, listen, thanks. Luke and Lauren for coming in.
It's been a fascinating discussion. And maybe we'll get to pro-swim-trup tweeting about drugs for rights. I'm not sure if that would be constructive or not in this context. But this has been really, really helpful.
Thank you. Thanks, Jaime.