Episode 1: West Germany 1969

In 1969, West Germany held its sixth federal election since the end of the Allied occupation. The election produced Germany's first social democratic Chancellor in 40 years.Transcript:Hello and welcome to the first full episode of the History of Elections podcast, where we will be exploring the 1969 federal election in West Germany. The sixth election held in West Germany since the end of the Allied occupation, it brought an end to 20 years of Christian Democratic rule and brought in Germany’s first Social Democratic government since 1930, leading to significant change in the country’s domestic and, especially, foreign policy.September, 1969. A coup in Libya overthrows King Idris and installs Colonel Muammar Gaddafi as the country’s leader, who would rule for the next 42 years. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference is founded in Morocco, bringing together leaders and representatives of 24 Muslim-majority states. The People’s Republic of China conducts its first underground nuclear test and ninth nuclear test in total, solidifying the country’s status as the world’s fifth nuclear power. Ho Chi Minh, President of North Vietnam and founding Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Vietnam, dies at the age of 79. And in West Germany, a federal election is held, as Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger faces the electorate for the first time.BackgroundIn the decades following the end of the Allied occupation in 1949, the politics of West Germany – known formally as the Federal Republic of Germany – was dominated by the centre-right Christian Democratic Union, or CDU. Between 1949 and 1969, the CDU governed West Germany in an alliance the Bavarian Christian Social Union, or CSU, a slightly more conservative party that operated, as one would expect, in the state of Bavaria. Referred to together as the Union Parties, the CDU and CSU existed – and continue to exist – as independent parties. However, they caucus together in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, and they do not compete against each other in elections, the CDU choosing not to contest elections in Bavaria in favour of its sister party.The Union parties were the local German proponents of Christian Democracy, an ideological tendency that flourished across much of Western Europe in the postwar years. Characterised by moderation, pragmatism and emphasising the virtues of family life and national stability, Christian Democrats sought to bridge the divisions between the political left and right that had dominated European politics in the first half of the twentieth century. This left Christian Democratic parties well placed to seize the postwar zeitgeist of security and renewal. They typically endorsed liberal democratic forms of government and accepted the creation of moderate welfare states within a liberal, mixed economy framework. This enabled significant scope for collaboration and sometimes formal coalitions with social democrats, the other major political tendency in postwar Europe. Christian Democrats also championed the European integration process that would eventually culminate in the creation of the European Union.In Germany, the CDU strove to overcome historical divisions between the largely protestant north and catholic south that had riven German politics for the past century. By advocating for a unified, moderate Christian political identity, the CDU hoped to build an electoral coalition that could overcome the legacies of both the Weimar and Nazi periods.This approach proved very successful in West Germany. The Union parties won between 45% and 50% of the vote in every federal election between 1953 and 1969. They led every government in this period, including under the CDU’s founding leader, Konrad Adenauer, who served as Chancellor for 14 years between 1949 and 1963. In the 1950s, the Union parties appeared, in the words of Mary Fulbrook, to be on an ‘unbeatable ascendancy.’ Such ascendancy began to gradually reverse in the 1960s as the Union Parties became embroiled in policy disagreements and scandals – most notably, in 1962, controversy surrounding the raiding of a newspaper office ultimately precipitated Adenauer’s resignation.The Union parties’ political success was fuelled by a period of remarkable postwar economic recovery in West Germany known as the Wirtschaftswunder, or ‘economic miracle,’ aided by European integration, the US Marshall Plan of financial aid, global economic conditions and effective policies implemented by Adenauer’s governments. By the 1960s, West Germany’s GDP per capita and industrial output had both more than doubled while unemployment had fallen below 1%.Nevertheless, West Germany’s proportional voting system prevented the Union parties from governing alone and they spent the postwar decades leading successive coalitions, usually with the liberal Free Democratic Party. Only once, in 1957, did the Union Parties win an outright majority, although on that occasion they chose to retain a coalition with one other party.These Christian Democrat-led governments did not, of course, govern all of Germany. The regions of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War gained independence in 1949 as the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, controlled by the authoritarian Socialist Unity Party under Soviet influence. Both states initially claimed   to be the sole legitimate representative of the German people. Attempts to reunify the two German states were scuppered by heightening tensions between east and west at the outset of the Cold War, and the Iron Curtain between NATO and the Warsaw Pact came to divide Germany in half.Although indisputably one of West Germany’s two major parties in this period, the centre-left Social Democratic Party remained in opposition for the first 17 years of West German independence. The party had been strengthened by its resistance to the Nazi regime and increased support for social democratic policies in the aftermath of the Second World War, gaining votes from about a third of the West German electorate. The Social Democrats grew their support base during this period in political opposition, rising from 29% in 1949 to 39% in 1965.The Social Democrats’ time in opposition came to an end in 1966. The coalition between the Union parties and the    Free Democratic Party, which had been in power since 1961, collapsed due to the FDP’s opposition to raising taxes to balance the federal budget. Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer’s successor, tendered his resignation and a new government was formed by Kurt Georg Kiesinger, the sitting Minister-President – head of government - of the state of Baden-Wurttemberg. With just three factions represented in the Bundestag, Kiesinger’s only alternative to governing with the Free Democrats was to bring the Social Democrats into government.Both factions were motivated by a strong desire to avoid a return to the political instability that had undermined the Weimar Republic and that risked strengthening the extraparliamentary left and right. Meanwhile, the SPD was keen to demonstrate that it was capable of governing, although many members were sceptical of the idea of governing with the Union parties.  Thus, Germany’s first ‘grand coalition’ of the two major factions was formed, representing 90% of the Bundestag. It continued to govern until the next scheduled election in 1969.Kiesinger’s grand coalition implemented several domestic reforms which subtly expanded the West German welfare state and embraced neo-Keynesian policies. The government gained new powers of economic intervention; student grants and support for vocational training were introduced; and sick leave and pension coverage were both extended. Internationally, Kiesinger largely kept to the status quo, maintaining West Germany’s place within the western alliance. However, he made some moves to reduce Cold War tensions, establishing formal diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia.State elections held between 1965 and 1969 produced strong results for the CDU, suggesting that the senior partner in the grand coalition might claim the greatest electoral dividends.The 1969 election also took place in the aftermath of the 1968 student protests that swept much of the western world and proved especially vociferous in West Germany, where young Germans protested against the country’s incomplete denazification process and the continued presence of former Nazi officials within state institutions. This notably included Kiesinger himself, who had occupied a senior role within the Nazi propaganda apparatus during the Second World War. Famously, in 1968, Kiesinger was slapped at a party conference by Beate Klarsfeld, a Nazi-hunter who accused Kiesinger of knowledge of the Holocaust and the production of antisemitic propaganda – both charges that Kiesinger denied. This polarised the country, bringing out multiple public figures both in defence and condemnation of Klarsfeld’s actions.By the time of the 1969 federal election, the three-year-old grand coalition was on the verge of collapse. Once again, the point of contention was economic policy. The economic boom had come to an end, a fact exemplified by a recession in 1966, which drove unemployment up to 750,000 people. The Social Democrats proposed revaluing the Deutsche Mark, West Germany’s currency, to respond to these economic difficulties. However, this was opposed by the CSU, in part due to the detrimental effect the policy would have on Bavarian farming interests.  Additionally, West Germany’s presidential election, held six months previously, produced further splits in the grand coalition. Elected by members of the federal and state parliaments, the presidential election led to a close contest between Gustav Heinemann, supported by the Social Democratic Party and Free Democratic Party, and Gerhard Schröder – no, not that one – supported by the Union parties and the far-right National Democratic Party. In the final round, Heineman defeated Schröder by just six votes, becoming the first Social Democratic President of West Germany. This divide would prove prophetic of West German political divisions over the coming decade.The 1969 CampaignBy this point, West German politics had consolidated into a two-and-a-half party system – or two and three quarters, if you count the CSU. Kiesinger led the Union parties into the election, seeking a second term in office and his first direct mandate as Chancellor. The CSU campaign in Bavaria was fronted by its long-term leader and the incumbent Finance Minister, Franz Josef-Strauss. The Free Democrat campaign was led by Walter Scheel, former Minister of Economic Cooperation and sitting Vice President of the Bundestag.The Social Democrats, meanwhile, presented Willy Brandt, West Germany’s Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister under the grand coalition, as its Chancellor candidate. Brandt – born with the name Herbert Frahm – was a former resistance journalist based in Sweden during the war who had adopted the name ‘Willy Brandt’ as a pseudonym to avoid detection by Nazi spies. He rose up through politics as the Mayor of West Berlin – then an enclave territory within East Germany -   and became the Social Democratic Party’s leader in 1964, going on to lead the party’s election campaign in 1965 where he secured 39% of the list vote. This was the best result in the party’s 90-year history, although it still fell in second place behind the Union parties.The Bundestag was elected using a form of mixed-member proportional representation, which saw 248 constituency seats  elected and at least 248 additional list seats allocated proportionally to produce a result proportional to the share of list votes. All parties that secured over 5% of the federal list vote or that picked up three constituency seats were entitled to their full share of list seats, a system intended to prevent a return to the political fragmentation and difficult coalition building that had bedevilled the Weimer Republic. There was also the possibility of parties gaining additional seats called ‘overhang seats’ if the existing list seats were not enough to ensure parties received the full number of proportional seats that they were entitled to, allowing the Bundestag to grow and shrink in size from election to election. However, in 1969, no overhang seats were awarded.Opinion polling during 1969 found that the Social Democrats were considered the most competent party on economic issues, education and ‘Eastern’ policy, whereas the Union parties were only considered the most competent with regard to foreign policy towards the West; a central tenet of postwar government policy. This marked a reverse from 1965, when the Union parties had led on economic competence. Polling also found that voters were predominantly concerned with economic policy during the campaign over ‘Eastern’ policy or reunification, a trend that strengthened as the campaign progressed. As the party that led on economic competency, and as the economic situation improved in the run-up to the election, this favoured the Social Democrats. On the other hand, Kiesinger held a clear lead over Brandt on voters’ preferred Chancellor. One poll in September found that Kiesinger was  favoured by 52% of respondents compared to just 20% who favoured Brandt.To take advantage of its lead on the issue, the Social Democratic campaign emphasised economic modernisation; one of its election slogans proclaimed: ‘We are building a modern Germany – We have the right men.’ In contrast, the CDU highlighted its reputation for competency. Its posters prominently featured Kiesinger with the slogans: ‘safely into the seventies,’ and ‘It all depends on the Chancellor.’ Given his personal popularity, the CDU’s decision to centre its campaign around Kiesinger may have helped limit the party’s losses in the election. Nevertheless, the CDU campaign was described by one contemporary commentator as ‘patently tired’ and some party officials even commented that the party might benefit from a period in opposition.For its part, the Free Democratic Party’s campaign centred on a reformist agenda in eastern policy, taxation and education, stances that increased the possibility of a coalition with the Social Democratic Party. Its slogans included the phrase: ‘You can change Germany.’The campaign received extensive television coverage. Evening programmes covering the election lasted up to two hours and featured panels comprised of the rival leaders answering questions from one another and from members of the public. On the ground, the Social Democrats utilised a strategy called the ‘Social Democratic Voters’ Initiative,’ led by novelist Günter Grass, which featured large public meetings across German towns and cities.Election ResultsAs results came in, it became clear that Willy Brandt had once again proved able to extend the Social Democratic Party’s appeal. On an 86.7% turnout, slightly below 1965, the Social Democrats secured a record 42.7% of the list vote, up 3.4 percentage points on 1965, and they won 224 seats, solidifying the party’s position as the largest single party in the Bundestag. The increase was broadly in line with the party’s average increase of 3.3 points in every election since 1953, an increase party strategists apparently referred to as the ‘Comrade Trend.’ The decision to enter into a grand coalition in 1966 and build a reputation for governance appeared to have been vindicated.However, this was not quite enough to catch up with the Union parties which, despite seeing a small reduction in their vote share, finished with a combined 46.1% of the vote, 3.3 percentage points ahead of the Social Democrats. Their final seat tally was 242 seats, a loss of three from the previous election. This left the Union 18 seats ahead of the Social Democrats and 7 short of a majority. Most of the Social Democrats’ gains came instead from the Free Democratic Party, whose vote share fell from 9.5% to 5.8%, bringing the party down to 30 seats – its worst ever result at that point, and not far above the electoral threshold.Although one might have expected the Free Democrats to have benefitted from a period in opposition, the party appears to have stopped receiving votes from disaffected supporters of the Union parties now that it was no longer their obvious coalition partner.  One member of the party optimistically commented that it had been ‘slimmed down to a healthy size.’ Some commentators even wondered whether the Free Democratic Party was heading towards extinction, and West Germany towards a fixed two-party system, although such predictions would ultimately turn out to be premature.No other party secured seats in the Bundestag. However, there was a shock result beneath the 5% threshold. The National Democratic Party, or NPD, had been formed in 1964 as a union of various right-wing and neo-Nazi parties. It first contested the 1965 federal election where it won 2% of the list vote, a slight improvement on its predecessors’ electoral fortunes. But in 1969 the NPD extended these gains further, more than doubling its vote share to reach 4.3% of the list vote, just 0.7 percentage points below the threshold for electing members to the Bundestag.The success of a party often labelled neo-Nazi in orientation threw into sharp relief onto many of the critiques raised during the 1968 student protests regarding the extent of Germany’s postwar denazification. Various explanations have been put forward by historians to explain this surge. One argument centres the 1968 protest movement itself, suggesting that the NPD benefitted from a right-wing, conservative backlash to the counter-culture. This phenomenon was seen in other western countries – for example, De Gaulle’s 1968 landslide parliamentary victory in France or Richard Nixon’s election in the United States. The establishment of the grand coalition has also been cited as an explanation for the NPD’s rise, having potentially alienated some further right-leaning Union voters – somewhat ironically, given the grand coalition’s intention to preserve political stability. West Germany’s economic downturn towards the end of the decade may also have contributed to dissatisfaction with the established party system.That said, the NPD’s electoral success should not be overemphasised. The party was disappointed by its result, hoping that recent successes in state elections would translate into winning its first seats in the Bundestag. The party’s association with extraparliamentary violence – solidified by the shooting of left-wing protesters by a steward at a party meeting – appeared to have dampened its political appeal. Moreover, this would be the party’s best result, following which it fell back to just 0.6% in the next election; the party never succeeded in electing MPs at the federal level. Its 1969 surge was a flash in the pan but served to remind mainstream parties that they could not take West Germany’s moderate, consensus postwar political landscape for granted.The election was also contested by a new party formed ahead of the election called the Action for Democratic Progress. This party was an alliance of smaller socialist, communist, pacifist and trade union movements seeking to build an electoral space to the left of the Social Democratic Party, taking advantage of left-wing disillusionment with the grand coalition. It included the German Communist Party, which had been founded in the previous year as a reconstitution of the banned Communist Party of Germany. For its part, the Social Democrats viewed the Action for Democratic Progress alliance as a communist front, sometimes accused of being a puppet of East Germany and Moscow. The party did not perform well, netting just 0.6% of the federal vote; its best result was 1.5% in the state of Bremen. Most young voters alienated by the status quo seem to have broken for the Social Democrats. The alliance fell apart after the election.One of the highest-profile candidates for the Action for Democratic Progress was none other than Beate Klarsfeld, who continued her campaign against Chancellor Kiesinger by running against him in his Baden-Wurttemberg constituency of Waldshut. She received just 0.7% of the vote in the constituency, not posing any great electoral threat to Kiesinger, nor did she manage to physically confront him for a second time.The Union parties remained dominant in the southern states. The CSU exerted its seemingly eternal control over rural Bavaria while the CDU mostly swept Kiesinger’s home state in Baden-Wurttemberg, both benefitting from particularly strong support among Catholic voters in the south. The SPD saw more success in northern and central states, producing the kind of divided map you would expect for such a relatively close race for first position. The Free Democratic Party also continued to receive greater support in the north, while the National Democratic Party performed better in the south. For the first time, the Social Democrats won a majority of constituency seats; had the election been held under the First Past the Post electoral system, the party would have secured an outright majority.The Social Democrats made particular gains among middle-class, white collar workers, more than doubling its share of the vote among this group since beginning of the decade, at the expense of the Union parties. The Social Democrats made notable gains among civil servants and unskilled workers, while maintaining its traditional lead among skilled workers. The Union Parties once again won a majority of votes from farmers but their level of support fell from 73% in 1965 to just 59% in 1969, much of which went to the National Democratic Party. Women also voted for the Social Democrats in increased numbers, as did younger voters and even, to a lesser degree, Catholic voters.The election also saw West Berlin elect 22 non-voting delegates to the Bundestag, appointed indirectly by the city’s legislature. They were able to give voice to the divided city’s interests but did not have any effect on the federal balance of power.  As the Social Democratic Party had won a decisive majority in the legislature two years previously, 13 of West Berlin’s 22 delegates were Social Democrats; a further 8 were members of the CDU, while the Free Democratic Party had 1 non-voting delegate. If these delegates had been granted voting rights, the balance of power in the Bundestag would not have been significantly altered.AftermathAs in several previous elections, the result in 1969 placed the Free Democratic Party in a kingmaker position. Finding himself the leader of the largest grouping, albeit slightly weakened, Kiesinger could have expected to continue as Chancellor, either by re-establishing the grand coalition with the Social Democrats or returning to coalition with the Free Democratic Party. Yet, emboldened by another record result, Brandt opted to attempt to form his own government. He found in the Free Democrats a willing partner, itself having moved markedly to the left under Scheel’s leadership. A coalition between the two parties - known in Germany as a ‘social-liberal coalition’ – was formed remarkably quickly.  On 22 October 1969, Brandt was sworn in as West Germany’s fourth chancellor, becoming Germany’s first Chancellor from the Social Democratic Party in nearly 40 years, although three members of the Free Democratic Party abstained during the investiture vote. The Union parties entered opposition for the first time.No longer dependent on the CSU, Brandt was able to implement his policy of revaluing the Deutsche Mark. This contributed to an economic recovery during his first term in which the average poverty rate fell and inflation remained low. His government accelerated the expansion of West Germany’s welfare state, earning Brandt the popular title, ‘Chancellor of domestic reform.’ The Bundestag passed a series workers’ rights policies, increasing maternity leave, improving support for sickness and injuries and introducing noise protections. Pension reform guaranteed a minimum income for all pensioners and established a minimum pension value. Children were included within the country’s accident insurance scheme and benefited from free medical checkups, while free hospital care was introduced for recipients of social relief. West Germany’s education budget increased threefold and social spending reached a third of the federal budget.The government also brought in a slate of environmental policies: the maximum lead content in petrol was reduced, the insecticide DDT was banned, and regulations to control airport noise were brought in. Brandt gave particular focus to introducing social reforms, which included a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18, equal rights for children born out of wedlock – Brandt himself was the child of an illegitimate relationship – ending the prohibition on landlords renting rooms to unmarried couples, a ban on corporal punishment in schools and some safeguards against the abuse of animals. The pace of social democratic reforms was somewhat constrained by the Free Democrats, who contained a larger socially conservative wing than the Social Democrats.The Brandt government, in cooperation with state governments, also passed the Radicals Decree in early 1972, which banned any members of organisations designated as extremists from working in the civil service. This was produced primarily to combat the Red Army Faction, an East German-funded Marxist militant group founded in 1970 that viewed West Germany as an illegitimate state and which remained fascist in essence.However, Brandt’s most controversial policy area, and the one that would most define his legacy, concerned foreign policy. Brandt promoted a policy known as ‘Neue Ostpolitik,’ or ‘new eastern policy’ focused on expanding cooperation with Eastern Bloc countries and aiming to reduce tensions. Under the ‘Hallstein Doctrine,’ named after Walter Hallstein, a senior civil servant in the Foreign Office during the 1950s, West Germany had refused to establish relations with East Germany and broke off relations with any state that did so, with the exception of the Soviet Union. In contrast, Brandt had long been an advocate of collaboration between the two German states, arguing that trade and engagement were more likely to weaken the communist hold on power in the East than continued confrontation.For Brandt, alongside other politicians that had grown up through West Berlin, it was apparent that West Germany’s NATO allies would not prioritise ending the division of Europe at the risk of war; American and western European passivity to the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 merely seemed to confirm that assessment. Moreover, the United States and Soviet Union were entering into a period of détente and a cooling of Cold War tensions in which opportunities for diplomacy appeared to be expanding.As Chancellor, and supported by his Free Democrat foreign minister, Walter Scheel, Brandt signed the 1970 Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet Union in which West Germany formally abandoned claims to territories east of the Oder-Neisse line that had been stripped from Germany at the end of the war. That was followed by the Treaty of Warsaw, which saw West Germany recognise the People’s Republic of Poland and its territorial integrity. The borders of postwar Germany were a sensitive political issue, particularly for over 10 million Vertriebene, ethnic Germans expelled from eastern territories no longer part of either German state, who sought the right to return to those territories and constituted a sizable voter block. After signing the Treaty of Moscow, Brandt commented: ‘with this Treaty, nothing is lost that had not long since been gambled away.’Ostpolitik finally reached East Germany in 1972 with the signing of the Basic Treaty that established relations between the two states, more than two decades after their establishment. Brandt had already become the first West German leader to visit East Germany in 1970 and had previously negotiated the Transit Agreement of 1971, which enabled some limited movement between citizens of East and West Germany. During his 1970 visit to Poland, Brandt provided the most iconic image of his Ostpolitik policy when he fell to his knees in front of a memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, a gesture of national repentance for the Holocaust which came to be known as the ‘Kniefall.’For these efforts, Willy Brandt was named the Time Person of the Year in 1970 and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.Much of Brandt’s Ostpolitik was opposed by the Union parties in opposition and also resulted in multiple MPs defecting from the ruling coalition in protest. To his critics, Brandt was appeasing a hostile and illegitimate state while accepting Germany’s permanent division. By mid-1972, the government had lost its majority, and West Germany held its first ever snap elections, which saw the coalition increase its majority – and the Social Democratic Party emerge for the first time as the largest political bloc. Brandt governed for a further two years until one of his closest aids was revealed to be an agent of the East German secret service, forcing his resignation after five years in power.The 1969 West German federal election marked a key moment in German postwar political history. Although the result was not especially dramatic in its own terms, it further strengthened the Social Democratic Party’s political position and enabled it to form Germany’s first social-democratic government since the late Weimar period, 40 years previously. This was also the first time that the position of Chancellor had transferred democratically from one party to another since 1928. Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik – aiming to overcome tensions in the east through diplomacy and trade - continued to influence German politics in subsequent decades. In recent times, this diplomatic approach has come under renewed debate with regard to Germany’s policy towards Russia under Vladimir Putin.Nor was 1969 the only election Beate Klarsfeld ever contested. She remained an activist and Nazi-hunter in the subsequent decades, including a campaign against Kurt Waldheim’s ultimately successful bid to become President of Austria. In 2012, 40 years after her first electoral contest against Kiesinger, Klarsfeld was nominated as the left-wing Die Linke party’s candidate for the indirectly-elected German presidency, when she received 10% of the vote from lawmakers.Reading List:Fulbrook, Mary, A History of Germany 1918-2014: The Divided Nation (John Wiley and Sons, 2014).Judt, Tony, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (Vintage, 2010).Klingemann, Hans D. & Urban Pappi, Franz, ‘The 1969 Bundestag Election in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Analysis of Voting Behaviour,’ Comparative Politics 2.4 (July 1970), pp. 523-548.Morgan, Roger, ‘The 1969 Election in West Germany,’ The World Today 25.11 (Nov. 1969), pp. 470-8. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit historyofelections.substack.com