Skip to content
Energy Security and Geopolitics episode artwork

Nov 7, 2024 49 min

Energy Security and Geopolitics

from The Decision Advantage Hosted by RANE Network

In this episode of RANE Insights, RANE Founder David Lawrence sits down with Clay Siegle, an energy industry analyst with specialization in market intelligence, global energy security, and political risk. Over a 25-year career, Clay has held multiple roles in the public and private sector interpreting market and policy dynamics for executives, investors, governments, and general audiences. Clay serves as a board member at the Houston Committee on Foreign Relations and Chairman of its Finance Committee. Prior to this, he served as Vice President of the US Association for Energy Economics. RANE is a global risk intelligence company that delivers risk and security professionals access to critical insights, analysis and support to ensure business continuity and resilience for our clients. For more information about RANE's risk management solutions, visit www.ranenetwork.com.

Episode details come from the podcast's RSS feed.

Embed this episode

Ready to play

Energy Security and Geopolitics

0:00 49:22
of matches

Transcript Auto-generated, may contain errors

I'm Roger Baker, Executive Director of the Stratfor Center for Applied Geopolitics at RAIN, a global center of excellence for geopolitical intelligence and analysis. Learn how you can put geopolitics to work for your organization at rainnetwork.com. Welcome to the RAINN Insights Podcast from RAINN Network. In this episode, founder and chief collaborative officer at RAINN, David Lawrence, chats with Clay Siegel, an energy industry analyst with specialization in market intelligence, global energy security, and political risk. Over a 25-year career, Clay has held multiple roles in the public and private sectors, interpreting market and policy dynamics for executives, investors, governments, and general audiences.

Clay serves as a board member at the Houston Committee on Foreign Relations and chairman of its finance committee. Prior to this, he served as vice president of the U.S. Association for Energy Economics. We hope you enjoy this episode. Clay, it's great to have you available for our audience today, so thanks for the privilege of a bit of your time. I thought just by way of introduction, you might want to explain.

to the audience a little bit about your background and your history in following energy, and generally speaking, how you would basically define your role as an analyst, a commentator involving the energy industry. Well, thanks, David. It's great to be with you today. And it really comes at an interesting time in the world of energy security and geopolitics, which are so closely related. My career has been focused on thought leadership and market intelligence.

and strategic decision making at the intersection of market dynamics, primarily oil and gas, and industry trends, governmental policy. And global political risk, which I know is a lot, but it's been a very rewarding career because, first of all, as you might surmise, never a dull moment. And there's always stuff going on around the world in the global economy and even in security developments that are taking place around the world that combine with, for example, oil supply and demand to change expectations about that future supply demand balance for energy commodities. My area of focus has been primarily oil. So that means crude oil and refined products like gasoline and diesel, et cetera.

Who needs to know about these ongoing changes and changes in expectations for these fundamentals? That's everyone from oil and gas corporate leaders and strategists to government officials to investors and traders. And even general audiences, because let's face it, energy affects all consumers and businesses in a pretty material way. It ranges from the fuel that we use to purchase in order to move around and have our general mobility on the way to work and school drop offs all the way to people's wealth and their companies that are in their 401k or their other retirement plans and other investment portfolios. That's just.

for retail people, but for professional investors and commodity traders as well, it's important to have a pretty good sense about where we've been and where we're going with regard to energy markets. And I've had the opportunity to provide some of that decision-making guidance in my roles with both government and private-held companies during my kind of 25-year career in this business. So having become very familiar with your analyses, some of the points you're making, and also what you attempt to do. One of the basic precepts in your thinking is that you're not looking at the price of energy, the price of oil, in a vacuum. This is not just about supply, demand, predicting prices up and down, but very much, and you alluded to it, is the intersection of energy, oil, with national security, but also geopolitics. And part of what I know your clients, our network, tries to figure out is not just what the changes in the market are going to be, but what's the meaning of those changes.

What messages are being conveyed? What can we glean about future events, future prospects, future security issues? Maybe you can delve into a little bit about what you actually try to do as you look out at the markets. You're looking at a lot of data, supply, demand. You're looking at some of the geopolitical tensions and dynamics, but a little bit about what you actually try to do.

Well, it's vitally important to have a strong sense of the fundamentals in trying to forecast oil prices. And that basically means being able to estimate with some reasonable assurance the volumes of oil supply and demand around the world. We look at myriad matrix. myriad metrics for estimating supply and demand changes. But one of the most important is changes in oil inventories. That's not the same thing as oil reserves, which is yet to be produced oil that's still in their basins below ground. But oil reserves, meaning oil that's already been produced and is being temporarily stored in tanks around the world. Some of them are held by government. Most of them are held on the commercial side or the industry side. And those inventory volumes serve as a reasonably good proxy for the balance between supply and demand.

To your point, to have a comprehensive view about where energy prices are headed, it's important to look beyond just today's physical fundamental analysis, the most recent readings on supply and demand, and try to have a think about where they're headed next. And that's where you have to kind of broaden the definition of fundamental analysis to include what some may actually find to be sort of outside factors like geopolitical dynamics. like macroeconomic policies, because those two directly play into the formation of supply-demand changes. So just an example, let's see, from today's headlines, we obviously have a hot war. We have two hot wars in the world right now, major ones, one in the Middle East and one in Europe. And in the one in the Middle East, we've got a situation where Israel has just retaliated for the latest Iranian attack on Israeli soil and Israeli targets. It looks as though, by and large, Iran's energy infrastructure and assets were spared in this round. And what the market...

meaning traders and investors, are trying to do right now is anticipate whether that likely concludes the risk of a supply disruption emanating from this Middle East war, or if it's just one more round that will also have subsequent rounds that very well could bring oil into the crosshairs. And my philosophy, my outlook on this particular situation is the latter. I believe that if the Mideast war continues, and it's been going for more than a year now, that eventually oil will be directly affected, meaning oil will be directly targeted by one or more of the major parties in this war, which are substantially Iran and Israel. There are quite a few other proxies that are participating in the war, but it's substantially the state actors are Iran and Israel. And the reason why I have this hunch, David, is because of a holistic view of history. And the fact is that oil has come into the crosshairs.

and into the fighting in substantially every major war that we've seen during the past 100 years, during the past century. And if you think about what was going on about 100 years ago in the 1920s, it was the time between the First and Second World Wars. And what's going on at this time is that oil is becoming the dominant fuel of the world's major armed forces. And so on land, in the air, a little bit at sea. we see that oil becomes a target of military operations naturally because each side is trying to deny, deprive its enemy of this resource that is becoming, again at that time, so vital for prosecuting military campaigns. And I can give some examples that I think are really fascinating about the change that was taking place about 100 years ago that really colors all of the major wars that the world has seen since that time.

So let's take a second to do that. You know, on land, before oil became the fuel of moving stuff around, it was primarily done by locomotive. And I'm thinking principally of Europe and parts of Asia at that time. But then the final mile between where the railroad tracks ended and the front lines of the battle areas was honestly just still horse-drawn carriages in many cases. But the truck is going to become the indispensable tool for moving men and war material around. And of course, the truck is powered by oil.

We also find at this time that the armed forces have created this new, awesome combination of maneuver and firepower, which is, of course, the main battle tank. And this is going to revolutionize land-based warfare starting in the Second World War and in many of the military campaigns that we see subsequently. The tank, like the track, powered by oil. And in the sky as well, the revolution is just as important. Military aviation, which was basically just kind of a small-scale experiment during the First World War, becomes the preeminent.

element of the modern fighting force by the Second World War. The German Blitzkrieg, of course, is heralded by an aerial attack before land forces move in. And naturally, essentially all of the campaigns that we've seen since the Second World War involve air power in terms of establishing air supremacy and, of course, projecting firepower through bombing campaigns on land-based and even sea targets. So this is all about the maturity of the modern military aircraft, an aircraft like a tank in a truck run on oil. So this change in technology in force projection.

and in combat capability is basically powered by oil. And so the 20th century and into the 21st is all going to be colored by each armed forces desire to deny its enemies of this vitally important resource. We see it time and again, Korea, Vietnam. preceding wars in the Middle East, like the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, all the way up until modern times, even the most recent campaign in the 20-teens by the Allied Coalition against Islamic State involved using precision weaponry to target land-based convoys of ISIS or ISIL fuel shipments. So this is an endemic part of modern military combat. And I don't think that the modern war in the Middle East, the current war in the Middle East, if it continues, if it's not brought to...

a conclusion pretty soon, is going to be able to escape this very well-established historical pattern of going after oil. So it's an interesting observation, and I know you're a student of history, Clay, so shades of events prior to World War II and the campaign in the Pacific. Can I mention another word about that? Yeah, please. So what's happening in the Second World War is this pattern of oil coming under fire.

actually colors quite a few of the major campaigns of the war. If you think about the Battle of the Atlantic and shipping material from the Americas to Europe, a lot of this is about these lines of communication and logistics. Among them are petrol. And in the Battle of the Caribbean, which is kind of a subset of the Battle of the Atlantic, it's German forces, including submarine forces, that are basically laying siege to Allied refineries in the Caribbean, in the Caribbean islands, on the ground in the Second World War, in the European theater. We have Operation Tidal Wave, which is a major allied effort to degrade and destroy axis refineries that are concentrated in Romania.

And the Allies are going to incur substantial losses in trying to prosecute Operation Tidal Wave. They're going to wind up losing scores of combat aircraft and hundreds of skilled crew, airmen, in the campaign of Tidal Wave to take out those Axis refineries. And so here's another one in the Battle of North Africa. I mean, a lot of what was taking place was a race against time to move forces before, again, ground lines of communication, among them petrol supplies, could be cut off. from expeditionary forces. So a lot of what you see when you read the history of the Second World War is underpinned by this need to deprive enemy forces of this vital commodity for fighting the wars, which is oil. And what I'm hearing from you is a little bit of history, if not repeating itself exactly, it's rhyming. And you see some of the same dynamics playing out now in the geopolitical arena. Yeah, certainly. Let's talk about the two hot wars that are taking place. And we've already started a little bit with the Middle East.

which has been going now for more than a year, since early October of 2023. The full scope is probably more than we can give adequate treatment during this interview. But the fact is that oil has really only come under marginal threat during the war so far, and there's been no material supply disruption. So what have we seen? We've seen attacks by one of Iran's proxy forces, the Houthi forces that are based in Yemen.

undertaking a multi-month campaign against shipping in one of the most important choke points for international shipping, which is the Bab al-Mendeb, and of course the adjacent waterway, which is the Red Sea. And so Red Sea shipping, including energy commodities like oil, have come repeatedly under fire in the Red Sea from these Houthi attackers. And the United States and allies have waged a bit of a campaign to mitigate Houthi attacks. I'd say partially successful, limited success, but the Houthis still retained their capacity to carry out those attacks. And as a result, you've seen a lot of international commerce, including oil transportation, divert away from the Red Sea and take much longer routes from the eastern hemisphere to the western, namely by sailing all the way around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, at considerable extra cost.

which has still been worthwhile for companies that have to pay sort of a fully loaded cost of transporting the oil, which includes insurance. It can include a war premium and even the higher cost of bunker fuel, basically ship fuel to go those longer distances has been worthwhile to help mitigate the risks associated with the attacks on shipping. Now, we've also seen. A little bit of response from Israel against the Houthis, now on two occasions, once during the summer and once during the fall. The first one in summertime was quite significant because Israeli forces flew a very long distance in order to reach the Houthi-controlled port city of Al-Hudaydah in Yemen. They didn't really go after Yemen's capacity to attack shipping directly in that campaign. They went after Yemeni oil.

And you've probably seen some of the images and pictures of those burning fuel tank farms in the port of Al-Hudaydah. Like I said, they didn't really have a direct impact on neither on the Houthi attacks on shipping nor on the Houthi ballistic missile and cruise missile and drone attacks that those Houthi forces waged on Israel from time to time. Instead, I think it was largely symbolic. I think it was sending the message that Israel can fly really long distances and project considerable firepower and, if necessary, include oil in the target set. I believe actually the real audience, intended audience for that strike on Hodeidah's fuel depot was in Tehran and not in Yemen itself. So that's kind of my supposition or my estimate. And it clearly calls into or basically underscores the reality that Israel does have the capacity to hit at Iran's oil, which would be far more significant than anything that it could do to healthy fuel storage tanks in Yemen. Iran, of course, is a major oil producer and exporter in its own right.

Although right now, because of sanctions, it has only substantially one buyer, which is China. But of course, when you study oil and other similar commodities, you understand that it's a global commodity with a global supply-demand balance and is largely, not completely, but largely fungible. Therefore, a disruption among one supplier has an effect on prices and the supply-demand balance worldwide, with some externalities, some dislocations. But for the most part, that rule holds true. Iran is also a major consumer of refined products, and most important of which is gasoline.

And without gasoline, the country would come to a grinding halt. Many countries would, Iran too. And also the regime in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran, would come under tremendous pressure if gasoline manufacturing production in Iran were to be disrupted. So Israeli strategists and planners know that they have really big leverage against Iran by kind of rattling the saber, the oil saber. by attacking those targets in Yemen on a symbolic basis, and also in the most recent round of Israeli attacks, these direct attacks that we saw a few days ago. Here now that we're toward the end of October, we saw an Israeli aerial campaign in three waves against about 20 target sets in Iran, and among them were the air defenses surrounding some of Iran's most important oil assets, including reportedly the large refinery at Abadan.

And also the Bandara Imam Khomeini petrochemical complex and nearby port facility. So the messages continue to be sent. Those oil targets were not in any material way directly attacked in this latest wave. But Israel showed that it can reach them. and others and neutralize their defenses relatively easily. So I think message sent and message received on the Iranian side, but that by no means concludes the business between these two sides. And again, my overarching thesis, as long as this war continues and continues to escalate in intensity, it's increasingly likely that oil will here, too, come into the crosshairs. So I want to unpack just a little bit of what you said. So looking at the commodity supply and demand, irrespective of, Clay, the discussion that we have about

getting away from fossil fuels. Oil is going to play a fundamental and central role on the geopolitical stage and involving the geopolitical conflicts that now exist and some that may exist in the future, number one. Two, you've highlighted the heavy reliance that the military has on the supply of oil, not just our military, but all military bodies. Three, that oil is going to be a hostage here as part of the geopolitical conflict. It's not the reason for it, for these conflicts, but it is going to be potentially a casualty and certainly we'll call it a Damoclean sword involving all of the conflicts that we're now witnessing. And all this potentially can coalesce to have a negative impact on supply, negative impact on the price of oil in terms of negative for consumers. Is that a reasonable synopsis of your views of what's happening right now?

Yeah, very much so. I think you've hit the nail on the head that it's that interplay that has the ultimate effect on those supply-demand balances and importantly, the expectations for changes in those supply-demand balances going forward. And if you take the broadest definition, David, even the geopolitical dynamics and even things like macroeconomic and trade policy still boil down to anticipated changes in either supply and or demand. And so looking at it from that kind of big picture view, everything basically can be categorized or labeled as affecting either supply. There's nothing that's really and truly exogenous to that. And I mean, some people will take a perspective and say, but Clay, what about just pure speculators, market participants that are not hedging any physical risk? They're not even maybe hedging any risk to their balance sheet or their P&L. They're just purely out there betting on changes in, let's say, oil prices. But even there, too, I would say that...

Those non-commercial participants in the oil market, paper traders, are still doing what they're doing and placing bets that oil will go either higher or lower based on their expectation for changes in supply and demand. There's probably nobody out there who's betting that the supply-demand balance is going to tighten, and in order to reflect that expectation is putting on a short position, and vice versa. Those that think that the oil market might be loosening in the future, regardless of their trading strategy or their time horizon for closing out their trade, I mean, it probably corresponds with their expectation that the market is either going to tighten. or ease, and prices are either going to go higher or lower, and more or less, they're trying, just like all traders, to buy low and sell high. So I would just say that even in the case of non-commercial, speculative, et cetera, traders, it still really comes down to what you think is coming next for supply and demand. And I want to press a little bit, because you alluded to Iran having only one buyer, and I don't want to go down to sanctions rabbit hole quite, but oil has only been a record aid.

key target for the imposition of economic sanctions. And there's been a fair amount of investigative journalism and intelligence reports about whether or not these sanctions are working. You referenced the fungibility of oil in the marketplace, which is an important point, and there's no shortage of traders and other people who are willing to offload. Just briefly, as sanctions are imposed and there's now a call for more sanctions to be imposed in the energy, the oil space, how do you view this in terms of effectiveness and truly being what I'll refer to as a stool, sorry, I'll correct myself, a tool of foreign policy and tradecraft?

That's a great question and apropos, because we have international sanctions that are affecting two really major suppliers of oil right now, which are respectively Iran and Russia. There's some others as well, Venezuela and smaller cases that we can talk about. But those two are the biggies, I think, to evaluate when we're talking about effects on global supply demand dynamics and global supply changes. So let's take them in order. The sanctions on Iranian oil have kept production and exports limited, well below Iran's notional capacity to produce and export crude oil and related material called condensates. And so those crude volumes right now are something on the order of about a million and a half barrels per day.

And like I said before, they are going substantially all to China. The political dynamic and geopolitical dynamic, you have to look no further on the calendar than 10 days from now or substantially in the U.S. election on November 5th, because most people believe that a second Trump administration would reimpose what it called maximum pressure. on the regime in Tehran by much greater enforcement of sanctions that are already on the books that could cause Iran's exports of crude to sharply decline. So they could go from 1.5 to imagine like a third of that, like maybe only 500,000 barrels per day, which is basically a trickle of its capacity or potentially even lower than that. They could get substantially toward zero for a time. And where the geopolitical comes into effect is you have to look to the buy side.

China and the central government in Beijing is going to be very wary of losing its security of energy supply as a result of potentially tightening sanctions by the United States, or let's say tightening enforcement of the existing sanctions. And the sanctions got some more powerful teeth, some sharper teeth in recent months in Washington with the passage of the so-called SHIP Act. It's an acronym, but it basically allows the federal government and the presidential administration to crack down harder on those exports that are being done, obviously, with ships in a dark fleet and a gray fleet and enable them to exploit loopholes in the monitoring and reporting systems. So all that is to say that if China truly anticipates a return of Trump, and return of maximum pressure by a crackdown on oil export sanctions, they are likely to turn away from.

looking at Iran as an important supplier and to diversify further their sources of oil supply to other producing countries. Certainly, China already has a somewhat diversified portfolio, but I'm raising this right now to indicate that substantially all of the buying interest in Iranian crude could turn down or maybe even evaporate, depending on how Beijing perceives the acute nature of the threat to its 1.5 million barrels a day of Iranian supply. Now, we also have sanctions on another important producer and exporter to consider, which is Russia. Now, there were already quite some series of sanctions on Russian energy and Russian oil exports and imports that were imposed by the international community after Russia added on to its full invasion of Ukraine in 2022. And the big question at that time was whether the sanctions were going to remove Russian oil from the market or merely reshuffle the flows of those Russian barrels to different buyers around the world.

And the answer was clearly the latter. Russian overall volumes have really not changed too much since before the invasion and before the sanctions were imposed. But several sets of sanctions, most importantly, the European Union's ban on importing Russian oil products, since, of course. Europe was the largest consuming market of Russian oil before the invasion. That's the one that's had the biggest effect, and that applies to both crude oil and refined products. So with only a couple of very small exceptions, actually which will, I think, expire at the end of this year, there are no legitimate Russian barrels that are reaching European buyers anymore. Instead, those Russian barrels have been reshuffled.

In the case of refined products, they've gone to myriad other countries around the world, from Brazil to several countries in North Africa and others. When it comes to crude oil, Russian crude has really been directed to two major continuing buyers, which are India and China. So that's the geopolitical related question for sanctions with regard to Russia and the U.S. election is whether the incoming administration, whether Harris or Trump, decides to go harder or softer or about the same with regard to the sanctions against Moscow, the energy ministry, and importantly, the ships and the operating companies that transport the oil in those gray and dark fleets. And, you know, there are those out there who believe that a new Trump administration would find a lot of common interests with the government in Moscow.

and potentially ease sanctions, and potentially reduce support for the Western Security Alliance, NATO, and other arrangements as well, which could have, first of all, an effect on the battlefield, and secondly, an effect on those energy sanctions that we talked about. I'd like to take a moment to also describe how oil is coming into the crosshairs in this second big flashpoint, which is the Russia-Ukraine theater of operations. Because... Again, aligned with our overall paradigm here that oil eventually always comes into the crosshairs. The Ukrainians, as of this year, have been waging a continuous multi-month campaign, military campaign, to strike Russian oil infrastructure, primarily refineries, but also storage and distribution terminals with varying effects.

What's really interesting, though, is that although Ukraine has succeeded in using long range drones with precision guidance systems to hit very specific equipment on far afield Russian refineries, those that are positioned quite some distance from the border, not only nearby ones, you know, they really have not led to any kind of material downturn in Russian refined products output, meaning gasoline and diesel supplies. And so it really has had no effect on probably the hoped-for objective, which was reducing or diminishing Moscow's ability to prosecute the war. And we have to ask ourselves as analysts, both energy side, geopolitical side, even the military dimension, why so few results to show from this now kind of almost a whole year campaign against Russian refining? And everybody with YouTube or X or whatever you use to get your news videos have seen these pictures of the Russian refineries going up in flames. We've seen explosions. We've seen fires. You've got to look at the math. The oil math is where it starts.

And Russia produces surpluses more than it needs domestically of both gasoline. It has a small surplus in gasoline, but especially diesel. It has a surplus of about 700,000 barrels per day of diesel above and beyond what its domestic consumers, including the armed forces, need in order to keep the gears turning every day. So if you want to cause a shortage of diesel in the Russian armed forces, you're going to essentially have to eat through or at least greatly diminish that surplus 700,000 barrels per day of diesel supplies, which is exported to the world. So why has it been relatively unsuccessful? They have the range. They have the precision guidance. They're missing that third really important ingredient in their indigenously produced drone platforms, which is firepower. These drones, even though they look maybe impressive to our layman's eyes on these videos, these are not military grade explosive warheads. The tradeoff that you have to make in an airframe between range and firepower is dictated by the weight of the fuel that you need. And this is a...

a perennial concern for military planners everywhere. But in advanced militaries with combat aircraft and extended range capabilities and military grade ordinance, those problems are solved. But for the Ukrainian armed forces, it's been tricky to attack targets at range and also hit them with enough firepower to do lasting damage. So what have we seen instead in this campaign on oil? We've seen relatively easy, relatively fast repairs in most cases. We also have a situation where Russia, one of its mitigating factors is it has spare capacity.

to refined crude oil in other non-afflicted refineries. So it's almost like a game of whack-a-mole, in a sense, for the Ukrainian planners. First, they have to evade air defenses so that these drone platforms can reach their targets. And once they get there and are able to land on the right equipment, you know, they have this problem with insufficient firepower. What are the conditions that could change that? And this segues us back to the United States election. It seems to me that the greatest likelihood of having the Western capitals, Western governments loosen the reins on the advanced weapons systems that have been deployed that could make a difference in this campaign would probably be under a Harris administration as opposed to a Trump administration. So that's one consideration. And if they were to be more successful.

you could see a tightening in global supply of diesel, assuming that some of that Russian surplus, which is exported, dries up. And you could potentially see more Russian crude oil, which is a medium sour grade called Urals, the primary export grade, in greater supply. If you assume that Russian refineries are going to reduce their throughput, and as we say in the business, cut runs, cut their operation of refineries accordingly. Now, whether that extra Russian crude oil could reach market or not, takes us back to the relative laxity or seriousness of sanctions enforcement. And we're not going to know on the Harris side about what may be changing versus the Biden administration status quo, which is actually to encourage Russian crude to continue reaching market until the administration gets established and key appointments are made and we see first hundred day plans. So there's a lot riding on this election, particularly foreign policy and sanctions policy that will dictate the outcome for oil supplies and oil prices going forward.

make this more complicated than it is, Clay. But we have seen the enforcement of price controls on Russian oil that is hitting the market. I don't want to go down that rabbit hole, but whether that turned out to be effective or not, I think it's very debatable. And it's interesting that, again, we're going to put a title on this podcast. It's not about the oil, stupid. So much of this is the geopolitics and the implications that oil has for the markets.

and what may happen in the future with the economy. And I'll just point out, and I know you track this stuff carefully, but there were some recent reports about significant fines of oil in New Mexico, which potentially can be exploited, may add to the supply or the supply on the market, help with our national stockpiles, et cetera. But I want to close with the following question, and you actually started to touch on it. We will have elections. within less than two weeks. There'll be hopefully a clear decision shortly thereafter. But irrespective, there'll be a new president taking over in January. What advice would you be giving to this new president about the importance of U.S. energy independence and or stockpiling of supplies? That's a great question. It would be a privilege to be asked. And here's how I would respond. You've got to be careful what you ask for. But go ahead. Fair enough.

The two primary considerations are, number one, the importance of maintaining the position of the United States as a major supplier of energy to the world. This is of paramount importance to our own economy and I think global energy security. We've been a supplier of refined products for quite some time. We've been a supplier of crude oil. for substantially the past nine or 10 years. And that has really put the United States on the map as a major energy supplier. We're producing approximately 13.5 million barrels per day of crude oil, record high levels, exploiting our natural resources here, but also American technology in the exploration and production industry and the oil field industries. So much longer lateral wells, advanced hydraulic fracturing and well stimulation techniques have unlocked the potential for us to be the leading.

producer volumetrically of oil around the world right now, by far at 13.5 million barrels per day. And we're poised to go higher if regulatory permitting and other conditions remain amenable. That also includes permitting for midstream. projects, transportation and storage to get that United States oil and other resources to market. So it's not enough to just have the prolific fields and wells, but they have to be able to get to not only our refineries, but international markets. And exports of crude oil are also at a very high level right now, averaging near four million barrels per day. So it's of paramount importance for both our own economy and global energy security for us to maintain our position as a very important supplier of oil to the world. And now to complement that.

that's complement with an E, to go along with oil, the wave of the future will be exporting more and more United States gas from the same, in many cases, the same shale plays associated gas to a world that is going to remain hungry for natural gas supplies, notwithstanding the important work of the energy transition for many, many years to come. The second advice I would give, we have to close on this geopolitical note, I think, and also related to the market dynamics, is don't always put too much stock in what the market signals at face value appear to be signaling. because sometimes they can come a little bit unglued and become a little bit distorted and not serve as a good indicator. I think we are at one of those inflection points right now where the oil market has sold off quite a bit because of the latest wave of Israeli attacks.

has apparently avoided oil in a major way, and the market is responding by thinking that that risk of a supply disruption is off the table. But I think that's short-sighted. I think that this was only one in a series that will include future rounds, and it's very unlikely that oil supplies will remain unscathed if this war is not brought to and doesn't reach a quick end. So don't put too much stock on what the market is showing one week to the next. You have to have an independent assessment of the risk indicators and mitigations in order to develop the right strategy and execute it. That's my advice. White oil is not just oil.

Clay, I want to thank you for your insights. I look forward to continuing the conversation, possibly after the election and candidates or whoever the president-elect is, is perhaps freer to talk about their plans for the future, but certainly something worth watching. And maybe for our next conversation, we can speak about what specific indicators you do look at as potential predictors for the future. It'd be a good topic. Anyway, thank you again, and your insights are terrific. Pleasure to be with you. Thanks for inviting me.

This was the latest installment of the RAINN Insights podcast, which is part of the RAINN podcast series. To explore more of RAINN's podcast content, be sure to subscribe to the RAINN podcast series so you never miss a new episode, available on all platforms. To learn more about how RAINN assists organizations and professionals anticipate, monitor, and respond to worldwide risk, please visit RAINNetwork.com. That's R-A-N-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-N-E-

Frequently asked questions

How long is this episode of The Decision Advantage?

This episode is 49 minutes long.

When was this The Decision Advantage episode published?

This episode was published on November 7, 2024.

Is there a transcript available for this episode?

Yes, a full transcript is available for this episode. You can read the complete transcript on the episode page.

Can I download this The Decision Advantage episode?

Yes. Use the download control on the episode player to save the publisher-provided media file.