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To put AI to work for people, visit servicenow.com. I'm Mr. Klein, and this is the Ezra Klein Show. It's obviously not a novel observation to point out that the global economic response to the pandemic was astounding in size, but I want to start today with just some numbers to put this in context.
So the OECD, which is a consortium of a lot of richer nations, estimates that its members issued a total of 18 trillion in debt in 2020 alone. That is the largest surge in debt ever recorded in peacetime. A whopping 11 trillion of that was just between the months of January and May. Nearly 70% of that debt, 70% was in the US alone.
The $2.2 trillion CARES Act, that was passed by a Republican Senate. It was signed into law by a Republican president, and it was more than double the size of the 2009 stimulus. In a matter of weeks, the Federal Reserve bought 5% of the entire $20 trillion bond market at the peak of its action. The Fed was buying bonds at the rate of $1 million per second.
These are wild numbers. But the most revealing part of that response wasn't what happened. It was what didn't happen. Bond vigilantes didn't send markets into a tailspin.
Interest rates didn't skyrocket. Inflation, well, we're going to talk about inflation a lot in this, but there was certainly no evidence of a hyperinflationary spiral. Private investment didn't plummet. The terrified view of future uncertainty hasn't stopped everyone from hiring or making new capital investments.
Instead, the Treasury market stabilized. The financial markets not only recovered, they searched the decades of doomsday predictions of what would happen if the government should spend huge amounts of money without paying for it. They didn't materialize, not in the moment anyway. My guest today is Adam Tues.
Adam Tues is a brilliant economic historian at Columbia University. He's the author of The Book of Craft, which for my money is the single best history of the financial crisis, and now shut down, how COVID shook the world's economy. He's also co-host of the new podcast, One's and Tues. Yeah, that is Tues spelled T-O-O-Z-E, like his name.
So who said economic historians don't have a sense of humor? Tues' angle though is a scholar, is using financial crises as a lens into the ideology of economics, using them as a way to understand where our economic theories and models match the world, how they're really created, and then the moments in which they are changed by the world, whether or not the economists behind them admit it. And in just the past 15 years, we lived through two such moments. And so that is what this conversation is about.
As always, my email as a client show at N by Times, I always appreciate your feedback, your guest suggestions, your recommendations of things to read, listen to, pay attention to, play, watch, but here's Adam Tues. Adam Tues, welcome to the show. Great to be here. So you've written that one of the central takeaways of last year and a half is that quote, John Maynard Keynes was right when he declared during World War II, that anything we can actually do, we can afford.
Tell me about that idea. So it's double edged. I think that's the key. And it's a bit of a political while to drop for me, but 2020, I think, illustrates both sides of this.
So on the one side, there is the sort of emancipatory promise, this open-handed, we can afford anything, by which I think Keynes means, you know, money is a technical issue. In the end, it's a question of mobilizing finance, streaming together the financial engineering, doing some of the central banking arithmetic we might need to do. But in the end, what limits what we can do is not whether we can afford something, but whether we can actually do it. And this is why 2020 is a society academic way, but it's a kind of beautiful illustration of the force of this point, because we could pay for all sorts of things.
But could we organize ourselves to collectively, socially, socially distance? Well, in the end, in some places, yes. And in many places, no. Could we roll out a vaccine?
Well, we didn't know ahead of time. Early in 2020, I remember sitting in meetings with science colleagues at Columbia and going, you know, them saying, you know, we've never done this before. We've never had a coronavirus vaccine. And we ended up with a whole suite of them.
And that depended on, you know, the extraordinary skill of the scientists and manipulating nature to produce that result. But then again, you know, can we actually organize to roll that out to the entire world's population, certainly not at the pace that we'd want to. So the book is really a kind of meditation on that, on the one hand, enabling discovery, but really finding the money isn't the problem, and not just in the rich countries, but if the Fed settings are right and you've got competent management, in fact, in much of the world economy right now, that isn't the problem. The problem is, the nitty gritty, the problem is what economists call the, if you like more the supply side, the real economy, that turns out to be where the problems are that we need to overcome.
I want to draw on this idea for a minute, because it is simultaneously deceptively simple and not how we have been taught to think. So what you're saying here, what Kings was saying here, is that money can be invented in whatever quantity we want, really, I mean, the Federal Reserve can just create more of it, but things cannot be invented in whatever quantity we want. So if you have 100 jet planes that you can make, and you only have quote unquote money for 80 of them, the government can create the money for 100. But if you want 120 jet planes and you can only make 100, then you can't.
And so it's the idea here that we've often got in which side the scarcity is on wrong? I think that's a really good way of putting it. And part of the tension, part of the stress calls by discovering that really budgetary arithmetic is just really budgetary arithmetic. Is that without it, we face the really harsh political questions of could we agree to do this?
And if we're not doing it, it's because you, the other people, our antagonists don't want to do it. You've got something else you'd rather do, or it's the humbling realization that will it as much as we will, we just can't do it. We just don't have the technical wear with all. So it's either sort of the stubbornness of power or the stubbornness of nature that constrains us.
And there's moments where you would kind of quite like to have the budgetary arithmetic back, because that presents these constraints in a more abstract form. Well, it also makes a pretense of constraint. So you wrote a great piece in your newsletter, which I subscribed to and others should do, about what you can tell by how much money we spent on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars without an inflationary problem, without a crowding out problem. We just spent it, we didn't pay for it.
It's trillions and trillions of dollars. We clearly could do that financially. Although often when people wanted to critique the wars, they pretended we couldn't. They would say, you know, you should be building, as John Kerry famously said, firehouses had bagged out when you need them here at home.
I think he said Boston, if I'm not misremembering. At the same time, I covered economic politics and policymaking in Washington for two decades now, basically. And the number of tiny tens of billions of dollars programs I have watched die on the view that we can't afford them are high right now as we speak. There's a fight going on in the Democrats reconciliation bill over whether or not they will make the child tax credit refundable, whether or not that will go to the poorest families who don't file taxes.
And the argument being made by some as well, we can't afford this entire bill, which of course costs a lot less in its totality than those wars did. So this is sort of what you're getting at here, which is that it is convenient to say we can't afford to do something, rather than say I don't want to do something. But if you actually look at the way we act when we do want to do something, you can see that we often can afford it. Well, exactly.
And I think for me, ultimately, the tragedy of the global war on terror is that that was the one thing that the American political elite over a period of decades could, in fact, to a certain degree, at least agree to do together. Whereas everything else came incredibly hard. And when it came to everything else, the budget arithmetic rapidly becomes, as you say, penny pinching. But when it came to that project, in fact, there was a high-grade unanimity and the budgets tended to move upwards rather than downwards.
And so the criticism is not so much really the criticism of, well, we couldn't afford this, look at the damage this will do to the balance sheet in future generations, though there will of course be a bill to pay, but that bill will circulate within society. Other Americans will get paid and some foreign investors as well. The real critique should be, the real question should be, how on earth have we arrived as a point where that is the one thing that we can agree on doing on real scale, as opposed to all of the other projects that we need? So you make an argument in the book, that the pandemic was a moment where, at least for a period of time, we could agree to spend.
And we did spend at a level we've almost never seen before. But even that agreement is now beginning to break down around inflation fears, around party polarization, and we'll talk about all that in a minute. But in the past, when the US has decided to spend huge amounts of money, the debate at least hasn't been framed as purely political. If you go back to 2009, 2010, there had been quite a bit of stimulus spending, Obamacare gets passed in 2010, and the argument that emerges is this deep fear that we're gonna see interest rates rise, that bond market vigilantes are gonna come.
People are not gonna want government debt, or that the size of deficits is gonna create this thing called uncertainty, and businesses will not hire, they're not gonna invest, they will not create or pursue new opportunities, because they're gonna be so afraid of the future taxation environment, or the future spending environment, that they won't really have the certainty needed to plan. And we didn't really see either of those things happen then, and we aren't seeing them now. So what went wrong in these treasure theories of fiscal consequence? Such that there really was no interest rate or bond market, or even obvious corporate reaction.
Yeah, your description there, some of the memories of Paul Krugman's famous confidence fairies, was this idea that excessively large-scale action would send a tremor of uncertainty, as you say, uncertainty, radical uncertainty was the great buzzword at the moment. I think first of all, it's really important to say that we're not there yet, right? So on that timeline, you just laid out so nicely, the shocks 2008, 2009, the still the scrambling response, the argument over Obamacare begins, not frank, likewise, and the austerity turn doesn't happen until 2010, another Krugman bond mode all went wrong in 2010. So if you run that clock on us now, we really need to worry about what happens next year.
That's where these debates will come. And I would actually wage of money that we will see very similar arguments like that made next year. The question is, whether they will be allowed to win out. In Europe, you can already see the battle lines being drawn.
There was a memo just, I think, by eight conservative finance ministers yesterday, on precisely this issue, saying, it's time for fiscal consolidation. We need to start worrying about how we achieve a sustainable, credible fiscal framework and from credibility to confidence, to uncertainty, that's a short step. So those arguments are yet to be had. But what we discovered in the moment was that you could issue any truly epic quantities of debt, like we haven't seen since World War II, without what is it worth simple neoclassical standard economics.
And we'll not generalize about economics in a city way, because it's a huge discipline for the incredibly bright people. But let's just accept as a schoolbook version. And it would say that if you borrow a huge amount of money, you would expect the prices borrowing to go up. In other words, the interest rate would go up.
And that's, in fact, the opposite happens, right? A huge quantity of money was borrowed and interest rates have fallen to extraordinarily low levels. Now, I think it would be presumptuous for me to say that we know, I know the answer to why that has happened. I mean, it's one of the great mysteries of economics at this moment.
There are a variety of different theories out there, some very long-term theories. People see this as the result of the forces of secular stagnation. Or it could be to do with demographic factors. But in the moment, in 2020, I think the shock factors are more important.
And what we're seeing is a huge quantity of household expenditure just stopping in its tracks in March and April. So money market mutual funds where other middle class Americans put their spare cash, a flush with cash. So if the US Treasury wants to issue short-term bills, not long-term treasuries, which they didn't do much of in 2020, but short-term bills, there's a huge appetite for them. They get snapped up by those kind of investment funds.
So in a sense, what the government is doing here is basically stepping into the void left by the contraction of private sector activity. And if that weren't enough, the other thing, of course, that's happening is the central banks in the US, but all over the world, are also just gobbling up huge quantities of government debt. They're buying on the whole the treasury. So the longer term, the 51030 of paper, not the short-term bills which are being absorbed by money market mutual funds and vehicles like that.
But the combined effect of it was a surge in private saving and a huge sucking noise in the accounts of the central banks. And the fed bought 5% of the treasury market in a matter of weeks. It's absolutely staggering. That naturally, because it drives the prices of treasuries up and the inverse of the price of the treasury is the yield or in other words, the interest rate.
So as that sucking effect happened in the treasury market, yields plunged. And we had the top seat of it. It was a completely top seat of the effect. And faced with that, bond vigilantes attempting to sell treasuries because they weren't feeling like holding them or they were trying to punish the American government for pursuing a large, expansive fiscal policy.
They're just an irrelevance. It really is sort of men on horseback, the vigilantes on horseback meet the 101st airborne or something. I mean, they're just a complete disproportionate force. So the entire vision of the 90s in which bond markets dominate government fiscal policy, which was very much the thing of say, the Clinton administration sort of evaporated.
This is really important to extend your analogy a bit. The reason you weren't supposed to send the 100 inverse airborne after the bond vigilantes on horseback was you'd break the time space continuum. You're not supposed to fight the past with the future. And the idea is that if the central banks began buying up the debt, they would spark potentially an inflationary spiral.
I mean, people understood that central banks could create money and buy debt. And then in some way, it was unlimited the amount of debt you could offer because you would never face a problem in interest rates. But it was believed that there would be all kinds of terrible consequences if you did this. And so in general, they didn't do it.
Or they did do it. They did it in really weird backdoor ways. But a story you tell in your book, which I'd like you to tell here, is that during the pandemic, there almost is a true crisis in the treasury markets. And then the Fed steps in.
And they're stepping in, stabilizes the situation. But it doesn't set off the secondary crisis. So can you tell a bit more about story, what almost happened? And then why it was unusual to see the Fed do what they did?
Yeah, this is really the hidden drama of March 2020. I mean, Lord knows we had enough to concentrate on in March 2020. But there was something truly terrifying happening in the most important financial market in the world. I mean, there are three broad segments, the global financial markets.
There's the equity market, which generates so much of the headlines, the buying and selling of shares in Apple or whatever. Then there's the private corporate bond market, which is much more boring than shares where companies like Apple issued debt, which carries an interest rate. But they're really crucial on where all the macro economics, all the arguments about inflation and central banks, comes to bear is the market for government debt to treasuries. And the most important of all is the American treasury market.
It is depending on how you count it somewhere between $17 and $21, $22 trillion worth of debt in various people's hands. And the thing about those is that they're kind of like a cash piggy bank. So they yield an interest rate. But the market is huge.
And normally you're able to sell these for cash more or less instantaneously. And you can sell huge volumes of them. And you're selling of them. That huge volume doesn't affect the price.
So in any given day, you know what it's worth. And you can then liquidate as much as you like. So this is the piggy bank of the global financial system. It's the source of safe assets.
So that market is crucial for the stability of the whole system. And in 2008, what happened is that as people pan it in investment banks and mortgage backsecurities, people ran for safety into this debt. And this has a stabilizing effect, because as people run in prices go up and interest rates go down, and that's exactly what the economy needs at a moment of stress. The terrifying thing that we saw in the second week of March, starting on Monday nights, is that first of all, that relationship broke down.
And people were not just selling equities. They were selling treasuries as well. And when we say people, what I'm talking about, are foreign managers of large dollar exchange holdings, not to get out of dollars, but to get out of treasuries into cash, investment funds of various types, which again, invested a range of things. They had their clients panicking, trying to pull their funds out.
It was very difficult to sell shares in those days, because equity prices were collapsing. So they sold the next best thing, or rather, the better thing, which is easy to turn into cash, which is treasuries. So they were piling into the market. And then there were a bunch of hedge funds, which had done very complicated trades, depending on the future development of treasury prices, which were now completely upended by this.
And hedge funds speculate. So they borrow to own these treasuries. And when their prices go AWOL, those deals unravel, and then you need to sell quickly, because you don't actually have the money to hold the treasuries in the first place. And those three forces together created true turmoil in the treasury market.
So as share prices fell, treasury prices fell too. So interest rates were going up. And as the panic began to spread, something even more terrifying began to happen, which is that if you wanted to sell treasuries, you couldn't find ready buyers at whatever the prevailing price was. In fact, it was quite difficult to find buyers at any price.
I was talking to somebody in Hong Kong the other day, who was telling me that he will never forget for the rest of his life. And this is how significant this is, by the financial market act, is the moment when he tried to sell a couple of billion dollars of US treasuries and couldn't find a buyer. Because what that tells you, if there's no buyer for US treasuries, as this spins out over the next couple of weeks, the buyers for practically everything else will evaporate too. Because in the end, the treasury is as it were, the thing that's almost as good as cash.
And that basic relationship was breaking down. And if it does fundamentally snap, the problem is that all portfolios in the world are anchored on piggy banks of treasuries, which are used as a cash equivalent. So you can hold the less liquid stuff, the stuff that's harder to turn into cash, because you have this stash of treasuries, which you can instantly turn into cash. If you can't any longer make that transformation, then the entire portfolio is misbalanced.
And really, you have to offload the rest too. And so the fear was that this tension in the treasury market would basically just blitz the entire financial system. In the United States and globally, the trend has spread to London in the third week of March, where basically the guilt market, which is one of the oldest in the entire world, stopped functioning according to the bank of England, and there was stress in Europe as well. And the answer is, and there's only one possible answer to a crisis like this, is for a buyer of last resort to simply say, look, anyone want to sell treasuries?
We're here for you. Here's the cash. And the only agency that can do that is the federal reserve. And so from late March, they were buying a million dollars of treasuries and mortgage backsecurities a second.
They were buying over 70 billion dollars a day for several weeks. And this is just an absolutely shocking intervention in the market that shouldn't need this kind of stabilization. On one level, that's very convenient. If the federal reserve can pop in and buy as many treasuries as the treasury department wants to offer, that means functionally, the treasury department can issue as much debt as it wants to, and we have the money to do anything we want.
So tell me traditionally why people did not want the Fed to do this. Well, because what you're doing is just pumping huge quantities of liquidity into the global financial system. And if you have a simple quantity theory type of inflation, in other words, the lack of the envelope idea that inflation results for more money chasing the same quantity of goods, then this should basically be the trigger for inflation. And this has been one of the great mysteries of the global economies in 2008, is that we've seen successive waves of liquidity pumped into the global economy.
And rather than inflation, our problem is in fact being lowflation, or even deflation in the worst case. And that indeed was what the central banks have been fighting in 2020, is a slump the fear of the global economy contracting and prices falling, as they did spectacularly, for instance, in the global oil market in April, where famously the price went negative for a day. But that is not the problem now. This is gonna connect a few parts of our conversation.
You were saying a few minutes ago, well, we're not on the timeline yet, by which we began having the austerity fears in 2010. And you're right. And I think we're getting there, but we're not gonna get there over deficits and interest rates. It's going to be over inflation.
We are seeing inflation, we're seeing concerns from central left economists, like Larry Summers, like Libby E. Blanchard, like Jason Furman, there's now an argument as to whether or not it's transitory inflation, it's just gonna ease up once we get more cars on the market and semiconductors out, or whether or not it's gonna become built into expectations. So it does seem that we are seeing at least part of one of the feared consequences. And the question is how much to fear what we're seeing.
How do you read what's going on with inflation in the US right now? Well, I think one can see people joining the dots in those ways. And I actually like your political analysis. I think you're absolutely right.
That is the way this argument is going to run. It's already begun running, basically. Yes. I mean, you already see Joe Manchin, the Senator from West Virginia and Kirsten Sinema, they are using inflation as an argument for not doing the fall at least $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill.
I mean, it is already being used to block further investment. Same in Europe. So I mean, inflation rate in Germany popped over 3%. And there was a lot of hawkish talk there immediately.
On the substance, I think, this is not a very convincing analysis. It's not very convincing because there are obvious drivers of these spikes in prices, which are from the supply side on the whole. They are completely out of proportion. In other words, they're far too small, relative to the scale of the liquidity we've injected.
And then furthermore, I think there's every reason to think that they will ever weigh over time already. In fact, we're seeing signs that the really rapid surge in inflation that we saw in some sectors at the beginning of the year is decelerating. So month or month inflation, rather than year on year inflation is now much calmer than it was earlier in the year. So if you take the year on year measures, you are as it were, lagging.
You're not quite capturing how rapidly things are calming down. So I think the jury's out, obviously. It's too early to tell. But there is a fundamental reason, I think, beyond as it were the empirics, for thinking that there's very little reason to fear a return to 1970s-style inflation dynamics.
And that's basically the last time we actually had substantial inflation in the United States or Europe. And the difference is political economy. In the 70s, we had the mechanisms of a wage price spiral. In other words, we had powerful bargaining partners on each side of the labor market organized later on one side, capital on the other.
And they became directly involved in price and wage setting. And the entire logic of inflation had a dynamic of acceleration or at least sustained increases in wages and prices. This is where the economist's preoccupation with expectations really cadrip, right? Because you could study wage setting and price setting in the 70s and see the way in which negotiators would explicitly invoke the track record of inflation to date as a justification for further forward-looking increases in wages and prices.
There were even possible living adjustment clauses that built this in automatically. And we know that the power balance in labor markets has radically shifted. In fact, somebody like Larry Summers started 2020 by publishing a rather brilliant paper on precisely this point. And so it's particularly surprising.
I think to find somebody like him now arguing what seems like the other side at the same point. Can you say what he said in that paper? Well, he was arguing there that the fundamental unifying fact, if you just had to point to one idea, the grand unifying theory of political economy in the current moment is the shift in the power balance between labor and employers. And that it helped to explain profit margins, it helped to explain inequality, it helped to explain the tendency towards low inflation that we see across most of the advanced economies.
And now all of a sudden, Larry in 2021, he's concerned about inflation and yet the power dynamic, of course, is not shift. If anything, I think the position of workers is in total weaker than it was before. Now, we have an administration, which is in the business of trying to shift that parameter. So you could add that in as a political argument.
In other words, the markets reflect the fact that they no longer trust the conservative biases of the Biden administration. The Biden administration has been quite forward about saying that it wants to shift the power balance. But I think to accord that, you know, the efficacy that would imply I think is to exaggerate. And as you say, the counter-argument is operating very powerfully already.
In other words, this XYZ we can't do because look, inflation is happening. And so I want to slow us down just a little bit. So one of the arguments being made here is in the 70s, you have stronger unions throughout the economy, you have contracts being set. And one thing you begin to see built into contracts is wage increases tied to inflation.
So that becomes very clear how you get a wages prices spiral. I mean, they begin to go automatically with each other. But there isn't that dynamic now. And whatever you might say about the Biden administration, they actually not passed any legislation that is going to lead to a rapid increase in unionization in the next year or two.
But this then cuts into this whole question of expectations. And I do find traveling around the inflation debate that how different economists and people think about expectations becomes really important. And so let's hold on Larry Summers for a minute because one of the arguments he's been making is that it is the very things the Fed is doing that will change inflation expectations. And I'll quote here from an op-ed he wrote in The Washington Post where he says, quote, the Fed used to believe in preempting inflation.
Then it announced it would not act until there was evidence. Now it is an imposter of not even beginning to reduce the most generous monetary accommodation in history until presented with conclusive proof of excessive inflation. And what he's saying there is Fed is doing all this quantitative easing. There is evidence of inflation.
But they are treating it so differently now that you have to assume that that is going to change how the market thinks the Fed will act in the future and thus begin to create more inflationary expectations. What do you think of that argument? It's an interesting argument. I mean, it accords huge power to the Fed.
That's not a plausible story in the economy at large when you look at price setting and wage setting at large. But when you invoke the market as you did there, what we're talking about is the bond market. And I think it's definitely true that in the loop between the Fed commentators like Larry Summers and other journalists and the bond market, there is a kind of extraordinary hall of mirrors in which the Fed's announcement that it intends to allow prices and inflation to go above the 2% target to offset undershoots induces a kind of idea of a regime shift. But in a sense, you could go back to the beginning here, the whole point of the Fed's announcement was to induce a regime shift because in the real economy, they judge the protracted periods of low inflation are a very bad thing.
And so what precisely we need to do is encourage the idea that the Fed broadly speaking favors slightly higher inflation. That's the entire point. The argument gets serious when you suppose that if you do achieve that goal, it then becomes runaway. So the Fed's announced intention is to try and reset inflation expectations to a slightly higher level.
The objection to that, I think, is a serious objection, not when you say, well, they're trying to reset inflation expectations to a higher level because the Fed pleads guilty to that. But if you say, ah, and then I see a dynamic which could produce escalated inflation, every great attention, panic in the bond market, that would then cause the necessity for some sort of very painful action, and that would be very bad. I think that's where the argument is. So then the question is, not will this reset inflation expectations?
The intention is to do that. The question is, will they become unstable? Unanchored is the phrase that's used. And I don't really see why anyone should think that.
And if you look at the bond market, which through their pricing of interest rates give us an idea of what the really big money thinks inflation is going to be, we can read it off the interest rates that you get for investing at different maturities. There's no actual, there's not much evidence in the bond market for that kind of panic. And the Fed itself, which after all is one of the great centers of data processing about the economy, is also fairly confident, I think, that the inflation shock is transitory. They're not totally on a consensus about that.
And there are bits of the Fed, say data spread, would like to go begin tightening a little bit sooner. But nevertheless, their general position is one of being never really reasonably relaxed. So I think that's the gamble, right? The gamble is yes, we want to get to a slightly higher level of inflation, and we think we can do that without this coming runaway.
And the good reason for thinking it's not going to come runaway is the fundamental political economy is really different. And the position of workers is much weaker. And that's actually kind of a bad thing, really. And if it did, in some way, in some degree, shift the advantage in favor of workers, well, that would be a good problem to have.
And we'll address it when we get there. So one of the frustrating parts of this debate to me is that inflation gets talked about all as this one thing. And to go back to what you're saying, there is this question of the productive capacity of the economy. So something we've been seeing in the inflation now is that we're in trouble on cars, because we just need more cars.
And there was a supply shock during COVID to key components. But you don't see a lot of discussion about what we want the economy to produce and how to make it possible for it to produce that much. Instead, we really talk in these generalities about money supply and inflation and the economy itself. And yet, when I talk to economists, they will tell me, of course, what we are ultimately talking about is the productive capacity of the economy.
But it does seem to me that if you never talk about that in the specific or rarely do, and instead use these aggregate metaphors, you're going to end up with very different solutions and very different goals than you would otherwise. I think that's right. And I think it's one of the things that 2020 exposed is that we have a set of conventional assumptions about what makes up the economy, what makes up prices in general, and how they'll respond to impulses in general, like an expansion in the money supply. And those assume a certain set of particular structural relationships, a particular set of industrial patterns, a particular pattern of production.
But when a shock like 2020 comes along, which is incredibly idiosyncratic, all of those assumptions are sort of disrupted. And we're forced to sit back and ask ourselves what we actually mean by something like inflation, what we actually mean by the economy, one of the huge surprises of 2020 was that the highly selective way in which the shutdown operated and took out dentists, surgeries, and schools and the entire service sector, which aren't normally part of the conventional story of the business cycle at all. And on the flip side on the recovery now, we're trying to pass whether or not it really is inflation, if what's happening is that the price of lumber and then the price of used cars and then anything that has chips in it surges, whereas other prices really aren't moving, because the movement seems so wildly idiosyncratic. And economists will say, generally speaking, OK, what we're talking about is the average moving, but they don't have elaborate means.
It's not taught. Economists are not undergraduate economists, graduate school economists are not sat down with an image of what makes up the US economy or the world economy sector by sector, and they don't learn lessons then separately about each one of those, because these are general sciences. If you want to know about agriculture, you go to ag school. If you want to know about chip supply, you would presumably become an industrial engineer or an electronic engineer or somebody who specializes in supply chain logistics.
It's really the knowledge of engineers, not the knowledge of economists. And in some ways, the most radical demonstration of this was the vaccine story, right? That the entire macroeconomic outlook hinges on the development of a handful of products and their supply chain. I mean, it's really not an exaggeration to say that the entire outlook hinged through the summer and the early fall of 2020 on a handful of labs around the world running tests, which altogether would generate an output, maybe worth a couple of $10 billion, but trillions of dollars of the world economy hinged on it.
So we're exposed to a sort of walk for one to the nail, you know, that famous nursery rhyme for one to the nail. The battle was lost. That kind of a logic becomes absolutely dominant without those bottleneck things, without that vaccine, without those microchips, whatever it is, the whole, which we like to generalize about, simply doesn't function. It also then becomes a serious form of evaluation.
You know, what is a working vaccine worth? Do we decide that by hamlet? It's cost of production, is all what it would command in the market or what value it delivers in terms of stabilizing the economy? That's been one of the disorientating effects of this shot.
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Find out more at nytimes.com.com. So I want to bring up something here that may not at first blush seem deeply connected to what we've been talking about. But I think it is, which is how the boundaries of acceptable thought are policed and defined within the economics profession. And I want to go back here to the line we began with that whatever we can do, we can afford.
This is a line that I have talked about with some leading Zephyr left economists. And they'll tell you that, of course, they know that. They've always believed that. Modern monetary theorists love quoting this line, but they will say, oh, the modern monetary theorists have nothing new to say.
That's just an old Keynes line. But I will say that having covered economics for a long time in Washington, that was not a line that used to get quoted to me. And there's a lot like that, it seems to me in economics, where if you dig in deep, what you either find is an indeterminacy that could go in many different directions, is a principle that is actually quite radical, like whatever we can do, we can afford, or a lot of disagreement. But then when the economists come into the political realm, they begin trying to add their theory of how the politics will interpret something into the way they talk, and then it gets much more narrow.
And then they become much more nervous about the way they'll be interpreted, heard, et cetera. And that to me is where a lot of the reliance on things like headline inflation numbers, budget deficits, interest rates comes from. Those are signals that can be a problem or may not be a problem. But it's been a useful shorthand to just say, we don't want you getting out of control.
And so we're just gonna watch this pretty closely. If it gets over a certain line, we're gonna slow the whole thing down. And that seems to me to be happening here. I think there's a lot of fear that if it becomes known, if it becomes believed that whatever we can do, we can afford that that will be used irresponsibly, and then being used irresponsibly, will create a lot of real problems for people like runaway inflation.
The idea will be, well, of course, we can just give everybody a universal basic income, and then they'll turn out that does create a bunch of inflation and there'll be problems. And yet I don't know that many economists who disagree with the line. And so this seems to me to be a point of real tension right now, a bunch of different things from the pandemic to the way social media has evolved to just the way political discourse has evolved are blowing up people's control over the conversation. And that is exposing some nostrums that weren't really true.
And then the professional wants to say, no, we knew all this. But in fact, they haven't really been saying it because they're a little bit afraid in my view of what people will do with these ideas if they get hold of them, if they're sort of not protected by the responsible economists placing boundaries on what isn't isn't, so reminded policymaking. Very responsible was the word that Larry Summers, I think, used repeatedly with regard to the various proposals coming out of the Biden administration. I think that's absolutely right.
And I mean, one can see the professional logic of this. One can see the concern of a professional of extraordinarily high status, the police, the boundaries of who gets the speak in their name. But I think also one could offer a more sympathetic reading, which is that the situation is genuinely opaque. I mean, we are in a broken plate here.
We're in a gray zone. There's no longer one best way. There's no longer a Washington consensus that you can easily subscribe to. There's a sort of maneuvering.
And it's somewhere between one size fits all, which we've kind of abandoned, or one policy fits every situation, which we've also abandoned. And then I think goes. And figuring out that space is what we all have to do going forward from here, I think. And it isn't surprising, I think, that as it were defenders of the authority of a discipline of the kind of potency of somebody like Larry Summers, are allergic on these issues, right?
Because they fear mysteries, they fear people, frankly, who don't really understand what they're talking about in their view as it were acquiring authority. But I think underlying that is actually a situation of profound uncertainty about questions like, why are interest rates so persistently low? Why is inflation not taking off when the money supply is blown up? What is the best way for an emerging market economy to handle the stresses of globalization?
Once upon a time, perhaps people had a sense they actually knew the answer. That's just, I don't think any longer the case. I think that's a really important way to put it. And I want to say this and recognize it'll get me in a little bit of trouble.
I am a lot more sympathetic to Larry Summers's take on some of these issues than others I agree with are, but I'm not always sympathetic to how he presents it, which is to say, I agree with what you just said, Adam, which is at the core of a lot of these economic policy questions right now is profound uncertainty. For instance, I would say the economics profession has just been devastatingly wrong about what effect different deficit levels would have over the past 20 years. I think you simply have to look at that given the credentials of some of the people making these arguments as in aggregate, a record of a lot of failure. Not literally everybody has failed, some people got it right, but there was just a lot of warnings and I look completely ridiculous.
A lot of worries about things that didn't happen. It's pretty clear to me at this point that the two things that are a problem, the commercial deficits, one being higher interest rates and the other being inflation, economists just don't understand well enough to predict. But I don't quite take that view where some of my friends on the left do, which I would say is in the direction of free for all. The fact that there is uncertainty doesn't mean bad things can happen, bad things can happen.
Inflation could begin to bite in a real way. It could move in a way we don't expect. The Fed could become highly politicized very quickly and then the markets react in a certain way to that. And the thing that is frustrating to me is that I don't see a lot of strong communication of real uncertainty from the economics profession.
Because it's one thing to say, I think we should be cautious because we are in territory that we don't understand and things can get out of control. And instead what I see is very, very strong opinions from just different directions. But nevertheless, these are hard questions. And I don't know, I mean, I think this is actually quite a bit of the fight between the modern monetary theory types and the New Keynesian types.
Whereas I think the modern monetary theory is often say things at this point or not that different than the New Keynesians, but the modern monetary theories are more comfortable that they'll be able to slam the brakes on if just creating a lot of money out of thin air gets out of control and the New Keynesians are not comfortable with that. And so fundamentally they have a disagreement over how they're gonna handle the risk of inflation that ends up sounding like a disagreement over whether or not money is an invention or not. But the truth is neither side knows. And that's also just a scary thing to know from the outside, you like to think that people have their hand on the wheel here and they've all got answers, but they, at least in my view at this point, truly don't.
And there is the additional dimension, I think that it's very important to not think money simply along the axis of if you like the state and the bond market, but to also figure on private finance. I mean, we mustn't lose sight of the fact that the biggest shocks of the last 12 years were the banking crisis of 2008 in the North Atlantic system as a whole. And then this disruption in the treasury market, which was intimately tied up with new forms of market finance. And so beyond the classic terrain of public finance, government decisions about spending and taxing and so on and the debt that's run up and the question of whether that's a burden.
And the classic macroeconomic topics of employment, unemployment, inflation, there is also this looming cliche elephant in the room of the flight wheel of finance, a private finance into which government debt, which is the hotly contested topic in those two other fields, really serves as the raw material. The government debt serves as the key medium through which private speculation operates. It's leveraged on government debt. And that's actually the reason why the central bank stepped in in the spring of 2020.
They weren't doing it to monetize a Keynesian stimulus program. This wasn't World War II. It kind of looked like it if you viewed it from a certain angle, but it really wasn't because the bankers will go, the central bankers will go to their graves, swearing, insisting that no, they didn't do this to support the efforts of national governments to fight off the crisis. They did it to prevent financial instability, by which they mean to preserve the intact, this structure of private finance that pyramids on top of that public debt.
And that's another dimension which it didn't be fair to say at all the economics has nothing to say about it, but it was blindsided by it by 2008 is in a sense, scrambling to capture up with the dynamic of the virtuality of that private financial engineering, which again, in 2020, we didn't see the banking crisis, but we did see in some sense as an even more fundamental disturbance in that treasury market. I will go to my grave defending car. You have to stop things that are too big to fail from failing. But it is a place where I get very populist because we do seem to me to have one financial political system for banks and financial institutions and another for people.
And I am not making the argument you will sometimes see on Twitter where it's like we gave banks however many trillions of dollars and all the people got was a 12-inch hour stimulus check. That's not true as a matter of policy. But it is true that when the Fed wants to, it can simply open the spigot in the most profound of ways for the banking system. And there is not that same ability to say there's an emergency for households.
There's an emergency for people because Congress is a much harder to move institution. And it is just weird that we have an institution of checks and balances and filibusters and committees and divided government that operates when you need to ask should people get help in their everyday lives. And then an institution functionally just run by Chairman Powell and the Fed board that operates around the question of, well, do we just need to begin buying up all the debt anybody wants to sell us? And even if it is better, they do that than not.
There's just no doubt that it is a profoundly unfair way to run the system. And it compounds itself, right? I mean, the sort of added twist in that tale is the paralysis of fiscal policy because of the complexity of politics. And we should be frank about it, right?
I mean, the objections from the right to measures which like us on the progressive side of things are just essential, that paralysis means that for a long time for much of the time, the only game in town in terms of active economic policy is the Fed. And the Fed's interventions have the effect of not just underwriting speculation today, if you like, but further accelerating and exacerbating and forcing the process of financial accumulation and growth and profit taking. So it's really a very difficult and deeply entrenched sort of structural bias. I mean, no one actually has to necessarily want any of the effects it produces.
You don't have to have a conspiracy of people determined to have trillions of capital gains to the top 1% of wealth holders but that in an emergency often turns out to be the only thing you can do. And then you expect some sort of massive trickle down effect to operate from there. The only way out of that impasse is some sort of structural form, which is of course profoundly unlike for all of the reasons that much more modest measures of reform are difficult to get through. Well, it also creates different kinds of pressures.
This is an argument I've been making forever. I wrote a Newsweek piece about it more than a decade ago. But something I've always tried to say is that an issue with gridlock, gridlock and the way we think about it in Congress, is that it's actually a very good metaphor. I mean, as somebody who grew up outside Los Angeles, when there was gridlock on the freeway, people take side streets.
And one of the things gridlock does is it begins to put pressure on the institutions that are less gridlock, even if they are less effective as a way to get to a policy goal to act. So you have more pressure on the executive, to use executive orders for things that maybe one would not have thought executive orders could be used for before. That you saw very clearly in the Obama administration, you saw the Trump administration, there's pressure on the Supreme Court to do through decision-making what the various coalitions cannot do through legislating. You see that on abortion politics, you see that on marriage equality, you see it on gun issues, all kinds of different things.
But you also don't see it increasingly in the Fed. And this is something I'd like us to talk about because Jerome Powell, despite being a Trump appointee, I would say backing up 10 years in the conversation, just an exemplary Fed share from a progressive standpoint. Like if you go back to where progressives were on the Fed 10 years ago, they would feel great about Powell. Not worried about inflation really, very committed to full employment, seems to be pretty committed to a hotter economy where there's worker power.
But there's now pressure from the left to not reappoint him because they want, on the one hand, we're done on financial regulations, we can talk about, but I think the real issue is they want the Fed to act as a big player on climate change. And part of the reason they're desperate to have the Fed step in on climate change, treating it as a systemic risk, which it now needs to begin evaluating banks and other players on, is because they are worried correctly. So the Congress will not act on climate change, certainly not with the power they need to. And so that makes the Fed a much more important game in town if you could get them off of the sidelines on this.
I'm curious how you see that demand. Do you think it would be a good idea for the Fed under Powell to say, yep, climate change is a huge problem, and we're going to begin to build it into our financial regulations, the way we backstop markets, whatever. So I mean, I've been of two minds about this. I was one of the people early in the field arguing that central bankers needed to take climate change more seriously.
And what we've seen in Europe is the wholesale adoption of the agreed agenda by the ECB against, of course, a radically different political backdrop on the climate issue, specifically. Broadly speaking on social and economic policy in general, I agree that Powell has been an extraordinary surprise, but it's also undeniably the case that he has been slow to act on climate. But I think you have to ask why. I'm reliably informed it isn't because Jerome Powell doesn't care about the environment.
I think he does. But I think he's acutely conscious of a variety of different constraints operating on the Fed in a way perhaps that they don't operate on the ECB. And the first is that the Fed's mandate is in some ways not quite as capacious as that of the ECB, which is really setting, I'm invoking that because they're setting the pace really on this issue globally. ECB just quickly being European Central Bank.
You have an Central Bank and the Central Bank is a truly cosmopolitan network. They benchmark each other themselves against each other all the time. The Fed has a full employment and a inflation mandate and a financial stability. It's understood that it's mandate too, but it's not obvious really how you shoehorn environment into that.
You could maybe do it through a community's mandate. You could maybe do it through full employment, but it's a bit of a reach. They also, of course, know that there is profound political opposition to doing this. They know that they will take a beating in Congress if they make moves in this direction from the usual suspects from the GOP.
And they've already been quite vocal demanding that the Fed cease and desist politically, you know, explosive research on climate issues, which they believe is contentious and risk politicising the Fed. Their words not mine. Then there is the issue of what instruments the Fed would actually use. And for a central bank to be really dynamically active in climate policy, you want it to be doing what the European Central Bank does or the Bank of England or the Bank of Japan, which is actually buying lots of private debt.
Because that then gives you the leverage of saying, look, we're going to not, we'll disqualify this as collateral if it's dirty, if it comes from fossil fuel pollution. And the Fed sort of during the crisis in 2020 indicated it might, but the factor was not brought to substantial portfolio of private debt. So it's not immediately obvious beyond financial regulation where the Fed would go. And then finally, and non-trivially, the Fed is enmeshed in a financial system with big beasts in it.
And America's big financial players are the largest global backers outside the oil states themselves of fossil fuel investment. So if you push in this direction, you're going up against the likes of JP Morgan, which is hands down globally, the largest fossil fuel investor. And I think for all of these reasons, it's a little unsurprising that the Fed at the power is leery of moving rapidly on this. That should make one impatient.
It's frustrating. If your climate is your central preoccupation, then you want all hands on deck to be moving. But then think about the broader political consolation in the US. And consider, do you really want to pick a fight on the Fed over this?
And it seems to me that you could quite reasonably argue the case that you were implying, I guess, which is that on so many issues, power has proven to be highly effective. If we replace him with Leobrainard or somebody of that type, who is more likely to come around to the green side, we make the Fed into a huge political issue, politically for the GOP in the mid-term season. They will be able to say that we politicize the institution. They can come after us on that side.
And the main thrust, given the limitations of what the Fed can actually do in climate policy in the US cannot lie with the Fed, it has ultimately to lie with infrastructure spending and regulation. And so it's critical, presumably, if that's the way we're going to use policy, not to pick a fight over the Fed that we don't need. So for this rather complicated reason, I've ended up coming down on a kind of much more, you know, I think it would be a mistake not to reconfirm Powell, not because he is the champion of green policy, and he hasn't been. For all the reasons it's unlikely he will be, but because we have the beside tactically speaking, what is the most likely route for success actually is?
And I don't think it's this way. Let me try to make a stronger argument for the people who want the Fed to play in this more aggressively and then make my argument for why I'm a little skeptical. If you force me to choose right now, I would say, read a point Powell that is a fight you don't need, and you could create more problems than solutions if you win. But let me start at the beginning.
The view is the Fed is a regulator among other things of systemic risk, and it is ridiculous on some level to not say that climate change is a systemic risk. There's a great paper that came out a while ago from a central bank consortium called Green Swans, which people can look up and I used in a column a while back, all about this. It is a profound kind of risk that could lead to all kinds of assets needing to be repriced, that could undermine not just companies, but even countries. It is a profound risk to prices in the future.
Of course, of course it is. So then what could the Fed do? Well, they could begin to say, well, as a bank, if you are not divesting from things that expose you to climate risk, we are going to judge you as highly risky and begin to regulate you in that way. Or you made the point, Adam, that maybe they can say, well, the Fed does a lot of purchasing of government-backed mortgage-backed securities.
And so maybe they should begin only purchasing these mortgage-backed securities if the mortgages are for houses that are up to a Green Building Code or for buildings up to a Green Building Code. There are things you can imagine doing, but when you begin to think about the Fed acting at that level, really going all in a way that might make a difference because I don't think just giving some speeches on how climate change is a risk will make a difference, then you're talking about something really different. Lil Brainard is not going to do that. I've covered Lil Brainard in Washington for years.
I'm not saying I know her super well, but she is a cautious economic policymaker. She always has been. She might be on the margin a little more green than Powell, but she's not going to turn the Fed into an instrument of climate policy in this way. But also, one of the things that has really saved the political system for some years now is that a Republican Party that has been irresponsible and functionally every other respect keeps making pretty responsible federal reserve appointments.
Ben Bernanke, under George W. Bush, Jay Powell, shockingly under Donald Trump. I'm there's no reason for Trump to kick-yell out, but if he was going to, Powell was a great replacement. And Central banking policy has simply, it has been a rare space that is not that polarized.
And if you polarize it by bringing in other issues that are much more polarized, then the right is going to begin judging candidates across this other issue set, and you're going to begin to find more doctrinaire candidates. If it becomes very important that whoever is running the Fed also doesn't believe climate change is a big deal, then people like Ben Bernanke and Jay Powell in the future will not be plausible candidates because they're not that kind of conservative. They're not that kind of Republican. And so that's my worry that you're not going to get in somebody who's going to do all that much on climate change, but in adding that to the vetting process, you'll begin to create a situation where on the right, you get much crazier candidates for the Fed because you have to fit the broader set of right wing concerns.
And if we had some of these much crazier candidates enduring the 2008-2009 crisis, the 2020 pandemic crisis, I think what could have happened becomes really scary. I completely agree with you. I mean, let the B. Don't be so understanding.
I mean, I've literally been called out by the head of the German Bundersbank as like a green haw, a consensual bank policy in exchange that we had in the fall of 2019. So I fully believe that central banks need to play their part in the green energy transition. And clearly that the high roads to doing that, given their existing portfolio and brief, is by way a regulation. And obviously, they should be insisting on systematically stress testing all major financial institutions against some sort of Paris conforming scenario.
In other words, what happens to your portfolio of investments if we are on a path to decarbonization that gets us the net zero by 2050? I take that as red. And furthermore, I think whether with Leobrenard or Powell, I think the Fed is moving in that direction, right? That inside the Fed, it's quite clear that they've already got several committees working on this problem.
It's such a no brainer. It's easy to do. It sits within what they already do. And to reiterate, we both agree on this, there's not much else that the United States central bank is going to do in this direction.
So then the question is purely tactical. The question really is, how do you create a space in which the Fed can, A, not become a problem, B, go on doing the good thing it's currently doing, and C, under the radar, which is where this is probably going to have to happen because the GOP watches this stuff. They literally read the research papers that come out of the San Francisco Fed, for instance, one of the more liberal branches of the Fed. Some of this is going to have to be to be too much surreptitious.
It's going to be kind of infrastructural political change to use that unfortunate phrase. It's going to have to happen within the deep state. In the same way, as for instance, the Pentagon went on working on climate change issues under Trump. So the only question in the debate here, the way that you framed it in this conversation is, you know, powered or not on green criteria or not.
And my view would be, well, power is certainly a reasonable option and to reject him on green criteria will be to shoot ourselves in a book. AI was supposed to take work off your plate and said it gave you homework. ServiceNow's AI specialists do to work, start to finish so people can do the parts of the job their best step. To put AI to work for people, visit servicenow.com.
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I think you're working on it before lockdown and presumably now you're back to it about the history of energy policy. And so I'm curious in your roles in economic story and I think about energy policy, what have you learned so far? How has your view changed? I think the fundamental issue that we need to understand is why A, this problem came to be posed as a problem.
I mean, I'm trying to stand back as it were from the frustrations of the moment and try and understand how we ended up in what feels like such a profound agonizing impact. The way this is eventually framed is people won't listen to science because they're self-interested and basically shills for Exxon. That's very crudely put, but that is one way of thinking about this problem. I don't think it goes far enough and we need to think in a more structured and deep way about why our societies are capable on the one hand of formulating huge macroscopic problems, like for instance the proposal to vaccinate the world, the vaccines we didn't have 12 months ago.
And then not capable of us moving to the next level of actually doing it because I'm broadly speaking of the belief that the energy transition though it's a dramatic engineering proposition and though at some sort of almost metaphysical level, it's very hard to imagine transitioning to a world dependent on much more diffuse energy sources within the sun and so on. From an economic point of view, which is where I tend to start, it's not actually the most spectacular transition, well, certainly not ever. It doesn't compare with the kind of effort that we made during wars. There's I think a terrible temptation and a very misleading temptation to compare it in that way and it's perfectly within our reach in a sense.
And so if you start from that perspective, the question is how we might never let us fail to make those steps. And that is the conundrum that I'm really struggling with and COVID in the 2020 world, which this lockdown is trying to grapple with as in a sense, we almost deepened it. I am haunted by this failure to create and to implement and to properly resolve a global vaccine program. It is such a staggering failure of rationality, the program that could deliver $8 trillion of benefits can't raise $50 billion in funding.
If we're failing with that on that now, then a thoroughly manageable problem of energy transition might be beyond our reach. I try not to let the depth of my pessimism here out of the box too often, but I will say that for me, the coronavirus experience so deeply affirmed my worst fears about the politics of climate change, which is in the models of many climate change advocates, the mental models people have, not advocates for climate change, but advocates for doing something about it. I think there's a view that eventually this will get bad enough that, of course, humanity will have to act. There'll be big enough storms, big enough droughts, whatever it might be.
And I think what you saw during the pandemic, which is a punctuated period of suffering, of unimaginable scale affecting everybody all at the same time with death tolls in the millions, is that the amount of suffering people will get used to, and still not really be willing to sacrifice is astonishing. The number of people they will allow to die a day, not just here in America, but to say nothing globally, and do nothing about it. And in fact, demand that they don't want a vaccine mandate, they don't have to wear a mask, they don't want to have to show a test result before they go into a restaurant. If you believe there's some bad enough line we could cross on climate, we're not crossing it anytime soon.
And it's not even clear that it does exist. I completely agree. And 18 months on, it's as though it's sort of dwindling into significance. So I completely agree that the simple story that will be something bad enough to suddenly change all the money.
It could happen, but I no longer have any confidence that I understand how it happens. It's going to be really erratic, and it will depend crucially on mobilization and the way in which whatever disaster happens is pitched and framed as to whether one or it does have that liberating capacity. Something I've come to over the past couple of years, and that I believe on climate, and I think the pandemic was an example of this, and it seems to me you've come to the same place in your book, is that if you take a realistic view of the constraints on political action and the slowness of it, and the difficulty of it, you have to put more emphasis on what you end up going to the book, techno-scientific fixes, that you really do need to invent your way into technologies that make the politics of a solution easier. So for instance, we are not by any means 100% vaccinated in America, but a lot of people have gotten vaccines, and I don't think we could have sustained simply political solutions.
We could not have sustained distancing and masking and so on at the level that the vaccines were able to give us protection. And I think this to be true on climate change, my thinking on this has moved much more towards really almost all of the energy needs to be on pumping money into renewable energy infrastructure and development, and then incentives to adopt it, and just spend as much as you can to make the technology better, and then spend as much as you can to get the people to adopt the technology, because that is your best hope. If you can get things that make this easy for people and don't feel like a sacrifice, maybe you will get more action faster, but if you try to make it about sacrifice, you are just going to end up losing. But I am curious if that is a fair read of you on this as well.
Yeah, I mean, the danger of course is that you end up as we are searching into a kind of techno optimism. So maybe what the position is, a sort of techno-realism. Yes, it is not optimistic. This is not an optimistic take.
No, it is exactly. It is born out of a sense of limitations of our capacities and other dimensions. And to me, this is why I always go back to Keynes, because Keynes was thinking exactly that way about macroeconomics. If you think about the dilemmas he was diagnosing in 1920s Britain, he is basically saying, look folks, we are in uncompetitive post-war economy.
If we try and address this head on, it will lead to the class war, or the disintegration of British politics, and quite possibly fascism. So look, here is a macroeconomic fix I have got for you. And this is the way in which we can in fact reduce the real wage. It is not a full-frontal progressive politics.
But do it in a way which will hurt less. People won't notice and overall employment will be high. And so this is the way we can solve this. Let me take this off your plate because I can see you are a little overwhelmed.
And the way in which we are going to manage this is this meta-politics of what is political and what not. And if we can through a variety of devices, whether it is macroeconomics, we can afford anything we can actually do, if we can take those issues off the agenda so as to enable democracy to function, we have a chance. But if everything has to be resolved by way of grams, political bargains, including as you say comprehensive rhetoric and logic of sacrifice, one has to be I think deeply pessimistic. So then for me, as you say, the question is how serious are we about this technological last resort path?
And that's where the gloom comes back, right? Because say in the Biden programs, where is the $100 billion biotech program that's going to make us proof against the next pandemic? There's some money there, it turns out. But it's a couple of billion here, a couple of billion there.
It's small change. Although I will say that in their $3.5 trillion reconciliation plan, which very well may not pass at that level, they do have a lot of money. I mean, I would say the Biden administration is mostly moving towards this big techno fix approach. The question is, will it pass?
And that is, I want to be clear on this, that is not to say they are funding everything I would. I mean, among other things, I would just be putting so much more money into direct air capture technology research than we are, not because I'm sure it will work, not because I think it is good that we will end up needing it, but because we have to be trying everything. And this loops us back to the very first point of this conversation, that idea of whatever we can do, we can afford. And we've, I think, mostly been talking about this of if we want to spend the money now, can we get it?
But I think on climate, you also need to think about that in the reverse direction. We need to spend the money now to create the productive capacity so that we can then spend the money later. We need a pipeline, increasing the scale of that research and development pipe. If we can only spend $10 billion on vaccine development, we need a bigger vaccine research establishment.
Because we might need to be able to spend $50 billion on it. And I would like to be able to do that. And I want to be able to buy $8 billion doses of vaccine in one fell swoop for delivery in three months time. Thank you very much.
So we need seven serum institutes. That's the sort of scale we need to get to. This seems to me, it's funny to put it in this language, but what you're proposing, some degrees what I'm arguing for too, is supply side progressivism. That you have to, if you're progressive and you're worried about many of these problems, that you have to begin taking the supply side constraints as a real problem.
And it's not true for every issue. I mean, there are things where we can, you know, we can give people a child tax credit now and help get them out of poverty. But on a lot of things, we're going to need technologies that we either don't have or that there are constraints on how much of it we can deliver all at once, you need to begin really investing in the supply side for the future. And I think that's nowhere to work then climate where, you know, imagine a world, imagine a world where six years from now, we get the kind of horrific disaster, you and I both fear, but also fear will not create enough change to fix the problems even language I like here, but make as much progress as we need to make.
Nevertheless, it is a disaster that creates a lot of political will to do something, a world where we've created productive capacity, such that we can use that political will to actually buy a tremendous amount of renewable energy and a tremendous amount of resilience and a tremendous amount of negative emissions technology. That's a better world than one where we, even if we decide to spend the money, we just can't get that much for it because we haven't built out the capacity to get that much for it. Yes. And I love this idea of progressive supply side politics.
And I would extend it in the widest possible terms. And, you know, in a sense, my greatest sympathy amongst the Biden programs, which generally I wholly agree with, they're just too small, is in fact the family's plan because the ultimate progressive supply side policies people, right, and supporting care work, supporting child-rearing, supporting early childhood education is the root. That's where we start 20 years down the line. Those are the brilliant grad students that we need that are going to, as it were, supercharged, the energy research, the molecular biology.
So we need to be thinking comprehensively about this program. And in phrase, in those terms, I think it does become a rather good description for the kind of interventionism, the kind of progressive vision that we need. I think that is a good place to end. So, Adam, to use that was our final question.
What are three books you'd recommend to the audience? Well, we've been talking a lot about MMT. I think Stephanie Countensberg on the deficit, is a good one for people to start with. I'm sure this has been recommended before, but it's really a brilliantly lucid accessible account of the MMT position.
It would be, I think, wrong not to mention it in this context. I mean, another book that has profoundly influenced me more than I think I can remember reading in recent years is Vassidy Grossman's giant two-volume mega-novel about Stalingrad. So the first volume is published in English as Stalingrad II is life and fate. And then given the Keynesian tone of the conversation today, John Maynard Keynes is essays in Persuasion, which contain many of the sort of arguments that we've been making here in an inversion coming out of the 1920s, that I think he would have been entirely sympathetic to the kind of case that we've been elaborating here.
Adam Puse, thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you for having me on. This is a collection of Your Times opinion.
It's produced by Richard Karmet and Jeff Gelt, back to act by Michelle Harris, original music by Isaac Jones, and mixing by Jeff Gelt.